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2011 DIGILAW 6 (PNJ)

Ranjit Singh v. State Of Haryana

2011-01-03

RANJIT SINGH

body2011
Judgment Ranjit Singh, J. 1. I have had the privilege of going through the judgement prepared in this case and have felt the urge of expressing myself in view of the importance of issues involved in this case. 2. The writ petition was filed simply to challenge the order passed on 25.8.2000 (Annexure P-7) by Assistant Collector Ist Grade, vide which the Assistant Collector has not only directed eviction of the petitioner but has imposed a penalty of Rs. 10,000/- per hectare per year upon him from 1993 onwards. The petitioner filed an appeal against the same, as per his rights under Section 13-B of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (for short, "the Act"), which was dismissed primarily on the ground that the petitioner had not deposited the compensation, as ordered, before filing the appeal. It is observed that the appeal, as such, could not be heard. 3. The Writ petition is filed for quashing of orders dated 22.7.2003 and 25.8.2000. Additional prayer is to issue a writ, order or direction, which this Court may deem just fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, there is no challenge made to the provisions of Section 13-B of the Act or the proviso contained therein, which lays down the requirement of pre-deposit of the penalty, as imposed, as an essential condition to file the appeal. Apparently, the challenge to the impugned orders is only based on the facts as urged in the petition. 4. The need to consider the issue arose because of the reference made by the Division Bench before which the writ petition came up for hearing on 18.11.2008. Even though there was no challenge to that part of Section 13-B of the Act, which required the petitioner to deposit the penalty, yet the Division Bench apparently felt that the issue in regard to interpretation of Section 13-B of the Act confronted the Court. Since two earlier Division Benches of this Court had taken different views, the Bench, noticing this conflict admitted the case for decision by a Full Bench. Since two earlier Division Benches of this Court had taken different views, the Bench, noticing this conflict admitted the case for decision by a Full Bench. The admission order is as under:- "Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner has impugned the order passed by the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Yamuna Nagar, dated 25.8.2000 (Annexure P-7), whereby the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Yamuna Nagar, while ordering the eviction of the petitioner under Section 7(2) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Village Common Lands Act) imposed a penalty of Rs.l0,000/- per hectare per year on the petitioner from the year 1993. Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner has also impugned the order dated 22.7.2003 passed by the Collector, Yamuna Nagar, declining to entertain the appeal preferred by the petitioner on account of the fact, that the petitioner had not deposited the penalty imposed by the Assistant Collector First Grade, Yamuna Nagar, vide his order dated 25.8.2000. The issue that confronts this Court in the disposal of the instant writ petition is the interpretation of Section 13-B of the Village Common Lands Act. A Division Bench of this Court in Satbir Singh and another v. The Collector, Jhajjar and others (Civil Writ Petition No. 15930 of 2008, decided on 8.9.2008) has held, that it is imperative for an individual who desires to raise a challenge by preferring an appeal under Section 13-B of the Village Common Lands Act, to deposit the entire penalty amount. As against the aforesaid determination in Satbir Singhs case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court in Sehaj Ram v. The Collector, Yamuna Nagar (Civil Writ Petition No.13468 of 2007, decided on 28.8.2007) has concluded, that it is not necessary for a person aggrieved by an order passed under Section 7(2) of the Village Common Lands Act to deposit the penalty amount as a prerequisite for preferring an appeal under Section 13-B of the Village Common Lands Act. In view of an apparent conflict in the views expressed by two Division Benches of this Court, we consider it just and appropriate to require Honble the Chief Justice to constitute a Full Bench for resolving the controversy. Admitted to Full Bench. It has been noticed in the order passed by the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Yamuna Nagar, that the petitioner is in arrears of rent from the year 1993. Admitted to Full Bench. It has been noticed in the order passed by the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Yamuna Nagar, that the petitioner is in arrears of rent from the year 1993. The appellate order in the present case is dated 22.7.2003. It is, therefore, apparent that the petitioner has continued in possession without paying any rent to respondent No.4 i.e. The Gram panchayat, Tajewala. Since it is not possible for us to express any view, one way or the other at the present juncture, we consider it just and appropriate to direct the petitioner to file an affidavit in this Court, that in case, the instant writ petition is decided against the petitioner, he will deposit the arrears of rent as have been determined by the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Yamuna Nagar ( vide his order dated 25.8.2000) within two months of the said decision. Affidavit be filed within two weeks from today. In case, an affidavit as stated hereinabove, is filed by the petitioner duly authenticated by his counsel, the interim order passed in favour of the petitioner on 17.12.2004 shall continue till further orders, failing which the petitioner shall hand over the vacant possession of the land in question to the Gram panchayat, Tajewala, forthwith (after the expiry of the period of two weeks afforded to the petitioner to file an affidavit)." 