I.A. Ansari. J- This review petition raises some impor­tant questions of law, namely, whether the market value of a land, which is acquisitioned under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall include, within the meaning of Section 23(1) thereof, the market value of the trees and crops standing thereon and if so, with refer­ence to what date, the market value shall be determined and, further, whether the market value of the trees and crops, if any, shall be determined separately from, and independent of, the land, which is acquisitioned? Yet an­other important question, raised in this review petition, is: when a 'person interested', as defined by Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisi­tion Act, 1894, is aggrieved by an award on the ground that while granting compensation, various statutory components for determina­tion of compensation have not been taken into account by the District Collector, whether he can seek a 'reference' to be made within the meaning of Section 18 of the Land Acquisi­tion Act, 1894? 2. This review petition, it may be noted, seeks review of the judgment and order, dated 05.08.2009, passed in Writ Appeal No.31/ 2009, whereby the appeal has been dismissed affirming and upholding the judgment and or­der, dated 16.05.2008, passed in WP(C) No.315/2007, which was filed by the present review petitioner, namely, Fortuna Agro Plan­tations Ltd, a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, with its registered of­fice at Kailashahar, North Tripura. 3. The material facts and various stages, which have led to the making of the present review petition, may, in a nutshell, be set out as follows:- (i) The petitioner-company (hereinaf­ter referred to as the 'review petitioner') is the owner of a tea garden named Murticherra Tea Estate, situated at North Tripura, Kailashahar. An area of land, measuring 18.31 acres, belonging to the review-petitioner's said tea garden, has been acquired by the Government by no­tification, dated 28-7-05, issued, under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to 'the L. A. Act'), for the purpose of construction of barbed wire fencing on the Indo-Bangaladesh border, and the requisite dec­laration was published, in this regard, on 30-8-2008, under Section 6 of the L.A. Act. Before, however, even the notifica­tion under Section 4(1) of the LA Act was issued, the National Building Construction Company (for short, 'the NBCC'), which was the executing agency for the said barbed wire fencing, had taken posses­sion of the land, in question, as far back as on 11.10.2004. (ii) Thereafter, a notice was issued, under the provisions of Section 9 of the L.A Act, requiring the owners of the ac­quired land to submit their claims for com­pensation on or before 20.10.2005. In response to the said notice, the review-petitioner submitted its claim, on 20.10.2005, requesting an amount of Rs.661,87,33,891/- to be awarded as compensation under various heads. How­ever, the review-petitioner, again, on 28.10.05, submitted a revised claim of Rs.908,09,46,924/- requesting to pay compensation under Section 23(1 A), so­latium under Section 23(2) and statutory interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the L.A. Act, by contending that it (review petitioner) was not making any extra claim save and except the statutory dues pay­able under Sections 23(1A), 23(2), 28 and 34, which had not been correctly com­puted earlier, due to inadvertence, at the time of submitting the original claim on 20.10.2005. 4. At the time of acquisition of the land, belonging to the review petitioner, a joint sur­vey, on the said acquired land, as directed by the Addl. District Magistrate and Collector, had been conducted by the NBCC, which was the executing agency of the barbed wire fencing, in the presence of representatives of the review-petitioner. In the said joint survey, it was found that there were, on the said ac­quired land, 13,630 numbers of trees cov­ered by, and classified into, 42 species and 3,49,002 numbers of bamboo covered by 2 species. 5. On 23.12.2005, the Land Acquisition Collector made an award for an amount of Rs.54,53,401 as follows and the said amount was received, under protest, by the review-petitioner on 8.6.2006: "(a)Market value of land with­out trees and Bamboos standing there on Rs. 15,62,625 (b) Damage cost of six species of trees and one species of bamboo under Section 23 (1) -Secondly of the said Act Rs.33,60,852 (c) Additional Compensation @ 12% p.a. under Section 23(1A) Rs. 61,136 (d) Solatium @ 30% under Section 23(2) Rs. 4.68.788 Total Rs.54,53,401" 6. 15,62,625 (b) Damage cost of six species of trees and one species of bamboo under Section 23 (1) -Secondly of the said Act Rs.33,60,852 (c) Additional Compensation @ 12% p.a. under Section 23(1A) Rs. 61,136 (d) Solatium @ 30% under Section 23(2) Rs. 4.68.788 Total Rs.54,53,401" 6. Alleging that the said award, dated 23.12.2005, did not include the market value claimed by the review-petitioner in respect of the trees and the bamboos and that at the time of assessment, all the 42 species of trees and 2 species of bamboos had not been taken into account, the review-petitioner filed a writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.348 of 2008, seeking a direction for early assessment of the entire compensation payable to the writ petitioner under Sections 23 and 34 of the L.A. Act. On the basis of the admitted position, the said writ petition (hereinafter referred to as 'the 'first writ petition") was disposed of, on 01.11.2006, with the observations made, and the directions given, as under: "Heard Mr. B. Das, learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respon­dent Union of India and Mr. T. D. Majumder, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate for the State re­spondents. As agreed to, the matter is being disposed of at admission stage. The petitioner is a company registered un­der the Companies Registration Act, 1956. Cer­tain lands with valuable trees owned by the petitioner have been acquired for the purpose of construction of Indo Bangladesh Border fencing in a land acquisition proceeding which commenced with a notification dated 28.7.2005 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'Act'). The area of the land ac­quired belonging to the petitioner is 18.31 acres for which the petitioner has already received Rs.54,53,401/-. The admitted position is that out of 42 species of trees and two species of bam­boo only six species of trees and one species of bamboo have been covered by the assessment made by the L.A. Collector. Thus, the award was only in part. The L.A. Collector is required to determine the compensation for the remain­ing 36 species of trees and one species of bam­boo. The only grievance of the petitioner is that the L.A. Collector, in spite of repeated requests, has not made the assessment for awarding the compensation for the aforementioned trees and bamboo. Mr. Thus, the award was only in part. The L.A. Collector is required to determine the compensation for the remain­ing 36 species of trees and one species of bam­boo. The only grievance of the petitioner is that the L.A. Collector, in spite of repeated requests, has not made the assessment for awarding the compensation for the aforementioned trees and bamboo. Mr. Majumder has shown the parawise com­ments furnished by the respondents from which it appears that the L.A. Collector could not as­sess the compensation for the remaining trees and bamboo only because the approved rate therefor could not be obtained from the Rev­enue Department of the State Government. As soon as the rate would be available the L.A. Collector would complete the assessment and make the award.n Mr. Das, learned senior coun­sel would, however, emphatically submit that the Revenue Department is believed to have made available the approved rate for the said purpose. In spite of this position, the L.A. Collector is slow in concluding the proceeding. Be that as it may, in view of the above ad­mitted position, this writ petition is disposed of by a consent order that within a period of one month from today the Revenue Department of the State Government shall make available to the L.A. Collector the approved rate for assess­ment of the compensation for the trees and bam­boo after receipt of the approved rate said L.A. Collector shall finally make the assessment and award the compensation within a period of one month more." [Emphasis supplied] 7. By the said order, dated 01.11.2006, the learned Single Judge, as can be seen, di­rected the L.A. Collector to determine com­pensation in respect of the remaining 36 spe­cies of trees and one specie of bamboo, which had not been, admittedly, taken into account in the earlier award. In the said order, it was recorded by the learned Single Judge that the petitioner had already received compensation of Rs.54,53,401 towards acquisition of 18.31 acres of land and that the said assessment covered only six species of trees and one specie of bamboos out of 42 species of trees and two species of bamboos respectively. The learned Single Judge accordingly directed payment of compensation in respect of the remaining 36 species of trees and one specie of bamboo. The learned Single Judge accordingly directed payment of compensation in respect of the remaining 36 species of trees and one specie of bamboo. A direction was also issued by the learned Single Judge, in the order, dated 01.11.2006, that the Department of Revenue, Government of Tripura, shall furnish to the L. A. Collector the approved rates for assess­ment of compensation for the trees and the bamboos aforementioned. 8. Following the directions given by the order, dated 01.11.2006, aforementioned, the L.A. Collector made, on 06.01.2007, another award for a sum of Rs.57,36,918/-, the said amount being the compensation, as noted above, for the remaining 36 species of trees and one specie of bamboo and this amount too was received, on 08.01.2007, by the re­view petitioner under protest. "Amount allowed for trees, crops house, Huts of any other immovable things Rs.35,59,022 Total value of the land Rs.35,59,022 Additional compensation on the market value under Section 23(2) Nil Damages under clause seco­ndly to fourthly and sixthly of Rs.9,47,886 section 23(1) and expenses incidental to change of resid­ence under clause fifthly. Interest under Section 34, Act 1 of 1894@9%from Rs.12,30,010 11.10.2004 to 10.10.05 and Thereafter® 15% from 11.10.2005 to 30.12.2006 Capitalised value of Govern­ment revenue abated Award Nil under Section 11, Act 1 of 1894 Total Rs.57,36,918 (Rupees fifty seven lakhs thirty six thousand nine hundred eighteen only)." 9. The L.A. Collector, however, made a footnote, at the end of the said award, indi­cating therein that in respect of 'the other claims', made by the interested party, namely, Fortuna Agro Plantation Ltd, Murticherra (i.e., the review petitioner), the decision would be taken after receipt of Government's di­rection as had been sought for vide office let­ter, dated 12.4.2006. 10. It is, now, extremely important to note that in the proceedings before the LA Col­lector, which had been held pursuant to the order, dated 01.11.2006, passed in the 'first writ petition', the present review petitioner had claimed that the felled trees and bam­boos, which were standing on the acquired land, at the time of the acquisition thereof, had not been handed over to them and, hence, they (review petitioners) be paid market value of the same. This claim was disputed by the NBCC contending that the felled trees and bamboos had been handed over to the re­view-petitioner. This claim was disputed by the NBCC contending that the felled trees and bamboos had been handed over to the re­view-petitioner. Dealing with the claim of the review-petitioner with regard to the true value of the trees and the bamboos, the L.A. Col­lector, after hearing the parties concerned, passed, on 27.4.2007, another order, which reads, inter alia, as follows :- "After perusal of deposition as well as avail­able records it is transpired that there is no proof in respect of taking over/handing over of trees/ bamboos already felled down in between the Implementing Agency i.e NBCC Ltd and Fortuna Agro Plantations Ltd in anytime of the referred period. In view of what has been stated in the for­going paragraphs I am of the view that trees/ bamboos felled down by NBCC Ltd has not been handed over to Fortuna Agro Plantations Ltd. Hence M/S Fortuna Agro Plantations Ltd is entitled to receive the compensation of the tim­ber of the trees/bamboos already felled down during the construction of IBB Fencing from their acquired land as per L.A. Act. 1894 follow­ing the provision of Section 81 of Land Acqui­sition Manual issued by Revenue Department. Government of Tripura." [Emphasis is added] 11. The above finding of the LA Collec­tor, which he arrived in his order, dated 27.04.2007, namely, that the trees and bam­boos, which had been felled during the con­struction of the Indo-Bangladesh Border fencing, had not been returned to the review petitioner and the review petitioner is entitled to receive the compensation. This finding was never put to challenge in any proceeding in­cluding in the writ petitions, which were filed. These findings, therefore, have attained final­ity and must be treated to have remained fi­nal. 12. Following the above order, dated 27.04.2007, passed by the L.A. Collector and direction given in W.P(C) No.348 of 2006, the review petitioner, contending that the market value of the felled trees and bamboos had not been paid, filed another writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.315 of 2007, (hereinafter referred to as the' second writ petition') seek­ing a direction for payment of the price of the timber. The basis of the claim, made by the writ petitioner, in the' second writ petition', was the order, dated 27.04.2007, aforesaid. The basis of the claim, made by the writ petitioner, in the' second writ petition', was the order, dated 27.04.2007, aforesaid. The review petitioner also contended, in the 'second writ petition', that the L.A. Collec­tor, while making the above mentioned award, on 06.01.2007, did not assess and, consequently, did not make award in respect of true value of the felled trees and bamboos and that the award aforesaid being partly made without making final award, the review-peti­tioner could not have sought for relief under Section 18 of the Act and could have not, therefore, applied, in terms of Section 18, to the Collector requesting him to make a 'ref­erence' to the District Judge against the award. 13. By filing counter affidavit, in the 'sec­ond writ petition', the respondents denied that the review petitioner was entitled to further compensation. It was contended by the re­spondents, in the 'second writ petition', that pursuant to the direction given by the Court in W.P.