JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. Present petitioner is the maternal uncle of the detent, namely, Shri Laishram Sagor Singh @ Sanatomba @ Rupachandra. 2. The impugned detention order is assailed on two grounds viz-(i) the particulars of the cases, similar with the present case in which bails are granted by the normal criminal courts, are not mentioned in the impugned order dated 02.11.10 and the grounds of detention; and as such the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based on no material and (ii) the reasons or grounds for the satisfaction of the detaining authority for detention of the detent which are not mentioned in the detention order and the grounds of detention cannot be supplemented by way of an affidavit by the detaining authority in the writ petition. 3. Heard Mr. Dolen Phurailatpam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. RS Reisang, learned G.A. appearing for the respondent Nos.-1 and 2 and Mr. Amarjit Naorem, learned CGSC appearing for the respondent No.3 respectively. 4. Only the short facts sufficient for deciding the above two grounds are noted; on 24.10.10 at about 10.30 AM the detent was arrested by the Commando personnel but he was shown to have been arrested in connection with police case being FIR No. 447(10)2010 IPS under Section16/17/20 UA(P) Act only on 25.10.10 and remanded to police custody by the concerned Judicial Magistrate till 02.11.2010. When the detent was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate in connection with the said FIR case on 02.11.10, copy of the impugned detention order dated 02.11.10 was served on him. When the detent was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate in connection with the said FIR case on 02.11.10, copy of the impugned detention order dated 02.11.10 was served on him. For easy reference the impugned detention order dated 02.11.2010 is quoted hereunder ORDERS Imphal, the 2nd Nov., 2010 No.Cril/NSA/No.116 of 2010: Whereas, a police report has been laid before me that Shri Laishram Sagor Singh @ Sanatomba @ Rupachandra (51 yrs) s/o L. Mohon Singh of Keibi Khullen Makha Leikai, P.S. Lamlai, District-Imphal East, Manipur is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order; Whereas, I, K. Radhakumar Singh, District Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur am satisfied that his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order under Section 3(2) of National Security Act, 1980; Whereas, it is considered necessary to detain Shri Laishram Sagor Singh @ Sanatomba @ Rupachandra (51 yrs) s/o L. Mohon Singh of Keibi Khullen Makha Leikai, P.S. Lamlai, District-Imphal East, Manipur with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order; And whereas, I am satisfied from the police report that Shri Laisharam Sagor Singh @ Sanatomba @ Rupachandra (51 yrs) s/o L. Mohan Singh of Keikai Khullen Makha Leikai, P.S. Lamlai, District-Imphal East Manipur who is now in Police custody, is likely to be released on bail in the near future by the normal criminal court as bails are granted in similar cases by the criminal courts. Now, therefore, I, K. Radhakumar Singh, District Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-Section 3 of Section3 of the National Security Act, 1980 read with the Home Department's Order No. 17(1)/49/80-H(Pt-I) dated 07.08.2010 make this order directing that the above said person who is now in Police custody be detained under Section 3(2) of National Security Act, 1980 until further orders. Given under my Hand and Seal of the Court on this second day of November, 2010. Sd/-(K. Radhakumar Singh) District Magistrate: Imphal West. 5. In para 4 of the impugned detention order it is stated that the detaining authority was satisfied with the police report that the detent, who is now in police custody, is likely to be released on bail in near future by the normal criminal court as bails are granted in similar cases by the normal criminal courts. 6. 5. In para 4 of the impugned detention order it is stated that the detaining authority was satisfied with the police report that the detent, who is now in police custody, is likely to be released on bail in near future by the normal criminal court as bails are granted in similar cases by the normal criminal courts. 6. In pursuance of Section 8 of the National Security Act, 1980 the detaining authority, under his letter dated 4.11.10, furnished the grounds of detention to the detent. A copy of the said letter (grounds of detention) of the detaining authority, the District Magistrate, is available at Annexure-2 to the present writ petition. In para Nos-9 and 10 of the writ petition it is categorically stated that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority (respondent No.2) in sub para (4) of the impugned detention order that the detent is likely to be released on bail in near future by the normal criminal court as bails are granted in similar cases, is merely ipse dixit statement of the detaining authority. In para 10 of the writ petition it is also stated that the detaining authority, i.e. respondent No.2, has failed to furnish any material or document to the detent to show that normal criminal courts had granted bails in similar cases in order to arrive at his subjective satisfaction. 