JUDGMENT ( 1. ) HEARD learned advocate Shri Vaghela appearing for the petitioner, learned advocate Shri Majmudar for caveator-respondent no.5 and learned AGP for respondent no.1. ( 2. ) THE petitioner, Up-sarpanch of Bholav Gram Panchayat, has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 29.07.2011 passed by the respondent no.1 for the reasons stated in the memo of the petition. THE facts in brief leading to filing of this petition deserves to be set out as under. The petitioner happens to be Up-sarpanch of Bholav Gram Panchayat. On 10.02.2009, the application was made by the members of the Gram Panchayat to the Gram Panchayat as well as TDO in the prescribed form for convening the meeting of Panchayat for considering 'no confidence motion' against respondent no.5, the Sarpanch of Bholav Gram Panchayat. As stated by the petitioner in the petition, on 18.02.2009, the respondent no.5, Sarpanch addressed a letter to Talati, stating that there is no necessity for convening meeting for considering 'no confidence motion'. On 19.02.2009, the concerned Talati reported this fact to TDO. On 20.02.2009, the Taluka Development Officer nominated one Shri D.N. Parmar, of his office for conducting and witnessing the meeting, which was to be convened to deliberate upon the 'no confidence motion' against respondent no.5. The meeting was to be convened on 02.03.2009. ( 3. ) THE meeting of Panchayat was held on 02.03.2009, with 'no confidence motion' as one of the agenda item. Out of 26 members present, 24 members voted in favour of 'no confidence motion' and two members voted against it. On 03.03.2009, the Taluka Development Officer took note thereof and ordered that the charge of the post be taken by Deputy-Sarpanch. THE respondent no.5 challenged the resolution of 'no confidence motion' by filing Revision Application under Section 259 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), which came to be allowed by the State quashing and setting aside the resolution of 'no confidence motion' vide its order dated 28.04.2009. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with this order, the present petitioner and other members challenged the same by preferring Special Civil Application being S.C.A. No. 4436 of 2009, which came to be allowed on 26.06.2009 and the order dated 28.04.2009 passed by the State in Revision Application preferred by respondent no.5 was quashed and set aside. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with this order, the present petitioner and other members challenged the same by preferring Special Civil Application being S.C.A. No. 4436 of 2009, which came to be allowed on 26.06.2009 and the order dated 28.04.2009 passed by the State in Revision Application preferred by respondent no.5 was quashed and set aside. It is to be noted at this stage that the petition was allowed only on the ground that respondent no.5 should have filed appeal, as the respondent no.5 had not filed the appeal under Section 242 of the Act, the petition was allowed. ( 4. ) THE respondent no.5, therefore, preferred Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No. 2313 of 2009, which came to be dismissed on 23.11.2009. THE respondent no.5, thereafter preferred appeal under Section 242 of the Act, before the Appellate Committee of District Panchayat, challenging the resolution of 'no confidence motion' and as no stay order was granted in favour of the petitioner, the Appellate Committee heard the appeal and disposed of it in favour of the respondent no.5, by quashing and setting aside the resolution of 'no confidence' in its meeting dated 12.04.2010. THE secretary of District Panchayat did not sign the minutes of the meeting of Appellate Committee, wherein the resolution of 'no confidence' was quashed nor did he draw the necessary order based thereon, hence the respondent no.5 was constrained to prefer Special Civil Application being S.C.A. No. 5904 of 2010, seeking implementation of the order of the Appellate Committee, where under the resolution of 'no confidence' was quashed. THE petition was not entertained and dismissed on 20.09.2010, as the petitioner i.e. respondent no.5 in this petition had a remedy of availing appropriate direction under the Contempt of Court Act, as the Appellate Committee and all the concerned were directed by this Court in Special Civil Application preferred by the respondent no.5 for deciding the appeal within stipulated time and non signing of the minutes, quashing the motion of no confidence was prima facie held to be violative of the said order, as it was amounting to non compliance of the order of this Court for disposing of the appeal within stipulated time. A Miscellaneous Civil Application being M.C.A. No. 2658 of 2010 was filed by the respondent no.5, seeking appropriate direction, however the Division Bench did not entertain his contempt application on the ground that the petitioner-applicant i.e. respondent no.5 hereinabove, could take out appropriate remedy for having the order implemented. Thus, the respondent no.5 was constrained to prefer Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No. 133 of 2011 in S.C.A. No. 5904 of 2010, challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 20.09.2010, as the order did not leave any scope to the respondent no.5 for seeking redressal of his grievances. THE said Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No. 133 of 2011 in S.C.A. No. 5904 of 2010, came to be allowed on 07.02.2011 and the matter was remanded to the learned Single Judge. Thus, Special Civil Application being S.C.A. No. 5904 of 2010 came to be revived, as the matter was remanded by the Division Bench and ultimately the same was allowed on 01.03.2011, issuing direction to the DDO concerned to sign the minutes and accordingly the minutes were signed on 04.06.2011/07.06.2011. This is the order, which according to the present petitioner, is also required to be challenged, as now under this order the charge is sought to be taken from the present petitioner who otherwise, by virtue of operation of the statutory provision was entitled to hold charge of the post of Sarpanch. The present petitioner preferred Revision Application under Section 259 of the Act, challenging the order dated 04.06.2011 as well as 12.04.2010, passed by the Appellate Committee. The Revision Application whereon order of status quo was made on 09.06.2011 ultimately came to be turned down on 29.07.2011, it was turned down on the ground of non maintainability thereof. On 01.08.2011, as it is stated by the petitioner, the respondent no.5 approached Talati vide order dated 29.07.2011. The Talati-cum-Mantri forwarded letter on 01.08.2011 for seeking direction from DDO with regard to handing over the charge and to pass necessary orders. As per the say of the petitioner, DDO has not passed any order and charge was not handed over, which is disputed by respondent no.5 and submitted that respondent no.5 has taken over the charge. ( 5. The Talati-cum-Mantri forwarded letter on 01.08.2011 for seeking direction from DDO with regard to handing over the charge and to pass necessary orders. As per the say of the petitioner, DDO has not passed any order and charge was not handed over, which is disputed by respondent no.5 and submitted that respondent no.5 has taken over the charge. ( 5. ) THE learned advocate for the petitioner contended that the Revisional Authority could not have rejected the revision on the ground of its non-maintainability, as even the earlier revision filed by the present respondent no.5 had been entertained and allowed. THE learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that in this view of the matter, once the 'no confidence motion' is passed, then by virtue of operation of Section 56(2) of the Act, the Sarpanch would cease to be Sarpanch after three days thereof