P. K. Musahary, J. - Heard Mr. B. N. Sarma, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Apok Pongener, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. C, T. Jamir, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. A. Jamir, learned counsel for the respon­dents. 2. This is defendants' appeal against the judgment and order dated 3.12.2001 passed by the learned Addl. Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Mokokchang in Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1991. 3. The facts material for disposal of this appeal, in short, are that the cause of action arose in the year 1989 when one late Talinungsang encroached upon the respondent's land by making fencing and when it was alleged that the present respon­dents are not the descendants of their ances­tors Manakba and when the present respon­dents, being disappointed, took the matter before the village council. On 30.08.89 the village council concerned passed an oral or­der on 28.08.1989 to the effect that as per the written record of the Chuchuyimpang his­tory both Martemjen and Talinungsang (respondents/plaintiffs) are descendants of Manakba. 4. Being aggrieved by the said decision of the village council dated 30.08.1989, the present respondents/defendants took the matter before Dobasis's Court, Mokokchung (DB's Court in short), which was registered as case No. 113/89. After heaing the parties the DB's Court passed a judgment & order on 29.06.1990 deciding the matter in favour of the present respondents holding that re­spondents are the descendants of Manakba. Against the said judgment and order of the D. B's Court dated 29.06.1990 the prsent appellants filed an appeal before the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial) [hereinafter in short referred to as 'ADC (J)' which was registered and numbered as Civil Appeal No.8 of 1990. The learned ADC(J) by order dated 11.03.1991 disposed of the matter by setting aside and quashing the DB's Court judgment and order dated 29.06.1990 on ground of lack of jurisdiction and directed the present respondents/plaintiffs to file an appeal against the decision of the village coun­cil. Accordingly the present respondents/plain­tiffs filed an appeal before the ADC (J) which was registered and numbered as Civil Ap­peal No. 3 of 1991. The learned ADC (J), after hearing the parties, by an order dated 22.7.1991 ordered for de novo trial. There­after by the impugned judgment and order dated 3.12.2001, the learned ADC (J) held that the plaintiff/respondent is entitled to a decree. The learned ADC (J), after hearing the parties, by an order dated 22.7.1991 ordered for de novo trial. There­after by the impugned judgment and order dated 3.12.2001, the learned ADC (J) held that the plaintiff/respondent is entitled to a decree. The present appeal has been filed by the defendants against the aforesaid impugned judgment and order dated 3.12.2001 mainly on the ground that the learned Court below failed to discuss and appreciate the evidence on record and came to erroneous finding in favour of the plaintiffs. 5. The plaintiffs/respondents have raised a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the present appeal saying inter alia that no appeal lies under the existing provisions of law against the judgment and order passed in ap­peal by the learned ADC(J) who has already exercised its appellate jurisdiction in deciding and disposing of the aforementioned civil ap­peal No. 3 of 1991 filed by the defendants/ appellants. Since the learned ADC (J) has decided the Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1991 by the impugned order dated 3.12.2001, the present appeal has been left with legal rem­edy by filing 2nd appeal and no first appeal maintainable under Rule 29 of the Rules for Administration of Justice of Police inNaga Hills District, 1937 [hereinafter referred to as Rules, 1937] and as per decision pronounced by this Court in Medenkaba & Ors. Vs. Takatemjen Ao & Anr. reported in 1987 1 GLR156, wherein a Division Bench of this Court held that de novo hearing is decided when earlier hearing is taken to be of no con­sequence or legal effect. In the said case, ac­cording to the appellants, held that adenovo proceeding held under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules is an original proceeding for all purposes and must be treated as such. 6. Before entering into the merit of the case, it has become imperative to consider and decide the question of maintainability of the present appeal on the basis of the argu­ments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. 7. 6. Before entering into the merit of the case, it has become imperative to consider and decide the question of maintainability of the present appeal on the basis of the argu­ments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. 