Judgment : This Revision is preferred by the 1st defendant in the Suit, calling in question the orders passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, Khamman in I.A. No.111 of 2010 filed in O.S. No.15 of 2007, instituted by the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2 herein. O.S. No.15 of 2007 was instituted seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 23-09-2006 entered into by and between these parties. Subsequent to the institution of the Suit, defendants 2 to 6 got impleaded therein resisting the intended sale by the 1st defendant on the ground that it is a joint family property. I.A. No.111 of 2010 was moved hence, seeking amendment of the plaint for introduction of an alternative relief for repayment of the advance sale price of Rs.3,60,000/- received by the petitioner herein together with interest thereon @ 12% per annum from the respective dates of receipt of the said money till the date of repayment. The said I.A., was resisted on variety of grounds including that the claim for refund of the advance sale consideration amount was barred by limitation. Finding that the nature of amendment sought for, does not result in altering the nature of the cause in the Suit itself and since the relief sought for is only an alternative relief, the learned I Additional District Judge, Khamman, by his order dated 03-02-2011 allowed the said amendment application. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri J.P. Srikanth would strenuously contend that the alternative relief of refund of Rs.3,60,000/-together with interest @ 12% thereon is sought for more than three years after the Suit is filed, i.e., on 19-04-2007, therefore, it is clearly barred by limitation. Further, the relief of refund is very much available to the plaintiffs to seek from the very inception. Having, thus, not prayed for such a relief at the inception, the Application ought to have been dismissed. Further, the alternative relief now prayed for will cause prejudice to the petitioner-1st defendant in the Suit. Per contra, Sri Hari Sreedhar, the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 herein would submit that all the relevant facts have been pleaded in the Suit clearly. The agreement of sale dated 23-09-2006, in clear and categoric terms, acknowledged the receipt of advance payment of Rs.3,60,000/- by the 1st defendant in the Suit. Per contra, Sri Hari Sreedhar, the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 herein would submit that all the relevant facts have been pleaded in the Suit clearly. The agreement of sale dated 23-09-2006, in clear and categoric terms, acknowledged the receipt of advance payment of Rs.3,60,000/- by the 1st defendant in the Suit. Hence, the amendment for introduction of an alternative relief is not going to either change the cause of action or would cause any prejudice, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Sri Sridhar has placed strong reliance upon the Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in BABU LAL v. M/S HAZARI LAL KISHORI LAL ( AIR 1982 SC 818 ). The principles relating to the amendment of the pleadings have been illustrated by Sarkar, J, in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in A.K. GUPTA & SONS LIMITED v. DAMODAR VALLY CORPORATION ( AIR 1967 SC 96 ), in the following words: “7. It is not in dispute that at the date of the application for amendment, a suit for a money claim under the contract was barred. The general rule no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred : Weldon v. Neale, (1887) 19 QBD 394. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation: see Charan Das v. Amir Khan, 47 Ind App 255 (AIR 1921 PC 50) and L.J. Leach and Co Ltd v. Jardine Skinner and Co., 1957 SCR 438 ( AIR 1957 SC 357 ). 8. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation: see Charan Das v. Amir Khan, 47 Ind App 255 (AIR 1921 PC 50) and L.J. Leach and Co Ltd v. Jardine Skinner and Co., 1957 SCR 438 ( AIR 1957 SC 357 ). 8. The principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are first, that the object of Courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes (Cropper v Smith, (1884) 26 Ch D 700 (710-711) and secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended (Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba, (1909) ILR 33 Bom 644 at p.651, approved in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v Kalgonda Shidgonda 1957 SCR 595 (603) : ( AIR 1957 SC 363 at p.366)). 9. The expression “cause of action” in the present context does not mean “every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed” as was said in Cooke v. gill, (1873) 8 CP 107 (116), in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corporation Ltd. 1962-2 All ER 24, and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile. The take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party by lapse of time. 10. …..It introduces no new case of facts. Indeed the facts on which the money claim sought to be added is based are not in dispute. The take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party by lapse of time. 10. …..It introduces no new case of facts. Indeed the facts on which the money claim sought to be added is based are not in dispute. …..” (Emphasis is mine) And again the principles in that regard have been reiterated by the Supreme Court in B.K. NARAYANA PILLAI v. PARAMESWARANPILLAI AND ANOTHER ( (2000) 1 SCC 712 ), as hereunder: “The principles applicable to the amendments of the plaint are equally applicable to the amendments of the written statements. The courts are more generous in allowing the amendments of the written statement as the question of prejudice is less likely to operate in that event. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment the other side should not be subjected to injustice and that any admission made in favour of the plaintiff is not withdrawn. All amendments of the pleadings should be allowed which are original lis was raised or defence taken. Inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of facts should not be allowed to be incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings. Proposed amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs. No amendment should be allowed which amounts to or lapse of time. The delay in filling the petition for amendment of the pleadings should be properly compensated by costs and error or mistake which, if not fraudulent should not be made a ground for rejecting the application for amendment of plaint or written statement.” (Emphasis is brought out) In JAGDISH SINGH v. NATTHU SINGH ( AIR 1992 SC 1604 ), in a Suit for specific performance, without abandoning the relief for specific performance when alternative relief for damages is sought for, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the effect of proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which expressly gave power to the Court to grant amendment of the pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and the principles in that regard have been settled as under: “10. S.21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 corresponding to S.19 of 1877 Act enables the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance also to claim compensation for its breach either in addition to or in substitution of, such performance. Sub-secs.(2), (4) and (5) of S-21 are material and they provide: “(2) If, in any such suit, the Court decides that specific performance ought not to be granted, but that there is a contract between the parties which has been broken by the defendant, and that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for that breach, it shall award him such compensation accordingly. (3) [Omitted as unnecessary.] (4) In determining the amount of any compensation awarded under this section, the Court shall be guided by the principles specified in S.73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, 9 of 1872. (5) No compensation shall be awarded under this section unless the plaintiff has claimed such compensation in his plaint: Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such compensation in the plaint, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just, for including a claim for such compensation. Explanation-The circumstance that the contract has become incapable of specific performance does not preclude the Court from exercising the jurisdiction conferred by this section.” So far as the proviso to sub-sec.(5) is concerned, two positions must be kept clearly distinguished. If the amendment relates to the relief of compensation in lieu of or in addition to specific performance where the plaintiff has not abandoned his relief of specific performance the Court will allow the amendment at any stage of the proceeding. That is a claim for compensation falling under S.21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the amendment is one under the proviso to sub-sec. (5). But different and less liberal standards apply if what is sought by the amendment is the conversion of a suit for specific performance into one for damages for breach of contract in which case S.73 of the Contract Act is invoked. This amendment is under the discipline of R.17, O.6, C.P.C. The fact that sub-sec. (4), in turn, invokes S.73 of the Contract Act for the principles of quantification and assessment of compensation does not obliterate this distinction. This amendment is under the discipline of R.17, O.6, C.P.C. The fact that sub-sec. (4), in turn, invokes S.73 of the Contract Act for the principles of quantification and assessment of compensation does not obliterate this distinction. The provisions of S.21 seem to resolve certain divergencies of judicial opinion in the High Courts on some aspects of the jurisdiction to award of compensation. Sub-sec. (5) seeks to set at rest the divergence of judicial opinion between High Courts whether a specific claim in the plaint is necessary to grant the compensation. In England Lord Cairn’s (Chancery Amendment) Act, 1858 sought to confer jurisdiction upon the Equity Courts to award damages in substitution or in addition to specific performance. This became necessary in view of the earlier dichotomy in the jurisdiction between common law and Equity Courts in the matter of choice of the nature remedies for breach. In common law the remedy for breach of a contract was damages. The Equity Court innovated the remedy of specific performance because the remedy of damages was found to be an inadequate remedy. Lord Cairn’s Act, 1858 conferred jurisdiction upon the Equity Courts to award damages also so that both the reliefs could be administered by one Court. S.2 of the Act provided: “in all cases in which the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to entertain an application for specific performance of any covenant, contract or agreement it shall be lawful for the same Court if it shall think fit to award damages to the party injured either in addition to or in substitution for such specific performance and such damages may be assessed as the Court shall direct.” This is the historical background to the provisions of S.21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and its predecessor in S.19 of the 1877 Act.” It would be apt, at this stage to notice that Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure employs identical phraseology as is employed in the proviso to Sub-section 5 