Order Prashant Kumar, J.-This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 20th July, 1989 passed by VIIIth Additional Judicial Commissioner, Aanchi in Title Appeal No. 76 of 1989, whereby he upheld the judgment of Sub-Judge-III, Aanchi in Title Suit No. 67 of 1984/43 of 1987 dated 29.6.1989 by which the suit for specific performance of contract was decreed. 2. The case of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 is that the father of appellants, namely Haji Imam Bux, executed an agreement on 20.8.1975 in favour of plaintiff/respondent no. 1 for sale of land, details of which given in schedule of the plaint, for consideration of As. 1.1,750/-. It is further stated that on the date of execution of agreement itself As. 8,000/- paid to the father of appellants as advance. It is further stated by the plaintiff that on the date of execution of agreement, possession of suit property was handed over to the plaintiff/respondent no. 1. It is then stated that on 16.9.1978 father of appellants took a sum of Rs. 1,000/- as further' advance from plaintiff and an endorsement to that effect was made on the back of agreement and was duly signed by him. It is stated that appellants' father, namely, Hazi Imam Bux, died in the year 1978. Thereafter, plaintiff requested defendant no. 1/proforma respondent no. 2 to execute and register sale deed for herself as well on behalf of appellants (defendant nos. 2 to 4), as being mother she is the natural guardian of appellants. It is further stated that mother of appellants avoided execution of sale deed on different pretext, however, she' took further advance of Rs. 1,000/- on 17.5.1981 and then again on 4.1.1983 a sum of Rs. 1 ,480/- was taken as advance. It is further stated that though the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 had paid a total sum of Rs. 11,480/- as advance with respect to the agreement dated 20.8.1975 but the defendants are not executing the sale deed after obtaining necessary permission from competent authority. It is stated that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract and is still ready to perform his part of contract but appellants and defendant no.1 were evading to comply their part of contract. Hence, the suit filed for specific performance of contract. 3. It reveals from the record that proforma respondent no. 2, who is mother of appellants and defendant no. Hence, the suit filed for specific performance of contract. 3. It reveals from the record that proforma respondent no. 2, who is mother of appellants and defendant no. 1 in the court below, has not contested the suit by filing written statement. Thus, the Suit proceeded against her ex parte. However, the appellants, who were minor at the time of institution of suit, contested the suit through their guardian ad litem appointed by court. In the written statement, appellants stated that the suit is barred by law of limitation and the same is not maintainable. It is also stated that the father of appellants had not executed any agreement as alleged in the plaint and, if any, the same agreement is forged and fabricated document. It is further stated that the signatures of Haji Imam Bux on the said agreement is not the signature of Haji Imam Bux and the same are forged signature. Appellants had also taken a defence that no advance given either to Haji Imam Bux and/or to their mother (defendant no. 1). It is also stated that under the Muslim law, mother is not a legal guardian of minors and therefore defendant no. 1 could not alienate properties belonging to minors. Accordingly, it is stated that the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. It appears that in the court below plaintiff/respondent no. 1 had adduced both oral and documentary evidence in support of its case and the appellants also adduced oral evidences. It then appears that the learned trial court decided all the issues in favour of plaintiff/respondent no. 1 and decreed the suit. The said judgment and decree challenged by filing Title Appeal No. 76 of 1989, which was also dismissed with certain modification in the decree of court below. Against that present appeal filed. 5. This appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law:- 'Whether the minor children (appellants) of late Haji Imam Bux, who had executed an agreement for sale in favour of plaintiff respondent no. 1, can be legally bound by receipt of part of the consideration money by way of further advance by their widow mother (respondent no. 2) so as to be liable to execute sale deed in the specific performance of contract executed by their late father.' 6. 1, can be legally bound by receipt of part of the consideration money by way of further advance by their widow mother (respondent no. 2) so as to be liable to execute sale deed in the specific performance of contract executed by their late father.' 