Judgment :- 1.This writ petition is directed against the order passed on 21-7-2009 by the Collector under Section 41-A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and District Registrar, Hyderabad (South), directing the writ petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.95,545/-, towards the deficit stamp duty in respect of two documents bearing No. 80/2002 and 713/2002, and also the orders passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Commissioner & Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, through his proceedings dated 20-7-2010, rejecting the Appeal preferred by the petitioner against the aforementioned orders passed by the Collector. 2. One Sri G. Visweswara Rao. the husband of the petitioner, acquired house property bearing municipal No.8-3-315/C/5, admeasuring 253 square yards or 211.54 square meters, situate at Maruthinagar. Yousufguda, Hyderabad, under a registered sale deed bearing document No.3458/1974. Sri G. Visweswara Rao died intestate on 26-6-2001, leaving behind his wife, the petitioner herein, two sons and two daughters, namely, Smt. G. S. R. Lakshmi. Sri G. V. S. Sai Kumar. Smt. N. P. Padmaja and Sri. G. Subba Rao. Thus, the petitioner herein and her four children, referred to supra, succeeded to the estate of Sri. Visweswara Rao. On 7-1-2002, Sr. G. V. S. Sai Kumar, Smt. N. P. Padmaja and Sri. G. Subba Rao, joined together and executed a release deed bearing No.80/2001 in favour of the writ petitioner herein releasing and relinquishing their 3/5th undivided share in house property bearing municipal No.8-3-315/C/5. Maruthinagar, Yousufguda, Hyderabad, for a total consideration of Rs.1,50,000/-. The said release deed is appropriately stamped and it was also registered by the Sub Registrar concerned. Subsequently, Smt. G. S. R. Lakshmi, executed another release deed on 31-1-2002 in favour of the petitioner herein releasing and relinquishing her 1/5th undivided share in the same property referred to supra for a total consideration of Rs.50,000/-. The said document bearing No.713/2002 was also registered by the Sub Registrar concerned. Both these documents have been released to the petitioner. 3. Long thereafter, on 28-2-2007, the Collector, exercising the power available under Section 41 - A of the Indian Stamp Act 1899, has issued a notice on the ground that during the audit undertaken by the Accountant General, while checking the documents registered in the Sub Registrar Office. Both these documents have been released to the petitioner. 3. Long thereafter, on 28-2-2007, the Collector, exercising the power available under Section 41 - A of the Indian Stamp Act 1899, has issued a notice on the ground that during the audit undertaken by the Accountant General, while checking the documents registered in the Sub Registrar Office. Banjara Hills, it is realized that in respect of both the documents bearing Nos.80/2002 and 713/2002, to which the petitioner herein is a party, stamp duty of Rs.21,500/- and Rs.7,155/- respectively is only paid, whereas both these documents are liable to be treated as conveyance deeds on sale and consequently, a deficit stamp duty of Rs.95,545/-is payable and hence, called upon the petitioner to show cause why the said amount should not be recovered from her. On the plea that the writ petitioner has not shown any cause, the Collector passed final orders on 21-7-2009, confirming his provisional conclusion about the deficit stamp duty on the aforementioned two documents and thus, demanded payment of Rs.95.545/-, within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the said order. The petitioner carried the matter in Appeal before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Commissioner and Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, who rejected the said Appeal, based upon the ratio laid down by this Court in K. V. Subba Rao versus District Registrar of Assurance, Guntur, AIR 1986 AP42 and Maddula Girish Kumar and another versus The Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records and another, 1993 (1) A. P. L. J. 79. Hence, this writ petition. 4. Heard Sri. J. V. Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Government Pleader for Revenue. 5. It is contended by Sri. J. V. Rao that the Collector as well as the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority have misconstrued completely the ratio laid down by the Special Bench of this Court in Maddula Girish Kumar’s case (cited 2 supra). It is contended that the respondents have failed to distinguish a release deed from that of a conveyance deed on sale of immovable property. In the result of this confusion, they have held the petitioner liable to pay deficit stamp duty. It is contended that the respondents have failed to distinguish a release deed from that of a conveyance deed on sale of immovable property. In the result of this confusion, they have held the petitioner liable to pay deficit stamp duty. It is further contended that if the two documents are to be properly construed by the very nature of their contents and scope, they are liable to be treated as release deeds and hence, they are appropriately stamped. Hence, the question of such instrument receiving deficit stamp duty, would not arise. 6. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader would contend that since all the coparceners have not joined at one time, but executed separate deeds and relinquished their rights in immovable property, the documents in question are only liable to be understood as conveyance deeds on sale, but not as mere release deeds. When so construed, the inevitable finding is that both the deeds have suffered deficit stamp duty and hence, the levy and demand are correct in law. 7. The question raised in the instant case, in my opinion, is completely covered by the answer furnished by the Special Bench (comprising of three Judges) of this Court in Maddula Girish Kumar's case (cited supra). In the said case, a reference was made under Section 57 of the Indian Stamp Act, by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Commissioner of Survey. Settlements and Land Records, Hyderabad, regarding stamp duty payable on the two documents executed on 12-10-1974 by Smt. Maddula Pramila, on behalf of her two minor sons, namely, Jaya Veera Venkata Durga Prakash and Girish Kumar, relinquishing their respective shares in the joint family movable and immovable properties in favour of their father Sri. Maddula