7. The respondent No. 2 had filed his affidavit in-opposition wherein vide para 7 of the affidavit in-opposition the respondent No.2 replied the contents of the para Nos-9, 10 and 11 of the writ petition. Para 7 of the affidavit in-opposition filed by the respondent No.2 read as follows: 7. That, with reference to para No.9, 10 and 11 of the writ petition, it is submitted that there is no bar for filing bail application. The detaining authority was aware of the subsisting custody, but very often similarly situated persons involved in number of criminal cases were released on bail by the concerned Courts before the expiry of the statutory period. The detaining authority was aware of the subsisting custody, but very often similarly situated persons involved in number of criminal cases were released on bail by the concerned Courts before the expiry of the statutory period. For example, one Smt. Khumukcham (N)Loitongbam (O) Memcha Devi @ Ibechaobi (47 yrs) w/o L. Manimohon Singh of Wangoo Laipham was arrested by police near at Cheirap Court on 08.04.2010 in connection with FIR No. 135(4)2010 IPS u/s 19/39 UA(P) Act and she was produced before the Court on 14.04.2010 for judicial remand but she was released by the Court on the same day (Ref.: W.P(Cril) No. 118 of 2010 L. Manimohon Singh vs. The State of Manipur & Ors). Moreover, there was a possibility of likelihood of the detent being released on bail, if bail application is filed before the statutory period is expired and that there is every possibility of the detent continuing his prejudicial activities as a member of PLA, if he is released on bail. The application of normal criminal laws against the detent would not be effective to prevent him from commission of further prejudicial activities to the maintenance of public order and accordingly detention order under NSA 1980 has been rightly issued. On bare perusal of the impugned detention order dated 02.11.10 (quoted above) and the grounds of detention (letter of the detaining authority dated 4.11.10), it is clear that particulars of the similar cases in which normal criminal courts granted bails, are not mentioned either in the impugned detention order or in the grounds of detention. The respondent No.2, by filing the affidavit in-opposition, an attempt had been made vide para 7 of his affidavit in-opposition for giving particulars of the similar cases in which bails were granted by the normal criminal courts. 8. In the above factual backdrop, we are now taking up the first ground for assailing the detention order. In support of the first ground, Mr. Dolen, learned counsel for the petitioner, places heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu Tr. Sec. to Govt. & Anr. 2011 (4) Scale 387. 8. In the above factual backdrop, we are now taking up the first ground for assailing the detention order. In support of the first ground, Mr. Dolen, learned counsel for the petitioner, places heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu Tr. Sec. to Govt. & Anr. 2011 (4) Scale 387. In Rekha's case also the detaining authority had come to the subjective satisfaction that the detent is likely to be released on bail in the near future as bails are granted by the normal criminal court and the particulars of the similar cases in which bails were granted by the normal criminal court are not mentioned in the detention order. The Apex Court in Rekha's case (supra) held that in the absence of furnishing the particulars of the similar cases in which bails were granted by the normal criminal court to the detent, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detent is likely to be released on bail, is mere ipse dixit statement of the detaining authority which cannot be sustained as the ground of detention. Para 5, 6 and 7 of the Scale in Rekha's case (supra) read as follows: 5. The detention order reads as under: No.199/2010 Dated 08.042010 DETENTION ORDER Whereas I. T. Rajendran, IPS, Commissioner of Police, Chennai Police, is satisfied that the person known as Tr. Ramakrishnan, male aged 35, s/o Devaraj, No.82-B, South Mada Veethi, Villivakkam, Chennai-49 is a Drug Offender as contemplated under Section 2(e) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 and that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to make the following order. Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred on me by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, and Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act of 1982) read with orders issued by the Government in G.O.(D)No.6, Home, Prohibition and Excise(XVI) Department dated 18th January, 2010 under subsection (2) of Section 3 of the said Act, I hereby direct that the said Drug Offender Tr. Ramakrishnan, s/o Devaraj, be detained and kept in custody at the Central Prison, Puzhal, Chennai. Ramakrishnan, s/o Devaraj, be detained and kept in custody at the Central Prison, Puzhal, Chennai. Given under my hand and seal of this office the 8th day of April, 2010. 