5. Accordingly, a Full Bench was constituted and the writ petition came up for hearing before three Judges Bench on 5.3.2010. The need to constitute a Larger Bench was felt, when reliance was placed on some observations made by Full Bench of this Court in Jai Singh and others v. State ofHaryana and others (Civil Writ Petition No.5877 of 1992). In this regard, it is observed:- "We have gone through the judgment of the Fuil Bench in Jai Singhs case (supra) and found that the reasoning given in the judgment to uphold the condition of deposit of penalty amount as a pre-requisite for preferring an appeal under Section 13(B) of the Act of 1961 is largely based on the facts that most of the lawyers appearing for the petitioners did not raise any arguments with regard to the validity of that condition. In our view, the condition imposed under Section 13(B) of the Act of 1961 regarding deposit of the entire penalty amount as a condition precedent for filing an appeal requires to be examined independently because the interpretation would effect the rural population of the State as the said condition is a stringent condition of the deposit of the entire penalty amount which in number of cases cannot be afforded by poor farmers. Mere reference to judgments relating to deposit of entire house tax, excise, custom duty, income tax or even house tax cases before filing the appeal under various fiscal legislations may not have a direct bearing on the issue involved in this Full Bench reference which relates to the Agrarian Community. There is no power given to the appellate authority in appropriate cases to reduce the amount of penalty to be deposited or waive the deposit in a suitable case. This issue of the fettering of the jurisdiction of the appellate authority has not received the attention of the Full Bench. Accordingly, we are of the view that the findings recorded by a Full Bench in Jai Singhs case (supra) qua Section 13(B) of the Act of 1961 requires reconsideration by a Larger Bench of five Honble Judges of this Court. We order accordingly refer the issue involved in the present writ petition to a larger Bench consisting of five Honble Judges." 6. This is how the issue has now been considered by a Larger Bench. 7. Counsel appearing for the parties stuck to their different stands. The counsel for the petitioner and the amicus-curiae maintained that the proviso under Section 13-B of the Act being unreasonably onerous must be regarded as unconstitutional and struck down. On the other hand, the State counsel, by making reference to number of precedents, maintained that such or similar provisions have been upheld by the Honble Supreme Court in large number of cases and, thus, the same is constitutionally valid and would not call for any interference. Both sides have cited number of precedents in support of their respective stands and accordingly it has been viewed that this proviso would need to be read down to incorporate within it the power of the Appellate Authority to grant interim relief in appropriate cases where the ground so exists by passing a speaking order while normally insistence may be made on pre-deposit of penalty. 8. 8. Apparently, there would be no need to read down Section 13-B of the Act as such, and need would only be to read down the proviso contained under the Section. That need would also arise only if it is considered that this proviso is either unfair, harsh or otherwise making the right of appeal, as such, illusionary. To save the proviso from being invalidated, the aid of the concept of reading down the provision may have to be adopted. 9. It would be appropriate to consider the rigors of the proviso. The amicus-curiae has submitted with lot of stress that this provision has sufficiently negated the right of appeal and is a fetter imposed on the right and, thus, is unconstitutional. 10. In view of the precedents cited and noticed like of State of Gujarat v. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh, 2003 (4) RCR (Criminal) 488 SC and James Joseph v. State of Kerala, 3 Civil Appeal No.7207 of 2010, it can be stated that right to appeal is not a natural, inherent or a vested right but exists only as a legislative privilege to be granted or withheld as seems best to the law making body. It is also true that under common law, appeal is a right conferred by a statute and does not exist unless so provided. It is required to be kept in mind that despite being a right having arisen in equity, it is not inalienable. Once provided, it is valuable, substantial and guarded in law. In Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Jawahar D. Mehta v. Collector of Customs (Preventive) Bombay, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2010, it is observed that right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice, the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant. Even in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, AIR 1999 SC 1818, it is observed that right of appeal is the creature of a statute and it is for the legislature to decide whether the right of appeal should be unconditionally given to an aggrieved parry or it should be conditionally given. Right of appeal, which is, a statutory right, can be conditional or qualified, 11. Right of appeal, which is, a statutory right, can be conditional or qualified, 11. From the above, the right of appeal and its nature is clearly made out. It can not be a matter of dispute that it being a right under the statute, can be a conditional one. That being a legal position, it would require consideration if the condition imposed while providing a right of appeal could be so unreasonable so as to defeat the very right, which is being provided by a statute. This issue, in the present case, is required to be examined in the background that the right of appeal has been provided by the statute is a conditional