7. While making objection on the main­tainability of the present appeal, the respon­dents contends as under: (i) The impugned order dated 3.12.2001 passed by the ADC (J), Mokokchung is a decision passed in an appeal filed under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules against decision dated 30.8.1989 passed by the Vil­lage Court and since the ADC(J) has passed the impugned judgment and order dated 3.12.2001 in an appeal, no more First Appeal is maintainable under Rule 29 of the Rules inasmuch as under Rule 29 of the 1937 Rules an appeal lies to the High Court against the original decision of the Deputy Commissioner. The case before the ADC(J), Mokokchung was filed as an appeal and not as a fresh suit and as such the Court has already exercised the juris­diction of an appellate Court. The very first word under Rule 31 runs with "an appeal" and therefore any order passed under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules is an order passed by an appellate Court and so it is not an original decision. (ii) The decision of the appellate Court to try a case de novo is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules. The power of the appellate jurisdiction includes the power to hear the case de novo. Moreover, to try the case de novo is an inherent power of the ap­pellate Court under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules and therefore, the order passed by the appellate Court under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules is an appeal is not an original decision, unless there is an appeal filed under Rule 31, the appellate Court can­not even hear a case de novo by trying the case de novo by the appellate Court be­low under Rule 31 and it would not take away the inherent power of the appellate Court. (iii) Even if the case is tried de novo the Court can pass an order in exercise of the appellate power under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules in an appeal inasmuch as the order passed by the Village Court is not an appellate order. (iii) Even if the case is tried de novo the Court can pass an order in exercise of the appellate power under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules in an appeal inasmuch as the order passed by the Village Court is not an appellate order. Against such order the civil appeal No.3/91 was filed before the ADC (J) and the impugned judgment and order dated 3.12.2001 was passed by the ADC (J) in an appeal. Therefore, the de­cision of the ADC( J) dated 3.12.2001 is not an original decision as contemplated under Rule 29 of the 1937 Rules and as such, the First Appeal under Rule 29 of the 1937 Rules before this Court is not maintainable against the appellate order dated 3.12.2001 passed in Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1991. At best a Second Appeal would lie against the impugned decision dated 3.12.2001 inasmuch as the said impugned judgment and order dated 3.12.2001 passed by the ADC (J) in Civil Appeal No. 3/91 was passed in a con­tinuous proceeding of case No. 113/89 passed by the DB's Court. (iv) A similar provisions as regards the appeal is provided under Section 107 of the CPC, 1908 particularly under clause (2) whereunder, the appellate Court has the power even to try a case as an original jurisdiction but such exercise of power does not take away the inherent power of the appellate jurisdiction. (v) An appeal is an extension of earlier proceeding and it has the power to exer­cise even in the original jurisdiction. The power to try the case de novo under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules is inherent and as such, by trying the case de novo, it would not take away the power of the appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, an order passed in an appeal filed under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules cannot be treated as an original de­cision and as such, the instant appeal be­fore this Court which has been registered as First Appeal cannot be treated as an Appeal against an original decision. A First Appeal under Rule 29 of the 1937 Rules before this Court is maintainable only against the original decision of the Deputy Commissioner. A First Appeal under Rule 29 of the 1937 Rules before this Court is maintainable only against the original decision of the Deputy Commissioner. Since the impugned judg­ment and order dated 3.12.2001 is not an original decision, the instant first appeal under Rule 29 of the Rules is not main­tainable before this Court and as such it is liable to be dismissed on this score alone. 8. The admissibility of the present appeal has been questioned on the ground of estop­pel also. It is contended that the learned Court below acted illegally in going for de novo trial of the case. However, both the parties ac­cepted the order to try the case de novo and they filed the respective suggested issues and accordingly, altogether six issues were framed and after examining all the issues and appre­ciation of evidence available on record, the learned Court below passed the impugned order dated 3.12.2001. Both the parties par­ticipated in the trial as per order dated 22.7.1991. If any party is/was aggrieved by order dated 22.7.1991, they could have agi­tated/challenged the same before the appro­priate Court at that relevant point of time. Since the appellants have participated in the proceeding without challenging the order dated 22.7.1991 for de novo trial, they are stopped from questioning the impugned judgment and order. 