6. The relevant part of the grounds on which the said detention order has been made as follows: Thiru Elango, M. Pharm, male aged 43, S/o Ramasamy is working as a Drug Inspector, Drug Control Department, Perambur Range, Zone-II, D.M.S. Complex, Teynampet, Chennai-18. On 15.03.2010, Thiru. Elango appeared before the Inspector of Police, Crimes P-6 Kodungaiyur Police Station and lodged a complaint against Thiruvalargal, Prabhakar @ Ravi, 2) Venkatesan, 3) Sanjay Kumar, 4) Sekar, 5) Baskar, 6) Pradeep Kumar Chordia and 7) Meenakshi Sundarm. In his compliant, he has stated that expired drugs collected from the medical shops of Chennai city and Suburban used to be dumped at dump yard of Corporation ground at Ezhil Nagar, Kodungaiyur, Chennai. On 15.3.2010, Thiu, Elango received a secret information that expired drugs dumped at dump yard at Corporation ground, Ezhil Nagar, Kodungaiyur, Chennai, were taken by Thiu. Prabhakar @ Ravi residing at the first floor of No.A-6/541, 151st Street, Muthmizh Nagar, Kodungaiyur, Chennai and by keeping the same with his associates tampered the same tampering the original labels and printing fresh labels to make it appear as though they are not expired drugs and redistribute the same for sale to the general public. In para 4 of the grounds of detention, it is stated:- 4. I am aware that Thiru. Ramakrishnan, is in remand in P.6, Kodungaiyur Police Station Crime No. 132/2010 and he has not moved any bail application so far. The sponsoring authority has stated that the relatives of Thiru. Ramakrishnan are taking action to take him on bail in the above case by filing bail applications before the Higher Courts since in similar cases bails were granted by the Courts after lapse of time. Hence, there is real possibility of his coming out on bail in the above case by filing a bail application before the higher courts. If he comes out on bail he will indulge in further activities, which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and order. Further the recourse to normal criminal law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in such activities, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and order. If he comes out on bail he will indulge in further activities, which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and order. Further the recourse to normal criminal law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in such activities, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and order. On the materials placed before me, I am fully satisfied that the said Thiru. Ramakrishnan is also a Drug Offender and that there is a compelling necessity to detain him in order to prevent him from indulging in such further activities in future which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982." 7. A perusal of the above statement in para 4 of the grounds of detention shows that no details have been given about the alleged similar cases in which bail was allegedly granted by the concerned court. Neither the date of the alleged bail orders has been mentioned therein, nor the bail application number, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of the co-accused on the same case, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of other co-accused in cases on the same footing as the case of the accused. All that has been stated in the grounds of detention is that "in similar cases bails were granted by the courts". In our opinion, in the absence of details this statement is mere ipse dixit, and cannot be relied upon. 9. In the present case also, as stated above, the particulars of the similar cases in which bails were granted by the normal criminal court are not mentioned either in the grounds of detention or in the impugned detention order. In such situation, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned detention order, approval order and the confirmation order are required to be interfered with. 10. Regarding the second ground, Mr. Dolen, to substantiate the case of the petitioner, relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs. Gordhandas Bhanji AIR (39) 1952 SC 16 and Mohinder Singh Gill &Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. AIR 1978 SC 851 (Constitution Bench). Basing on the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Commissioner of Police's case (supra) and Mohinder Singh Gill's case (supra), Mr. Gordhandas Bhanji AIR (39) 1952 SC 16 and Mohinder Singh Gill &Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. AIR 1978 SC 851 (Constitution Bench). Basing on the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Commissioner of Police's case (supra) and Mohinder Singh Gill's case (supra), Mr. Dolen contends that the legality or otherwise of the impugned detention order dated 2nd Nov., 2010 and the grounds of detention dated 04.11.2010 are to be decided basing on the reasons mentioned therein, and not on the basis of the explanations furnished by the detaining authority vide para 7 of his affidavit in-opposition in the writ petition. 