(C) No.348 of 2006, (i.e., the 'first writ petition'), the review-petitioner had al­ready been awarded full compensation per­taining to the land as well as trees and bam­boos standing thereon. According to the con­testing respondents, the said order, dated 27.4.2007, issued by the L.A. Collector, af­ter the finalization of the matter, was uncalled for. 14. A learned Single Judge of this Court, having heard both the parties and on consid­ering the materials on record, dismissed the 'second writ petition', on 16.05.2008, ob­serving therein, inter alia, that, in W.P.(C) No.348 of 2006 (i.e. the 'first writ petition'), filed on 4.9.06, the prayer of the petitioner was for issuing a direction to the respondents to make assessment of the compensation in respect of 36 species of trees and one specie of bamboo on the ground that the respon­dents had not assessed the remaining 36 spe­cies of trees and one specie of bamboos, while assessing the six species of trees and one specie of bamboos out of the total 42 spe­cies of trees and two species of bamboos. While dismissing the' second writ petition', it was also observed by the learned Single Judge that in its 'first writ petition', the sole griev­ance of the writ petitioner (i.e., the review petitioner) was that the authority concerned had not taken into account the prices of 36 species of trees and one specie of bamboo and that no further grievance had been made in the earlier writ petition (i.e., the 'first writ petition') as was being raised in the present writ petition (i.e., the 'second writ petition'). The learned Single Judge, while dismissing the 'second writ petition', namely, WP(C) No.315/2007, in the manner as aforemen­tioned, further observed:- "In Annexure 5 supplementary award of compensation dated 06.01.2007, all the species of trees and bamboo were taken into consider­ation. In the earlier writ petition filed by the pe­titioner, it was never the case that some of the trees and bamboos apart from the 36 species of trees and one species of bamboo were not ac­counted for and that the petitioner was entitled to further compensation in respect of those un­accounted trees and bamboos. It is true that while passing the Annexure 5 supplementary award dated 06.01.2007, the L.A. Collector made a further remark that in respect of 'further claim's of the petitioner, the matter would be decided after received the decision of the Government. Similarly, in the Annexure Respondent 7 esti­mates of the probable cost of acquiring land, the L.A. Collector made a remark to the effect that the awar4d was made except the claim of the petitioner dated 27.3.2006 forwarded to the Revenue Department under letter dated 12.04.2006. On a perusal of both the documents, prima facie, it appears that such endorsements were made subsequently. It is not specified as to what 'further claim' means and constitutes. Once the entire species of trees and bamboos were accounted for and compensation paid on that basis, the matter could not have been kept open in such manner. In the earlier writ petition, there is no whis­per regarding the present claim of the petition. It was stated that the inventory of the felled trees and bamboos was prepared jointly by the petitioner and the NBCC. The case, as is pro­jected now, was not the case of the petitioner in the earlier writ petition. In the earlier writ petition, there is no whis­per regarding the present claim of the petition. It was stated that the inventory of the felled trees and bamboos was prepared jointly by the petitioner and the NBCC. The case, as is pro­jected now, was not the case of the petitioner in the earlier writ petition. There is also no spe­cific statement made in the writ petition as to what account the petitioner is entitled to re­ceive further compensation. It gives an impres­sion that the petitioner has taken a chance for favourable consideration on the basis of the aforesaid letter and order of the L.A. Collector. It was none of the business of the L.A. Collec­tor to pass further order after settling the matter as per direction of this Court." 15. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order of dismissal, dated 16.05.2008, the present review-petitioner preferred an appeal, which gave rise to W.A. No.31 of 2008. 16. Armed with the above mentioned foot­note, given by the L. A. Collector in the award, dated 6.1.07, to the effect that the 'other claims' of the claimant (i.e., the present re­view petitioner) would be decided after re­ceiving the Government's response, and the L.A. Collector's order, dated 27.4.2007, that the felled trees and bamboos had not been returned to the review petitioner and the re­view petitioner needs to be paid compensa­tion therefor, the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner) contended, in the appeal, that the awards, made by the L.A. Collector, were part awards and that the value of the trees and the bamboos having not yet been assessed and awarded, the award, to be passed, was still incomplete and the stage for seeking 'reference' to be made, under Section 18 of the LA Act, had not yet been reached. 17. It was, thus, the stand of the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner), in the appeal, that since no final award had been made by the L.A. Collector, the review-petitioner could not have, under the law, filed an application, under Section 18 of the L.A. Act, seeking a 'reference' to be made to the District Judge for determining proper compensation. 17. It was, thus, the stand of the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner), in the appeal, that since no final award had been made by the L.A. Collector, the review-petitioner could not have, under the law, filed an application, under Section 18 of the L.A. Act, seeking a 'reference' to be made to the District Judge for determining proper compensation. Ac­cording to the appellant (i.e., the review-pe­titioner), in the appeal, what had been awarded was the 'market value' of the land, but not the compensation for the damage suf­fered by the appellant (i.e., the review peti­tioner) for being deprived of the trees and bamboos, which were standing on the acquisitioned land, and had not been handed over to the appellant (i.e., the review peti­tioner) and as such, the learned Single Judge ought to have directed the L.A. Collector to pass the award as per law. 18. The State respondents, contesting the appeal, contended that the plea the appellant (i.e., the review-petitioner) the subsequent award, dated 6.1.07, was made, on the ba­sis of the value of the trees and the bamboos, by assessing the same as per the approved rates of the Department of Revenue, Gov­ernment of Tripura, and that, in the event of any dispute regarding quantum of compen­sation assessed, the owner of the property could have filed an application under Section 18 of the Act, 1894, which the appellant (i.e., the review-petitioner) had not done and the writ petition, made under Article 226, was, therefore, not maintainable. 19. A Division Bench of this Court, while refusing to interfere with the impugned judgment and order, dated 16.05.2008, passed by the learned Single Judge, in the 'second writ petition', dismissed the appeal, on 05.08.2009, with cost of Rs. 10,000/- (ru­pees ten thousand). The Division Bench (with one of us, Sarma, J, being party thereto) ob­served that though the appellant had con­tended that what had been awarded was the damage cost and not the true value of the trees and the bamboos, the appellant could not show any provision, under the L. A. Act, for awarding the damage cost. 20. Coupled with the above, referring to paragraph 15 of the W.P.(C) No.315 of 2007, (i.e., the 'second writ petition'), the Division Bench observed that the said writ petition was, in substance, filed with a claim for enhancement of compensation for the trees/bamboos. 20. Coupled with the above, referring to paragraph 15 of the W.P.(C) No.315 of 2007, (i.e., the 'second writ petition'), the Division Bench observed that the said writ petition was, in substance, filed with a claim for enhancement of compensation for the trees/bamboos. The Division Bench further observed that even if the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner) had felt aggrieved by the second award, i.e., the award, dated 06.01.2007, the remedy of the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner) lied in making an appli­cation, under Section 18 of the L.A. Act, seeking a 'reference' to be made to the Dis­trict Judge and, the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner) ought to have, therefore, applied, if it was so aggrieved, for a 'reference' to be made to the District Judge and in the face of this alternative remedy already available to the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner), the ap­peal had no substance. In the order, dated 05.08.2009, dismissing the appeal, the Divi­sion Bench observed: "The L.A. Collector having passed the award, if the appellant is not satisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded, it was open to them to file an application u/s 18 of the Act seeking reference of the dispute relating to the amount of compensation to the competent court under the Act. The appellant instead of taking such recourse has filed the 'second writ peti­tion', being W.P.(C) No.315 of 2007 praying for the same relief as prayed for in W.P.(C) No.348/06. The 'second writ petition' on the same prayer is in fact hit by the principles of res judicata. In any case, the claim of the appellant being for enhancement of the amount of compensation as awarded, after accepting the amount awarded vide the subsequent award dated 06.01.07, they cannot raise their grievance relating to the amount of compensation awarded by filing a writ petition before the High Court for directing the L.A. Collector to pass another award to­wards the true value of the compensation. The High Court cannot entertain such a writ peti­tion as, before allowing such prayer, the High Court must satisfy itself that the true value has not been given which cannot be ascertained by the High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and such dispute can only be resolved under the provisions of the Act, i.e in a proceeding required to be initiated before the competent court on the basis of the application filed by the interested persons seeking reference of such disOute to such competent court. The contention of the appellant that the subsequent award dated 06.01.07 being a part award, the true value of the trees and bamboos having not been assessed, the stage for filing an application u/s 18 of the Act has not come, cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the L.A. Collector has already passed an award on 06.01.07 assessing the amount of compensa­tion payable for the said trees and bamboos, which ac cording to the L.A. Collector is the true value, but according to the appellant is not the true value. Even assuming any further claim of the appellant in respect of the value of the such trees/bamboos subsists, the appellant has to take recourse to Section 18 of the Act, which has not been done. The decision of the Apex Court in Hriday Narain (supra) on which the reliance has been placed cannot be of any help to the appellant as specific provisions have been made under the Act for redressal of grievances, if any, of any interested person in relation to the claim for enhanced amount of compensation, after passing of an award by the Collector. It is no doubt true that the restriction imposed by writ court to entertain a writ petition, on the ground of availability of efficacious alternative remedy, is a self-imposed restriction, but High Court will not exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of the claim for enhancement of the amount of com­pensation as such dispute cannot be decided in a writ jurisdiction, which requires detailed examination of evidence and can be done only under the provisions of the Act, meaning thereby, there has to be an application u/s 18 of the Act seeking reference and in the event of filing such application within the time allowed under the Act, on the basis of the decision that may be given by the competent court." 21. Not satisfied with the judgment and order, dated 05.08.2009, passed by a Divi­sion Bench of this Court dismissing the ap­peal, the appellant has, now, come up with this petition seeking review of the judgment and order aforementioned. 22. We have heard Mr. KN Poddar, learned Senior counsel, for the review peti­tioner, and Mr. A. Lodh, learned Assistant Solicitor General, assisted by Mr. JMA Choudhury, learned Central Government Counsel, for the respondent No. 1. We have also heard Mr. NC Paul, learned Senior Gov­ernment Advocate, Tripura, for the respon­dent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 23. hi the review petition, the review-pe­titioner contends, inter alia, that the market value of the trees and bamboos, furnished by the Forest Department to the Revenue De­partment, was deliberately suppressed by the latter and that the approved rate for damage was worked out by the Revenue Department with reference to a negligible percentage (3%) of the true value of the felled trees and the bamboos. 24. According to the review-petitioner, since the L. A Collector had clearly mentioned in the order, dated 27.04.07, aforesaid that only damage cost of the trees and the bam-boos had been paid and the felled trees and bamboos had not been handed over to the owner of the land, the review petitioner, be­ing the owner of the land, was yet to be awarded the true value of the felled trees and the bamboos, which is nothing, but the mar­ket value of the trees and bamboos standing on the acquisitioned land on the date of pub­lication of notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act. 25. 