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2011 DIGILAW 589 (GAU)

Pinaki Samanta v. State of Tripura

2011-07-15

C.R.SARMA

body2011
JUDGMENT C.R. Sarma, J. 1. Heard Mr. Somik Deb and Mr. A. Paul, learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner. Also heard Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State-Respondents. 2. The Petitioner, invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Code of Criminal Procedure'), has prayed for quashing the proceedings, initiated against the Petitioner, in connection with G.R. Case No. 79/2007, arising out of Champahowar P.S. Case No. 10/2007, under Sections 302/34 IPC, lodged by Sri Rabindra Debbarma. 3. On 07.04.2007, the Petitioner, who was the Assistant Commandant, 9th Battalion and attached to 6th Battalion of the Tripura State Rifles (for short 'TSR'), upon receipt of a secret information that a group of NLFT extremists had taken shelter in the 'Mainak village' under the Champahowar police station, along with his force, proceeded towards the village aforesaid, and on their such arrival at the village, the extremists fired upon them. Accordingly, the TSR party, led by the Petitioner, also retaliated by opening fire. When the exchange of fire came to halt, the TSR party searched the area and found two dead bodies of the extremists with one hand grenade, eight empty cartridges, writing pads of Royal Borok Army and NLFT subscription notice. The said dead bodies were, later on, identified to be the dead bodies of Arpan Debbarma and Manoj Debbarma. Accordingly, the Petitioner, in his capacity as the Asstt. Commandant, 9th Bn. TSR attached to 6th Bn. TSR, lodged an FIR with the O/C, Champahower police station, informing that the said two extremists were killed in the encounter aforesaid. The said FIR was registered as Champahower P.S. Case No. 09/2007, dated 07.04.2007, under Sections 148/149/353/307IPC, Section 27 of Arms Act and Section 5 of the Explosive Substance Act. On the basis of the said FIR, police launched investigation into the matter. 4. On 19.04.2007, the Officer In-charge of Champahower police station, received another FIR from Sri Rabindra Debbarma i.e. the father of Arpan Debbarma (accused in FIR No. 09/2007, since deceased). On the basis of the said FIR, police launched investigation into the matter. 4. On 19.04.2007, the Officer In-charge of Champahower police station, received another FIR from Sri Rabindra Debbarma i.e. the father of Arpan Debbarma (accused in FIR No. 09/2007, since deceased). By this FIR, Sri Rabindra Debbarma informed that, his son Arpan Debbarma, aged about 22 years, on 06.04.2007, went to attend the sradha ceremony of the brother-in-law of the informant and on 07.04.2007, at about 8.00 am, Sri Pinaki Samanta i.e. the present Petitioner, accompanied by TSR personnel, entered the said house and took away his son i.e. Arpan Debbarma, in presence of the invitees, towards the 'tilla' (i.e. small hill). According to the informant, though the witnesses also followed the TSR personnel, who had taken Arpan Debbarma in their custody, the villagers were chased away and they saw that, the Petitioner had suddenly opened fire at the informant's son causing his death. In the said FIR, it has also been stated that, subsequently, the TSR personnel had told the villagers that the informant's son had died in the exchange of fire between the TSR and the militant group. On receipt of the said FIR, police registered a case being Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007, under Sections 302/34 IPC and launched investigation into the matter. 5. The investigation, in both the aforesaid cases, were handed over to the CID department. At the close of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted separate charge sheets in both the cases. 6. In Champahower P.S. Case No. 09/2007, charge sheet No. 11/09, dated 02.07.2009 was submitted, under Sections 148/149/353/307 IPC, Section 27 of Arms Act and Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, against Sri Sakti Debbarma (absconder). In the said charge sheet, it was mentioned that, other two accused persons, namely (1) Manoranjan Debbarma @ Manoj @ Mana and (2) Arpan Debbarma, had died in the encounter that took place on 07.04.2007. It was also mentioned therein that, another accused namely, Salem Debbarma @ Cheplai, died in connection with another encounter held on 03.06.2007. In the charge sheet, police cited as many as 66 witnesses including the TSR personnel and other independent witnesses. It was also mentioned therein that, another accused namely, Salem Debbarma @ Cheplai, died in connection with another encounter held on 03.06.2007. In the charge sheet, police cited as many as 66 witnesses including the TSR personnel and other independent witnesses. In the said charge sheet, the Investigating Officer clearly stated that, from the statement of the eye witnesses and other circumstantial evidences, it was found that, the death of Arpan Debbarma and Manoj Debbarma @ Manoj, did not occur in the alleged encounter. 7. In Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007 i.e. the FIR lodged by the father of Arpan Debbarma also, police submitted charge sheet No. 12/09, dated 02.07.2009, under Sections 302/34 IPC against the Petitioner and eight TSR personnel. In this case, police examined as many as 51 witnesses including the TSR personnel and some independent witnesses. In the charge sheet aforesaid, the Investigating Officer, stated that, the deceased Arpan Debbarma, was detained in the house of Sri Lalit Kanya Debbarma and he, along with Manoj Debbarma, were taken to the jungle after tying their hands. It has also been stated that, though the villagers had followed the said TSR personnel, they were asked not to follow them and thereafter, the villagers heard the sound of gun fire and came to know that Arpan Debbarma and Manoj Debbarma died in the said encounter. 8. The charge sheet No. 12/09, was filed against the Petitioner and eight TSR personnel, under Sections 302/34 IPC, after receipt of sanction to prosecute them. 9. Champahower P.S. Case No. 09/2007 was re-numbered as G.R. Case No. 71/2007 and Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007 was re-numbered as G.R. Case No. 79/2007. 10. (i) The Petitioner has challenged the second FIR i.e. the FIR in connection with Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007 and the proceeding in G.R. Case No. 79/2007, on the ground that, no second FIR, in respect of the same occurrence/incident was maintainable and as such the proceeding initiated vide G.R. Case No. 79/2007, against the Petitioner, was liable to be set aside and quashed. (ii) In the petition, it has also been contended that, as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act,1958 (for short ' the Act,1958'), was in force, at the relevant time, and the area falling under the jurisdiction of Champahower police station, which covers the place of occurrence also, was declared as a disturbed area, the Petitioner, under Section 6 of the Act,1958, which reads as follows, was protected and that initiation of the prosecution, without any sanction from the Central Government, was bad. 6. No prosecution, suit or legal proceeding shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise by the powers conferred by this Act. (iii) It has also been contended, in the petition aforesaid, that, as the Petitioner was discharging his official duty, valid sanction under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, was required to be taken, but mention of Section 196 Code of Criminal Procedure, in the sanction order, issued by the Government, indicates that no proper sanction, under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, was granted and, therefore, the initiation of the prosecution, without valid sanction was bad in the eye of law. (iv) The Petitioner has also contended, in his petition aforesaid, that the prosecution is barred by law of limitation, under the provision of the Police Act, 1861, in as much as the prosecution was not initiated within three months from the date of the alleged act. 11. Challenging the Petitioner's contention, the State-Respondents, by filing affidavit-in-opposition, has submitted that, as revealed from the investigation, the deceased Arpan Debbarma and Manoj Debbarma, were taken into custody by the Petitioner and the TSR personnel and that they were killed by the said officers and that the second case involved charge of grave offence like murder. It has also been contended, on behalf of the contesting Respondents, that the FIR lodged by the father of Arpan Debbarma, gave rise to a counter case and as such the FIR lodged by the said informant, was not barred by the statute. It has also been contended, on behalf of the contesting Respondents, that the FIR lodged by the father of Arpan Debbarma, gave rise to a counter case and as such the FIR lodged by the said informant, was not barred by the statute. The State-Respondent has further stated that the Petitioner, being an officer of TSR, under the provision of Section 18 of the Tripura State Rifles Act, 1983, is deemed to be a police officer under the Police Act, 1861, and as such, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, was not applicable to the TSR personnel. Therefore, it has been contended, no sanction from the Central Government was necessary to prosecute any TSR personnel. It has also been submitted that, necessary sanction under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure has been granted by the Government to prosecute the Petitioner and other TSR personnel, in connection with Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007. 12. Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, has challenged the initiation of the proceeding, against the Petitioner, vide Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007 (G.R. Case No. 79/2007), on the following 4(four) grounds: (i) Firstly, as both the FIRs i.e. Champahower P.S. Case No. 09/2007 and Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007, relate to the same incident, which occurred on the same day, same time and at the same village, the subsequent FIR lodged, by the father of the deceased Arpan Debbarma, was not maintainable, in as much as, the same should have been treated as a statement under Section 162 Code of Criminal Procedure It is also contended that, the said FIR does not disclose a counter case. Therefore, it is submitted that, the police committed gross error by registering two cases and submitting two charge sheets, in respect of the same occurrence, and as such, the FIR and the proceeding in connection with Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007, is liable to be set aside and quashed. (ii) Secondly, it is contended that, in view of the provisions, provided by Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861, no cognizance could have been taken after three months, from the date of the alleged occurrence i.e. 07.04.2007. (ii) Secondly, it is contended that, in view of the provisions, provided by Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861, no cognizance could have been taken after three months, from the date of the alleged occurrence i.e. 07.04.2007. It is submitted that, in the present case, the occurrence took place on 07.04.2007, the FIR was lodged on 19.04.2007 and the learned court below took cognizance on 03.08.2009 i.e. beyond the period of three months from the date of the alleged act. (iii) Thirdly, the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, has also submitted that, the alleged sanction, granted under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and breach of principle of natural justice. It is pointed out that, in the sanction order, no mention was made regarding existence of the ingredients of Sections 302 and 34 IPC. It is also submitted, on behalf of the Petitioner that, the sanctioning authority recorded that, the case was registered on 07.04.2007, though, in fact, the same was registered on 19.04.2007. It is further contended, the sanctioning authority had mentioned that, the Investigating Officer i.e. S.I. Sri R.K. Jamatia, visited the place of occurrence and recorded the statement of the witnesses, whereas the charge sheet was, in fact, filed by Sri Priyalal Majumder, Dy. SP (CID). It is also submitted by Mr. Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the sanctioning authority, at the last part of the 'order' mentioned the provision of law as 'Section 196 Code of Criminal Procedure', though Section 196 Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide any provision of granting sanction. Therefore, it is strenuously argued that there was serious no application of mind at the time of granting the sanction. (iv) Fourthly, Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has submitted that, in view of the bar prescribed by Section 49 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Petitioner was not liable to be prosecuted, for the act done by him in good faith. 13. Concluding his argument, Mr. (iv) Fourthly, Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has submitted that, in view of the bar prescribed by Section 49 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Petitioner was not liable to be prosecuted, for the act done by him in good faith. 13. Concluding his argument, Mr. Deb, learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, has submitted that, the prosecution against the Petitioner, on the basis of the second FIR, lodged by the father of the deceased Arpan Debbarma, can't stand in the eye of law and as such the proceeding in respect of G.R. Case No. 79/2010, against the Petitioner, is liable to be set aside and quashed. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, has placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala and Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181 ; (2) Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in (2006) 1 SCC 732 ; (3) Pandurang Chandrakant Mhatre and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2009) 10 SCC 773 ; (4) C. Muniappan and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2010) 9 SCC 567 ; (5) Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and Ors. Criminal Appeal No. 1599 of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2077 of 2010; (6) Kari Choudhary v. Mst. Sita Devi and Ors. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 714 ; (7) Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash and Ors. reported in (2004) 13 SCC 292 . 14. Controverting the said arguments, advanced by the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State-Respondents, has submitted that, though the incident, in both the cases, took place on the same day and despite the fact that the victims in both the cases were the same persons i.e. Arpan Debbarma and Manoj Debbarma, the facts and circumstance mentioned in the FIR, lodged by the father of the deceased-accused Arpan Debbarma i.e. Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007 is not similar to that of the FIR, which has given rise to Champahower P.S. Case No. 09/2007. The learned Addl. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, taking this Court through both the FIRs and the charge sheets, has submitted that, in the first FIR, lodged by the present Petitioner, on the basis of which, the Champahower P.S. Case No. 09/2007 was registered, it was informed that, when the TSR personnel had approached the village, they were greeted by firing by the extremists, for which, the TSR personnel were compelled to retaliate and in the said cross-fire, Arpan Debbarma (son of the informant of Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007) and Manoj Debbarma, had died. But, according to the FIR, registered as Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007, the Petitioner and the TSR personnel, went to the house, where Arpan Debbarma and Manoj Debbarma were staying, took them into their custody by tying their hands, in presence of the villagers and moved them to the jungle, wherein they were killed by using fire arms. In view of above, it is submitted, that G.R. Case No. 79/2007, which arose out of the FIR, lodged by the father of Arpan Debbarma, was clearly a counter case to the case registered on the basis of the FIR, lodged by the Petitioner. Therefore, it is submitted, by the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, that the second FIR made by the father of Sri Arpan Debbarma, was not bad in the eye of law. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, has also submitted that the sanction under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, has been duly accorded by applying mind of the authority concerned and that the Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007, in respect of which, the sanction has been granted, was correctly mentioned. