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2011 DIGILAW 60 (GAU)

Sushil Chandra Majumder v. State Bank of India

2011-01-25

BROJENDRA PRASAD KATAKEY

body2011
JUDGMENT B.P. Katakey, J. 1. Heard Mr. Roy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, and Mr. S. Deb learned senior counsel for Respondent No. 1. Also heard Mrs. Lodh, learned State counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4. 2. The Petitioner, working as an Assistant Teacher in a Government school, by the present petition has challenged the communication dated 12 April, 2000 issued by the Inspector of Schools, Santir Bazaar, South Tripura, whereby and where-under a sum of Rs. 1500/- (Rupees one thousand and five hundred) only was directed to be deducted from the monthly salary of the Petitioner towards realization of loan taken from the Respondent Bank. 3. The Petitioner obtained a loan on 31 March, 1987 from the Respondent Bank at Santir Bazaar Branch, prior to his appointment as Assistant Teacher in the Government school, with the conditions stipulated in loan scheme as enumerated in communication dated 10 November 1986. Thereafter, on being selected for appointment as Assistant Teacher, he joined the service in the year 1989. While he was serving as such, the Inspector of Schools issued the impugned communication directing deduction of the aforesaid amount from the salary of the Petitioner towards the loan advanced to him by the Respondent bank, which action has been put to challenge in the present writ petition. 4. It has been submitted by learned Counsel for the Petitioner that since the loan obtained by the Petitioner prior to his employment has no relation with his employment, the Inspector of Schools has no jurisdiction to deduct any amount from the salary of Petitioner, as has been done by the impugned communication dated 12 April 2000. It has also been submitted that office memoranda dated 6 December 1994 and 19 June 1995 issued by the Joint Secretary, Finance Department as well as Director of School, Government of Tripura, respectively, cannot be applied in the case in hand for realization of any amount towards the loan availed by the Petitioner prior to his employment as Assistant Teacher. 5. Learned State counsel, appearing for the Respondent Nos. 5. Learned State counsel, appearing for the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 placing reliance on the office memoranda dated 6 December 1994 and 19 June 1995 has submitted that the Inspector of Schools has passed the impugned orders directing deduction of certain amount from the salary of Petitioner towards liquidation of the loan availed from the Respondent Bank, as the Petitioner has failed to repay the said amount. On a pointed query made, it has however been submitted that the said loan was availed by the Petitioner prior to his employment as Assistant Teacher. 6. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent No. 1, placing reliance on office memoranda dated 6 December 1994 and 19 June 1995 has also submitted that as the Petitioner has failed to repay the amount, no illegality has been committed by the Inspector of Schools by directing deduction of the said amount, keeping in view the fact that bank's fund is public money. It has also been submitted by learned senior counsel that since the office memoranda dated 6 December 1994 and 19 June 1995 have not been put to challenge, the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed in the writ petition. 7. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties. The office memoranda dated 6 December 1994 and 19 June 1995, which are the basis, according to learned Counsel for the Respondents, for making such deduction from the salary of the Petitioner, reveal that such deduction is permissible only when such loan is availed by an employee of the Government and there is a condition that on failure to repay the loan by such employee, the loan amount would be deducted by the drawing & disbursing officer. It is not in dispute that the Petitioner had availed the loan in the year 1987 prior to his employment as Assistant Teacher in a school run by the State Government. Therefore, naturally there is no stipulation in the loan agreement that on failure to repay the loan availed, the future employer would be entitled to deduct the same from the salary of the Petitioner. 8. Therefore, naturally there is no stipulation in the loan agreement that on failure to repay the loan availed, the future employer would be entitled to deduct the same from the salary of the Petitioner. 8. The contention of learned senior counsel that the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the absence of any challenge to the aforesaid office memoranda dated 6 December 1994 and 19 June 1995 cannot be accepted, as by those memoranda the concerned drawing & disbursing officer was allowed to deduct any amount from salary of an employee provided there is a stipulation in the loan agreement that the DDO would be at liberty to do so and such loan is availed by an employee of the Government, which is not the case at hand. The said memoranda, therefore, need not be challenged by the Petitioner. 9. That being the position, the office memoranda dated 6 December 1994 and 19 June 1995 cannot be applied for recovery of any amount from the salary of the Petitioner for liquidation of loan availed by him prior to his employment in a Government-run school. The action on the part of the Inspector of Schools as reflected in the communication dated 12 April 2000 is highly illegal, and therefore cannot be sustained in law. The Inspector of School has acted like an agent of the Respondent bank for realization of the loan, which was advanced to the Petitioner prior to his employment. 10. In view of the above, the communication dated 12 April 2000 is set aside and quashed. The amount already deducted from the salary of the Petitioner shall be refunded to him. The State Respondents shall pay a cost of Rs. 5000/- (Rupees five thousand) only to the Petitioner, for the illegal action on the part of the Inspector of Schools, which compelled the Petitioner to approach this Court and he was deprived of full salary for a long time. Such cost shall be paid within a period of one month from today. 11. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Petition allowed