and this being a statutory provision, it could not have been set at naught by any authorities and in view of this, the petition was required to be filed for appropriate prayers and relieves against the action of respondent no.5 and other respondents in continuing him as Sarpanch. ( 6. ) LEARNED advocate for respondent no.5, on caveat, contended that the petitioner cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate, as it can be seen from the order made in the petition. It was the contention specifically taken by the present petitioner that the revision is not maintainable and respondent no.5 i.e. Sarpanch ought to have preferred appeal under Section 242 of the Act. Now, having once taken this stand and when the stand was upheld and respondent no.5 was thus constrained to file appeal, and having participated in appeal proceedings, then after losing in appeal, it would not be proper for him to contend that appeal was not maintainable. At this stage, Shri Vaghela, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner's contention all along is very consistent that the respondent no.5 could not have straightway filed revision without availing the remedy of appeal. This contention is upheld by this Court vide order dated 26.06.2009 in S.C.A. No. 4436 of 2009. This Court has heard learned advocate appearing for petitioner as well as caveator and learned AGP. This contention is upheld by this Court vide order dated 26.06.2009 in S.C.A. No. 4436 of 2009. This Court has heard learned advocate appearing for petitioner as well as caveator and learned AGP. It is important to note at this stage that the provision of Section 56(2) makes it abundantly clear that once the 'no confidence motion' is passed against the Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch, as the case may be, he shall cease to hold office after a period of three days from the date on which the motion is carried, unless he has resigned and the resignation has become effective earlier and thereupon the office held by him shall be deemed to have become vacant. It would be most appropriate to set out Section 56 for the ready reference. "56. Motion of no-confidence-(1) Any member who intends to move a motion of no confidence against the Sarpanch or the Up-sarpanch may give notice thereof in the prescribed form to the Panchayat concerned. If the notice is supported by one half of the total number of members of the Panchayat concerned, the motion may be moved. (2) Where in the case of the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch, the motion is carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the members of the panchayat, the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Up-sarpanch, shall cease to hold office after a period of three days from the date on which the motion is carried unless he has resigned and the resignation has become effective earlier; and thereupon the office held by him shall be deemed to have become vacant. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder a Sarpanch or, as the case may be, an Up-sarpanch, shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him, but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the right to vote). (4) When the offices of both the Sarpanch and Upa-sarpanch become vacant simultaneously, such Officer as the Taluka Development Officer may authorise in this behalf shall, pending the election of the Sarpanch, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions and duties of Sarpanch but he shall not have the right to vote in any meetings of the panchayat. (5)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 91 or 95 a meeting of the Panchayat for dealing with a motion of no confidence under this section shall be called within a period of fifteen days from the date on which the notice of such motion is received by the panchayat; (b) If the Sarpanch fails to call such meeting, the Secretary of the panchayat shall forthwith make a report thereof the competent authority and thereupon the competent authority shall call a meeting of the panchayat within a period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the report." ( 7. ) THERE exists identical provision in terms of Section 70 in respect of Taluka Panchayat and Section 84 in respect of District Panchayat. Once again, it would be expedient to set out provision of Section 70 and Section 84 of the Act, herein below for ready reference. "70. Motion of no confidence- (1) Any member who intends to move a motion of no confidence against the President or Vice-President may give a notice thereof in the prescribed form to the panchayat. If the notice is supported by such number of members as may be prescribed, the motion may be moved. (2) If the motion is carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the then members of the panchayat, the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, shall cease to hold office after a period of three days from the date on which the motion is carried, unless he has resigned earlier; and thereupon the office held by such President or Vice-President shall be deemed to be vacant. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder a President or Vice-President shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the right to vote). (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder a President or Vice-President shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the right to vote). (4)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 122, a meeting of the panchayat for dealing with a motion of no confidence under this Section shall be called within a period of fifteen days from the date on which a notice of such motion is received by the panchayat. (b) If the President of the panchayat fails to call such meeting, the Secretary of the panchayat shall make a report thereof to the competent authority and thereupon the competent authority shall call a meeting of the panchayat within a period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the report. "84. Motion of no confidence- (1) Any member who intends to move a motion of no confidence against the President or Vice-President may give a notice thereof in the prescribed form to the panchayat. If the notice is supported by such number of members as may be prescribed, the motion may be moved. (2) If the motion is carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the then members of the panchayat, the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, shall cease to hold office, after a period of three days from the date on which the motion was carried unless he has resigned earlier; and thereupon the office held by such President or Vice-President shall be deemed to be vacant. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder, a President or Vice-President shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him; but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the right to vote). (4)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 144, a meeting of the panchayat for dealing with a motion of no confidence under this Section shall be called within a period of fifteen days from the date on which a notice of such motion is received by the panchayat. (4)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 144, a meeting of the panchayat for dealing with a motion of no confidence under this Section shall be called within a period of fifteen days from the date on which a notice of such motion is received by the panchayat. (b) If the President of the panchayat fails to call such meeting, the Secretary of the panchayat shall make a report thereof to the competent authority and thereupon the competent authority shall call a meeting of the panchayat within a period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the report." ( 8. ) THUS, as could be seen from sub-section (2) of all the three provisions, the legislature has disentitled the Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch, President or Vice-president as the case may be, losing in 'no confidence motion' against him from continuing as such after three days of passing of such motion and created legislative deeming fiction that the office is deemed to have been vacated after three days, in case if the incumbent of office did not resign earlier thereto. In other words, the legislature has made it mandatory by introducing deeming fiction that the office of the person against whom the 'no confidence motion' is passed shall fall vacant after a period of three days from the date of passing of the motion. Therefore, now in light of these provisions, question arises as to whether, can there be any remedy said to exist, in form of appeal under Section 242 of the Act or revision in form of Section 259 of the Act. This Court (Coram: Jayant Patel, J.) in case of "Geetaben L. Rathwa Vs. State of Gujarat" in S.C.A. No. 14565 of 2003 decided on 10.03.2005, has in terms held that the revision under Section 259 of the Act, is not permissible for challenging the passing of notice of motion by the person against whom the same is passed, upon interpretation of Section 70 of the Act. The relevant paragraphs deserve to be reproduced hereunder: "7. The relevant paragraphs deserve to be reproduced hereunder: "7. In view of the aforesaid express language used by the legislature for carrying the motion of no-confidence and in view of the express contingencies provided under the Act in the event the motion is carried by the majority of not less than 2/3rds of the members in respect to cessation of the office by the President or Vice-President of the Panchayat, as the case may be, and in view of the express provisions made by the legislature for giving deeming fiction to make the office of the President and Vice-President as vacant, I am of the view that the power of the State Government under Section 259 of the Act cannot be attracted when it is a matter pertaining to carrying of the motion of no-confidence or otherwise. When the legislature itself provides for express language and giving effect to the carrying of the motion of no-confidence and the contingencies thereupon, it is not possible to agree with the submission that the State Government will have the revisional jurisdiction over the decision of the elected representatives in the matter of considering the motion of no-confidence or otherwise. As such, Section 70 of the Act provides for a complete mechanism of its own for reflecting the "will" of the elected representative in the President and Vice-President of the Panchayat. The State Government may have general power of superintendence which may include the revisional jurisdiction under Section 259 of the Act, but such revisional jurisdiction, if read with the State Government, in my view, may result into diluting the effect of carrying the motion by elected representation as provided under Section 70(2) of the Act and, therefore, I find that in a matter where the subject matter is pertaining to carrying of the motion of no-confidence under Section 70(2) of the Act, the power of the State Government under Section 259 of the Act would not be attracted. 8. There is one additional reason for taking the aforesaid view and the same is that in a matter to consider the motion of no-confidence it is the confidence of the elected representatives/members which is of paramount consideration. No procedure for holding of the meeting or otherwise can be allowed to operate so as to frustrate the real Will and desire of the elected representatives. No procedure for holding of the meeting or otherwise can be allowed to operate so as to frustrate the real Will and desire of the elected representatives. If the elected representatives have lost the confidence upon the President or Vice-President of the Panchayat, the only requirement would be to state as to whether such motion is carrying out or not. Even if it is presumed for the sake of consideration that there were some procedural lapse while convening the meeting and or of issuing the agenda and/or other procedural aspects, the same cannot be allowed to operate which results into nullifying the effect of the motion of no-confidence, which is otherwise passed by the requisite majority of the elected representatives, more particularly when the legislature itself has provided for the contingencies thereupon and the cession of the Office by the Office bearers against whom the motion of no-confidence is carried. The power under Section 259 of the Act of the State Government is largely concerned with the procedures to be adopted by the Panchayat for the purpose of maintenance of its record and the proceedings and in view of the aforesaid observations, as the proceedings and the procedure pertaining to the motion of no-confidence do not assume much importance in the matter of carrying the motion of no-confidence and giving its effect, even if the principles of purposive interpretation of the statute are considered, it would be reasonable to hold that the power of the State Government under Section 259 of the Act shall not be attracted in a matter where it is pertaining to carrying of the motion of no-confidence by the elected representatives or otherwise." As it is submitted by learned advocate for the petitioner that based upon the observation of this Court in S.C.A. No. 14565 of 2003, the State has issued resolution for not entertaining Revision Application in respect of notice of motion. Relying thereupon, the revision filed by the present petitioner was not entertained. Therefore, it was contended that, in case, if the revision was not to be entertained, then in the first instance itself, the State could not have entertained revision when respondent no.5 had filed Revision Application, challenging the notice of 'no confidence motion'. ( 9. ) IT is most expedient to set out herein below, the provisions of Sections 242, 243 249 and 259 of the Panchayat Act. ( 9. ) IT is most expedient to set out herein below, the provisions of Sections 242, 243 249 and 259 of the Panchayat Act. "242.Appeals against order of village panchayat.-(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, an appeal shall lie to the district panchayat against any order or decision of a village panchayat or taluka panchayat affecting any individual or institution. (2) Such appeal shall be made within a period of thirty days from the date of the order or decision. (3) The district panchayat may pass such order on the appeal as it may deem just and proper and the order on appeal shall be final. 243. Appeal Committee to exercise appellate powers of district panchayats.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 145, the appellate powers conferred on a district panchayat under section 104, 200 and 241 shall be exercisable by an Appeal Committee of the district panchayat, which shall consist of the President of the panchayat and four other members of the panchayats as may be chosen by the panchayat from amongst its members. (2) the President of the panchayat shall be ex-officio Chairman of the Appeal Committee. (3) The term of the Appeal Committee shall be two years. (4) A member chosen on the Appeal Committee may resign from membership of the Committee by tendering his resignation to the Chairman. (5) The State Government shall make-rules consistent with this Act to regulate the procedure that the Appeal Committee shall follow in exercising its appellate powers and such rules provide for- (a) The sitting of the members of the committee in benches constituted by the President or such other members of the committee as is authorised by him; and (b) the mode of settling differences of opinion which may arise between the members of a bench. (6) The appellate powers as aforesaid shall include power to grant temporary injunction or to issue a direction to stay the execution of the decision or order appealed against until the disposal of the appeal or to make such other interlocutory orders as may appear to be just and convenient and such power may be exercised by the Chairman of the Appeal Committee. (7) Any decision given by the Appeal Committee in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by this section shall be deemed to be the decision of the district panchayat. 