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, referring to paragraph-(iv) of the said sanction order, has submitted that, at paragraph-(iv), it was clearly mentioned that the sanction was accorded as per provision of Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure It is submitted by the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor that, mistake in mentioning the date of lodging the FIR, and the appropriate Section were typographical mistakes which can't be fatal for the prosecution. It is further submitted that, though the initial investigation was conducted by Sri R.K. Jamatia, charge sheet was submitted by Sri Priyalal Majumder. Public Prosecutor that, mistake in mentioning the date of lodging the FIR, and the appropriate Section were typographical mistakes which can't be fatal for the prosecution. It is further submitted that, though the initial investigation was conducted by Sri R.K. Jamatia, charge sheet was submitted by Sri Priyalal Majumder. Therefore, it is submitted that, mention in the sanction order, that during investigation SI Sri R.K. Jamatia had visited the place of occurrence and recorded the statement under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure, can't be sufficient ground to hold that the sanctioning authority did not apply his mind in granting the same. Taking this Court through the sanction order, dated 24.06.2009, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, has submitted that, the sanctioning authority examined the record of Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007 and accorded sanction to prosecute the Petitioner and others, under Section 302/34 IPC. 15. Regarding the question of limitation, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, referring to the provisions of Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861, has submitted that the said provision of taking cognizance, within a period of three months, is applicable in respect of the actions committed under the provision of the said Act and not otherwise. It is submitted that provisions, made in the Police Act, nowhere empowers a police officer to kill a detained person without any provocation or compelling circumstances. Therefore, it is submitted that, as the Petitioner is alleged to have killed the deceased by shooting bullet, after taking them into custody, the Petitioner is not entitled to any benefit under the provision of Section 42 of the Police Act. Regarding the Petitioner's claim of protection, under Section 49 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, has submitted that, considering the fact and circumstance, under which the alleged offence was committed, the prosecution, initiated against the Petitioner, for committing the offence under Sections 302/34 IPC is not barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. 16. Having heard the learned Counsel, appearing for both the parties and considering the materials on record, more particularly, the two FIRs and the charge sheets, I find that the prime question requiring decision of this Court is whether both the cases relate to the same occurrence or the second one was a counter case of the first one. 16. Having heard the learned Counsel, appearing for both the parties and considering the materials on record, more particularly, the two FIRs and the charge sheets, I find that the prime question requiring decision of this Court is whether both the cases relate to the same occurrence or the second one was a counter case of the first one. If the cases relate to the same occurrence and the second case is not a counter case then certainly the second FIR was bad. 17. According to the FIR, lodged by the Petitioner, which has given rise to Champahower P.S. Case No. 09/2007 (G.R. Case No. 71/2007), as soon as the Petitioner, along with his force entered the Mainak village, the extremists had fired upon them, which compelled them to retaliate and in the said cross-fire, the deceased persons aforesaid were killed. But, according to the FIR, lodged by the father of the deceased-accused Arpan Debbarma, which has given rise to Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007 (G.R. Case No. 79/2007), the Petitioner and his party went to the Mainak village, took the two deceased persons in their custody from the house where they were staying, without any provocation, tied their hands and took them into the jungle. Though the villagers had followed them, the Petitioner and the TSR personnel had asked them not to do so and thereafter, the Petitioner was found to have killed the deceased, Arpan Debbarma by firing from his fire arm. Subsequently, the dead bodies of the said two deceased persons, who were taken to the jungle alive by the Petitioner and his staff, were shown to the villagers. Therefore, according to the FIR giving rise to the Champahower P.S. Case No. 09/2007, the deceased persons died in cross firing, which took place prior to the entry of the Petitioner and his staff into the village, but according to the Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007, the Petitioner and his staff took the deceased persons in their custody from the house and killed them in the jungle without any cause. Therefore, the facts and circumstance of both the cases are quite different. The second FIR lodged by the father of Arpan Debbarma, clearly indicates that the Petitioner, along with his staff, had killed the said deceased persons without any sufficient cause, after taking them away from their house. Therefore, the facts and circumstance of both the cases are quite different. The second FIR lodged by the father of Arpan Debbarma, clearly indicates that the Petitioner, along with his staff, had killed the said deceased persons without any sufficient cause, after taking them away from their house. Apparently, by the said second FIR, the allegations made in the first FIR have been denied, controverted, countered and a new case bringing different version regarding death of the deceased has been put up. Hence, the lodging of the said second FIR was in the form of a counter case. 18. It is settled law that, there can't be two FIRs in respect of the same occurrence. The information received at the first point of time, regarding the incident, which moves the machinery of investigation, is to be treated as the First Information Report i.e. FIR under Chapter XII of Code of Criminal Procedure All subsequent information, lodged with the police, in connection with the same incident, are to be treated as statement under Section 162 Code of Criminal Procedure Therefore, there can't be more than one FIR, resulting registration of more than one case against a person/persons in connection with the same occurrence or for acts done in course of same transaction or occurrence, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. There can't be any scope or legal sanction to compel a person to face more than one trial for the same occurrence or incident or occurrences/incidents arising out of the same transaction or course of actions. 19. In the case of T.T. Antony (supra), the Supreme Court observed: (19) The scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure is that an officer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in 156 or 157 Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion under 169 or 170 Code of Criminal Procedure, as the case may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion under 169 or 170 Code of Criminal Procedure, as the case may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. However, even after filing such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to make further investigation, normally with the leave of the court, and where during further investigation he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports; this is the import of Sub-section(8) of Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure. 20. From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 Code of Criminal Procedure only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence of an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure 20. In the case of Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh (supra), the Supreme Court observed that, if subsequent complaint/FIR is not in relation to the same offence or occurrence, as mentioned in the first complaint/FIR, the second FIR is barred. In the case of Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh (supra), the Supreme Court observed that, if subsequent complaint/FIR is not in relation to the same offence or occurrence, as mentioned in the first complaint/FIR, the second FIR is barred. In this case also, the decision of T.T. Antony (supra) was considered and the Supreme Court held that, the FIR lodged in the case of T.T. Antony (supra) were in respect of the same incident and as such the second FIR was not permissible in view of the provisions of Section 154 read with Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh (supra). The Supreme Court observed: 13. In the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that the complaints, which were filed in respect of malfeasance and misfeasance within the jurisdiction of the Ahmedabad Police, were not in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, nor were they alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence as the ones alleged in First CR No. 67 of 2001. 21. In the case of Pandurang Chandrakant Mhatre (supra), the Supreme Court, referring to the case of T.T. Antony (supra), held that, there can be no second FIR in respect of same occurrence. In the case of Pandurang Chandrakant Mhatre (supra), the Supreme Court observed: 38. It is fairly well settled that first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and it can be used only to discredit the testimony of the maker thereof and it cannot be utilised for contradicting or discrediting the testimony of other witnesses. In other words, the first information report cannot be used with regard to the testimony of other witnesses who depose in respect of the incident. It is equally well settled that the earliest information in regard to commission of a cognizable offence is to be treated as the first information report. It sets the criminal law in motion and the investigation commences on that basis. Although first information report is not expected to be encyclopaedia of events, but an information to the police to be "first information report" under Section 154(1) must contain some essential and relevant details of the incident. It sets the criminal law in motion and the investigation commences on that basis. Although first information report is not expected to be encyclopaedia of events, but an information to the police to be "first information report" under Section 154(1) must contain some essential and relevant details of the incident. A cryptic information about commission of a cognizable offence irrespective of the nature and details of such information may not be treated as first information report. 