Panduranga Rao. The Joint Registrar of Machilipatnam impounded those two documents treating them as documents of conveyance on sale. In those set of circumstances, a reference was made to the High Court as to whether the documents styled as release deeds were sale deeds or not. 8. Maddula Panduranga Rao. The Joint Registrar of Machilipatnam impounded those two documents treating them as documents of conveyance on sale. In those set of circumstances, a reference was made to the High Court as to whether the documents styled as release deeds were sale deeds or not. 8. The Special Bench has considered the Judgment rendered by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Subbana versus Balasubba Reddi, 1945 (1) MLJ 140 , where the question arose whether one member of a Hindu joint family consisting of several members, can, irrespective of a partition of a family estate, give his own interest therein to one of the other coparceners: While deciding the above case, the Madras High Court has considered two of its earlier decisions in Peddayya versus Ramalingam (1888) ILR 11 Madras 406 and Thangavelu Pillai versus Doraiswami Pillai (1914) 27 MLJ 272 . It has also considered the decision of the Privy Council in Venkatapathi Raju versus Benkatanarasimha Raju (1936) 71 MLJ 558 and observed as follows : "The relinquishment by one co-parcener of his interest in the family estate in favour of the members of the co-parcenary does not amount to an alienation; it merely amounts to an extinction of his right in favour of the others." The Special Bench of our Court has also considered an earlier Full Bench Judgment of our High Court rendered in Anjaneyulu versus Ramaiah. AIR 1965 AP 177 , wherein the Full Bench has held as under: "The relinquishment of a share by one of the coparceners in favour of the other members does not alter the status of the joint family. The releaser alone separates himself from the family while others continue as members of an undivided family. Mitakshara treated the estate of coparceners as held in entirety without recognition of shares and defined partition as the adjustment of diverse rights regarding the whole by distributing them in particular portions of the aggregate. The relinquishment by a coparcener does not require either the adjustment of diverse rights or the division of wealth in definite portions. It only results in the extinction of his rights in the family properties and his separation from the family. That being so, it cannot be predicated that a relinquishment of his interest by one of the coparceners in the family estate is tantamount to a partition of the joint family wealth. It only results in the extinction of his rights in the family properties and his separation from the family. That being so, it cannot be predicated that a relinquishment of his interest by one of the coparceners in the family estate is tantamount to a partition of the joint family wealth. To put it differently a partition of the family properties involves definement of shares, whereas a release by a member of an undivided family does not require the ascertainment of shares of each of the members though the releaser separates himself. The separation of one member, who renounced his share, does not necessitate a distribution of the joint family property in definite portions. His renounciation merely extinguishes his interest in the estate but does not in any way effect the status of the remaining members quoad the family property." The Special Bench has also considered another Judgment of the Madras High Court in Board of Revenue versus Murugesa. AIR 1955 Madras 641 and an earlier Judgment of this Court in Board of Revenue versus V. R. Krishnaiah, AIR 1973 AP 275 . Thereafter, the Special Bench dealing with Maddula Girish Kumar's case (cited supra) had considered the earlier Judgment in K. V. Subba Rao's case (cited supra). 9. The reference has been ultimately answered in para 12 as under : "12. In the case of hand, the question is whether the two documents executed by the two coparceners in favour of the remaining coparcener are release deeds or deeds of conveyance. The preponderance of judicial opinion, which we have referred to above, is that it only comes under release, but not a conveyance. Therefore, we agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the documents dated 12th October, 1974 executed by the petitioners in favour of their father are only documents of release." 10. Therefore, the principle that emerges is that by executing a release deed, one of the coparceners is merely separating himself from the joint family, while the others continue as members of the same undivided family. The estate of the coparceners, in law, is liable to be treated as held in entirety without recognition of identifiable shares. Therefore, the principle that emerges is that by executing a release deed, one of the coparceners is merely separating himself from the joint family, while the others continue as members of the same undivided family. The estate of the coparceners, in law, is liable to be treated as held in entirety without recognition of identifiable shares. By executing a release deed, one or more coparceners are merely renouncing or extinguishing his or their interests in the estate without, in any manner, affecting the status of the remaining members of the joint family. Therefore, a release deed is not required to be executed by all the coparceners joining the same deed or the release deed is required to be executed in favour of the remaining coparceners either. The principle is, to the extent the coparceners have relinquished their respective rights, the release of the document derives a corresponding benefit of increased proportion in the estate. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the view taken by the Collector as well as the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority in the instant case, is unsustainable in law and the two documents bearing Nos.80/2002 and 713/2002, are rightly treated by the Sub Registrar concerned as release deeds and they have not suffered any deficit stamp duty. 11. The orders passed by the Collector on 21-7-2009 and the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority on 20-7-2010 are quashed and the writ petitioner is held as not liable to pay a sum of Rs.95,545/-, as levied and demanded by the respondents towards deficit stamp duty. 12. With this, the writ petition stands allowed. No costs.