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2011 DIGILAW 592 (UTT)

ARUN AGARWAL v. VISHESHWAR AGARWAL

2011-09-21

B.S.VERMA

body2011
JUDGMENT Hon’ble B.S. Verma, J. (Stay Application No. 9418 of 2011) By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 5.11.2007 passed by the Prescribed Authority/1st Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Dehradun (for short the Prescribed Authority) in Rent Control Case No. 48 of 2006 as well as the order dated 29.7.2011 passed by the learned Additional District Judge/V Fast Track Court, Dehradun in Rent Control Appeal No. 132 of 2007. By the order dated 5.11.2007 the learned Prescribed Authority has allowed the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the Act) moved by the landlord-respondents against the tenant-petitioner and directed the petitioner to vacate the disputed property within thirty days and deliver its possession to the landlords. The landlords were directed to pay amount of Rs. 200/- as compensation to the petitioner. By the order dated 29.7.2011, the appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed by the appellate court. 2. Relevant facts giving rise to the present writ petition, in brief, are that the respondents are the landlords of the property no. 46, New No. 107, Darshani Gate Dehradun (for short disputed property) that the disputed property is a commercial accommodation, which was let out to one Krishna Chandra Agrawal and after his death, the petitioner is a tenant therein at the rate of monthly rent of Rs. 1965/-. The release application has been moved on the ground of bona fide and genuine need for the son and daughter-in-law of the landlords. 3. The release application has been contested by the petitioner. He denied the allegations made in the release application and asserted that the applicant-respondents have sufficient residential accommodation and that in case the release application is allowed, the petitioner would suffer greater hardship than the landlords. 4. Both the parties filed documentary evidence. Learned Prescribed Authority heard them and after perusing the evidence led by the parties, it has been held that the need of the landlords is bona fide and genuine and on the point of comparative hardship, the learned Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the landlords would suffer greater hardship if the release application is rejected. Consequently, the Prescribed Authority passed the impugned order dated 5.11.2007. 5. Aggrieved, the tenant-petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate Court. Consequently, the Prescribed Authority passed the impugned order dated 5.11.2007. 5. Aggrieved, the tenant-petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate Court. The appellate Court did not find favour with the appellant-petitioner and recorded its independent finding of fact and dismissed the appeal by order 29.7.2011, which gave rise to the present writ petition. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed before this Court. 7. At the outset it may be mentioned that this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or re-evaluate the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of misreading of evidence by the courts concerned. 8. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 9. The Apex Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through L.Rs. and others [(2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 1] while dealing with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitutions of India has observed as under : “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 10. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned Prescribed Authority shows that the Prescribed Authority after appraisal of the evidence led by the parties came to the conclusion at page 4 of the judgment that the petitioner-opposite party could not lead any evidence to controvert the evidence of the landlords that the landlords have in their possession only two rooms and one store and they have no accommodation to use as dining room, drawing room, guest room and Puja room. Therefore, the need of the landlords is bona fide and genuine. On the point of comparative hardship, the learned Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding of fact that the tenant-opposite party has a shopping complex to do his business. Ultimately, by a detailed order, the application for release moved by the respondents has been allowed by order dated 5.11.2007. 11. The appellate Court after hearing both the parties and after reappreciating the evidence of the parties did not find favour with the petitioner and dismissed the appeal by order dated 29.7.2011. 12. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondents, I am of the considered view that there is concurrent finding of fact on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship. From a perusal of the impugned judgments, it is obvious that there is a shopping complex in the name of the wife of the petitioner in the city of Dehradun. The release application has been rightly allowed by the Prescribed Authority and the appeal has been rightly dismissed by the appellate Court. I do not find any perversity or manifest error of law in the impugned orders. The release application has been rightly allowed by the Prescribed Authority and the appeal has been rightly dismissed by the appellate Court. I do not find any perversity or manifest error of law in the impugned orders. There is no merit in this writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed outright at admission stage. 13. The writ petition is dismissed in limine. However, to do complete justice, the petitioner is granted one year’s time to vacate the disputed property from today provided the petitioner furnishes a written undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within a period of ten weeks to the effect that he shall vacate the disputed premises before the expiry of the period of one year and shall deliver its vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent-landlords. It is further provided that the petitioner shall pay/deposit monthly rent regularly by the seventh day of each succeeding month for the previous month. In case of default, the landlord-respondents would be at liberty to get the disputed property vacated in accordance with law. The petitioner shall be entitled to the compensation from the landlords as awarded by the Prescribed Authority. 14. All pending applications stand disposed of.