22. In the case of C. Muniappan (supra), on 22.01.2000, in connection with arrest of the former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, a series of incidents, involving burning of vehicles, including the town buses and the buses belong to the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, which was used by the students of the University, took place. In the said incident, some students of the University died due to burn injury sustained by them. On the same day, an FIR was lodged at about 1.30 pm, regarding the occurrence involving the town bus. Another FIR was also lodged at about 3.30 pm, regarding bus burning. On the same day, a written complaint was lodged at 8.00 pm, by the Senior Assistant Engineer of Tamil Nadu Transport Corporation, Dharamapuri. On these complaints, investigations were carried out. In the said case, two cases were clubbed together and the Appellants were convicted. The submission on behalf of the Appellants that two crimes, bearing Nos. 188 and 190 of 2000 could not be clubbed together, was found to be of no merit. In the above referred case, the Supreme Case observed: 37. The submission on behalf of the Appellants that two crimes bearing Nos. 188 and 190 of 2000 could not be clubbed together, has also no merit for the simple reason that if the cases are considered, keeping in view the totality of the circumstances and the sequence in which the two incidents occurred, taking into consideration the evidence of drivers and conductors/cleaners of the vehicles involved in the first incident and the evidence of C. Ramasundaram, VAO (PW 87), we reach the inescapable conclusion that the second occurrence was nothing but a fall out of the first occurrence. The damage caused to the public transport vehicles and the consequential burning of the University bus remained part of one and the same incident. The damage caused to the public transport vehicles and the consequential burning of the University bus remained part of one and the same incident. Merely because two separate complaints had been lodged, did not mean that they could not be clubbed together and one charge-sheet could not be filed. 23. In the case of Babubhai (supra), on 07.07.2008, some altercation took place between members of the Bharwad and the Koli Patel communities over the plying of rickshaws in the area surrounding Dhedhal village of Distt. Ahmedabad, Gujarat. The Bharwad community had been preventing the Koli Patels from running their rickshaws in the said area. On the next day, i.e. on 08.07.2008, case No. C.R. No. 1154/2008, was registered at 1730 hours in the Bavla Police Station under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 332, 333, 436 and 427 IPC read with Section135 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 and Sections 3, 7 of Prevention of Damages of Public Property Act,1984, for an incident which occurred at village Dhedhal, wherein Mr. M.N. Pandya, Sub-Inspector of Police, Bavla Police Station stated that while he was patrolling in Bavla Town, he received a message from H.C. Kanaiyalal, Police Station Officer, at 10.00 am that some altercation/incident had taken place between the two communities at Dhedhal Cross Roads. On receiving the said information, he along with other police personnel, rushed to the place of incident, however, by that time the crowd had already dispersed. Thereafter, he received information that a clash was going on between the said two communities in Dhedhal village. Immediately, he contacted the Control Room, as well as the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Dholka, for further police support and rushed to the spot where he found about 2000-3000 persons from both the communities, all with sticks, dhariyas, swords etc., attacking each other. The police resorted to teargas shells as well as to lathi charges to disperse the crowd. Several rounds of firing were resorted to in order to disperse the mob. In the incident, more than 20 persons were injured and three houses of members of the Bharwad community were set on fire. One person, namely Ajitbhai Prahladbhai, also died. Several police personnel were also injured. No person was named in the said FIR. Another FIR, being Case No. C.R. No. 1-155 of 2008, was registered at Bavla Police Station on the same date i.e. 8.7.2008 at 22.35 hrs. One person, namely Ajitbhai Prahladbhai, also died. Several police personnel were also injured. No person was named in the said FIR. Another FIR, being Case No. C.R. No. 1-155 of 2008, was registered at Bavla Police Station on the same date i.e. 8.7.2008 at 22.35 hrs. by Babubhai Popatbhai Koli Patel (Appellant in SP (Crl.) No. 2077/2010 and Respondent in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 3235-3240/2010) (hereinafter called as complainant), resident of village Vasna, Taluka Bavla, wherein he alleged that an incident took place on the same day at 9.15 hours near Dhedhal village in which he named 18 persons as accused. The High Court quashed the FIR registered as CR No. 1-155/2008 and clubbed the investigation of the FIR along with the investigation of the other FIR bearing CR No. 1-154/2008 to the extent it was feasible. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court observed: 17. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the subject emerges to the effect that an FIR under Section 154 Code of Criminal Procedure is a very important document. It is the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by the Officer-In-Charge of the Police Station. It sets the machinery of criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends with the formation of an opinion under Section169 or 170 Code of Criminal Procedure, as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure Thus, it is quite possible that more than one piece of information be given to the Police Officer In-charge of the Police Station respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case, he need not enter each piece of information in the Diary. All other information given orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the facts mentioned in the First Information Report will be statements falling under Section 162 Code of Criminal Procedure In such a case the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different version or counter claim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted. The Supreme Court, referring to the decisions in T.T. Antony (supra) and Upkar Singh (supra), observed that, the FIR in CR No. 1-154/2008 and the FIR in CR No. 1-155/2008, relate to the same incident and had occurred in the same place in close proximity of time and, therefore, they are two parts of the same transaction. In view of above, the Supreme Court held that, the decision rendered by the High Court was correct and that the second FIR in CR No. 1-155/2008 was liable to be quashed. 24. In the case of Kari Choudhary (supra), the Supreme Court observed that, there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But, when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency. It has also been observed that, the ultimate object of every investigation is to find out whether the offences alleged have been committed and, if so, who have committed it. Regarding power of the investigating agency, the Supreme Court observed that, the investigating agency, in respect of an offence in spite of forwarding a report under Sub-section(2) of Section 173 on the previous occasion, is not precluded from further investigation under the provision of Section 173(8) of Code of Criminal Procedure 25. In the case of Upkar Singh(supra), the Supreme Court considered the correctness of the judgment in the case of T.T. Antony (supra) and observed: 11. This observation of the Supreme Court in the said case of T.T. Antony is understood by the learned Counsel for the Respondents as the Code prohibiting the filing of a second complaint arising from the same incident. This observation of the Supreme Court in the said case of T.T. Antony is understood by the learned Counsel for the Respondents as the Code prohibiting the filing of a second complaint arising from the same incident. It is on that basis and relying on the said judgment in T.T. Antony's case an argument is addressed before