25. It is also contended by the review pe­titioner that the L.A. Collector has assessed the award in respect of the damage cost un­der the second Clause of Section 23(1) of the L.A. Act, whereas the market value of the felled trees and bamboos has not yet been assessed and awarded under the 'first' Clause of Section 23(1) and, hence, it could not have been held by the learned Single Judge that the order, dated 27.04.07, passed by the L.A. Collector, was uncalled for or beyond the ju­risdiction of the L.A. Collector. It is also con­tended by the review petitioner, in its review petition, that since the Revenue Department, Government of Tripura, had not furnished the value of the trees and bamboos to the L.A. Collector, the L. A. Collector could not di­rect payment of the market value as pre­scribed by the 'first' clause of Section 23(1) of the L.A. Act. 26. Referring to the term, 'other claim', as mentioned at the footnote of the award, dated 06.01.2007, the review-petitioner con­tends, in its review petition, that the term 'other claims' implies the market value of the felled trees and the bamboos under the 'first' clause of Section 23(1) of the L.A. Act and that no portion of the claim, under the said provisions, was ever assessed and paid and that the term 'other claims' also included the review petitioner's claim on account of severed land measuring 250 acres or so as well as damage caused to the trees and bamboos standing on the severed land. It is the case of the review petitioner that the L. A. Collector rightly ob­served that the 'other claims' would be settled after receipt of the Government decision as had been sought for by him. 27. It is contended by the review petitioner that the law is clear regarding payment of dam­age cost and that under the first clause of the said Section, the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification un­der Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act is required to be assessed and paid. 27. It is contended by the review petitioner that the law is clear regarding payment of dam­age cost and that under the first clause of the said Section, the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification un­der Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act is required to be assessed and paid. It is also contended that since the market value of the trees and the bamboos, standing on the acquired land, as referred to in 'first' Clause of Section 23(1), is clearly distinct and different from the 'damage' referred to in the 'second' clause of Section 23(1), the review-petitioner, hav­ing been paid the damage cost, is entitled to get the market value of the trees and the bam­boos, which has not yet been assessed and paid. 28. The review-petitioner has further con­tended that compensation, in respect of the standing trees and the bamboos, etc, on the acquired land, which have been cut and felled, are required to be assessed under two heads, namely, the market value of such trees and the bamboos under the 'first' clause of Sec­tion 23 (1) of the L.A. Act and, secondly, potential value of the trees and the bamboos by way of damages for taking away the stand­ing trees and bamboos. It is also claimed by the review-petitioner that in view of the part award made by the L.A. Collector and no final award having yet been made by the Col­lector, no 'reference' was competent under Section 18 of the L.A. Act and has, there­fore, not been made by the L.A. Collector. 29. With regard to the observations made by the Division Bench in the appeal, which had arisen out of the 'second writ petition', that the 'second writ petition' was hit by the principle of res judicata, the reviewpetitioner contends that there being no claim for enhance­ment of the compensation, the 'second writ petition' was not hit by the law of res judi­cata. 30. On the grounds as indicated above, the review petitioner seeks review of the ap­pellate judgment by contending that the ap­pellate judgment suffers from errors appar­ent on the face of record and the decision, rendered in the appeal, therefore, needs to be reviewed. 31. Appearing on behalf of the review petitioner, Mr. 30. On the grounds as indicated above, the review petitioner seeks review of the ap­pellate judgment by contending that the ap­pellate judgment suffers from errors appar­ent on the face of record and the decision, rendered in the appeal, therefore, needs to be reviewed. 31. Appearing on behalf of the review petitioner, Mr. Poddar, learned Senior coun­sel, has submitted that the scheme of Sub-Section (1) of Section 23, which relates to determination of compensation, is that the Court shall, under Clause 'first' of Section 23(1), determine the market value of the land and the Court shall, then, assess, under Clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1), the damage, which has been sustained by the person, who has been deprived of the usufructs of his land, because of the acquisition of the land. Mr. Poddar further submits that when the stand­ing trees or crops, on the acquisitioned land, are cut and felled, the owner of the property is required to be paid not only the value of the felled trees, but also the potential value thereof. The potential value, in such a case, according to Mr. Poddar, would be the dam­age sustained by the person, who has been deprived of the crops and trees, which were standing on the acquainted land, and the mar­ket value of the crops and trees would be the value of the felled trees and crops. 32. In support of his above submissions, Mr. Poddar illustrates thus: A coconut tree may bear fruit, say, in a period of 10 years, from the date of its plantation. If the value of a matured coconut tree is, say, Rs.20/- and it is cut at the age of two years from the date of its plantation, the market value of the felled coconut tree would not be Rs. 20/-, but would come down to Rs. 4/- at the rate of Rs.2/- per year. The owner of the coconut tree would, thus, be deprived of his future use of the coconut tree, which the tree would, oth­erwise, have, in the time to come, yielded, his loss being a sum of Rs. 16, which is unpaid potential value of the said tree. The owner of the tree is, therefore, according to Mr. Poddar, required to be compensated for the loss of Rs. 16/-, which he would sustain if only mar­ket value of the felled coconut tree is paid to him. It is, according to Mr. 16, which is unpaid potential value of the said tree. The owner of the tree is, therefore, according to Mr. Poddar, required to be compensated for the loss of Rs. 16/-, which he would sustain if only mar­ket value of the felled coconut tree is paid to him. It is, according to Mr. Poddar, the com­pensation for the damage, sustained by the owner of the tree for having been deprived of the use or usufructs of the tree, which be­comes payable to the owner, as the damage cost. This compensation is assessed, submits Mr. Poddar, under clause 'secondly' of Sec­tion 23(1). Thus, what is given, contends Mr. Poddar, under clause 'secondly', is the po­tential value of the tree and not the market value. The market value, further contends Mr. Poddar, would be Rs.4/-, which would be given to the owner if the felled tree is not handed over to him and this is, according to Mr. Poddar, covered by the 'first' Clause of Section 23(1). 33. In short, what Mr. Poddar contends, with the help of the said illustration, is that Rs.4/- would be the market value of the tree and Rs. 16/- would be the potential value of the tree. It is the compensation for the dam­age sustained, as a result of being deprived of the potential value of the tree, which is paid under clause 'secondly', and the market value of the tree is paid under clause 'first' of Sec­tion 23( 1). In the case at hand, points out Mr. Poddar, it is the clear observation of the L.A. Collector, in the order, dated 27.04.2007, that his enquiry has revealed that the NBCC had not handed over the felled trees to the review petitioner and, hence, in such circum­stances, the review petitioner was, and re­mains till date, entitled to receive the market value of the trees and this value has to be as­sessed under Clause 'first' of Section 23(1). Had the felled trees and bamboos been re­turned to the review petitioner, the review pe­titioner could not have asked for, points out Mr. Poddar, the market value of the trees and bamboos, but when the felled trees and bam­boos had not been handed over to the re­view petitioner, the review petitioner re­mained, and still remains, entitled to be paid the market value of the said felled trees and bamboos. 34. In support of his above submissions, Mr. Poddar, the market value of the trees and bamboos, but when the felled trees and bam­boos had not been handed over to the re­view petitioner, the review petitioner re­mained, and still remains, entitled to be paid the market value of the said felled trees and bamboos. 34. In support of his above submissions, Mr. Poddar heavily places reliance on the de­cision in Collector of Bareily Vs. Sultan Ahmad Khan, AIR 1926 All 689. Reliance is placed by Mr. Poddar on Dayaprakash Trikambhai Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Baroda, AIR 1969 Gujarat 34, Tarwadi Ravishanker Mohanlal Vs. Col­lector, Panchmahals, AIR 1969 Guj 191 and State of Bihar Vs. Rameshwar Singh, AIR 1973 Patna 123. 35. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the review petitioner, Mr. Lodh, learned Assistant Solicitor General, submits that in the case of acquisition of land, the trees, standing thereon, have to be valued as fire wood and, hence, the petitioner, in the present case, has received much more than the real value of the trees, which stood on the acquisitioned land, though it was entitled to nothing but price of fire wood. In support of his contention, Mr. Lodh places reliance on State of Haryana Vs. Gur Char an Singh & Anr., reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 637. It is reiterated by Mr. Lodh that the petitioner has received far more than what the review petitioner was entitled to and, hence, there is no substance in the review petition and the same may be dismissed. 36. As far as Mr. Pal, learned State Gov­ernment Advocate, is concerned, his submis­sion is that the review petitioner's remedy, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, lies in seeking a 'reference' to be made to the District Judge under Section 18 and, hence, his writ petition is not maintainable and has been rightly dismissed. 37. Repelling the above submissions made on behalf of the respondents, Mr. Poddar points out that in the present case, respon­dent No. 1, namely, Union of India, is the ap­propriate Government within the meaning of Section 3(ee) of the LA Act and it is, there­fore, the Union of India, which is liable to pay compensation. In the case at hand, respon­dent No. 1, i.e., Union of India, further points out Mr. Poddar points out that in the present case, respon­dent No. 1, namely, Union of India, is the ap­propriate Government within the meaning of Section 3(ee) of the LA Act and it is, there­fore, the Union of India, which is liable to pay compensation. In the case at hand, respon­dent No. 1, i.e., Union of India, further points out Mr. Poddar, never disputed the findings of the LA Collector and/or the observations made by him in the order, dated 27.04.2007, that the 'other claims' made by the review petitioner has not been assessed and the same would be assessed on receiving Government's response. The respondent No. 1 had, at no stage, since the commencement of the pro­ceeding, ever contested the proceeding and, in the present review petition too, the Union of India, having not challenged the findings of the L. A. Collector that the felled trees and bamboos had not been handed over to the owner of the land, cannot dispute the correctness of the said finding. 38. Countering further the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, it is sub­mitted by Mr. Poddar that what has been paid, according to the part awards, which have been made by the L.A. Collector, is the com­pensation for the damage caused to the re­view petitioner, i.e., the loss of potential value of the trees and bamboos standing on the acquisitioned land and this damage cost, con­tends Mr. Poddar, has been awarded to the review petitioner under clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1), but the review petitioner has not been paid, and must be paid, under Clause 'first' of Section 23(1), the market value of the trees, which had been' felled' and had not been handed over to the review petitioner. 39. Thus, the correct market value of the trees and bamboos, as were standing on the acquisitioned land on the date of notification under Section 4(1), is, insists Mr. Poddar, still required to be assessed under clause 'first' of Section 23(1), but this aspect had not been correctly noticed and appreciated, in the' sec­ond writ petition', by the learned Single Judge and has also gone unnoticed by the Division Bench, in the appeal, which had arisen as a result of dismissal of the 'second writ peti­tion'. The error is, thus, submits Mr. The error is, thus, submits Mr. Poddar, an error apparent on the face of the record and the same, therefore, needs to be corrected by this Court under its plenary power. 40. As regards the observations made, in the appeal, by this Court that the appellant has the remedy of seeking a 'reference' un­der Section 18 of the LA Act, if the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner) is dissatisfied with the award and no writ petition, under Article 226, could have been made by the applicant (i.e., the review petitioner), Mr. Poddar con­tends that this observation is, again, an error apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as Section 18, which embodies provisions for seeking or making a 'reference', relates to an award, which, according to Mr. Poddar, is complete. Till today, points out Mr. Poddar, complete award has not been given and, hence, no 'reference' could have been sought for by the review petitioner by making an ap­plication under Section 18 and the only effi­cacious remedy left to the review petitioner was by way of a writ petition under Article 226 and this is what the review petitioner had done. 41. There was, thus, contends Mr. Poddar, no remedy, alternative and equally efficacious, available to the review petitioner and, hence, the observation made by this Court that the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner) ought to have taken recourse to the alternative rem­edy, as provided under Section 18, is an ap­parently erroneous conclusion and may, there­fore, be corrected by exercising this Court's plenary power of review. 42. Poddar, no remedy, alternative and equally efficacious, available to the review petitioner and, hence, the observation made by this Court that the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner) ought to have taken recourse to the alternative rem­edy, as provided under Section 18, is an ap­parently erroneous conclusion and may, there­fore, be corrected by exercising this Court's plenary power of review. 42. As can be noticed from the above dis­cussion, the contention of the review-petitioner is that the L.A. Collector, by his awards, dated 23.12.05 and 06.01.2007, granted only the damage cost of the trees and the bam­boos under clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) of the LA Act, but not the market value of the felled trees and the bamboos under clause 'first' of Section 23(1) of the LA Act, though the felled trees and bamboos were never, ac­cording to LA Collector's finding recorded in his order, dated 27.04.2007, handed over to the review petitioner and since the felled trees and bamboos were not handed over to the review petitioner, the review petitioner re­mains entitled to receive the value of the felled trees and bamboos and the value of the felled trees and bamboos would be nothing but the 'market value' of the felled trees and bam­boos, which is awardable, but has not been awarded, to the review petitioner under clause 'first' of Section 23(1). It is also the conten­tion of the review petitioner that the market value of the trees and the bamboos, standing on an acquired land, is clearly distinct and different from the compensation awardable for the 'damage' referred to in clause 'sec­ondly' of the LA Act. 43. In effect, what is contended by the review petitioner is that compensation, in re­spect of the standing trees and the bamboos on an acquisitioned land, is required to be as­sessed under two heads, that is, firstly, the market value of such trees and the bamboos under clause 'first' of Section 23(1) of the LA Act, and, secondly, potential value of the trees and the bamboos, under the provisions of clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) of the LA Act, by way of damages for taking away the standing trees and bamboos. 