249. (7) Any decision given by the Appeal Committee in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by this section shall be deemed to be the decision of the district panchayat. 249. Suspension of execution of order:- (1)If, in opinion of the the Taluka Development Officer the execution of any order or resolution of a panchayat subordinate to the taluka panchayat or the doing of anything which is about to be done, or is being by or on behalf of such panchayat, is unlawful, he may by order in writing suspend, the execution or prohibit the doing thereof. (2)When Taluka Development Officer makes an order under sub-section (1) he shall forthwith send to the panchayat affected thereby a copy of the order with a statement of the reasons therefore. (3)The Taluka Development Officer shall forthwith submit to the District Development Officer a report of every case occurring under this section and the District Development Officer may revise or modify any order made therein and make in respect thereof any other order which the Taluka Development Officer could have made. (4) The District Development Officer in respect of taluka panchayat or a village panchayat shall have the same powers as taluka development officer has in respect of a village panchayat under sub-section (1),(2)and(3)subject to modification that he shall submit a report under sub-section (3) to the State Government, The State Government may pass such order thereon as it may deem fit. (5)An officer authorized by State Government in this behalf by general or special order, shall in respect of a district panchayat, have the same powers as the District Development Officer has in respect of a Taluka Panchayat under this section. (6)If in the opinion of the Collector the execution of any order or resolution of any panchayat or the doing of anything which is about to be done or is being done by or on behalf of such panchayat, is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or to lead to breach of peace, the collector may by order in writing suspend the execution or prohibit the doing thereof and shall forthwith (a) send to the panchayat affected thereby a copy of the order, with a statement of the reasons thereof and, (b) submit to the State Government a Report thereof. 259. 259. State Government may call for proceedings.- The State Government may call for and examine the record of proceeding of any panchayat or of any committee thereof or of any officer for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety or any order passed and may revise or modify the order as it shall deem just." ( 10. ) IN some of the cases this Court, speaking through various benches, has in fact relegated the person, against whom the 'no confidence' resolution is passed, to challenge the same before the Appellate Committee of the District Panchayat under Section 242 of the Act where no specific challenge to District Appellate Committee's jurisdiction or competence was posed or proposed. IN case of "Geetaben Bharatbhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat" in Special Civil Application being S.C.A. No. 15636 of 2003 decided on 17.02.2004 (Coram: A.R. Dave, J.) when no precise question of jurisdiction or competence of the district Appellate Committee under section 242 of the Act to deal with the challenge to the resolution of 'no confidence motion' was elaborately posed with various aspects of peculiarity of 'no confidence motion' making it markedly different than other resolution passed by general body of panchayat, the learned Single Judge of this Court relegated the petitioner to file appeal under Section 242 of the Act. The relevant paragraphs of that judgment are set out as under: "10. Learned advocate Shri Raval appearing for respondent No.4 has submitted that an appeal can be filed against a decision/resolution before the District Panchayat against any order or decision of the village Panchayat. IN the instant case, a resolution of no-confidence motion has been passed against the petitioner. The said resolution is in the nature of a decision of the panchayat and, therefore, an appeal should be filed under the provisions of sec. 242 of the Act. Though learned advocate Shri Mehul Shah appearing for the petitioner has submitted that an appeal cannot be filed by the petitioner because the said decision taken by the panchayat is not against any individual or an institution and, therefore, an appeal under the provisions of sec. 242 of the Act might not be entertained by the district panchayat. 11. Though learned advocate Shri Mehul Shah appearing for the petitioner has submitted that an appeal cannot be filed by the petitioner because the said decision taken by the panchayat is not against any individual or an institution and, therefore, an appeal under the provisions of sec. 242 of the Act might not be entertained by the district panchayat. 11. IN my opinion, an appeal is maintainable against the resolution, which is in the nature of a decision, before the district panchayat and, therefore, the proper course for the petitioner would be to exhaust the alternative remedy first." In the present controversy also, as could be seen from the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram: D.A. Mehta, J., as he then was) in case of "Kashiben Swaminath Vasava Vs. State of Gujarat" in S.C.A. No. 4436 of 2009 dated 26.06.2009, held that the appeal was available to be filed under Section 242 to 244 of the Panchayat Act. The relevant paragraphs are set out as under: "8. The petition is required to be allowed on a limited ground, without going into merits of the controversy between the parties. It is true that the State Government has overriding revisional powers under the Act, but at the same time one cannot lose sight of the powers granted to the appellate authority which is to be constituted and entitled to hear an appeal in terms of provisions of Section 242 to 244 of the Act. The State Government cannot be permitted to usurp powers of the appellate authority on the specious plea that hearing of an appeal would be a very lengthy process and hence, a direct revision can be entertained. In so far as the bar to hear an appeal during applicability of code of conduct due to pendency of General Elections, even if such a bar was applicable, which prima facie does not appear to be correct, the revisional authority could have directed respondent No.4 to approach the Appellate Committee, and made interim arrangement till the appeal was filed and the proceedings commenced by the Appellate Committee. There was no prohibition to prefer an appeal. In the circumstances, the exercise of jurisdiction and powers by the revisional authority under Section 259 of the Act in the facts of the case was not warranted. 9. There was no prohibition to prefer an appeal. In the circumstances, the exercise of jurisdiction and powers by the revisional authority under Section 259 of the Act in the facts of the case was not warranted. 