one and, thus, it is not a case where the statute has not made a provision for appeal. Section 13-B of the Act has made a provision for appeal and revision and this right is created by a statute in the following terms:- "13-B. Appeal and revision:- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Collector of the first grade may, within a period of thirty days from the date of order passed under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 7 prefer an appeal to the Collector in such form and manner, as case may be prescribed, and the Collector may after hearing the appeal, confirm, vary or reverse the order as he deems fit." 12 After providing this right, the same is made conditional by the proviso made thereunder, which reads as unden- "Provided that no such appeal shall lie unless the amount of penalty, if any, imposed under sub-section (2) of Section 7, is deposited with the Collector." 13. The issue is, thus, about the proviso. The right to make the appeal being conditional perhaps is not disputed. The submission is that this condition as imposed through this proviso is onerous and has rendered the right of appeal provided by the statute to be illusionary. 14. The proviso has been worded to say that appeal shall not lie, unless the amount of penalty is deposited with the Collector. It is the very maintainability of the appeal, which is put to question and in a way, this proviso may lead to taking away the right of appeal and revision, which is provided under the statute. 15. 14. The proviso has been worded to say that appeal shall not lie, unless the amount of penalty is deposited with the Collector. It is the very maintainability of the appeal, which is put to question and in a way, this proviso may lead to taking away the right of appeal and revision, which is provided under the statute. 15. Mr.Rahul Sharma, Amicus-curiae, has made reference not only to the principle with regard to interpretation of right to appeal but has cited number of precedents to support his contention that the proviso is harsh and is taking away the right of appeal provided by the statute and hence, should be struck down. Reference is made to the Corpus Juris Secundum and it is urged that statutory provision relating to appeal must be interpreted in a manner that the Court perceive the legislature intended, and under applicable general rules of construction, a statute or a constitutional provision conferring, extending or regulating the right of appeal, should be liberally construed in favour of the right so as to preserve and maintain the right to appeal. It can further be observed that the provisions conferring the right to appeal must, in the interest of justice, be liberally construed in favour of the right. The substantial requirements of the statute must be complied with. While it is important to preserve the right, the legislative intend reflects itself in the procedure as well. Therefore, the sanctity of the procedure must be preserved to. It is the prerogative of the legislature to impose condition to avail the remedy but such conditions must be reasonable and must not be to the detrimental of the right or the litigant. It has also been observed that while the statute prescribing time and manner of procedure are to be strictly construed but still it is held that construction causing unnecessarily expense to litigant is not to be adopted. These being the parameters available under law, the sweep of the proviso made under Section 13-B of the Act may have to be tested in this background. 16. Mr.Sharma has made reference to some precedents in support of his submission. In Shyam Kishore & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ann, 6 AIR 1992 Supreme Court 2279, the provisions of Section 169 and 170 of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act were under consideration. 16. Mr.Sharma has made reference to some precedents in support of his submission. In Shyam Kishore & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ann, 6 AIR 1992 Supreme Court 2279, the provisions of Section 169 and 170 of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act were under consideration. Section 170 of the said Act lays down the conditions regarding right to appeal, which is provided under Section 169. As per Section 170, no appeal is to be heard or determined unless the amount, if any, in dispute in appeal has been deposited by the appellant in the office of Corporation. This was besides some other conditions for bringing the appeal within 30 days etc. The contention raised before the Honble Supreme Court was that as per the provisions noted above, the appeal will have to be dismissed in limine if the tax in dispute is not paid aiongwith the memorandum of appeal and that would place a very onerous condition on the right of appeal particularly in cases where there is substantial amount involved in appeal and the points raised in appeal are really contentious and debatable. 17. Against this, the plea of the Corporation was that validity of similar provisions have been upheld in number of cases. After making reference to the decision in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 1975 (3) SCR 220 and Vijay Prakash Mehtas case (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that it had occasion to consider only the vires of milder provisions which permitted the Appellate Authority to waive or relax the condition of deposit. Reference is also made to Nand Lal and another v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 2097, in regard to the proposition that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and there is no reason why the legislature while granting the right can not impose condition for exercise of such rights so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restriction rendering the right almost illusionary. It is also noticed that the Courts in these cases had no occasion to consider what the position