6. It is submitted by Sri V. Shivnath learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that under the Muslim Law, mother is not legal guardian of minor, thus she has no right to alienate property of her minor children. Accordingly, it is submitted that she has no right to accept consideration money on behalf of her minor children for alienation of immovable property. It is further submitted that the advance taken by the mother of appellants and any endorsement made by her on the agreement, will not revive the agreement, which had already expired and become unenforceable against the appellants. It is submitted that both the courts below have not considered this aspect of the matter and decreed the suit, thus the judgments and decree of the courts below cannot be sustained. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Shafique Rahman, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 1, has submitted that under the Mohammedan Law, on the death of a mohammedan, his estate devolves on 'his heirs. It is further submitted that on the death of a mohammedan his liabilities also devolve on his heirs and they are liable to discharge said liabilities to the e)$tent of their share. It is submitted that on the death of a mohammedan his wife and children inherit his properties to the extent of share enumerated under Mohammedan Law. Thus, it is submitted that on the death of Hazi Imam Bux, it is the joint liability of appellants and their mother defendant/respondent no. 2 to discharge the liability created by him by executing the agreement (Ext.-1/A). It is submitted that though the said agreement was executed on 20.8.1975 by late Haji Imam Bux, but as one of the co-sharer (defendant no. 1/ respondent no. 2) had acknowledged agreement by taking advance of Rs. 1,000/and Rs. 1,480/- on 7.5.1981 and 4.1.1983 respectively and also by making endorsement on the back of the agreement, the said agreement become enforceable in law against appellants. Accordingly, it is submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the learned court below do not required any interference by this Court. 8. 1,000/and Rs. 1,480/- on 7.5.1981 and 4.1.1983 respectively and also by making endorsement on the back of the agreement, the said agreement become enforceable in law against appellants. Accordingly, it is submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the learned court below do not required any interference by this Court. 8. Having heard the submission, I have gone through the records of the case as well as the law applicable on the subject. It has been. held by a Five Judges Bench of their Lordships of Supreme Court in N.K. Mohammad Sulaiman vs. N.C.Mohamad Ismail reported in AIR 1966 SC 792 that- "the Estate of muslim dying intestate devolves under the Islamic Law upon his heirs at the moment of his death i.e. the estate vests immediately in each heir in proportion to the share ordained by the personal law and the interest of each heir is separate and distinct. Each heir is under the personal law liable to satisfies the debts of the deceased only to the extent of the share of the debt proportionate to his share in the estate." On bare perusal of aforesaid law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court, it appears that on the death of a mohammedan his property immediately devolves in his heirs separately to the extent of the share they are entitled under the personal law. Thus, immediately on the death of a mohammedan, his each heir become absolute owner of the property. proportionate to his share. Thus, under the Islamic Law, there is no concept of jointness of ownership of the properties of deceased mohammedan. 9. Section 43 of Principles of Mohammedan Law, by Mullah provides that:- "Extent of liability of .heirs of debts.- Each heir is liable for the debts of the deceased to the extent only of a share of the debts proportionate to his share of the estate." 10. In view of the discussion made above, it is clear that - the mohammedan heirs are independent owners of their specific shares and their liability is also proportionate to the extent of their share in the estate. Under the said circumstance, one share holder has no right, title and interest to alienate property of another shareholder. 11. In view of the discussion made above, it is clear that - the mohammedan heirs are independent owners of their specific shares and their liability is also proportionate to the extent of their share in the estate. Under the said circumstance, one share holder has no right, title and interest to alienate property of another shareholder. 11. It is well settled that• a mother is not de jure guardian of her minor children under the Mohammedan Law and therefore has no right to sell the interest of her minor children in a immovable property and such transaction is not merely voidable but void. Reference in• this regard may be made to AIR 1939 Nagpur 27 and AIR 1977 Madras 215. 12. Thus, if mother is not the legal guardian of her minor children, then only by inheriting a 'portion of property of her deceased-husband, under the Mohammedan Law, she is not entitled to alienate immovable property, which fallen in the shares 9f her minor children. Accordingly, she has no right to enter into an agreement with third party for transfer of immovable property of her minor children. 