9. The provisions for de novo trial has been provided under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules. It is felt apt and necessary to reproduce below the said Rule for consideration of the present case. "31. An appeal shall lie from the decision of the Mauzadar, Gaonbura, Chief Headman of Khel or other duly recognized Village Authori­ties (to the tribal that Court whenever consti­tuted or otherwise) to the Deputy Commissioner or his Assistant. A record shall be made of the matter in dispute and the decision of the Village authorities. If necessary the Court shall exam­ine the parties, and if, the decision appears to be just, shall affirm and enforce it as one of its own. If the Court sees reason to doubt the jus­tice of the decision, it will try the case de novo, or refer it to a Panchayat as above." 10. In the present case the plaintiffs/re­spondents approached the Village Court and defendants/appellants contested the case upon which oral decision was given on 30.8.1989 by the Village Court. The deci­sion went in favour of the plaintiffs/respon­dents. In the present case the plaintiffs/re­spondents approached the Village Court and defendants/appellants contested the case upon which oral decision was given on 30.8.1989 by the Village Court. The deci­sion went in favour of the plaintiffs/respon­dents. The defendants appellants approached the DB's Court by filing case No. 113 of 1989 by way of an appeal and it was decided in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents by judg­ment and order dated 29.6.1990 passed in case No. 113 of 1989. The defendants then filed Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1990 against the order of the DB's Court. The said Civil Ap­peal was disposed of by the ADC(J) by judg­ment and order dated 11.3.1991 setting aside the DB Court's order dated 29.6.1990. It was held that the DB's Court had no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal against the decision of the Village Court/Council and under the said circumstances defendants/appellants were directed to file appeal against the Vil­lage Court's decision dated 30.08.89. In view of the judgment dated 11.3.91 passed in Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1990, the judgment dated 29.6.90 passed by the DB's Court in case No. 113/89 became none existent and enforceable in the eye of law. The learned ADC(J) clearly directed the defendants/ap­pellants to file appeal against the Village Court's decision dated 30.8.89. It may be noted that there was no plaint or written state­ment filed by the plaintiff and defendants be­fore the Village Court and the said Village Court rendered oral decision only. The learned ADC (J) misdirected himself in passing the judgment dated 11.3.1991 directing the de­fendants/appellants to file an appeal against the village Court's decision inasmuch as the order of the DB's Court dated 29.6.1990 rendered non-existent. The learned ADC (J) should have directed the defendants/appel­lants to file a case/suit instead of directing to file appeal against the oral decision of the Vil­lage Court. 11. It is an admitted fact that the defen­dants/appellants in compliance to judgment and order dated 11.3.1991 passed by the ADC (J), filed the Civil Suit No. 3 of 1991 on 4.4.1991 and after serving notice and hearing the parties passed an order on 22.7.1991 for de novo trial. It is verified from the records that the learned ADC(J) passed the aforesaid order as he found that the Lower Court could not frame the issue and the de novo trial was ordered in the interest of civil justice. It is verified from the records that the learned ADC(J) passed the aforesaid order as he found that the Lower Court could not frame the issue and the de novo trial was ordered in the interest of civil justice. The relevant portion of the said order is quoted below: "... On going through the records of the lower Court, it is necessary to set aside the lower Court decision as the lower Court could not frame the issue while deciding the issues. There­fore, in the interest of civil justice de novo trial is ordered fixing 24.7.1991 for framing of issues." The learned ADC (J) took up the matter by himself for disposal. He framed as many as six issues and recorded the evidence of witnesses examined by the parties. The par­ties also proved and exhibited some docu­ments including history of establishment of Chuchuyimpang dated 29.11.1946 (in origi­nal) and upon hearing the parties delivered the impugned judgment and order dated 3.12.2001 holding that plaintiff/respondents is entitled to decree. 12. The civil appeal No.3 of 1991 came up to be decided/disposed of vide impugned judgment and order dated 3.12.2001 by the ADC (J). There is nothing to dispute that in the proceeding offirst Appeal, the First Ap­pellate Court can examine the parties and their witnesses like the trial Court inasmuch as the First Appeal is considered to be continuation of the proceedings of the trial Court. In that view of the matter, the learned ADC(J) com­mitted no legal wrong in disposing the afore­said First Appeal in recording evidence of the witnesses and on appreciation of the evidence so recorded. The legality, correctness or oth­erwise of the judgment and order passed by the learned ADC(J) in the aforesaid First Appeal could be considered by this Court only if it is found that the present appeal is maintainable under the existing law. 13. The discussions so far made as above leaves no doubt that the learned ADC(J) passed the impugned judgment and order dated 8.12.2001 in a de novo proceeding as a First Appeal. The