us that once an FIR is registered on the complaint of one party a second FIR in the nature of a counter case - is not registrable and no investigation based on the said second complaint could be carried out. 12. Having perused the judgment in T.T. Antony case, we really do not think this Court in that case has laid down any such proposition of law. 13. To understand the ratio of the judgment in T.T. Antony case, it is necessary for us to note the facts of that case in brief: In the said case 2 incidents occurred on the very same day consequent to a decision taken by a Minister to inaugurate the function of an evening branch of a cooperative bank which was opposed by members of a political group and in that process the 1st incident took place in the proximity of the town hall at a place called Kutupuramba in Kerala and the second incident took place in the vicinity of a police station at the same place. During the said 2 incidents, on the orders of the Executive Magistrate and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the police opened fired as a result of which 5 persons died and 6 persons were injured amongst the demonstrators. In regard to the incident which took place near the town hall the police registered Crime No. 353 of 1994 under Sections143, 147, 148, 332, 353, 324 and 307 read with Section 149IPC along with some other offence, while in regard to the incident which took place near the Police Station a crime was registered under Crime No. 354 of 1994 under Sections 143,147, 148, 307 and 427 read with Section 149 IPC and other offences named therein. Both the offences were registered on the date of incident itself. 14. Both the offences were registered on the date of incident itself. 14. During the pendency of the said cases the political Government of the State changed and the new Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry and on the report of the Commission, an investigation was directed to be conducted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police concerned who after urgent personal investigation registered Crime No. 268 of 1997 under Section 302 IPC against the Minister who was present at the time of the incident, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the Executive Magistrate who ordered the firing and certain police constables. 15. The registration of the said crime came to be challenged before the High Court by way of a writ petition and learned Single Judge of the High Court directed the case to be re-investigated by CBI. But in a writ appeal the Division Bench of the High Court quashed the FIR in Crime No. 268 of 1997 as against the Additional Superintendent of Police but it directed a fresh investigation by the State police headed by one of the three senior officers named in the judgment instead of fresh investigation by CBI as directed by the learned Single Judge. It is the above directions of the Division Bench that came to be challenged by way of different appeals before this Hon'ble Court in the case of T.T. Antony and connected cases. In this factual background this Hon'ble Court, as stated above, came to the conclusion that a subsequent FIR on the same set of facts is not in conformity with the scheme of the Code for the reasons stated therein. 16. Having carefully gone through the above judgment, we do not think that this Court in the said cases of T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 has precluded an aggrieved person from filing a counter case as in the present case. 16. Having carefully gone through the above judgment, we do not think that this Court in the said cases of T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 has precluded an aggrieved person from filing a counter case as in the present case. This is clear from the observations made by this Court in the above said case of T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 in paragraph 27 of the judgment wherein while discussing the scope of Sections 154, 156 and 173(2) Cr.PC, this is what the Court observed: (SCC p200) "In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.PC or under Articles226/227 of the Constitution (emphasis supplied) 17. It is clear from the words emphasized hereinabove in the above quotation, this Court in the case of T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala: (2001) 6 SCC 181 has not excluded the registration of a complaint in the nature of a counter case from the purview of the Code. In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code. This prohibition noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter complaint by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident. The Supreme Court further observed: 23. This prohibition noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter complaint by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident. The Supreme Court further observed: 23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T. Antony case is to be accepted as holding a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given herein below i.e. if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code. 24. We have already noticed that in the T.T. Antony case this Court did not consider the legal right of an aggrieved person to file counter claim, on the contrary from the observations found in the said judgment it clearly indicates that filing a counter complaint is permissible. 26. In view of the above principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court, there is no difficulty in understanding that a second FIR in the form of a counter case is not bar. Carefully perusing both the FIRs in the case at hand, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the facts and circumstances involving both the FIRs, as discussed earlier, are quite different. At the cost of repetition, I feel it just and appropriate to record that, as revealed from the FIR, lodged by the Petitioner, i.e. Champahower P.S. Case No. 09/2007, before the Petitioner party could enter the village, the extremists had fired upon them, which compelled them to retaliate and as a result of which the deceased persons died in the said encounter. But, the FIR lodged by the father of deceased Arpan Debbarma, which has given rise to the Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/2007, reveals that, the Petitioner and his staff, entered the house, where the deceased Arpan Debbarma and Manoj Debarma were available, took them in their custody by tying their hands and moved them to the jungle, wherein they were killed by shooting bullets, without any sufficient reason. From the investigation conducted by the CID (investigating agency), in both the cases, it has been revealed that the deceased, namely Arpan Debbarma and Manoj Debbarma, were not killed in any encounter, as alleged by the Petitioner, but they were killed by the Petitioner and his personnel after taking them into their custody. Therefore, clearly, the FIR lodged against the Petitioner, which has given rise to G.R. Case No. 79/2010, does not relate to the same incident/occurrence as indicated in the first FIR. That apart, in G.R. Case No. 71/2007, the deceased persons and one arrested person were the accused persons, whereas in G.R. Case No. 79/2007, the Petitioner and his personnel were the accused persons. Though the occurrence took place on the same day in the same village, the place of occurrence and the facts and circumstance of both the cases are quite different. The continuance of both the proceedings will amount to compelling a person(s) to face trial twice for the same occurrence. In view of above, it can't be held that the FIR, lodged in G.R. Case No. 79/2007 was the second FIR of the same occurrence i.e. the occurrence mentioned in G.R. Case No. 71/2007. That apart, in view of the principles laid down in the case of Upkar Singh(supra), the second FIR i.e. the FIR, which has given rise to G.R. Case No. 79/2007, is apparently given rise to a counter case to the allegation made by the Petitioner. Therefore, the G.R. Case No. 79/2007, being the counter case of G.R. Case No. 71/2007, is maintainable. 27. The second point urged by the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, is that, in view of the provision, prescribed by Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861, taking of cognizance against the Petitioner is barred and as such the proceeding can't stand against the Petitioner. Section 42 of the Police Act, reads as follows: 42. 