of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act. Earlier thereto, dealing with Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Supreme Court has set out the following principles in BABU LAL’s case cited (1 supra). “11. Section 22 enacts a rule of pleading. Earlier thereto, dealing with Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Supreme Court has set out the following principles in BABU LAL’s case cited (1 supra). “11. Section 22 enacts a rule of pleading. The Legislature thought it will be, useful to introduce a rule that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings the plaintiff may claim a decree for possession in a suit for specific performance, even though strictly speaking, the right to possession accrues only when suit for specific performance is decreed. The Legislature has now made a statutory provision enabling the plaintiff to ask for possession in the suit for specific performance and empowering the Court to provide in the decree itself that upon payment by the plaintiff of the consideration money within the given time, the defendant should execute the deed and put the plaintiff in possession. 12. The section enacts that a person in a suit for specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property, may ask for appropriate reliefs, namely, he may ask for possession, or for partition or for separate possession including the relief for specific performance. These reliefs he can claim, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the contrary. Sub-section (2) of this section, however, specifically provides that these reliefs cannot be granted by the Court, unless they have been expressly claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. Sub-section (2) of the section recognized in clear terms the well-established rule of procedure that the Court should not entertain a claim of the plaintiff unless it has been specifically pleaded by the plaintiff and proved by him to be legally entitled to. The proviso to this Sub-section (2) however, says that where the plaintiff has not specifically claimed these reliefs in his plaint, in the initial stages of the suit, the Court shall permit the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings, to include one or more of the reliefs, mentioned above by means of an amendment of the plaint on such terms as it may deemed proper. The only purpose of this newly enacted provision is to avoid multiplicity of suits and that the plaintiff may get appropriate relief without being hampered by procedural complications.” (Emphasis is mine) The consideration that is required to be shown to the question of delay in moving an Application for amendment has fallen for consideration in SAMPATH KUMAR v. AYYAKANNU AND ANOTHER (2002 SUPP (2) SCR 397), in the following manner: “The question of delay in moving an application for amendment should be decided not by calculating the period from the date of institution of the suit alone but by reference to the stage to which the hearing in the suit has proceeded. Pre-trial amendments are allowed more liberally than those which are sought to be made after the commencement of the trial or after conclusion thereof. In former case generally it can be assumed that the defendant is not prejudiced because he will have full opportunity of meeting the case of the plaintiff as amended. In the latter cases the question of prejudice to the opposite party may arise and that shall have to be answered by reference to circumstances of each individual case. No strait-jacket formula can be laid down. The fact remains that a mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing a prayer for amendment. An amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation back in the context of amendment of pleadings is not one of universal application and in appropriate cases the Court is competent while permitting an amendment to direct that the amendment permitted by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by it shall be deemed to have been brought before the Court on the date on which the application seeking the amendment was filed. (See observation in Siddalingamma and Another v. Mamtha Shenoy [2001] 1 SCC 561).” (Emphasis is bought out) In view of these principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, the respondent/plaintiffs have not introduced a new cause of action to the suit by seeking the alternative relief of repayment of the advance consideration received by the petitioner/defendant No.1. Nor did the plaintiffs abandon the relief of specific performance of the suit agreement. Hence, allowing the amendment sought for is not illegal warranting any interference. Nor did the plaintiffs abandon the relief of specific performance of the suit agreement. Hence, allowing the amendment sought for is not illegal warranting any interference. Therefore, the attempt made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the amendment application ought not to have been allowed after the same is barred by limitation, based upon the Judgments rendered in MUNI LAL v. ORIENTAL FIRE & GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED AND ANOTHER ( (1996) 1 SCC 90 ), and T.L. MUDDUKRISHNA AND ANOTHER v. LALITHA RAMCHANDRA RAO ( (1997) 2 SCC 611 ), is of no avail to him as, in those two cases, the Court found that a new cause of action, which is time barred is sought to be introduced by way of amendment. Hence, that principle is not attracted to the facts of the present case. Further, the trial of the suit has not commenced yet. Hence, no prejudice will be caused to the defendants in the suit by allowing the amendment. Hence, I do not see any merit in the Civil Revision Petition and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.