question that has arisen now is as to whether against the First Appel­late Court's order another First Appeal as has been pursued, could be preferred ? Rule 34 of the 1937 Rules provides provisions for appeal before the Flight Court or Deputy Com­missioner in certain cases. To make the point clear, Rule 34 is quoted below. "34. The question that has arisen now is as to whether against the First Appel­late Court's order another First Appeal as has been pursued, could be preferred ? Rule 34 of the 1937 Rules provides provisions for appeal before the Flight Court or Deputy Com­missioner in certain cases. To make the point clear, Rule 34 is quoted below. "34. The High Court or Deputy Commis­sioner may, on application or otherwise, call for the proceedings of any case decided by any officer subordinate to him and pass such order as he may deem fit. An appeal shall lie to the Deputy Commis­sioner against the decision of any of his Assis­tants (and of any tribal) and to the High Court against an original decision of the Deputy Com­missioner, if the value of the suit be rupees five hundred or over, or if the suit involve a ques­tion of tribal rights or customs or of right to, or possession of immovable property: Provided that the petition of appeal accom­panied by a copy of the order appealed against and by a clear statement of the grounds of ap­peal be filed within 30 days from the date of decision, excluding the time required for obtain­ing a copy of the decision. An appeal which lies to the High Court may be presented to the Deputy Commissioner, who shall, if it be in order and presented in due time, endorse upon it the date of receipt and transmit it with the records of the case to the High Court. The decree of the appellate Court shall be transferred to the Court passing the original order for execution as a decree of its own." 14. From the above Rules it does not ap­pear that another round offirst Appeal be­fore the High Court against the appellate or­der of the ADC(J) is contemplated or pro­vided. What is clearly provided is that appeal would like to the High Court against an origi­nal decision of the Deputy Commissioner if the value of the suit be Rs. 500/- or above or if the suit involves a question of tribal rights or customs or right to, or possession of , immov­able property. Inspite of such clear position in the 1937 Rules, the appellants defendants have preferred the present appeal before this Court which is not contemplated or provided under 1937 Rules. 15. 500/- or above or if the suit involves a question of tribal rights or customs or right to, or possession of , immov­able property. Inspite of such clear position in the 1937 Rules, the appellants defendants have preferred the present appeal before this Court which is not contemplated or provided under 1937 Rules. 15. I would now consider as to whether the ratio of decision in Medenkaba (supra) is applicable to the present case. In the said case, learned Divisional Bench of this Court, while considering the question of law as to whether once the party having resorted to Rule 34 of the 1937 Rules by way of appeal or revision before the Deputy Commissioner, further appeal or revision to the Court will lie held that if the party has already appealed under Rule 34, the remedy by way of Revi­sion under the First part of the Rule to the High Court will still be available. It was also held that if the party directly approached the High Court either in appeal or revision under the Rule no further remedy will be available in the High Court. Before making any con­sideration on applicability of the aforesaid law to the present case, it is necessary to have a look on the facts of the aforesaid cases. It was a case where the plaintiff and petitioner instituted a declaratory suit in Dobasis Court at Mokokchung, claiming inter alia, that they being the legal heirs of the clan were eligible to use certain names and the defendants-re­spondents were not entitlted to use the said names. The Dobasis Court having decided against the plaintiffs-petitioners, they preferred an appeal under Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules. The learned ADC(J) having reason to doubt the justice of the decision, decided that the case be tried de novo and transferred to the Court of Assistant to the Deputy Commis­sioner, Mokokchung to try it de novo and the learned Assistant to the Deputy Commis­sioner by the judgment dated 18.1.1978 dis­missed the suit with cost. Against the said judgment of the Assistant to the Deputy Commis­sioner, the plaintiffs-petitioners appealed un­der Rule 34 of 1937 Rules to the ADC(J) who dismissed the appeal as time barred and the plaintiffs/petitioners then approached the High Court by filing a revision petition under the same Rule 34 of 1937 Rules. Against the said judgment of the Assistant to the Deputy Commis­sioner, the plaintiffs-petitioners appealed un­der Rule 34 of 1937 Rules to the ADC(J) who dismissed the appeal as time barred and the plaintiffs/petitioners then approached the High Court by filing a revision petition under the same Rule 34 of 1937 Rules. In the aforecited case there was no occasion to file any appeal before the learned Deputy Com­missioner or the ADC(J) against any original order passed in a suit. The plaintiff/petitioner in the