44. 44. Having taken note of the rival conten­tions raised by the parties, let us, before pro­ceeding further, examine the scheme of award­ing of compensation as embodied in the LA Act so far as the scheme is relevant for the purpose of the present review petition. 45. Section 23 of the LA Act provides as under: "23. Matters to be considered in determin­ing compensation. - (1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the court shall take into consideration- first, the market-value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under sec­tion 4, sub-section (1); secondly, the damage sustained by the per­son interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking pos­session thereof; thirdly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession taking posses­sion of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land; fourthly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings; fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person inter­ested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change; and sixthly, the damage (if any') bona fide result­ing from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the dec­laration under section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land. (1A) In addition to the market value of the land above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collec­tor or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation.-In computing the period re­ferred to in this subsection, any period or peri­ods during which the proceedings for the ac­quisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded. (2) In addition to the market-value of the land as above provided, the court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market-value, in consider­ation of the compulsory nature of the acquisi­tion." 46. It is apparent from a plain reading of Section 23 of the LA Act that in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the acquisitioned land the Court is required to take into consideration, among other things, the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the LA Act. The expression 'land' has been defined, under Section 3 (a) of the LA Act, to include benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. 47. It clearly follows from the above defi­nition of 'land' that the expression 'land' would also include, within its ambit, the trees, which stand on the acquisitioned land. In determin­ing, therefore, the amount of compensation to be awarded for the acquired land, the mar­ket value of not just the land, but also of the trees, which may be standing on the acquisitioned land, have to be taken into con­sideration. 48. The question, which, now, poses itself for consideration is this: If the trees, standing on the land, are also required to be consid­ered for assessing the market value of the land under clause 'first' of Section 23(1), what is, then, clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) meant for? According to clause' secondly', (as the same appears from a plain reading thereof), the Court shall, while determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the acquisitioned land, take into consideration the damage sustained by the person interested for taking of the standing crops or trees, which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof. 49. 49. Thus, it is clearly seen that under clause 'first', what has been provided for is the 'mar­ket value' of the land (which includes trees standing on it; whereas under clause 'sec­ondly', what has been provided for is the compensation for the 'damage' sustained by reason of taking of any standing crops or trees on the acquisitioned land. 50. In order to properly comprehend the scope and application of the clause 'first' vis-a-vis clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) of the LAAct, a brief survey of the history of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is impera­tive. 51. Under the Land Acquisition Act, 1870 (hereinafter referred to as 'the old LAAct of 1870'), the expression 'land' was defined exactly the way it has been defined under the new Act, i.e., Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (which is being already referred to, in this re­view petition, as 'the LAAct'). Section 3 of the old Act read as under: "The expression 'land' includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything at­tached to the earth." 52. Under the old Act of 1870, the provi­sions, analogous to the provisions of Section 23 of the new L.A. Act, stood embodied in Section 24, which read as under: "24. In determining the amount of compen­sation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Judge and assessors shall take into consideration - First, the market-value, at the time of award­ing compensation, of such land; Secondly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of awarding compensation, by reason of severing such land from his other land; Thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of awarding compensation, by reason of the acquisition in­juriously affecting his other property, whether moveable or immoveable, in any other manner, or his earnings ; and Fourthly, if in consequence of the acquisi­tion, he is compelled to change his residence, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change." 53. It is evident from the above provisions of the old LAAct of 1870 that in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under the old LAAct of 1870, the Judge (or assessor) was required to take into consideration the 'market value' of such land 'at the time of awarding com­pensation'. It is evident from the above provisions of the old LAAct of 1870 that in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under the old LAAct of 1870, the Judge (or assessor) was required to take into consideration the 'market value' of such land 'at the time of awarding com­pensation'. Is the 'market value' of the land still required to the determined, under the new LAAct, with reference to the 'date of mak­ing of the award' as was the case under the old LAAct of 1870? 54. Our quest for an answer to the above question brings us to a comparative study of the various changes, which the LAAct of 1870 has undergone to reach its present state. When the new LAAct (i.e., the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) was, initially, introduced, Clause 'first' of sub- Section (1) of Section 23 (analo­gous to Section 24 of the old LA Act) too had undergone a change inasmuch as in Clause 'first', the 'market value' of the land became determinable as 'on the date of the declaration under Section 6'; whereas the old LAAct of 1870 required, as already indicated above, determination of the 'market value' of the land as 'on the date of making of the award for compensation'. 55. Thus, while the old LAAct of 1870 required, under clause 'first' of Section 24, determination of'market value' of the land as on the date of making of the award for com­pensation, the new LAAct (when introduced) required, initially, determination of the 'mar­ket value' as on the date of declaration under Section 6. With this change also came the fur­ther change of addition of new clause 'sec­ondly' in Section 23(1), which read and still reads: "the damage sustained by the person inter­ested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof. 56. Why clause 'secondly' was required to be brought in can be safely gathered from the recommendations made by the Select Committee on the Bill to amend the old LA Act of 1870. 56. Why clause 'secondly' was required to be brought in can be safely gathered from the recommendations made by the Select Committee on the Bill to amend the old LA Act of 1870. In Paragraph 7 of the prelimi­nary report of the Select Committee on the Bill to amend the old LA Act of 1870 pre­sented to the Council of the Governor-Gen­eral of India on 2.2.1893, it was stated as under: ".....the Bill introduced last year rightly re­quired the market value to be taken at the time of the declaration under Section 6 and not, as in the Act, at the time of the award, but this change in the law required the addition to the section of a clause bringing under the consideration of the court any diminution in the profits of occu­pation during the period between the declara­tion and the Collector's entry into possession, as also the value of any standing crops or trees that may be on the land, when he takes posses­sion....." (Emphasis is added) 57. As can be clearly seen from the above recommendations of the Select Committee, the reason for introduction of the clause' sec­ondly' requiring determination of compensa­tion for the 'damage' sustained by reason of taking of any standing crops or trees, which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking over possession, was, in brief, as under: "The old LA Act of 1870 required determi­nation of compensation as 'on the date of mak­ing of the award'. Once an award was made under Section 11, it was to become, as provided in Section 12, final and conclusive as between the Collector and the persons interested as re­gards the (i) true area of the land, (ii) value thereof and (in) apportionment of the compen­sation amongst the persons interested. No ma­terial changes were brought in the provisions of Sections 11 and 12, when the new L.A. Act came into force." 58. Thus, once an award is made by the Collector, it becomes final between the Col­lector and the persons interested so far as the area of the land, value of the land and the apportioned amount of compensation amongst the persons interested are concerned. Thus, once an award is made by the Collector, it becomes final between the Col­lector and the persons interested so far as the area of the land, value of the land and the apportioned amount of compensation amongst the persons interested are concerned. Under the old LA Act of 1870, as compensation was determined by taking into account everything that happened till the mo­ment of making of the award, there was no question of awarding of any further compen­sation to the persons interested irrespective of the fact as to whether possession of the acquisitioned land, as provided in Section 16, was obtained by the Collector, in a given case, after the award was made, or, in a case of emergency, as provided in Section 17, be­fore the award was made. 59. To put it a little differently, irrespective of the date on which possession of the acquisitioned land was taken by the Collec­tor, the 'market value' of the land was, under the old LA Act of 1870, determined as on 'the date of making of the award' and since the 'market value' of the land, with its stand­ing, buildings, trees, crops, etc, was deter­mined as on the 'date of making of the award', it logically follows that the 'market value' of the land included the 'market value' of all buildings, constructions, trees or crops, which might have been standing on the said land 'on the day of making of the award'. When, how­ever, under the new LA Act, the 'market value' of the 'land' came to be determined as 'on the date of declaration made under Sec­tion 6', there was, obviously, a time lag be­tween the date of declaration made under Section 6 and the date of determination of compensation under Section 11. 60. Thus, clause 'first' of Section 23(1), under the new LA Act of 1870 (when it had come into force), could not have taken into account, and did not take into account, what­ever might have happened between the date of declaration under Section 6 and the date of the making of the award. 60. Thus, clause 'first' of Section 23(1), under the new LA Act of 1870 (when it had come into force), could not have taken into account, and did not take into account, what­ever might have happened between the date of declaration under Section 6 and the date of the making of the award. Though, techni­cally, until the time an award is made, the award is not final, the fact remains that the new LA Act did not take into account the events, which could have taken place between the date of declaration under Section 6 and the date of making of the award determining the compensation payable to the persons in­terested. 61. It, therefore, became necessary to take into account the events, which might have taken place between the two dates, namely, the date of declaration made under Section 6, on the one hand, and the date of making of the award, on the other. 62. What is, now, of utmost importance to note is that the new LA Act, when intro­duced, in the year 1894, did not prohibit growing of trees or crops on the acquisitioned land after a declaration was made under Sec­tion 6; but there was, indeed, a provision, made in Section 24 of the new LA Act, dis­entitling a person from receiving compensa­tion for any improvement, which he might have made on the land by raising construction or otherwise, after a declaration, under Section 6, stood made to the effect that the Govern­ment had acquired the land. 63. In other words, when the new LA Act was introduced in the year 1894, it provided for determination of compensation with ref­erence to 'the date of declaration made un­der Section 6' and not as' on the date of mak­ing of the award'. The result was that a per­son, whose land was acquired, remained free to use the land and raise any construction thereon or grow trees or crops on the acquisitioned land; but he was disentitled from receiving any compensation for the improve­ment, which he might have made on the acquisitioned land. 64. Thus, between the date of declaration under Section 6 and the date of making of the award, the person interested remained at liberty to grow trees or crops on the acquisitioned land or even raise constructions thereon or make improvements thereon. 64. Thus, between the date of declaration under Section 6 and the date of making of the award, the person interested remained at liberty to grow trees or crops on the acquisitioned land or even raise constructions thereon or make improvements thereon. For the constructions or the improvements, which he could have so made, he was, under the provisions of Section 24 of the new LAAct, disentitled from receiving any compensation. Was he not to receive any compensation if he happened to be deprived of the trees or crops, which he might have grown on the acquisitioned land after the date of declara­tion under Section 6, on the one hand, but before the date of making of the award, on the other? 