9. Hence, the order made by the revisional authority on 28.04.2009 is hereby quashed and set aside, leaving it open to respondent No.4 to approach the appellate authority and seek appropriate relief. Needless to state that the appellate authority shall not be influenced by any observations recorded by the revisional authority in the impugned order dated 28.04.2008, which is quashed and set aside." ( 11. ) THE order dated 26.06.2009 was carried into appeal being L.P.A. No. 2313 of 2009, wherein the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.11.2009 upheld the observation of learned Single Judge in the following terms. THE relevant paragraphs are, therefore, set out as under: "1. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the appellant was first required to file an appeal under Section 242(1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before preferring Revision Application under Section 259 of the Act. 2. Mr. S.P. Majmudar for the appellant contends that the appeal would lie only against the order or decision of a Gram Panchayat and not against passing of no confidence motion by the members of the Gram Panchayat against the Sarpanch or Upsarpanch. 3. Ordinarily the business of the Gram Panchayat is to be transacted by the members of the Gram Panchayat passing a resolution by simple majority. When no confidence motion against the Sarpanch or Upsarpanch is moved by one-half of the total members of the Gram Panchayat and thereafter, the motion is carried by a majority of not less than two-third of the members of the Gram Panchayat, it does not cease to be a decision of the Gram Panchayat. THE learned Single Judge was, therefore, right in holding that the appeal was maintainable against such a resolution of the Gram Panchayat under Section 242 of the Act. 4. THE learned Single Judge was, therefore, right in holding that the appeal was maintainable against such a resolution of the Gram Panchayat under Section 242 of the Act. 4. THE appeal is, therefore, summarily dismissed." A question arises as to whether in a democratic set up, where various political parties with their peculiar agenda and ideology are permitted to participate in and contest elections to govern various local bodies and institutions of local self governance, can one such democratically elected body on the strength of their peculiar agenda and ideology, though hierarchically forming higher forum or governing council itself or through it's representative be entrusted with powers of examining resolution of passing of 'no confidence motion' by another, again democratically elected governing body or council for governance of their respective area though hierarchically lower than the one discussed above, against it's Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch, President or Vice President?. THE answer would be emphatic "NO" as reasons are not far to seek. It would all the more become clearer that in a democratic set up, the will of majority cannot be permitted to be tinkered with lightly either by executive or by another elected body of different panchayat in our democratic set up where possibility of highly politicized parties and their factions tilting balance for sub-serving their partisan interests at the cost of justice cannot be ruled out. ( 12. ) THE appellate authority under section 242 and the revisional authority under section 249 and 259 are merely creation of the Panchayat Act only and therefore, they cannot be permitted to over look and/or ignore the statutory mandate in terms of sub-section 2 of sections 56, 70 and Section 84 of the Panchayat Act. In other words, it can well be said that the observations made by learned Single Judge of this Court in case of "Geetaben L. Rathwa Vs. State of Gujarat" (supra), are, also applicable to the provisions of appeal to the Appellate Committee. Though, in that matter, the issue was as to whether appeal under section 242 of the Panchayat Act would be a remedy for challenging passing of 'no confidence motion' and hence no elaborate discussion is made thereon, but I am of the clear opinion that the reasoning adopted by this Court in case of "Geetaben L. Rathwa Vs. Though, in that matter, the issue was as to whether appeal under section 242 of the Panchayat Act would be a remedy for challenging passing of 'no confidence motion' and hence no elaborate discussion is made thereon, but I am of the clear opinion that the reasoning adopted by this Court in case of "Geetaben L. Rathwa Vs. State of Gujarat" (supra), would also be available for negating the contention that appeal under section 242 and 243 would be maintainable for challenging passing of 'no confidence motion'. This Court is of the view that the scheme of the Panchayat Act and the statutory mandate embedded in sub-section 2 of Section 56, Section 70 and Section 84 of the Act should persuade Courts and authorities not to lose sight of the legislative intent expressed in unequivocal terms while examining legality or grievances against passing of 'no confidence motion'. ( 13. ) IN the various cases cited herein above in this court, either single Judge or Division Bench of this Court has in fact at various places in the aforesaid judgments while relegating parties to appellate forum or before the revisional authority observed that appeal against resolution of passing 'no confidence motion' would be available under Section 242 of the Panchayat Act. But in the cases cited herein above no one had invited the bench's discussion on the following aspect specifically, as it could be evident from close perusal thereof. ( 14. ) THIS Court is of the view that the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of "Geetaben L. Rathwa Vs. State of Gujarat" (supra), would show that filing of revision is not permissible and the same reasoning, as it is stated hereinabove, would also be available for resisting filing of appeal and negating those contentions under which the appeal is said to have been maintainable. THIS Court would enlist the following aspects which would indicate that why appeal and revision would not be maintainable against the notice of no confidence motion as under: (i) The statutory provision of sub-section 2 of sections 56, 70 and 84 cannot be whittled down in any manner. No Court or Tribunal can overlook the statutory provisions and legislative intent behind enacting it. No Court or Tribunal can overlook the statutory provisions and legislative intent behind enacting it. The provisions of sub-section 2 of Sections 65, 70 and 84 are therefore not to be subjected to any interim orders or verdict passed by the other creature of same statute. (ii) The importance of local self governance by democratically elected representatives and their leaders chosen from amongst multi-parties political system hardly requires any emphasis. Our constitutional concept of federal structure for governance by locally elected peoples' representatives need no elaboration. Suffice it to say that these constitutional principles meant to serve our plural society need to be jealously guarded by one and all. (iii) Thus in our system of governance, which we have adopted and which is enshrined in our constitution, voice of majority expressed in constitutional way and form is not be throttled or miffed in prosaic prolixity of misconceived contentions of inapplicable statutory provisions. The reading of the provisions of section 242 and 243 providing appellate powers to the Appellate Committee of District Panchayat over resolution of different panchayat bodies or reading section 259 empowering executives to examine passing of resolution of 'no confidence' expressed by majority in constitutional way declaring their no confidence in the incumbent, would be an anathema to our constitutional goals and aspirations. (iv) The executives cannot be permitted to set at naught the provision of sub ection 2 of Sections 56, 70 and 84 in any manner or else it would amount to doing greater harm to the very provision and it would lead to a situation where despite majority of members passing resolution against individual, the individuals would be permitted to perpetuate