27. The second point urged by the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, is that, in view of the provision, prescribed by Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861, taking of cognizance against the Petitioner is barred and as such the proceeding can't stand against the Petitioner. Section 42 of the Police Act, reads as follows: 42. Limitation of actions- All actions and prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act, or under the general police-powers hereby given shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed, and not otherwise; and notice in writing of such action and of the cause thereof shall be given to the Defendant, or to the District Superintendent or an Assistant District Superintendent of the District in which the act was committed, one month at least before the commencement of the action. In support of his contention, Mr. Deb, learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, has placed reliance on the following decisions rendered by the Supreme Court: (1) Tulsiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (1984) 4 SCC 487 ; (2) Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Guntur v. Ramdev Tobacco Company reported in (1991) 2 SCC 119 ; (3) Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggi and Ors. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 289 ; (4) State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal reported in AIR 1964 SC 33 ; (5) Pritam Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (1971) 1 SCC 653 ; (6) Public Prosecutor, Madras v. R. Raju reported in (1972) 2 SCC 410 . 28. There can be no dispute that, in view of the said statutory provision, no action and prosecution against any person can be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the provision of the Police Act, or under general police-powers, after the expiry of three months of the act complained of. The said provision has also provided that notice, in writing of such action and the cause of action thereof is required to be given to the Defendant or to the District Superintendent or an Assistant District Superintendent of the District in which the act was committed, immediately one month before the commencement of the action. The said provision has also provided that notice, in writing of such action and the cause of action thereof is required to be given to the Defendant or to the District Superintendent or an Assistant District Superintendent of the District in which the act was committed, immediately one month before the commencement of the action. This indicates that, one month's notice, prior to the commencement of the action or the prosecution is required to be given. In the present case, admittedly, no such notice has been given and the prosecution also has been launched after the expiry of the said statutory period. Now, we are required to examine, if the said prosecution initiated against the Petitioner is barred by Section 42 of the Police Act. 29. Relying on the decision of Tulsiram (supra), the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, has submitted that, the prosecution commenced from the date of taking cognizance by the Magistrate and not from the date of filing the FIR or registration of the case. The case of Tulsiram (supra) relates to a case under the provision of Food Adulteration Act. In the said case, the Supreme Court observed: 7. ...It is therefore to be assumed that the report of the Public Analyst is to be made available to the accused-vender at the commencement of the prosecution, that is to say, before the prosecution starts leading evidence in the case, and in good and sufficient time to enable the accused to exercise his right of having the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory if he so desires it.... Therefore, from the said ratio, laid down in the above mentioned case, the prosecution commences from the date of submission of the complaint before the Magistrate and prior to the prosecution side adduces their evidence. 30. The case of Asstt. Collector of Central Excise (supra) also involved the question of limitation prescribed by Sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The said Section bars the institution of suits, prosecution and other legal proceedings, lodged or taken for anything done or ordered to be done under the Act, after the expiry of six months. In this case, the Supreme Court observed: 6. The said Section bars the institution of suits, prosecution and other legal proceedings, lodged or taken for anything done or ordered to be done under the Act, after the expiry of six months. In this case, the Supreme Court observed: 6. ...There can be no doubt that 'suit' or 'prosecution' are those judicial or legal proceedings which are lodged in a court of law and not before any executive authority, even if a statutory one.... 31. In the case of Jasbir Singh (supra), the Supreme Court, referred to the dictionary meaning of the word 'Prosecution', as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, which reads as follows: A criminal action; a proceeding instituted and carried on by due course of law, before a competent tribunal, for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged with crime. 32. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Third Edition, Volume II, the expression 'Prosecution' has been inter alia defined thus: Prosecution 1567. [-O Fr. Prosecution or late L. prosecution, -on-, f.as prec.; se-IO.] The action of prosecuting. 1. The following up, continuing, or carrying out of any action, scheme, or purpose, with a view to its accomplishment or attainment. 2. The carrying on, exercise, performance, or plying of a pursuit, occupation, etc. 1631. 3. The action of pursuing; a literal pursuit, chase, or hunting - 1649. 4. Law. a. A proceeding by way either of indictment or of information in the criminal courts, in order to put an offender on his trial; the exhibition of a criminal charge against a person before a court of justice. b. gen. The institution and carrying on of legal proceedings against a person. c. Loosely: The part by whom criminal proceedings are instituted and carried on. Also attrib.1631.... 33. From the above, it is clear that, the term 'Prosecution' as defined by Section 42 of the Police Act, indicates a criminal action or proceeding initiated before a competent court of jurisdiction. Lodging of a FIR before the police or any other executive authority does not indicate commencement of proceeding. In the present case, the impugned FIR was lodged on 19.04.2007 and the charge sheet No. 12/09 was filed on 02.07.2009. Therefore, admittedly, the prosecution was launched after the expiry of three months from the date of the offence, alleged to be committed by the Petitioner and his TSR personnel. 34. In the present case, the impugned FIR was lodged on 19.04.2007 and the charge sheet No. 12/09 was filed on 02.07.2009. Therefore, admittedly, the prosecution was launched after the expiry of three months from the date of the offence, alleged to be committed by the Petitioner and his TSR personnel. 34. In the case of N. Venugopal (supra), the preliminary point raised was that, the prosecution was barred by the provision of Section 53 of the Madras District Police Act,1859. The Supreme Court, in the above referred case, observed: The actions and prosecution for which the limitation prescribed can be best understood from the actual words used by the legislature, which are these: All actions and prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise. The Supreme Court further observed: It is plain that in order that any person against whom a prosecution has been launched can get the benefit of the three months period of limitation thus prescribed, it must appear either, (i) that the act complained of was done under the provisions of the Police Act or (ii) the act complained of was done under the provisions of some other law in force conferring powers on the police or (iii) the act complained of was intended to be done under the provisions of the Police Act i.e. though strictly speaking the act was not done under the provisions of the Act, the intention of the accused in doing the act was to act under the provisions of the Police Act or (iv) the act complained of was intended to be done under the provisions of some other law in force conferring powers on the police i.e. though the act was strictly speaking not done under the provisions of such other law the intention of the accused in doing the act was to act under such provisions. The Supreme Court also observed that, unless the act complained of appears to have been done or intended to be done "under" the provisions of the Police Act or some other law, conferred powers on the police, the protection of Section 53 of the Police Act will not be available. The Supreme Court, in the above referred case, further observed: Many cases may however arise where in acting under the provisions of the Police Act or other law conferring powers on the police the police officer or some other person may go beyond what is strictly justified in law. Though Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code will have no application to such cases; Section 53 of the Police Act will apply. But, Section 53 applies to only a limited class of persons. So, it becomes the task of the court, whenever any question whether this section applies or not arises to bestow particular care on its decision. In doing this it has to ascertain first what act is complained of and then to examine if there is any provision of the Police Act or other law conferring powers on the police under which it may be said to have been done or intended to be done. The court has to remember in this connection that an act is not "under" a provision of law merely because the point of time at which it is done coincides with the point of time when some act in the exercise of the powers granted by the provision or in performance of the duty imposed by it. To be able to say that an act is done "under" a provision of law, one must discover the existence of a reasonable relationship between the provisions and the act. In the absence of such a relation the act cannot be said to be done "under" the particular provision of law. The Supreme Court has further made it clear that, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the provisions of Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure, authorise the officer examining a person to beat him or to confine him for the purpose of inducing him to make a particular statement. 