65. The answer to the momentous ques­tion, posed above, is available in clause' sec­ondly' of Section 23(1). It is important to take note of the fact that it was agricultural land, which used to be, ordinarily, acquired under the LAAct. A cultivator or owner of the land could not have been consciously prohibited from an agriculturist till his land awaiting mak­ing of the award. He was, therefore, allowed, as already indicated above, to grow trees or crops on the acquisitioned land until the time possession thereof was taken by the Collec­tor. Consequently, at the time of taking of pos­session of the acquisitioned land, the person interested would have been deprived of the use of the trees or crops, which he might have grown on the land between the date of dec­laration under Section 6 (later on, changed into the date of notification under Section 4( 1) by amendment, which was introduced in the year 1923,) and the date of taking posses­sion of the land by the Collector. 66. The Select Committee, as indicated above, therefore, suggested, on 02.02.1893, that the person interested be paid compen­sation for the' damage', which such a person would sustain, if he were to be deprived of the trees or crops, which he might have grown on the acquisitioned land after the declara­tion was made, in this regard, under Section 6, but before the date of taking of possession of the acquisitioned land by the Collector. In other words, it was considered appropriate by the Select Committee to suggest making of provisions, in the new LA Act, for pay­ment of compensation to be paid to the per­son interested for the damage, which he would sustain, because of being deprived of the use and enjoyment of the trees or crops, which he might have grown on the acquisitioned land after the date of declaration under Section 6, but before the date of taking of possession of the land by the Collector. It is this necessity or requirement, which clause 'secondly', as the same stands even today, takes care of, for, the Select Committee's said recommen­dation was accepted by the Legislature. 67. However, by an amendment intro­duced in the year 1923, "notification under Section 4(1)" was substituted in place of "declaration under Section 6", and this re­mains the position till date meaning thereby that under Clause 'first', the market value of the land, (as the new LA Act stands today), is required to be determined with reference to the date of publication of notification un­der Section 4(1) and not to be determined, contrary to the old LA Act, on the date of the making of the award nor is the 'market value' of the land is required to be determined with reference to the date of declaration under Section 6 as was the case before the new LA Act underwent further amendment, in the year 1923, as indicated hereinbefore. Introduction of this amendment further justified the change, in the procedure of determination of compen­sation in respect of the acquisitioned land, which was brought in by adding Clause 'sec­ondly' to sub-Section (1) of Section 23, which did not exist under the old L. A. Act. 68. Naturally, therefore, the amendment, introduced in the year 1923, brought a fur­ther change in Section 24, whereby a person was made disentitled to receive compensa­tion for the improvement, which he may make on his land 'after a notification, under Section 4( 1) is issued'; whereas Section 24 provided, before the amendment was introduced in the year 1923, that a person would not be en­titled to receive compensation for the im­provement, which he may make on the land ' after a declaration under Section 6 is made'. 69. 69. It is, now, pertinent to note that under the scheme of the LA Act, both the old as well as the new, there were and there still re­main, ordinarily, three important stages be­fore the determination of compensation is fi­nally reached. Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land, in any lo­cality, is needed, or is likely to be needed, for any public purpose or for any company, a notification to that effect shall be published as prescribed by Section 4(1). This is followed by an enquiry, which is held under Section 5 A on the basis of the representations or ob­jections, if any, which may be received pur­suant to the notification aforementioned. Hav­ing held enquiry as aforesaid, when the Gov­ernment is satisfied, on receiving the report of the enquiry, that the land is needed for any public purpose, or for a company, a declara­tion is made by way of notification under Sec­tion 6. Upon declaration, so made, the Col­lector shall cause notices to be given, under Section 9, to the person(s) interested (i.e., the persons, who may claim interest in the compensation) stating, in the notices, that the Government needs to take possession of the land and that the claims for compensation, by all the persons interested in the land, may be made to him. Having received objections and reports, if any, as regards compensation, which may be claimed by the persons inter­ested, the Collector holds an enquiry and, then, makes an award, under Section 11, with regard to the true area of the land, the com­pensation, which, in his opinion, should be al­lowed and, if necessary, apportionment of the compensation amongst various persons inter­ested in the land. Section 15 provides that the Collector shall be guided by the provi­sions contained in Sections 23 and 24 in de­termining the amount of compensation. Sec­tion 23 deals with those matters, which are required to be considered in determining the compensation; whereas Section 24 enumer­ates the matters to be ignored in determining compensation. One of the factors, which is required to be ignored and not taken into ac­count by the Court, as already indicated above, is the improvement, which may have been made by a person on the acquisitioned land after issuance of notification under Sec­tion 4(1). 70. One of the factors, which is required to be ignored and not taken into ac­count by the Court, as already indicated above, is the improvement, which may have been made by a person on the acquisitioned land after issuance of notification under Sec­tion 4(1). 70. When the award is made by the Col­lector under Section 11, he may, under Sec­tion 16, take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely on the Gov­ernment free from all encumbrances. In the case of emergency, however, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Col­lector, without the award having been made, may, in terms of Section 17, take possession of the land and on his such taking possession of the land, the land shall absolutely vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. 71. What may, now, be pointed out is that possession of the land can be taken by the Collector either before making of the award or after making of the award. In either case, a person interested could have sustained dam­age for being deprived of the trees and crops, which he might have grown on the acquisitioned land, for, clause 'first' of Sec­tion 23(1) provide him with the 'market value' of the land, which included the 'market value' of the trees or crops, which might be stand­ing on the land as on the date of the notifica­tion issued under Section 4(1), but did not take into account the trees or crops, which the person interested might have grown on the acquired land after issuance of the notifi­cation under Section 4( 1) and was being de­prived of the use and enjoyment thereof at a later date, when possession of the acquired land was being taken over by the Collector. It is this deficiency in law, which was rem­edied by introducing clause' secondly' in the present form, which did not exist in the old LA Act of 1870 inasmuch as clause 'secondly' not only gives the market value of the trees or crops, which may be taken away at the time of taking of possession of the land by the Collector, but also the potential value thereof, for, clause 'secondly' compensates for the 'damage' sustained by the person concerned and not merely make available to him the 'market value' of the trees or crops afore­mentioned as is the case under clause 'first' of Section 23(1). 72. 72. No wonder, therefore, that the learned author Sanjiva Row, in his book, Law of Land Acquisition & Compensation, (5th Edition), which Mr. Poddar, learned Senior counsel, relies upon, made the following comments under the heading - "Clause Secondly": "Compensation, when paid under the clause, is damage and not market value, and the mea­sure of damage is the loss, which the owner suffers by being deprived of the harvest and not the price (if any) of the unripe crop. In other words, the amount would be about the same as the value of the ripe crop when reaped in due course. In practice, however, it is usual to post­pone, wherever possible, taking possession of lands with standing crops till they are harvested, so that the crops may be saved" (Emphasis is added) 73. It is time for us to point out that in Sub-Collector of Godavari Vs. Seragam Subbaroyadu, (1906) 16 Mad. LJ 551, it was held that the word 'land', as defined in Section 3(a), includes 'things attached to the earth' and, therefore, trees, being 'things at­tached to the earth', must be treated to stand included within the expression 'land'. In short, 'land' would include trees standing on the land. It is this definition, which has to be ap­plied to Section 23. So held the Madras High Court. It was further held, in Seragam Subbaroyadu (supra), that clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) refers to damage sustained by reason of taking the standing crops or trees, which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof and cannot, without a misuse of language, be ap­plied to a case of purchase of land with trees upon it. Their Lordships also observed that clause 'secondly' may be applied to the case provided for in Section 17, when the Collec­tor takes possession before award and the owner of the land declines to accept the sum then offered as payment for the crops or trees taken, or possibly to the case of crops or trees grown after the date of the declaration under Section 6, (i.e., as already pointed out above, the date with reference to which the market value had to be determined under the new LA Act, when the same was, initially, intro­duced). Their Lordships further observed, "Moreover, to read the first clause of Sec­tion 23(1) as referring to the bare land without trees, involves this difficulty: there is no provi­sion in the Act for the separate assessment of compensation for buildings apart from the land on which they stand, and, inasmuch as it is im­possible to hold that they are liable to be ac­quired without payment of compensation, it must be taken, that in Section 23, the word 'land' includes 'buildings standing thereon'. If so, that must be, because buildings are 'things attached to the earth: but so are trees 'things attached to the earth', and it is anomalous to interpret the same word as including one class of things at­tached to the earth and excluding another." 74. What was, thus, held, in Seragan Subbaroyadu's case (supra), was that the ex­pression 'land', within its ambit, includes standing crops and trees and if the 'land' has any crop or tree on the acquisitioned land, the same has to be included within the ex­pression 'market value' of the land. Logically extended, it would mean that the land and the standing trees shall not be, generally, assessed separately for their respective market values, but have to be taken as an integrated whole; but when there occurs a time lag between the date of the notification, as regards acquisitioning of the land under Section 4( 1), and the Collector's date of taking possession thereof and, in the meanwhile, if the person interested, in the land, has grown any crop or tree on the land, he must be compensated for the 'damage', which he has to sustain as a result of taking of possession of the land by the Collector, though the corps or the tree, as the case may be, were not there on the date of the notification under Section 4( 1) and had not been included, while assessing, under Clause 'first' of Section 23(1), the market value of the land. 75. The decision in Sub-Collector of Godavari (Supra) has been followed in the case of Collector of Bareilly Vs. Sultan Ahmad Khan, AIR 1926 All 689, which Mr. Poddar relies upon. Observed Mukerji, J., in Sultan Ahmad Khan (Supra), "But under the definition of the land, as given in the Act itself, the land would include trees standing thereon. 75. The decision in Sub-Collector of Godavari (Supra) has been followed in the case of Collector of Bareilly Vs. Sultan Ahmad Khan, AIR 1926 All 689, which Mr. Poddar relies upon. Observed Mukerji, J., in Sultan Ahmad Khan (Supra), "But under the definition of the land, as given in the Act itself, the land would include trees standing thereon. We, therefore, do not see why the value of the trees should be ex­cluded in calculating the 15 per cent, allowed by the statute." His Lordship further observed, "We may point out that what is awarded under Clause 2 of Sub-section 2 of Section 23 is not the value of trees, but compensation for the taking away of trees. This means that in addi­tion to the present market value of the land and trees to be awarded by the Collector, he has to award something for the potential value of the trees taken away." 76. Closely following the above observa­tions of Mukerji, J., Boys, J. observed, in Sultan Ahmad Khan (supra), "Damage", if any, for taking trees under Section 23, sec­ondly, would similarly appear as an item alto­gether independent of the market value of the land and of the 'value' of the trees as part of the 'market value of the land'. 77. In order to clearly understand Sultan Ahmad Khan's case (supra), which Mr. Poddar has heavily relied upon, it is appro­priate to read Section 23(2) in the light of the provisions contained in Clause 'first' of Sec­tion 23(1). The relevant provisions, when combined together, read as under: "23. Matters to be considered in determin­ing compensation - (1) In determining the amount of compensa­tion to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration - First, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under Sec­tion 4, sub-section (1); Secondly,........................... Thirdly,.............................. Fourthly,............................... Fifthly,.................................. Sixthly,................................... (1A) ***** ****** ***** ****** ****** ****** (2) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market-value, in consideration of the com­pulsory nature of the acquisition." 