his tenure contrary to the provision of law and at the behest of few elected members of other body or the executives. THIS, in my view, would have serious adverse impact upon the very scheme of the Act, whereunder the mandatory fiction is provided by vacating the office within three days. (v) In addition to the aforesaid, the Court is of the view that defeated individual member of the house cannot challenge the decision of the house as an aggrieved person. The aggrieved person described in provision of Section 242 of the Act, can certainly not include the defeated Sarpanch, President or Vice-President as the case may be as he can be said to be party in making the decision. The aggrieved person described in provision of Section 242 of the Act, can certainly not include the defeated Sarpanch, President or Vice-President as the case may be as he can be said to be party in making the decision. The Panchayat, is a body corporate as prescribed under provisions of Section 5 of the Panchayat Act and as such individual member thereof cannot be permitted to divest himself from the decision of Panchayat and challenge it in his capacity as member only. As it would amount to challenging his own decision or the decision of the body to which he is very much part and parcel. Once the resolution is passed by the requisite majority then the minority members who cast their votes against it cannot be permitted to say that it is not their decision. It is binding on all the members equally. The Court hasten to add here that if the defeated member's fundamental right or statutory right is abridged as citizen different than as member of the Panchayat, he can avail the remedy, but such availing would be in his individual capacity for enforcing his rights not as member but as citizen only. The Panchayat members in minority if permitted to challenge decisions and resolutions of Panchayat only on account of their contrary view, then, it would lead to permit them to defeat the majority decision by invoking appellate powers of committee and would create chaotic situation militating against the democratic functioning of Panchayat. The locus in this regard assumes greater importance. The minority members, therefore, cannot be permitted to challenge the decision which is passed by the process of casting votes in which their voices could not persuade their fellow members to cast their votes as per their liking or dictates. Now, therefore, the minority or those who were not capable of mustering votes in their favour or the one who has lost the confidence in the house can not be permitted to say that he or they were not party to the decision making process or that it was not the decision wherein he was not party. (vi) THIS proposition of law gets fortified by referring to the decision of the Apex Court in case of Bihar Public Service Commission Vs. Dr. (vi) THIS proposition of law gets fortified by referring to the decision of the Apex Court in case of Bihar Public Service Commission Vs. Dr. Shiv Jatan Thakur reported in AIR 1994 Supreme Court 2466 the Apex Court has observed in para 28, as under: "Shri R.K. Garg, Senior Advocate, who appeared for Dr. Thakur, the petitioner in the writ petition, since did not make any submission in support of the reliefs sought in paragraphs (B) and (C) of the prayer in the writ petition, we do not feel the need to consider them. Shri Garg, we are inclined to think, did not make any submission in support of the reliefs sought in paragraphs (B) and (C) obviously realising that the allegations on which those reliefs were founded, related to functions of the BPSC, which could not have been disowned by the BPSC's sitting member. Whatever that be, no member of a Public Service Commission, in our considered view, could be allowed to question the validity or correctness of the functions performed or duties discharged by the Public Service Commission as a body, while he was its member. It ought to be so for the simple reason that such member must be regarded to be a party to the function required to be performed or the duty required to be discharged by the Public Service Commission as a body or institution, even though he might have been a dissenting member or a member in a minority or a member who had abstained from taking part in such function performed or duty discharged. Discretionary remedy vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot therefore, be allowed to be invoked by a member of the Public Service Commission to question the correctness or validity of functions performed or duties discharged by the Public Service Commission as a body or institution, according to well established procedures." (emphasis supplied) The aforesaid observations were made while Apex Court was considering the writ petition filed by one of the members of Bihar Public Service Commission seeking direction (i) to the Chairman of the Bihar Public Service Commission and the Governor of Bihar to restore to him the facilities, to which, it was said, he had enjoyed till 1st October, 1991 and (ii) to the Government of Bihar and the Governor of Bihar to report to the President of India of the omissions and commissions of the Chairman, while he performed his functions or discharged his duties as the Chairman of the BPSC, so as to make the President to take suitable punitive action against him according to law. In that writ petition he had also sought from the High Court, award of punishment to the Chairman of the BPSC and its Secretary for the alleged willful disobedience of the directions in the observation of the High Court's earlier judgment in C.W.J.C. 446 of 1992." (vii) The provision of appeal or revision either under Sections 242, 243 or 249 and 251 are not to be invoked for challenging the passing of 'no confidence motion' as otherwise it is likely to create an anomalous situation. If one reads section 242 of Panchayat Act as providing appeal against the passing of 'no confidence motion' by village or taluka Panchayat to the district Panchayat and power to stay it under Section 243 than though provisions of sub-Section 2 of Sections 56, 70 and 84 are in identical in it's intent the defeated Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch of village panchayat and defeated President or Vice-President of taluka Panchayat will have right to file appeal to the District Panchayat while the defeated President or Vice-president of District Panchayat, though governed by identical provision of sub-section 2 of Section 84 will be deprived of any remedy as no appeal is envisaged against the decision of District Panchayat and this Court has in case of "Geetaben L. Rathwa Vs. State of Gujarat" (supra) held that, revisional powers of State under section 259 could not be invoked for examining passing of 'no confidence motion' which has been accepted by the State as it has also passed resolution that no revision would be entertained against passing of 'no confidence motion'. Therefore, harmonious reading of all the provisions and the legislative intent, in view of the above discussions, would indicate clearly that the appeal or revision is not permissible for challenging the notice of motion or the proceeding arises there from. (viii) It is also required to be noted that the provision of sub Section 2 of Sections 56, 70 and 84 makes it clear that the office of the incumbent losing in 'no confidence motion', if already not vacated by his resignation, is deemed to have fallen vacant after three days time. Now this legislative mandate cannot be ignored by the institutions and committee created by the same statute. The provisions of section 56, 70 and 84 are equally binding on those who constitute the Appellate Committee in district Panchayat under section 242 of the Panchayat Act. If the provision of appeal against the resolution of 'no confidence' is