aforessiad case admittedly filed the re­vision petition before the High Court against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in appeal preferred against the order of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner. But in the present case the defendants/appellants filed the First Appeal before the High Court against the order of the First Appellate Court i.e. the judgment of the ADC(J) without filing any revision petition. In my considered view the defendants/appellants should have ap­proached this Court by way offiling revision petition or second appeal against the appel­late order of the learned ADC(J). As per the decision in the aforecited case, the defendants/ appellants are permitted to file revision peti­tion before the High Court but they have pre­ferred to file the First Appeal which is not permissible under the 1937 Rules or under the provisions of the CPC. During the course of argument, Mr. Jamir, learned senior coun­sel referred to decision in Neiloulhou G. B. & Anr. Vs. Khrielhoulie & Party, reported in 2009 (5) GLT139, on the basis of which Mr. Jamir, learned counsel further submits that a major amendment was brought into force in the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland, 1937 by way of enacting the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland (Third Amendment), Act, 1984 (Nagaland Act No. 1) of 1987 ( here­inafter referred to as Amended Act in short). As per Amended Act, Rule 34 of the 1937 Principal Rules has been substituted by Rule 29 of the Amended Rules which reads as fol­lows: "29(1) An appeal shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner against a decision of any of his Assistants and to the High Court against origi­nal decision of the Deputy Commissioner, if the value of the suit of Rs. 500/- or over, or of right to, or possession of immovable property provided that a petition of appeal accompanied by a copy of the order appealed against and by a clear statement of the ground of appeal be filed within 30 days from the date of decision excluding the time required for obtaining a copy of the decision: (2) An appeal which lies to the High Court may be presented to the Deputy Commissioner, who shall if it be in order and presented in due time, endorse upon it the date of receipt and transmit it with the record of the case of the High Court. (3) The decree of the appellate Court shall be transferred to the Court passing the original order for execution as a decree of its own." 16. In the amended Act, Rule 34 of the 1937 Rules i.e. the principal Rules has been deleted. In the aforecited case it has been held that since the Rule is silent with regard to sec­ond Appeal or Revision and in clear unam­biguous words written as "an appeal shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner against the de­cision of any of his Assistants, "in the Rules, has been stated, an appeal shall lie to the Deputy Commissoner against a decision of any of his Assistants regardless of whether the decision is an order under appeal or oth­erwise. In the aforecited case an Assistant to Deputy Commissioner passed an order on 16.12.2008 in a civil appeal No.2 of 2008 against which an appeal was filed before the ADC (J) under Rule 29 of the Amended Rules. The learned ADC (J) in the said case came to a conclusion that the said appeal was not maintainable under Rule 29 and dismissed the same, against which aforesaid revision peti­tion was filed before this Court. The circum­stances under which the instant First Appeal has been filed is quite different from the ones mentioned in above cited case in that the present appeal has been filed against an or­der of the ADC( J) passed in appeal case and not against any order passed by an original Court. It was not passed by any Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner either. It was not passed by any Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner either. It must be noted that the present case originated from Village Court to DB's Court and then to ADC(J) and at no point of time it was taken up by an Assistant to D.C. Due to this rea­son, I am of the considered view that the de­cision rendered in the aforesaid case would not cover the present case. An appeal shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner and I hold that the appellants/defendants have no other alternative but to approach the High Court by way of a revision petition or second ap­peal. In the alternative, if the decision of the learned Single Bench in the aforesaid case is to be applied, the appellant, at best have to file a revision petition against the impugned order of the learned ADC(J) taking the said order either as an original order or as an or­der passed in appeal. In either case, the ap­pellants have to file revision petition, and not otherwise, before the High Court against the impugned order of the ADC (J). 17. The result of the aforesaid discussions leads me to hold that the present appeal would not lie before the High Court inasmuch as the same is not maintainable. It has become re­dundant to enter into the merit of the case and to dispose of the present case on merit. The appeal, as not being maintainable under the law, stands dismissed. Ordered accord­ingly. No order as to costs. 18. Registry shall return the LCR forth­with.