78. Thirdly,.............................. Fourthly,............................... Fifthly,.................................. Sixthly,................................... (1A) ***** ****** ***** ****** ****** ****** (2) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market-value, in consideration of the com­pulsory nature of the acquisition." 78. When Section 23(2) is read in the light of Clause 'first' of Section 23(1), it becomes clear that the Court is required to award a sum of thirty per centum on the 'market value', because of the compulsory nature of acquisi­tion and this sum of thirty per centum is paid in addition to the market value of the land. In other words, market value of the land is, at first, determined under Clause 'first' of Sec­tion 23(1) and, then, in addition thereto, an additional amount of'thirty per centum' on the 'market value' is paid to the person, whose land is acquired. It may, now, be noted that the expression, 'thirty per centum', appear­ing in Section 23(2), has been substituted, with effect from 24.09.84, for the expression 'fif­teen per centum'. 79. Thus, when the case of Sultan Ahmad Khan (supra) was decided, the person inter­ested was required to be paid, in addition to the 'market value' of the acquired land, a sum of' fifteen per centum' of such' market value', because of the compulsory nature of acquisi­tion. This additional sum is commonly known as solatium. It was in the context of such statutory provisions that the decision, in Sul­tan Ahmad Khan (supra), was rendered. Let us, therefore, consider, now, a little more deeply the case of Sultan Ahmad Khan (su­pra). 80. It may be pointed out that it was con­tended, on behalf of the appellant, (i.e., the Collector of Bareilly in Sultan Ahmad Khan's case (supra)), that 15% solatium has been awarded by the District Judge under clause 'first' to Section 23(1) not only on the 'mar­ket value' of the 'land', but also on the 'trees' standing thereon; whereas Section 23(2) re­quires awarding of 15% solatium on the 'market value' of the 'land' only and a 'tree' can­not, therefore, be included within the expres­sion 'land' for the purpose of awarding sola­tium of 15% thereon. In other words, it was contended, on behalf of the appellant, in Sul­tan Ahmad Khan's case (supra)), that 'fifteen per centum', which had been awarded by the District Judge, should not have been awarded on the value of the trees and that the 'fifteen per centum' ought to have been awarded on the 'market value' of the 'land' alone, 81. In effect, what was contended was that the solatium of "fifteen per centum' on the 'market value' of the 'land' shall not include solatium of 'fifteen per centum' on the 'tree' standing on the 'land'. It is this submission, which was turned down by Allahabad High Court, in Sultan Ahmad Khan's case (supra), by holding that since the definition of 'land', as given in the L. A. Act, includes trees stand­ing thereon, the value of the 'trees' cannot be excluded in calculating 'fifteen per centum' solatium. This becomes clearer from the fol­lowing observations made in Sultan Ahmad Khan's case (supra): "The next point argued is that the 15 per cent awarded by the learned District Judge should not have been awarded on the value of trees. It is argued that under Section 23, Sub-Section (2) of the Land Acquisition Act the 15 per cent is to be awarded on the market value of the land. But under the definition of the land as include trees standing thereon. We, therefore, do not see why the value of the trees should be excluded in calculating the 15 per cent allowed by the Krishna Bai v. The Secretary of State [ 1920) 42 All. 5551 and Sub-Collector of Godavari v. Seragam Subbaroyadu [(1907) 30 Mad. 151]. We may point out that what is awarded under Cl. 2 of sub. S 2 of S. 23 is not the value of trees but compensation for the taking away of trees. This means, that in addition to the present mar­ket value of the land and trees to be awarded by the Collector, he has to award something for the potential value of the trees taken away. It is on this potential value that the 15 per cent, is not to be allowed. We have not got before us any figure which shows that anything has been awarded for the potential value of trees. We understand that the figure that is awarded for the trees is the present market value of them. It is on this potential value that the 15 per cent, is not to be allowed. We have not got before us any figure which shows that anything has been awarded for the potential value of trees. We understand that the figure that is awarded for the trees is the present market value of them. The next point urged is that the 15 per cent, compensation for a compulsory acquisition should not have been awarded for the wells. We take it that the wells go with the land and therefore the value of the wells should be added to the value of the land, as apart from the wells. In this view the 15 per cent, should be allowed for wells as well. The Judge was therefore, right in calculating the 15 per cent, on the entire value of the tree figures shown at page 6 of the printed record." [Emphasis supplied] 82. It has, nowhere, been held, in Sultan Ahmad Khan's case (supra), that the 'mar­ket value' of the land would not include the 'market value' of the tree. When a land is ac­quired and there is any tree or crop standing on the land on the date of the notification un­der Section 4(1), the land and the tree would be assessed with reference to the land and they shall not be, ordinarily, valued separately. Compensation for a parcel of land has to be determined either as a homestead land or as a cultivable land. If the land is a cultivable land, the market value of the land would be deter­mined by taking into account the benefits aris­ing therefrom (i.e., the value of the standing crops, if any). If the land is a homestead land, the value of the land has to be determined by referring to the use of the land. Thus, if the acquired land is a homestead land and some trees are found standing thereon, then, such trees would be valued as firewood if the trees cannot, but be used as firewood; but when the tree is valuable tree, which gives timber, the value of the tree cannot be assessed as firewood, but as timber wood and the land would be valued for its homestead value. Both these values would fall within the expression 'market value'. It is this principle, which is, broadly speaking, indicated in the decision in Gurcharan Singh & another (supra), which Mr. Both these values would fall within the expression 'market value'. It is this principle, which is, broadly speaking, indicated in the decision in Gurcharan Singh & another (supra), which Mr. Lodh, learned A.S.G., relies upon and, on this market value, solatium of 30%, (which was, in the past, 15%,) is required to be paid and this is precisely what the decision, in Sul­tan Ahmad Khan (supra), lays down. Simi­larly, when an agricultural land is acquired, the price of the land would be taken into ac­count on the basis of the yield from the land. In the latter case, it is the yield, which is the dominant factor to be taken into account, while determining the market value. Thus, market value of the land, in the case of agri­cultural land, would include the market value of the land including its yield. 83. Let us, once again, revert to the ob­servations made by Mukerji, J., in Sultan Ahmad Khan (supra), which Mr. Poddar has relied upon, the observations read: "We may point out that what is awarded under Cl. 2 of sub. S 2 of S. 23 is not the value of trees but compensation for the taking away of trees. This means, that in addition to the present market value of the land and trees to be awarded by the Collector, he has to award something for the potential value of the trees taken away. It is on this potential value that the 15 per cent, is not to be allowed. We have not got before us any figure which shows that anything has been awarded for the potential value of trees." 84. From a patient reading of the obser­vations made above by Mukerji, J. in Sultan Ahmad Khan (supra), what becomes trans­parent is that even according to Sultan Ahmad Khan (supra), what is given under clause 'sec­ondly' of Section 23( 1) is not merely the value of the trees, but compensation for the taking away of the trees. We too have pointed out, in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, that under clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1), it is not the 'market value' of the trees or crops, but compensation for taking away of the trees, which is payable. 85. We too have pointed out, in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, that under clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1), it is not the 'market value' of the trees or crops, but compensation for taking away of the trees, which is payable. 85. There is, thus, no dispute that what is paid by virtue of clause 'secondly' of Section 23( 1) is not the 'market value' of the trees or the crops standing on the acquired land, but compensation for the 'damage', which the 'person interested' would sustain by reason of taking away of the trees or the crops by the Collector on the date of taking posses­sion of the land provided that such tree or crop was grown after the date of notification under Section 4( 1) and before the date of making of the award. What we, however, seek to emphasize is that the compensation, which clause 'secondly' of sub-section (1) of Sec­tion 23 speaks of, is not in respect of trees or crops, which may be standing on the land on the date of the notification issued under Sec­tion 4(1), but on the date of taking posses­sion of the land by the District Collector. 86. We, therefore, find unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the observations made in Sultan Ahmad Khan (supra) that in addi­tion to the 'market value' of the trees stand­ing on the acquired land on the date of the notification, the person concerned is also en­titled to receive compensation for the trees or the crops, which may be found on the land on the date of taking of possession even if such trees or crops were raised before the notification under Section 4(1) was issued. With greatest respect, therefore, we express our humble disagreement with the observa­tions, made in Sultan Ahmad Khan (supra), to the effect that in respect of the tree or crop, which may be standing on the acquired land on the date of notification issued under Sec­tion 4(1), the person interested would be en­titled to be compensated, when such tree or crop is taken away from him on the date of taking of possession of the land by the Dis­trict Collector. 87. There is yet another way of looking into the scheme of the LAAct. The 'potential value', if any, of the 'land' is, concedes even Mr. 87. There is yet another way of looking into the scheme of the LAAct. The 'potential value', if any, of the 'land' is, concedes even Mr. Poddar, required to be taken into account, while determining the 'market value' of the land. Since the expression 'land', admittedly, includes trees or crops standing thereon, there is no reason as to why potential value, if any, of the tree or crop would not be included within the 'market value' of the land under Clause 'first' of Section 23(1) if such tree or crop stood grown on the date of the notifica­tion under Section 4(1) of the new LAAct. However, if any tree or crop was grown after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1), but before the date of taking over possession of the land by the Collector, the person interested shall be paid compensation for the damage, which he may sustain for being deprived of the use of such tree or crop, because of the District Collector's taking over of possession of the land. It would, therefore, not be correct, we may observe, to award compensation for the potential value of the trees or the crops sepa­rately under clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) if the tree or crop, which the person interested is deprived of by taking posses­sion of the acquired land. 88. We, now, turn to Dayaprakash Trikambhai Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Baroda, AIR 1969 Gujarat 34, which too has been relied upon by Mr. Poddar. The relevant observations, which Mr. Poddar relies upon in Dayaprakash Trikambhai (supra), read as under: "Para 12..........In our view, a plain reading of this clause indicates that the Court is obliged to take into consideration the damage sustained by the person interested by reason of taking of any crops standing on the land at the time of Collector's taking possession thereof. Poddar relies upon in Dayaprakash Trikambhai (supra), read as under: "Para 12..........In our view, a plain reading of this clause indicates that the Court is obliged to take into consideration the damage sustained by the person interested by reason of taking of any crops standing on the land at the time of Collector's taking possession thereof. It means that the Court has to take into consideration the damage sustained by the claimant on ac­count of taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Col lector's taking possession thereof.........." Para 14 "The learned Author Sanjiva Row, in his book, Law of Land Acquisition & Com­pensation, 5th Edition, 1966, at pages 574 and 575, made the following comments under the heading - "Clause Secondly", para 13 :- "Compensation, when paid under the clause, is damage and not market value, and the measure of damage is the loss which the owner suffers by being deprived of the har­vest and not the price (if any) of the unripe crop. In other words, the amount would be about the same as the value of the ripe crop when reaped in due course. In practice, how­ever, it is usual to postpone, wherever pos­sible, taking possession of lands with stand­ing crops till they are harvested, so that the crops may be saved", "It is pertinent to note that the criterion for compensation is the damage and not the market value. The actual loss to the owner, by depriving him of the harvest, is the ba­sis, and not the price of unripe crops". Para 15"........The word 'land' as defined in Section 3(a) includes things attached to the earth, and therefore, trees, and this definition has to be applied to Section 23, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context." Para 17 "In view of our finding regarding the market rate of the land under acquisition, to be Rs.3,200 per acre, the claimant is entitled to an additional amount of compensation of Rs.582.30 nPs. including solatium at the rate of 15% for the land. He will be further entitled to an additional amount of Rs.2,000 for the dam­ages suffered by him on account of digging of plants of the plantains at the time of taking-over possession by the Collector......" 89. including solatium at the rate of 15% for the land. He will be further entitled to an additional amount of Rs.2,000 for the dam­ages suffered by him on account of digging of plants of the plantains at the time of taking-over possession by the Collector......" 