would be if the conditions placed on the tight to appeal were unduly onerous or such as to render the appeal totally illusionary. It is also noticed that the Courts in these cases had no occasion to consider what the position would be if the conditions placed on the tight to appeal were unduly onerous or such as to render the appeal totally illusionary. Having made reference to these cases, the words used in Section 170 (b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act were held capable of broader interpretation. The expression used in the Section heard or determined brought and admitted were held to have some significance. It is held that it would sound plausible to say that such an appeal can be admitted or entertained but only can not be heard or disposed of without pre-deposit of the disputed tax. Such an interpretation was held to provide some much needed relief from the harshness of the provisions. In this regard, the following observations would need notice:- "It seems to us the words of S. 170(b) are capable of a broader interpretation. A perusal of S. 170 shows that the section uses three different expressions "heard or determined", "brought" and "admitted" in relation to an appeal and some significance is to be attached to the use of the expression "heard and determined". In like situations, other statutes such as the one considered by this Court in Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Assistant Commr. Of Sales Tax, AIR 1968 SC 488 and those contained in certain other enactments like the Bombay and Calcutta Municipal Acts specifically prohibit the very entertainment of the appeal if the tax is not paid. When the DMC Act has carefully avoided the use of that word, we must give full effect to the differential wording. Also, the absence of a language in Cl. (b) of the proviso similar to that in Cl. (a) which indicates that an appeal filed beyond the period of limitation will not stand admitted unless the delay is condoned also warrants an inference that the payment of disputed tax is not a condition precedent to the entertainment or admission of the appeal. In the present statutory context, it sounds plausible to say that such an appeal can be admitted or entertained but only cannot be heard or disposed of without re-deposit of the disputed tax. Such an interpretation will provide some much needed relief from the harshness of the provision. In the present statutory context, it sounds plausible to say that such an appeal can be admitted or entertained but only cannot be heard or disposed of without re-deposit of the disputed tax. Such an interpretation will provide some much needed relief from the harshness of the provision. These are not days in which the calculation of the property tax is simple and uncomplicated the determination of the annual value of the property, except when based on the actual rent received from the property, involves various subjective factors and, not unoften, there is a wide gulf between the tax admitted to be due and the tax demanded. Sometimes, to compel the assessee to pay up the demanded tax for several years in succession might very well cripple him altogether. This apart, an assessee may not be able to deposit the tax while filing the appeal but may be able to pay it up within a short time, or at any rate, before the appeal comes on for hearing in the normal course. There is no reason to construe the provision so rigidly as to disable him from doing this. Again when an appeal comes on for hearing, the appellate judge, in appropriate cases, where he feels there is some great hardship or injustice involved, may be inclined to adjourn the appeal for some time to enable the assessee to pay up the tax. Though it will not be expedient or proper to encourage adjournment of an appeal, where it is ripe for hearing otherwise, only on this ground and as a matter of course, an interpretation which leaves some room for the exercise of a judicial discretion in this regard, where the equities of the case deserve it, may not be inappropriate. The appellate judges incidental and ancillary powers should not be curtailed except to the extent specifically precluded by the statute. We see nothing wrong in interpreting the provision as permitting the appellate authority to adjourn the hearing of ths appeal thus giving time to the assessee to pay the tax or even specifically granting time or instalments to enable the assessee to deposit the disputed tax where the case merits it, so long as it does not unduly interfere with the appellate Courts calender of hearings. His powers, however, should stop short of staying the recovery of the tax till the disposal of the appeal. His powers, however, should stop short of staying the recovery of the tax till the disposal of the appeal. We say this because it is one thing for the judge to adjourn the hearing leaving it to the asses:ee to pay up the tax before the adjourned date or permitting the assessee to pay up the tax, if he can, in accordance with his directions before the appeal is heard. In doing so, he does not and cannot injunct the department from recovering the tax, if they wish to do so. He is only giving a chance to the assessee. to pay up the tax if he wants the appeal to be heard. It is, however, a totally different thing for the judge to stay the recovery till the disposal of the appeal; that would result in modifying the language of the proviso to read: "no appeal shall be disposed of until the tax is paid." Short of this, however, there is no reason to restrict the powers unduly; all he has to do is to ensure that the entire tax in dispute is paid up by the time the appeal is actually heard on its merits. We would, therefore, read CI. (b) of S. 170 only as a bar to the hearing of the appeal and its disposal on merits and not as a bar to the entertainment of the appeal itself." 