JUDGMENT By Court.-Heard learned counsel for the parties, 2. The petitioner is aggrieved against the order of detention dated 10.9.2010 as well as order confirmation passed by the State Government dated 11.10.2010 by invoking the powers under Section 12(2) by the District Magistrate and Sections 21 and 22 of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act. 1981 by the State Government. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the detaining authority the District Magistrate, was under obligation not only to communicate the order of detention but also was under obligation to inform the petitioner that he has right to submit the representation and till the detention order is confirmed by the State Government, the detaining authority himself was empowered to consider the representation of the petitioner and was only competent officer who could have passed the order of withdrawal of detention. Since the petitioner has not been informed that he has a right to submit representation before the detaining authority. Therefore, that order is in violation to the provisions of the Act of 1981 as well as contrary to the constitutional provision as provided under Article 22(5). Learned counsel relied upon the judgment, of the Supreme Court delivered in the case of State of Maharashtra and others v. Santosh Shankar Acharya. reported in AIR 2000 SC 2504 . 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the authorization to the District Magistrate under sub-section 2 of Section 12 of the Act of 1981 is also illegal because of the reason that the authorization could have been only due to the prevailing situation or on the basis of the situation which may come subsequently. Learned counsel relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the ,case of Abhay Sridhar Ambulkar v. S.V, Bhave. Commissioner of Police and others. reported in AIR 1991 SC 397 . 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the petitioner was alleged to have been involved in the cases referred in the 'detention order dated 10.9.2010, out of which except in one case where petitioner in fact was not in custody and in other case petitioner is on bail. However, in one of the cases, petitioner was convicted by the trial Court against which appeal was preferred in the High Court and in the High Court he was released on bail. However, in one of the cases, petitioner was convicted by the trial Court against which appeal was preferred in the High Court and in the High Court he was released on bail. It is also submitted that there is total non-application of mind of the detaining authority as he held that the petitioner is likely to be released on bail therefore, his detention is necessary whereas the• petitioner was already on bail in three cases and in 4th case he was not even in custody therefore, there was no occasion for moving the petitioner for bail. It is also submitted that apprehension of petitioner of being released on bail itself cannot be ground for passing order of detention. 6. It is also submitted that even the allegation against the petitioner is taken on its face value even then it was not affecting the public order but it could have been a question of law and order which is quite distinct issue and on the basis of any threat to the law and order, detention order could have been passed under the provisions of the Act of I 981. 7. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the pal1.ies. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and others v. Santosh Shankar Acharya (supra), has considered the only question that whether during the period where the State Government has not passed order of approval to the detention order passed by the Subordinate authority, Whether the said subordinate authority of the State possesses the power to pass order for dropping the detention order and in that situation Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the communication to the detenu about his right to submit representation to the subordinate authority to State Government is mandatory' and non-informing the detenu about his right violates the provisions of Article 22(5) and also held that said detaining authority subordinate to the State Government possesses the power to drop the detention order till order of approval is passed by the State Government. 8. 8. Law has been settled by the hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to the period within which the detaining authority if not the State then can pass order to drop the order of detention on representation submitted by the detenu and it is the duty of the detaining authority to inform the detenu that he has a right to submit the representation to the authority itself and not to the State Government. The judgment of the State of Maharashtra and others v. Santosh Shankar Acharya, nowhere laid down that even if the detention order is approved by the State Government even then the detention order can be set aside on the ground that the detenu is not given opportunity to submit representation before the original authority who passed the order of detention and which has been approved by the! State Government. 9. The authorization of the State' Government to the District Magistrate to exercise power under Section 12(2) has been .issued vide notification dated 26.8.2010 which contains that at present there is a necessity to put control over the naxal activities and, therefore, this order was passed in the light of the prevailing situation and it cannot be said to be illegal order even in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Abhay Sridhar Ambulkar v. S. Bhave. Commissioner of Police and others (supra). 10. We have also considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there are only four cases against the petitioner but we have perused the detail material which was before the learned District Magistrate and copies of those documents have been placed on record by the respondents along with their counter-affidavit and from those materials we are of the view that for passing the order by the District Magistrate. there was sufficient material for him for taking action and because of the reason that petitioner was not in custody in one of the cases and if one of the ground is not found to be correct then in view of Section 12(A) of the Act of 1981, the impugned order cannot be set aside. 11. there was sufficient material for him for taking action and because of the reason that petitioner was not in custody in one of the cases and if one of the ground is not found to be correct then in view of Section 12(A) of the Act of 1981, the impugned order cannot be set aside. 11. So far as contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that whatever allegations have been levelled against the petitioner in relation to the cases registered against him and particularly about the allegation that he has been involved in the case on the basis of the statement given by one of the co-accused or on the basis of some recoveries effected not from the petitioner but from the jail where the petitioner was lodged are concerned, in writ jurisdiction this question of fact cannot be adjudicated and under the provisions of the Act of 1981, what is necessary is to see whether there were material before the authority on the basis of which action can be taken or not. We are satisfied that there was sufficient material. 12. In view of the above reason, we do not find any merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.