89. What is extremely important to note, in Dayaprakash Trikambhai (supra), is that the decision in Dayaprakash rikambhai (su­pra) did not consider Sultan Ahmed Khan's case; rather, what was relied upon, in Dayaprakash Trikambhai (supra), was the case of Seragam Subbaroyadu (supra). In the case of Dayaprakash Trikambhai (supra), the facts of the case are extremely relevant inas­much as the notification under Section 4(1) was issued, in the said case, on 3rd of Sep­tember, 1958. The award was given by the Land Acquisition Officer on 10th of Novem­ber, 1959. The possession of the land was taken on 5th of December, 1959 i.e. after making of the award. The Land Acquisition Officer made a 'panchnama' at the time of taking possession of land, which revealed that there were 2000 plants of plantains standing on the land under acquisition and the posses­sion of the land along with those plants was taken. As the award had already been ren­dered on 10.11.59 and the claimant raised the claim for compensation for the 'damage' caused to him on account of taking of pos­session of the land with the standing crops, the question, which arose, was whether the claimant was entitled to receive, after the award had already been rendered, compen­sation for the 'damage' sustained by him due to being deprived of the standing crops of plantain which had been planted. Admittedly, in Dayaprakash Trikambhai (supra), the plan­tains were planted after the notification, un­der Section 4( 1), had already been issued. In this fact situation, the Court held, in Dayaprakash Trikambhai (supra), that under clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1), the 'per­son interested' has to be paid compensation for the 'damage' sustained by him on account of taking possession of the land with the standing crops. The decision, in Dayaprakash Trikambhai (supra), which Mr. Poddar relies upon, fortifies our conclusion that clause 'sec­ondly' of Section 23( 1) comes into play, when trees or crops are grown on a land after a notification in respect of the land has already been issued in exercise of power under Sec­tion 4(1). The decision, in Dayaprakash Trikambhai (supra), which Mr. Poddar relies upon, fortifies our conclusion that clause 'sec­ondly' of Section 23( 1) comes into play, when trees or crops are grown on a land after a notification in respect of the land has already been issued in exercise of power under Sec­tion 4(1). By no way, therefore, the decision, in Dayaprakash Trikambhai (supra), can be read in favour of the proposition, which the review petitioner has offered. 90. The decision, in Seragam Subbar­oyadu (supra), has also been reiterated in the case of Tarwadi Ravishanker Mohanlal Vs. Collector, Panchmahals, AIR 1969 Guj 191 , wherein it was held as under: "If we now refer to clause 'secondly' in Sec­tion 23( 1) of the Act, it refers to "the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested, by rea­son of the taking of any standing crops or trees, which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof. In the first place, since the expression "land" includes trees standing thereon, the second clause, in so far as it refers to trees, would appear to be redundant. That clause, therefore, must be taken as independent and dealing with damages in respect of trees under different head. That it is independent of the first clause in Section 23(1) of the Act, becomes clear from the words "at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof occurring in the second clause. Those words give an indication of a different period and that is after the notification under Section 4 of the Act is issued in respect of the land, in question, as against the compensation to be fixed at the date of the notification issued in clause 'first'. The reference to trees is along with standing crops and that again at the time, when possession is taken. Damages are, there­fore, contemplated to be given for the standing crops or trees on any such land acquired after the notification and before possession is taken. Thus, on a consideration of both the clauses, it appears clear that the claim for compensation for trees standing on land at the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act falls un­der clause 'first' in Section 23(1) of the Act." 91. Thus, on a consideration of both the clauses, it appears clear that the claim for compensation for trees standing on land at the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act falls un­der clause 'first' in Section 23(1) of the Act." 91. Thus, even the case of Tarwadi Ravishanker Mohanlal (supra) supports our conclusion that damages are contemplated to be given under clause 'secondly' of Section 23( 1) for the 'damage' sustained by the person interested on account of taking away of the standing crops or trees on the acquired land, which are grown after the notification under Section 4(1) is published and before the possession is taken. 92. At any rate, all the previous decisions of the Gujrat High Court, on the subject un­der discussion, have been set at rest by a decision of its Full Bench, in Kanchanbhai Jhaverbhai Desai & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., (1995) 1 Guj LR 156, wherein their Lordships observed: "By virtue of the definition of the word "land" under Section 3 (a) of the Act, the ben­efits which arise out of the land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened thereto are included in the said expression. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Chaturbhuj Pande and Ors. v. Collector, Raigarh, AIR 1969 SC 255 , that the value of the trees standing on the land at the time when Section 4 notification is issued has to be taken into con­sideration when the market value of the land is being determined under the clause first of Sec­tion 23(1) of the Act. The standing crops or trees which are mentioned in the clause sec­ondly of Section 23(1) thereof can only be those which come into existence after the notification under Section 4 is issued. There is always a time-lag between issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act and the completion of the acquisition proceedings with the making of the award by the Collector under Section 11. Till the possession is taken under Section 16, or earlier under Section 17, the owner of the land is at liberty to cultivate the same. The owner may not know as to when the possession will be taken. Till the possession is taken under Section 16, or earlier under Section 17, the owner of the land is at liberty to cultivate the same. The owner may not know as to when the possession will be taken. Obviously, with a view to compensat­ing him for the loss which may be suffered, if standing crops or trees planted subsequent to Section 4 notification, are taken away, he is en­titled to compensation under the clause sec­ondly of Section 23(1) of the Act." (Emphasis is added). 93. The above observations, made in Kanchanbhai Jhaverbhai Desai & Anr. (su­pra), strengthen the conclusion that we have already reached, namely, that the compensa­tion, contemplated under clause' secondly' of Section 23( 1), relates to the 'damage', which a person interested may sustain on account of taking away of the trees or the crops, which he grows on the acquired land after the noti­fication, under Section 4(1), is published. 94. The decision, in State of Bihar Vs. Rameswar Singh, AIR 1973 Patna 123, is yet another decision, which Mr. Poddar re­lies upon. In Rameswar Singh (supra), an ob­servation has been made that: "there may be cases, where the market value of the trees is fixed with reference to the date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, under the first clause, but trees be­come of greater value after the period and be­fore the time of the Collector's taking posses­sion thereof. The awardee shall, be entitled to further damages for the trees in such circum­stances under clause 'secondly'. We accord­ingly hold that the respondent to this appeal is not entitled to statutory compensation of Rs. 6,000/-." 95. For the reasons that we have also dis­cussed and assigned above, we are of the view, as already indicated above, that after the notification under Section 4(1) is pub­lished, clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) would not come into play in respect of the trees or the crops, which may be standing on the land on the date of publication of the said notification and that clause 'secondly' of Sec­tion 23(1) would apply only in respect of those trees or crops, which may have been grown on the acquired land after publication of the notification under Section 4( 1) and were taken away, when the possession of the land was taken by the Collector. 96. 96. From a careful reading of the deci­sions in Sultan Ahmad Khan's case (supra), Tarwadi Ravishanker Mohanlal (supra) and Kanchanbhai (supra), what emerges is this: Under Clause 'first' of Section 23(1), mar­ket value of the 'land' has to be determined with reference to the date of notification un­der Section 4(1). The trees and/or crops standing on the land, on the date of such a notification, would have to be included within the 'market value' of the land. Ideally, the land, with standing trees and bamboos, shall be taken as a whole for the purpose of determi­nation of compensation. Consequently, the land, on the one hand, and the trees and/or the crops, on the other hand, have not to be separately valued, ordinarily, for the determi­nation of total market value of the land as well as the tree or crop standing thereon. Both have to be determined as an integrated whole. Besides the crops or trees, which may have been so valued with reference to the date of publication of the notification under Section 4( 1), when any tree or crop is found standing on the land on the date of the Collector's tak­ing possession thereof, which did not exist on the date of publication of the notification un­der Section 4( 1) and has been grown there­after, the person interested, in such a case, has to be compensated for being deprived of the use and enjoyment of such trees or crops. It is, in this regard, noteworthy that the ex­pression 'person interested' has been defined in Section 3(b) to include all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of acquisition of land. 97. The resume of what we have dis­cussed, so far, is as under: The three important stages, under the scheme of the LA Act, both old as well as the new, which we are presently concerned, are: (i) publication of notification under Section 4(1), (ii) publication of the declaration under Section 6(1), and (iii) making of the award under Section 11. Apart from these three important stages in the scheme of the LAAct, what is necessary to bear in mind is the fact that the fourth stage, ordinarily, is the taking of possession of the land by the Collector. Apart from these three important stages in the scheme of the LAAct, what is necessary to bear in mind is the fact that the fourth stage, ordinarily, is the taking of possession of the land by the Collector. This fourth stage may, however, be reached either before or after making of the award inasmuch as it is, ordinarily, after making of the award that the Collector would, under Section 16, take possession of the land; but, in a case of emergency, possession of the land may be taken by the Collector, as provided under Section 17, even before the award is made. 98. It is evident from the above scheme of the new LAAct that there is bound to be some time-lag between the issuance of notification under Section 4(1), on the one hand, and the date of making of the award, on the other, by the Collector under Section 11, which brings finality to the acquisition proceeding inasmuch as the award becomes, as already indicated above, final and conclusive so far as the Col­lector and the persons interested are con­cerned. Till the possession is taken either un­der Section 16 (i.e., after making of the award) or under Section 17 (i.e., in an emer­gency, before the award is made), the owner of the land is at liberty to continue to use or cultivate the land in the manner he wants in­asmuch as the owner may not know as to when the possession would be taken and, in a given case, possession of the land, which becomes the subject-matter of the notifica­tion under Section 4( 1), may never be taken by the Collector pursuant to the notification under Section 4( 1) inasmuch as Section 11A clearly provides that the acquisition proceed­ing shall be completed within a period of two years from the date of publication of the dec­laration under Section 6 and if no award is made within the said period of two years, then, the entire proceeding shall lapse. 99. Obviously, when the Collector takes possession of the land on the date, which is subsequent to the issuance of notification un­der Section 4, damage may be sustained by the person interested on being deprived of the standing crops or trees, which he might have grown after the issuance of notification under Section 4. 99. Obviously, when the Collector takes possession of the land on the date, which is subsequent to the issuance of notification un­der Section 4, damage may be sustained by the person interested on being deprived of the standing crops or trees, which he might have grown after the issuance of notification under Section 4. Thus, the damage, which the person interested may suffer on being de­prived of the use of the trees or crops, grown on the land, is not accounted for under clause ' first' of Section 23 (1) and it is this deficiency in the scheme of determination of compensa­tion, which Clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) seeks to meet by laying down that the person be compensated for the 'damage' sustained by him as a result of being deprived of the standing crops or trees, which may be found on the land at the time of taking possession thereof by the Collector, for, the market value of the land, including the crops, trees, build­ings, etc, which may be standing thereon, is determined with reference to the date of no­tification under Section 4( 1) and does not take into account any trees or crops, which might have been grown on the land after the publi­cation of the notification under Section 4(1) and before the date of the award. This posi­tion can be easily appreciated if one refers to the preliminary report of the Select Commit­tee on the Bill to amend the old LA Act. 100. Thus, under the new LA Act, as it exists today, there is a time-leg between the date of notification under Section 4(1) and the date of taking possession of the acquisitioned land by the Collector either un­der Section 16 or 17. Thus, when the possi­bility of time lag was not ruled out (and is not, even today, ruled out), the owner of the land was, and remains till today, at liberty to keep on using the land in the same manner as be­fore even after the date of publication of no­tification under Section 4( 1). He could also raise, and can still raise, crops or grow trees. Obviously, when the Collector takes posses­sion of the land, the damage, sustained by such a person in respect of those standing crops or trees, which he had grown, is re­quired to be compensated. He could also raise, and can still raise, crops or grow trees. Obviously, when the Collector takes posses­sion of the land, the damage, sustained by such a person in respect of those standing crops or trees, which he had grown, is re­quired to be compensated. Clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) fulfills this requirement by providing that the person interested be com­pensated for the 'damage' sustained by him as a result of being deprived of the standing crops or trees, which he might have grown on the acquisitioned land after the date of the notification under Section 4( 1) and are found on the land at the time of taking possession of the land by the Collector. 