13. The contention of learned counsel for respondent no. 1 that as defendant no. 2 (mother) is natural guardian of appellants, therefore acceptance of advance consideration by her will revive the contract as against appellants also, cannot be accepted. It has been held by their Lordship of Supreme Court in a decision reported in (1990)4 SCC 672 in P.M. Veetil Narayani vs. Pathumma Beevi and Others that when a muslim' died, intestate, any acknowledgment made by one of the heir will not bind other heirs. Thus, even if defendanr no.1/respondent no. 2 took further advance in .the year 1981 & 1983 by' making endorsement on the back of the agreement the same will not revive against appellants. 14. It is worth mentioning that as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act a suit for specific performance of contract is required to be filed within three years from the date fixed for the purpose or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused. In the instant case admittedly life of agreement executed on 20.8.1975 is for one year. In the instant case admittedly life of agreement executed on 20.8.1975 is for one year. Thus, if the sale deed has not been executed by 19.8.1976, as per Article 54, the period of limitation starts running from that date and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 to file suit within three years from 19.8.1976. However, if the statement of plaintiff that late Haji Imam Bux had made an acknowledgment on 16.9.1978 by taking Rs. 1,000/- as advance is taken to be true (though denied by appellants) then also as per Section 18 of the Limitation Act, fresh period of limitation will be counted from the date of acknowledgment i.e. 16.9.1978. In that circumstance, plaintiff/respondent no. 1 is required to file the suit against the appellants within three years, from 16.9.1978 i.e. by 15.9.1981. Under the said circumstance, the agreement signed by late Haji Imam Bux is required to be enforced against appellants latest by 15.9.1981, but the present suit filed on 28.3.1984 much after the period of limitation. 15. As per the provision of law contained under Section 18 read with Section 20 Clause (1) of the Limitation Act, as defendant no. 1/respondent no. 2 is not the legal guardian of appellants, therefore, any acknowledgment made by her by receiving any advance consideration and making endorsement on the back of agreement, will not extend the period of limitation for filing suit against appellants, because after the death of Haji Imam Bux, defendant no. 1 has inherited only 1/8th share in the suit property and she has no right, title and interest to take advance for sale of properties which devolve in the shares of appellants. Thus, the acknowledgment and/or, advance taken by defendant no. 1/respondent no. 2 will not bind the appellants. 16. It is however, submitted by learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 that the appellants had not pressed the. issue of limitation either in the courts below or in this Court, thus, it. is not open for this Court to decide said issue. The said contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 is not acceptable. 16. It is however, submitted by learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 that the appellants had not pressed the. issue of limitation either in the courts below or in this Court, thus, it. is not open for this Court to decide said issue. The said contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 is not acceptable. In this respect it is apposite to quote Section 3(i) of Limitation Act:- "Bar of Limitation.-(i) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as defence." Thus, the aforesaid provision cast a duty upon the court to dismiss the suit, if the same is barred by law of limitation even if no defence set up by the defendants. Thus, even if the defendants/appellants had not pressed the said issue, it is imperative upon this Court to look into the matter and pass appropriate order if it finds that the suit itself is barred by law of limitation. 17. As noticed above, in view of the admitted facts as stated in the plaint itself, it appears that the suit for specific performance is barred by law of limitation as against these appellants. It appears that learned courts below had not looked into the matter and in a mechanical manner concluded that the suit is not barred by law of limitation. Thus, the said finding of the courts below cannot be sustained. 18. As discussed above, under the Mohammedan Law, mother is not the legal guardian of her minor children and she has no right, title and interest to alienate immovable properties of her minor children, thus. any advance taken by defendant respondent no. 2 (mother of appellants) for alienation of immovable properties of appellants, who were minor at the relevant point of time, will not bind the appellants and they are not liable to execute sale deed on the basis of said advance. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law framed in this appeal is answered in negative. 19. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the courts below is set aside. Consequently, the suit filed by the appellants is dismissed. However, parties shall bear their own cost.