11. We are of the considered view that submission made by Mr. Dolen holds the water inasmuch as if the explanations made by the respondent No.2 vide para 7 of his affidavit in-opposition is accepted, the impugned detention order bad in the beginning, may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. The Apex Court in Commissioner of Police's case(supra) clearly held that order issued by the Commissioner cannot be construed in the light of the explanation subsequently given by the Officer (Police Commissioner) making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind; or what he intended to do. Para 9 of the AIR in Police Commissioner's case (supra) read as follows: 9. An attempt was made by referring to the Commissioner is affidavit to Show that this was really an order of cancellation made by him and that the order was his order and not that of Government. We are clear that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind; or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. (emphasis supplied) 12. The Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Mohinder Singh Gill's case (supra) vide para 8 of the AIR held thus: 8. (emphasis supplied) 12. The Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Mohinder Singh Gill's case (supra) vide para 8 of the AIR held thus: 8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji( AIR 1952 SC 16 )(at p.18): Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind; or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older. (emphasis supplied) 13. On perusal of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in (1) Police Commissioner's case (supra) and (2) Mohinder Singh Gill's case (supra), it is crystal clear that the explanation or reasons subsequently given by the detaining authority making the impugned order what he (detaining authority) meant, or what was in his mind, in passing the impugned order cannot be accepted. It is well settled law that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is the cumulative effect of all the materials available before him and subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is not interfered with in case such subjective satisfaction is based on some materials. Court cannot exercise the power of judicial review over the detention order of the detaining authority for that subjective satisfaction is not based on sufficient materials. Court exercises powers of judicial review only when subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based on no material. In other words, sufficiency or insufficiency of the materials for coming to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is not within the purview of judicial review. Court exercises powers of judicial review only when subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based on no material. In other words, sufficiency or insufficiency of the materials for coming to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is not within the purview of judicial review. In the given case, it is clear that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detent is likely to be released on bail as bails are granted in similar cases is based on no material. 14. Our view is strengthened by the decisions of the Apex Court in Kamla Kanhaiyalal Khushalani Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 1981 SC 814 . In that case the Apex Court held that if the documents and materials are supplied later, then the detent is deprived of earliest opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. It is the mandate of the Constitution under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India that the detent should be made available earliest opportunity to file effective representation against the detention order. In the present case, an attempt had been made by the detaining authority by giving explanation vide para 7 of his affidavit in-opposition for coming to his subjective satisfaction that the detent is likely to be released on bail and his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and the said explanation was not made available to the detent before filing his representation under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India. This being the situation, the detent has been deprived of earliest opportunity for making effective representation against the detention order. 15. For the foregoing reasons, we have no alternative except to interfere with the impugned detention order, approval order and the confirmation order. Accordingly, the impugned detention order dated 2nd November, 2010, the approval order dated 10.11.2010 and the confirmation order dated 20.12.2010 are hereby quashed and set aside. The detent, namely, Laishram Sagor Singh @ Sanatomba @ Rupachandra, be set liberty forthwith if he is not wanted in connection with any other case. This writ petition is allowed and disposed of. Petition allowed