18. It may need a notice here that the Honble Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Judges, incidental and ancillary power should not be curtailed except to the extent specifically precluded by the statute. The Honble Supreme Court, thus, interpreted the provision in the manner as above suggested and observed that while doing so, one can steer clear of above problems of constitutional validity. The contention raised on behalf of the Corporation to read the provision rigidly and to soften the rigors by reference to the availability of recourse to the High Court by way of petition under Articles 226 and 227 in certain situations was not considered satisfactory solution. The Honble Supreme Court ultimately wished that the statute itself be amended to mle this provision clear. 19. In Anant Mills Co.Ltd. s case (supra), Section 406 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, was under consideration. The Honble Supreme Court ultimately wished that the statute itself be amended to mle this provision clear. 19. In Anant Mills Co.Ltd. s case (supra), Section 406 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, was under consideration. The provision in regard to deposit of the amount in dispute for entertaining the appeal as contained in Section 406 (2) (e) is as under:- "(e) in the case of an appeal against a tax, or in the case of an appeal made against a rateable value, the amount of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant, or the amount of the tax chargeable on the basis of the disputed rateable value, up to the date of filing the appeal, has been deposited by the appellant with the Commissioner: Provided that where in any particular case the Judge is of the opinion that the deposit of the amount by the appellant will cause undue hardship to him, the Judge may in his discretion dispense with such deposit or part thereof, either un-conditionally or subject to such conditions as he may deem fit." 20. The Honble Supreme Court did not accept the argument that the impugned provision has the effect of creating a discrimination as is offensive to the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is observed that requirement about the deposit of amount claimed as a condition precedent to the entertainment of an appeal, which seeks to engage the imposition or the quantum of that tax was not found to have an effect of nullifying the right of appeal, especially when the discretion is vested in the Appellate Judge to dispense with the compliance of above requirement. Thus, the reason which primarily weighed with the Court to uphold the requirement of pre-deposit of the tax was the discretion which had been given to the Appellate Judge to relieve the appellant from the rigor of the above provision in case the Judge was of the opinion that it would cause undue hardship to the appellant. 21. Reference here may also be made to the case of Gujarat Agra Industries Co. Ltd. (supra). In this case, the decision of Division Bench of Gujarat High Court, holding Section 406(2)(e) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, in its application to Ahmedabad in the State of Gujarat to be valid piece of legislation was under challenge. 22. 21. Reference here may also be made to the case of Gujarat Agra Industries Co. Ltd. (supra). In this case, the decision of Division Bench of Gujarat High Court, holding Section 406(2)(e) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, in its application to Ahmedabad in the State of Gujarat to be valid piece of legislation was under challenge. 22. Reference is made to the earlier decision of Division Bench of Gujarat High Court dated October 27, 1969, where Clause (e) was held violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The proviso accordingly was added to Clause (e) reproduced above, which came to be challenged before the Gujarat High Court on the same very plea that it is violative the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Division Bench held that Clause (e) violated Article 14 of the Constitution. This decision of the High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. s case (supra) and the decision of the High Court was reversed and Clause (e) with added proviso was held not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The amended Clause (e) and the proviso, which were subject matter of constitutional challenge in the High Court and the High Court holding the same to be constitutionally valid, was challenged before the Supreme Court in this case. Here again, it is the proviso which saved the provision of appeal being rendered illusionary. In this case, the conditions imposed to the maintainability of the appeal were not considered so harsh to make the right of appeal illusionary while upholding the provisions of pre-deposit in this regard. 23. From the above, it would be reasonable to construe that the right of appeal may be a statutory right but can not be rendered illusionary. Right of appeal is more or less a universal requirement of guarantee of life and liberty routed in the conception that the men are fallible and Judges are men and that making assurance doubly assured before irrevocable deprivation of life and liberty come to pass, a full scale re-examination of the facts and the law is made an integral part of fundamental fairness or procedure. Even Article 39A requires of a State to secure the operation of the legal system to promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity and to ensure that the opportunity of securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reasons of economic or other disabilities. Easy access to justice is an integral part of the right to move the Courts and it flows from the benevolent mandate of Article 39A. This Article expressly contemplates the existence of class of people who suffer from economic disabilities and has mandated the State to ensure that people belonging to that class are not deprived of access to justice. Accordingly, the provisions of Court Fees Act having classified litigants into those who are economically disabled and those who are not was held reasonable and permissible. Nobody is to be denied entry on account of huge court fees, particularly payable by the poorer section of the people. Doors of justice are not to be closed on ground of money. As observed in M/s Central Coal Fields Ltd. v. M/s Jaiswal Coal Co., AIR 1980 Supreme Court 2125, the right of effective access to justice has emerged in the third world countries as the first amongst the new social rights what with public interest litigation community based action and pro-bono public proceedings. Effective access to justice, thus, can be seen as the most basic requirement, the most basic human right of a system which proposed to guarantee legal rights. 