35. The Supreme Court has further made it clear that, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the provisions of Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure, authorise the officer examining a person to beat him or to confine him for the purpose of inducing him to make a particular statement. 35. From the above principles, laid down by the Supreme Court, it is clear that, to derive the benefit of Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861, it must be established that the act complained of or the offence, which has been alleged to be committed by the person concerned, was committed in exercise of the powers conferred by the Police Act. If, it can be shown that, there was any nexus between the act complained of and the power given by the Police Act, then the limitation prescribed by Section 42 of the Police Act will hold the field. On the other hand, if the act complained of does not appear to have been committed in exercise of powers conferred by the Police Act or under the general police-powers given by the said Act, then the limitation prescribed by Section 42 of the Police Act will not be applicable. 36. In the case of Pritam Singh (supra), the Appellant's prosecution was initiated against him for something done under the provisions of the Act, namely, non-compliance with the requirement to be on duty as required under the Police Act. In the said case, the Supreme Court observed that, under the provision of Section 42 of the Act, prosecution should have been commenced against the Appellant within three months after the act complaint of has been committed. 37. The case of Public Prosecutor (supra) also involves the question of limitation provided by Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The Respondents in the said appeal, were prosecuted for violation of Rules 9, 53, 64, 67, 68, 70, 71, 66 and 226 of the Central Excise Rule, punishable under Section 9(b) and (d) of the Act and also under Section 420 read with Section 511 IPC and Section 109 IPC. The High Court held that, the prosecution in the said case was barred by the rule of limitation provided by Section 40 of the Central Excise and Salt Act. Hence, the Public Prosecutor carried the appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging the order of the High Court. The High Court held that, the prosecution in the said case was barred by the rule of limitation provided by Section 40 of the Central Excise and Salt Act. Hence, the Public Prosecutor carried the appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging the order of the High Court. The Appellant's contention was that, the provision of limitation was applicable to the Government servants, that the words "anything done or ordered to be done under this Act" in the Section do not mean any act in violation of the provisions of the Act and that the protection given to the Government servants under the action is for actions done inadvertently or mistakenly but not for acts done deliberately and maliciously. The Respondents' contention was that, the Section applied to prosecution of the Respondents for violation of the provisions of the Rules and the Act. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal, observed that, the Respondents did not pay the lawful dues, which were acts to be done or ordered to be done under the Act and as such the provision of Section 40(2) of the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944, was held to be applicable. 38. Keeping in mind the above principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court and a careful reading of the provision of Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861, lead to hold that the provision of limitation is applicable in respect of the prosecution or actions done against any person for anything done or intended to be done under the provision of the Police Act or under general police-powers. Neither the Police Act, 1861 nor the general police powers, authorise the police i.e. the Petitioner to kill a person, after taking him into custody. The allegation brought against the Petitioner, in the case at hand, is that he had killed Arpan Debbarma after taking him into custody. The Supreme Court, in the case of N. Venugopal (supra), while dealing with similar provision, prescribed by Section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859, as stated earlier, observed that, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the provisions of this section authorise the officer examining a person to beat him or to confine him for the purpose of inducing him to make a particular statement. 39. 39. In the present case, admittedly, the prosecution has been launched against the Petitioner for committing the offence under Sections 302/34 IPC, for killing the deceased after taking them into custody. Therefore, I find no reason to conclude that the offence, alleged to be committed by the Petitioner, was done under the provision of the Police Act, 1861 or in exercise of general police-powers. There can be no dispute that, no law has given the power to police to kill a person, after taking him into custody, that too after tying his hands. 40. In view of what has been discussed above, I find no force in the contention of the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner. Therefore, I hold that the prosecution, initiated against the Petitioner, is not hit by Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861. 41. The third contention raised, on behalf of the Petitioner, is that, the sanction, granted under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, was bad for non-application of mind and breach of principles of natural justice. Taking this Court through the sanction order, dated 24.06.2009, learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, has submitted that, in the first paragraph of the said order, though the sanctioning authority mentioned that the sanction was granted in connection with Champahawar P.S. Case No. 10/07, under Section 302/34 IPC along with other offences, in fact, the charge sheet was filed under Section 302/34 IPC. Therefore, it is submitted that, the sanctioning authority, by mentioning the words "along with other offences", exhibited non-application of mind. It is also submitted that, at paragraph (ii), the sanctioning authority mentioned that the case was registered on 07.04.2007, although the same was registered on 19.04.2007. The further contention of the learned Counsel, for the Petitioner is that, the sanctioning authority, at paragraph (v), mentioned that the sanction was granted by the Governor of Tripura, under Section 196 Code of Criminal Procedure It has also been submitted on behalf of the Petitioner that, the sanctioning authority did not mention any reason for granting the sanction and thus, violated the principles of natural justice in granting the same. It is also submitted that, the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura, Home Department, who signed the sanction order, had no competence to remove the said Government servant and as such the sanction order, granted by him, was not proper in the eye of law. It is also submitted that, the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura, Home Department, who signed the sanction order, had no competence to remove the said Government servant and as such the sanction order, granted by him, was not proper in the eye of law. In support of his aforesaid contentions, the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Supreme Court: (1) Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat reported in (1997) 7 SCC 622 ; (2) State of Karnataka v. Ameerjan reported in (2007) 11 SCC 273 ; (3) Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Designated Authority and Ors. reported in (2006) 10 SCC 368 . 42. In the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan (supra), the Supreme Court observed: 18. The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. This fact can also be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority. 