read into section 242 of the Panchayat Act, then it would amount to permitting the appellate authority and it's individual chairman to set at naught the majority decision of separately elected body which might be representing different political ideology and aspirations than the party forming governing body in district Panchayat. The reading of provisions of Sections 242 and 243, as providing appeals against the passing of resolution of 'no confidence motion' by village and taluka Panchayat to the Appellate Committee of district Panchayat at times constituted by different political party than the one passing resolution of 'No confidence" in village or taluka Panchayat expressing their no confidence in their leader, would be amounting to empowering another elected body of different Panchayat to examine the resolution for deciding that body's internal management of choosing their leader. This can never be the legislative intent. Hence no appeal against passing of resolution of 'no confidence' could be said to be available under Sections 242 and 243 of the Panchayat Act. (ix) The resolution of passing of 'no confidence' cannot be equated with the other resolutions and decisions of Panchayat. This can never be the legislative intent. Hence no appeal against passing of resolution of 'no confidence' could be said to be available under Sections 242 and 243 of the Panchayat Act. (ix) The resolution of passing of 'no confidence' cannot be equated with the other resolutions and decisions of Panchayat. The passing of resolution of 'no confidence' is a kind of expression of elected representatives of people that they have no faith or confidence in the person against whom it is being passed. In other words it did not affect any outsider or lay citizens within or outside the Panchayat from enjoying their rights in any manner. Nor does it affect any fundamental rights or statutory rights of the incumbent against whom the motion is passed. It merely is a mandate of majority that he has no right to continue in the office. Therefore strictly speaking he cannot be said to be an 'aggrieved person' as envisaged in section 242 of the Panchayat Act. (x) The provision of sub Section 2 of Sections 56, 70 and 84 would eloquently go to show that the legislature has by legislative mandate not permitted defeated candidate to perpetuate his continuation in his office in any manner. Therefore, this provision is required to be effective and operational in it's full spirit and letters by all the concerned so as to ward off any unscrupulous elements' attempts to undermine majority's expression of will. The reading of provision of appeal against passing of 'no confidence motion' into Section 242 brings into play the power of granting interim relief to be exercised by the single individual, i.e. Chairman of the Committee as provided under Section 243 of the Panchayat Act. In other words single individual would be clothed with the power to set at naught the elected members collective will and their expression of no confidence in a person in whose favour the stay is granted. Such a situation can never be a legislative intent. The unscrupulous person loosing in no confidence motion will always have tendency to perpetuate his continuance despite the house loosing confidence in him. The creation of such a situation can never be permitted, otherwise it would affect and undermine the very fabric of democratic institutions. In the instant case also the notice of no confidence motion was issued on 10.12.2009. The unscrupulous person loosing in no confidence motion will always have tendency to perpetuate his continuance despite the house loosing confidence in him. The creation of such a situation can never be permitted, otherwise it would affect and undermine the very fabric of democratic institutions. In the instant case also the notice of no confidence motion was issued on 10.12.2009. The notice was passed on 02.03.2009 and till date the regular incumbent of the office is not decided. Thus the present situation is created only on account of reading the provisions of appeal in Section 242 of Panchayat Act against the passing of 'No Confidence Motion'. The procedure and proceedings taken so far in the present controversy are sufficient to establish that the provision of sub-Section 2 of Section 56 has been successfully thwarted. (xi) The Resolution of passing of 'no confidence motion' cannot be equated with a decision of Panchayat as envisaged under Sections 242, 243 249 and 259 of the Panchayat Act as affecting general public within the jurisdiction of that Panchayat. The elected representatives' right to pass 'no confidence motion' has been already acknowledged by various decision of the Courts as held in case of Ram Beti Vs. District reported in (1998) 1 SCC 680 The 'No confidence motion' is thus internal subject governing the matter as to whether the incumbent of the office is enjoying confidence of majority of members of the house and as such has any right to continue, against the will of those with whom he has to function for performing his duty as such. Now if the majority of members, whose right to pass no confidence motion against the Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch, President, Vice President is already acknowledged as stated herein above and when the majority members of that house have expressed their 'no confidence' in the incumbent as their leader then losing incumbent of the office has to simply demit his office as he cannot claim any right to continue by preferring appeal to hierarchical upper body which might be constituted by different political party. A concept of subjecting expression of majority 'will' against the incumbent of office and their willingness not to accept the incumbent as their leader to the scrutiny of altogether another elected body or its few representatives would greatly undermine the very foundation the edifice of democracy. A concept of subjecting expression of majority 'will' against the incumbent of office and their willingness not to accept the incumbent as their leader to the scrutiny of altogether another elected body or its few representatives would greatly undermine the very foundation the edifice of democracy. (xii) It is also clear from the fact that Sections 242, 243 249 and 259 are general in nature and they therefore are applicable to the act and action of Panchayat qua the general public and cannot be said to be available to individual members of that very Panchayat to challenge it only in their capacity as member without showing abridgment of either their fundamental or statutory rights. If such restriction is not read into it then the members in their capacity as such of the same Panchayat, without requirement of establishing any personal injury or infringement of his rights as citizen would challenge resolution which he might have voted against on making out some ground and the Appellate Committee of altogether different house through their few elected members would set it aside. (xiii) One may contend that on plain reading of Sections 242, 249 ( 15. ) AS could be observed from the decisions of this Court in cases touching upon the provisions of Sections 242, 249 and 259 of the Panchayat Act on question of challenge to passing of 'no confidence motion' it becomes evident that no bench was specifically invited to examine the issue on framing searching question, but the benches have expressed opinion that appeal would be available under Section 242 of the Panchayat Act for challenging resolution of no confidence. It is also required to be noted that the observations made in other earlier judgments were not cited before the Court. The Apex Court has in case of State of U.P. and another Versus Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd reported in (1991) 4 SCC 139 observed as under: "In Jaisri V. Rajdewan Dubey this Court while pointing out the procedure to be followed when conflicting decisions are placed before a bench extracted a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England incorporating one of the exception when the decision of an appellate court is not binding. 41. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusion be considered as declaration of law? 41. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusion be considered as declaration of law? Here again the English courts and jurists have carved out an exception to the rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule of sub-silention "A decision passes sub-silentio, in technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to it mind (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn p.153) In Lancaster Motor Company (London)Ltd V. Bremith Ltd the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered 'without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of authority' It was approved by this Court Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur ((1989 )1 SCC 101.)The bench held that 'precedents sub-silentio and without arguments are of no moment'. The courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reason nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In B. Shama Rao v. Union territory of Pndicherry ( AIR 1967 SC 1480 ) it was observed that 'it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles laid down therein.' Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law." ( 16. ) THE another decision of the Apex Court also needs to be cited on the point as in case of Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija v. Collector Thane reported in (1989) 3 SCC 396 the Apex Court has observed as under "21. ) THE another decision of the Apex Court also needs to be cited on the point as in case of Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija v. Collector Thane reported in (1989) 3 SCC 396 the Apex Court has observed as under "21. Chief Justice Pathak in recent decision stressed the need for clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court. Speaking for the Constitution Bench (Union of India v. Raghubir Singh ((1998)2 SCC754) learned Chief Justice said : THE doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of promoting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, and enables an organic development of law, besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transaction forming part of his daily affairs. And, therefore the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decision of a court. 22 Cardozo propounded a similar thought with more emphasis : I am not to mar the symmetry of the legal structure by the introduction of inconsistencies and irrelevances and artificial exceptions unless for some sufficient reasons, which will commonly be some consideration of history or custom or policy or justice Lacking such a reason, I must be logical just as I must be impartial, upon like grounds. It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. In our system of judicial review which is part of our constitutional scheme, we hold it to be the duty of judges of superior courts and tribunals to make the laws more predictable. THE question of law directly arising in the case should not be dealt with apologetic approaches. THE law must be made more effective as a guide to behaviour. It must be determined with reasons which carry convictions within the courts, profession and public. Otherwise, the lawyers would be I a predicament and would not know how to advice their clients. Subordinate courts would find themselves in an embarrassing position to choose between the conflicting opinions. THE general public would be in dilemma to obey or not to obey such law and it ultimate falls into disrepute. Otherwise, the lawyers would be I a predicament and would not know how to advice their clients. Subordinate courts would find themselves in an embarrassing position to choose between the conflicting opinions. THE general public would be in dilemma to obey or not to obey such law and it ultimate falls into disrepute. Thus it is of utmost important to settle the position of law qua purvey and purport of sub-Section (2) of Sections 56, 70 and 84 and the legislative intent in enacting and the jurisdiction powers and purvey of the district appellate committee working under Section 242 and State authority working under Section 249 and 259 of the Panchayat Act in respect of resolution passed by Panchayats against it's Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch, President and Vice-Presidents under Sections 56, 70 and 84 of the Panchayat Act. There are observations and directions both by learned Single Judges and Division Benches in respect of Sections 242, 249 and 259, hence the matter is in fact requires to be referred to a larger bench under Rule 5 of the Gujarat High Court Rules 1993 which reads as under: Rule 5: (1) A Single Judge may refer any matter before him or question arising in such matter to a Division Bench of two Judges or a Larger Bench. (2) A Division Bench of two Judges may refer any matter before it or any question arising therein or any question referred to it under sub-rule (1)above to a Larger Bench. On the question as to whether a Single Judge of this Court can directly refer the matter to Larger Bench or it has to be referred only to the Division Bench, the full bench of this Court has in case of Ram Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd and another v. State of Gujarat and another reported in 2001 (1) G.L.H. 698 held as under : " 4.1 It will be seen from the provisions of of Rule 5 of the Gujarat High Court Rules 1993 that a Single Judge may refer any matter before him or question arising in such matter to a Division Bench of two or more Judges or a Larger Bench. The rule does not require any reason for being recorded for the purpose and it is sufficient if in the opinion of learned Single Judge the requires to be considered by a Division Bench of two Judges or Larger Bench. The rule does not require any reason for being recorded for the purpose and it is sufficient if in the opinion of learned Single Judge the requires to be considered by a Division Bench of two Judges or Larger Bench. Therefore even if no reason is recorded for referring the matter there can arise no question of a Larger Bench not being able to consider the matter, because , the process of assignment of work to Benches is purely an internal matter of the High Court governed by these Rules and a matter, which could have been considered by a learned Single Judge, can always be referred for a decision to a Larger Bench." ( 17. ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that this matter requires to be referred, not to a Division Bench, but to a Larger Bench, for examining as to whether an incumbent of office of Sarpanch, Up-Sarpanch, President and Vice President, against whom his Panchayat has passed Resolution expressing 'no confidence' in him, can challenge it by way of appeal under section 242, or revision under Section 249 or 259, as the case may be, of the Gujarat Panchayat Act 1993, in light of the provisions of Panchayat Act with special emphasis on provisions of sub-Section (2) of Sections 56, 70 and 84 of the Panchayat Act. And if the remedy is held to be available then what interim relief could be granted to such incumbent in light of the statutory provisions of Sub-ection (2) of Sections 56, 70 and 84 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993. ( 18. ) THE office is directed to place this matter before the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice at the earliest for appropriate orders.

Jayendrasinh Bhupatsinh Diama v. State Of Gujarat Through Additional Secretary(Inquiry)