24. While dealing with the absence of appeal, it has been observed that if the absence of appeal makes the whole procedure oppressive and arbitrary, the same can be condemned as unconstitutional. (See Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1986 SC 468). Having made a provision for appeal, the same can not be rendered illusionary by providing some stringent conditions. Since the right of appeal is a statutory right and as per various authoritative pronouncements, the same can be made a conditional right. It is only to be seen whether such conditions imposed are reasonable or would render the right to be illusionary. It is also to be kept in view that the liability in this case is due to not any tax or such like liability where pre-deposit may have to be insisted upon. It is only to be seen whether such conditions imposed are reasonable or would render the right to be illusionary. It is also to be kept in view that the liability in this case is due to not any tax or such like liability where pre-deposit may have to be insisted upon. The distinction has to be drawn where the cases relate to tax liability or the liability under the Custom Act and the one where penalty is imposed in respect of use or occupation of agriculture land. One has also to keep in mind that the provisions have been made under the Act while taking away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with such matters and had it not been so, the right of appeal may have been available irrespective of any condition. The harshness of the provision can also be judged from the fact that when appeal is filed against an order in favour of the occupant or the person in possession of the land purported to be that of the Panchayat etc., no such stringent condition would apply. 25. In M/s Central Coal Fields Ltd. $ case (supra), the Honble Supreme Court had observed that it may have to consider from the point of view of policy and constitutionality whether inflated price for access to Court justice is just or legal. These observations came to be made because even the Central Government itself found the pinch of the excessive court fee that it was required to pay and to circumvent the same, had adopted an indirect way to directly approach the Supreme Court. It was in this context observed by the Honble Supreme Court that while it is deplorable that some speculators gamble in litigation using the stratagem of pauperism, it is more deplorable that culture of magna carta, notwithstanding the anglo-Indian forensic system - and currently free Indias Court process-should insist on payment of court fee on such a profiteering scale without co-related expenditure on the administration of civil justice that the levies often smack of sale of justice in the Indian reguaranteed Constitutional, fundamental and legal system. 26. The penalty, as prescribed, lays down the minimum amount, and the maximum, thus, taking away the discretion of the authorities dealing with the case and the right of appeal made conditional would lead to the provision being harsh in nature. 26. The penalty, as prescribed, lays down the minimum amount, and the maximum, thus, taking away the discretion of the authorities dealing with the case and the right of appeal made conditional would lead to the provision being harsh in nature. This Section also has not made any provision as to what is to happen to the amount so deposited for entertaining the appeal, if ultimately appellant succeeds. The Section not only bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court but has given finality to the order passed and the same can not be questioned in any manner in any Civil Court. 27. In order to save the validity of this proviso, it may have to be read down for which there are precedents. As observed in Shyam Kishore s case (supra), the appellate Judge would have incidental and ancillary power, which should not be curtailed except to the extent specifically excluded by the statute. There is no indication in the proviso that jurisdiction of the appellate Judge is excluded altogether to waive the penalty and, thus, the inherent rights of the appellate Judge to waive the condition in appropriate case can be read into the provision. Some interpretation, which leaves some room for exercise of a judicial discretion, where equities deserve it, may be appropriate. The golden rule that in a statute dealing with ordinary people in every day life, the language is presumed to be used in its primary, ordinary sense, unless this stultifies the purpose of the statute or otherwise produces some injustice absurdities, anomaly or a contradiction in which case some secondary ordinary sense may be preferred so as to obviate the injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradiction or fulfill the purpose of the statute. One of the principle of construction of provision in such like cases, as already noticed, causing unnecessary expense to litigant, is not to be adopted. Thus, to avoid injustice and unnecessary expense, the proviso to the Section may have to be read down to include the right to waive the condition by the appellate Judge in an appropriate case.