43. In the case of Ameerjan (supra), the Supreme Court, while considering the question of sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, observed: 9. We agree that an order of sanction should not be considered in a pedantic manner. But, it is also well settled that the purpose for which an order of sanction is required to be passed should always be borne in mind. Ordinarily, the sanctioning authority is the best person to judge as to whether the public servant concerned should receive the protection under the Act by refusing to accord sanction for his prosecution or not. 44. The case of Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra), referred to by the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, relate to the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995. 44. The case of Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra), referred to by the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, relate to the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995. The Supreme Court observed that, the proceedings before the Designated Authority was quasi judicial, and it is well settled that a quasi-judicial decision, or even an administrative decision, which has civil consequences, must be in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and hence reasons have to be disclosed by the Authority in that decision. 45. In the light of the above decisions and carefully perusing the provision of Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no difficulty in understanding that, ordinarily, the sanctioning authority, before passing an order, granting sanction for prosecution, is required to examine the entire records containing the materials collected against the accused. If the order of sanction does not indicate application of mind as to the materials placed, before the order of sanction was passed, the same may be produced before the court to show that some materials have in fact been produced. There is no dispute that the sanctioning authority is the best person to decide as to whether a public servant should receive the protection under the Act, by refusing to accord sanction for his prosecution or not. Whether the sanctioning authority applied its mind or not, can be determined from the contention made in the sanction order. If the sanction order indicates that the entire record, containing the materials, collected against the accused persons, was placed before the sanctioning authority to facilitate perusal and examination of the same, then it can be safely held that the sanctioning authority applied its mind. In the present case, the sanction order reveals that, the record of investigation of the Champahowar P.S. Case No. 10/2007, was made available before the sanctioning authority and the sanctioning authority, while examining the names of the accused persons, against whom the sanction was sought for, perused the records and came to the finding that, on 07.04.2007, at about 8.00 am, the TSR personnel of 6th Battalion, led by the Asstt. Commandant Sri Pinaki Samanta i.e. the Petitioner, entered the house of Durjoy Debbarma of Mainak village and took the informant's son out of the house and shot him dead. Commandant Sri Pinaki Samanta i.e. the Petitioner, entered the house of Durjoy Debbarma of Mainak village and took the informant's son out of the house and shot him dead. The sanctioning authority further came to the conclusion that, this was a counter case of Champahowar P.S. Case No. 09/2007 i.e. the case, which was registered on the basis of the FIR received from the Petitioner. From paragraph (iii) of the sanction order, it transpires that, the sanctioning authority had also perused the hand sketch map of the place of occurrence, photographs of the place of occurrence and the dead bodies, inquest report in respect of the dead bodies and the statement of the witnesses, recorded under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure Therefore, a careful perusal of the entire sanction order, lead to find that the sanctioning authority has granted sanction, after examining the entire record, containing the relevant materials. The sanctioning authority, granted the sanction for prosecution under Sections 302/34 IPC against the Petitioner and 8(eight) others. Therefore, granting of sanction for prosecution under Sections 302/34 IPC, does not suffer from any irregularity. Of course, in paragraph (ii) of the sanction order, the sanctioning authority mentioned that, the FIR was registered on 07.04.2007, though, in fact, the FIR was lodged on 19.04.2007. As the sanctioning authority had mentioned the case number i.e. Champahower P.S. Case No. 10/07, which arose out of the FIR, dated 19.04.2007, the said mistake, on the part of the sanctioning authority, can be treated as a typographical mistake. This typographical mistake does not lead to find that the sanctioning authority did not apply its mind with regard to the materials against the Petitioner properly. At paragraph (v) also, the sanctioning authority mentioned the Section as "196 Code of Criminal Procedure " instead of Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, but at paragraph (iv), the said Section has been correctly mentioned as Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure The cumulative effect of the said order is that the authority had perused all the material and decided to accord sanction to prosecute the Petitioner and others for the offences under Sections 302/34 IPC. Therefore, as the sanctioning authority had correctly mentioned the relevant provision of granting sanction at paragraph (iv), the wrong mention of Section as Section196 Code of Criminal Procedure at paragraph (v) can be treated as a typographical mistake and this mistake can't negate the order of granting sanction. 46. Admittedly, the sanction order was signed by the Deputy Secretary to the Governor of Tripura, under the heading "By order of Governor". At paragraph (v) of the sanction order also, it has been mentioned that, the Governor of Tripura has been pleased to accord sanction to prosecute the 9(nine) accused persons under Sections 302/34 IPC. As the said order was signed by the Deputy Secretary indicating that it was done by order of the Governor, there is no difficulty in understanding that, the appropriate sanctioning authority had granted the sanction, after examining the entire record, containing the relevant materials. Therefore, I find no force in the contention of the learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner that, the sanctioning authority, at the time of granting the sanction, did not apply his mind. 47. The learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, lastly contended that, the prosecution of the Petitioner was hit by Section 49 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Section 49 of the said Act, reads as follows: 49. Protection of action taken in good faith- No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against- (a) the Central Government or a State Government or any officer or authority of the Central Government or State Government or District Magistrate or any office authorised in this behalf by the Government or the District Magistrate or any other authority on whom powers have been conferred under this Act, for anything which is in good faith done or purported to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rule or order made there under; and (b) any serving or retired member of the armed forces or paramilitary forces in respect of any action taken or purported to be taken by him in good faith, in the course of any operation directed towards combating terrorism. A careful reading of the aforesaid Section, indicates that, the protection, provided by Section 49aforesaid, is applicable for anything done in good faith, in exercise of the power conferred by the Act or anything purported to be done in pursuance of the Act or in Rule or any order made there under. Admittedly, the said Act does not confer any power to kill a person after taking him into custody. 48. As discussed above, the Petitioner has been prosecuted for killing of Arpan Debbarma, after taking him into custody. The offence/act alleged to be committed by the Petitioner, does not appear to be done in exercise of the power conferred by the act aforesaid. Therefore, the protection provided by Section 49 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, is not applicable to the Petitioner. 49. Considering entire aspect of the matter and in view of the above discussion, this Court find no sufficient reason to interfere with the prosecution launched against the Petitioner. As the G.R. Case No. 71/2007 and G.R. Case No. 79/2007, relate to death of Arpan Debbarma and Manoj Debbarma, and most of the witnesses in both the cases are common, it will be appropriate for the learned trial judge to take up both the cases aforesaid, for disposal, at a time and at the earliest. 50. With the above observation, this Writ Petition (Crl.) is dismissed. Return the Lower Court Records along with the Case Diary. Petition dismissed.