101. In short, thus, Clause 'first' of Sec­tion 23(1) requires determination of the mar­ket value of the land including trees and crops standing thereon on the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1); whereas the Clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) com­pensates the person interested in respect of the crops and/or trees, which he may have grown on the land after notification under Section 4( 1) was published and which may be found on the date, when the Collector takes possession of the acquired-land, for, Clause 'first' does not take care of the loss, which the person, in possession of the ac­quired land, may sustain, because of being deprived of what is grown by him on the land after the issuance of the notification under Section 4. Thus, but, for the Clause 'secondly' of Section 23( 1), the person interested could not have been entitled to claim any compen­sation for being deprived of the use of the trees and crops, which might have been grown by him on the land in respect whereof, a notification, under Section 4(1), had been pub­lished, more so, because Clause 'seventhly' of Section 24 of the new LA Act provides that the Court shall not take into consider­ation any 'improvement' on the land, which is made or effected after the notification is pub­lished under Section 4. For example, if an immovable structure is erected on the land after the notification, under Section 4, is is­sued and before the possession is taken, no compensation would be payable for making such 'improvement' on the land; but, if any crop or tree is grown on the land, the person, who has grown the crops or the trees, be­comes, by virtue of the Clause 'secondly' of Section 23 (1), entitled to be compensated for the 'damage', which he may sustain for being deprived of his standing crops or the trees. It is only for the trees or crops raised on the acquisitioned land after publication of the no­tification under Section 4( 1) that the person concerned is required to be compensated if he is deprived of the use thereof as a result of taking possession of the land by the Collec­tor irrespective of the fact as to whether the possession of the land has been taken by the Collector before or after making of the award inasmuch as no compensation would be pay­able once the award is published, for, the land would include the standing trees and/or bam­boos, as the case may be. 102. We, now, turn to the other aspect of Mr. Poddar's submission that this Court had committed an error in observing that the writ petition was not maintainable under Article 226 inasmuch as the appellant, (i.e., the writ petitioner), could have sought for a 'reference' to be made to the District Court in terms of Section 18 in respect of the appellant's claim for the 'market value' of the felled trees and bamboos. We may recall, in this regard, that it is the submission of Mr. Poddar that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, does not per­ceive of making of piecemeal awards, but when an award is made by not taking into consideration one or more factors or com­ponents, which are required to be taken into account in the light of the provisions of Sec­tion 23( 1), the award remains incomplete and, in the case of an incomplete award, a 'refer­ence' cannot be sought for by resorting to Section 18 and the remedy would, in such a case, lie in making application, under Article 226, seeking directions to the Land Acquisi­tion Officer to determine compensation pay­able by taking into account those factors or those components of compensation, which had not been taken into account. Coming to the case at hand, Mr. Poddar has pointed out that the LA Collector, in his order, dated 27.04.2007, has clearly stated that 'the other claims' of the review petitioner would be de­cidedon receiving the Government's response to the Land Acquisition Officer's letter. 103. We may point out that in terms of Section 12, the award, which is made by the Collector, is 'final and conclusive' so far as the Collector and the persons interested are concerned. The finality, which the law attaches to the award, is, however, subject to the 'ref­erence', which may be made under Section 18, which provides that a person, who is dis­satisfied with the award, may apply for a 'ref­erence' to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, whereupon a 'reference', as sought for, shall be made. Thus, making of a 'reference' is mandatory if the person inter­ested so demands. 104. The Supreme Court, having consid­ered the legal character of an award, which the Collector in a Land Acquisition proceed­ing makes, concluded to the effect that the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and making of the award are, in law, nothing more than an offer or tender of the compensation to the owner of the prop­erty acquisitioned. It was held, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. Deputy Land Ac­quisition Officer, AIR 1961SC1500, that if the owner accepts the offer, no further pro­ceeding is required to be taken. The amount has to be paid and the proceedings for com­pensation shall stand concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer, Section 18 gives the owner, points out the Supreme Court, statutory right of having the question of adequacy of compensation determined by the District Court and whatever amount is determined by the Court, as compensation, would be binding on the owner as well as the Collector. It has been further pointed out, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), that where the 'reference' is made or sought for, the amount judicially determined by the Court would be the compensation payable to the owner of the property acquired and, on such determination, the acquisition proceeding would stand concluded. (See Hasar Ali (Md) Vs. Mustt. Batasi Bibi, reported in 2006 (Suppl.) 1 GLT 438). 105. A careful reading of Sections 11,12 and 18 clearly shows that in respect of a given plot of land, only one award is contemplated. (See Hasar Ali (Md) Vs. Mustt. Batasi Bibi, reported in 2006 (Suppl.) 1 GLT 438). 105. A careful reading of Sections 11,12 and 18 clearly shows that in respect of a given plot of land, only one award is contemplated. Apart from the fact that Section 11 clearly states that the Collector shall make 'an award' with regard to the true area of the land, the compensation, which in his opinion, should be allowed for the land and the apportion­ment of the said compensation among all the persons interested, Section 12(1) states, 'Such award' shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall be final and conclusive evi­dence, as between the Collector and the persons interested. The expression, 'such award' would, obviously, mean 'an award', which is made under Section 11. Section 16 fortifies this inference inasmuch as it states that when the Collector has made 'an award' under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall, thereupon, vest absolutely in the Government free from all encum­brances. Section 18 makes the position clearer, when it states that any person inter­ested, who has not accepted 'the award', may, by a written application to the Collec­tor, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the ap­portionment of the compensation among the persons interested. The expression 'the award', appearing in Section 18, obviously refers to 'an award', which Section 11 men­tions. 106. When a Collector makes 'an award' under Section 11, 'the award' covers the area of the land, the compensation as a whole and apportionment thereof. With regard to the area of the land, for which the award is made, the award is, indeed, final under Section 12. Hence, the question of rendering piecemeal award or making of supplementary award does not arise. 107. Thus, even when an award is made by ignoring some of the factors, which are, in the light of the provisions of Section 23(1), required to be taken into account, the award is still 'an award' rendered under Section 11 and the person, aggrieved by such an award, has the remedy of applying to the Collector to make a 'reference' in terms of Section 18. In other words, in arriving at the amount of compensation, all the factors, mentioned in Section 23 of the Act, have to be taken into consideration. If some of these factors are not taken into consideration, it cannot be said that in respect of those factors, which are omitted to be considered, supplementary award(s) can be made. If the contention of the review petitioner is acceded to, the result would be that there may be, in respect of the same par­cel of land, six different awards, each dealing with one aspect. If the award of the Collec­tor does not deal with one or more of the aspects contained in Section 23 of the LA Act, the remedy is not to ask for a supple­mentary award, but the only course, which is open to a person interested, is to file an ap­plication, under Section 18 of the LA Act, seeking a 'reference'. 108. In Kanchanbhai Jhaverbhai Desai & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., re­ported in (1995) 1GLR156, a Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court, speaking through B. N. Kripal (C J), as his Lordship then was, dis­agreed and overruled the decision, in Motibhai Paragbhai & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., reported in (1994) 2 GLR 1105 , wherein it had been held that as against an award, which has omitted to consider a factor required for determination of compen­sation, there can be a writ petition under Ar­ticle 226. The Full Bench has held that if the Collector has not taken into account the crops, which may have been raised after the award is made and before the possession is taken, a 'reference' can still be made under Section 18 and necessary compensation will be awarded by the Court. 109. In the case at hand, the Collector has mentioned, in his order, dated 27.04.2007, that 'the other claims' of the review petitioner would be determined on receiving the re­sponse from the Government. In this regard, it is noteworthy, as already indicated above, that there cannot be piecemeal award. If the LA Collector, for whatever reason, has not made the award in respect of 'the other claims' of the review petitioner, the remedy of the re­view petitioner, in such a case too, would lie in seeking a 'reference' under Section 18. In this regard, it is noteworthy, as already indicated above, that there cannot be piecemeal award. If the LA Collector, for whatever reason, has not made the award in respect of 'the other claims' of the review petitioner, the remedy of the re­view petitioner, in such a case too, would lie in seeking a 'reference' under Section 18. We do not find any error on this aspect in the judg­ment, which is the subject of review. 110. However, even if, for a moment, it is assumed that as against the omission of the LA Collector to determine 'the other claims' of the review petitioner, no application, un­der Section 18, seeking a reference could have been made, the fact remains that an alterna­tive and efficacious remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226, for, Article 226 confers dis­cretionary jurisdiction on the High Court, though this discretion cannot be arbitrarily exercised and has to remain confined within the established norms and principles govern­ing exercise of this power and this exercise of discretion has to be in tune with law, statu­tory or otherwise, which may be in force. 111. In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that the judgment, underreview, men­tions that the appellant (i.e., the review peti­tioner) ought to have applied for a 'reference' under Section 18 and a writ petition, under Article 226, was not maintainable, the fact remains that the learned Single Judge did de­cide the writ petition on 'merit'. Similarly, notwithstanding the observation made by the appellant Bench that the writ petition was not maintainable, even the appellate Bench, while dealing with the appeal, did enter into the 'merit' of the appeal and has, in fact, decided the appeal on 'merit'. Hence, there was, in­deed, exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 by this Court inasmuch as the appeal was not dismissed on the ground that it was not maintainable; rather, the Court has chosen to examine the correctness of the 'merit' of the appeal and dismissed the appeal on 'merit'. 112. Hence, there was, in­deed, exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 by this Court inasmuch as the appeal was not dismissed on the ground that it was not maintainable; rather, the Court has chosen to examine the correctness of the 'merit' of the appeal and dismissed the appeal on 'merit'. 112. It is, thus, immaterial as to whether the writ petition was or was not, strictly speak­ing, maintainable under Article 226, particu­larly, when an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the High Court's power of exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, for, this Court did exercise its power under Ar­ticle 226, examined the merit of the submis­sions made by the appellant (i.e., the review petitioner) and dismissed the appeal on merit. 113. What crystallizes from the above dis­cussion is that it has been pointed out, on be­half of the review petitioner, that this Court committed serious error in observing that the writ petition, in the light of the scheme of the LAAct, was not maintainable inasmuch as an application for 'reference' could have been made by the petitioner, under Section 18, to the District Collector. This observation of the Court, as indicated above, is sought to be pro­jected by the review petitioner as an error apparent on the face of the record. In this regard, it may be recalled that we have al­ready observed above that when a District Collector, while determining the compensa­tion payable, omits to take into account any of the statutorily determinable factors or com­ponents, which he ought to, in terms of the provisions of Section 23, taken into consid­eration, the remedy, against such an omission, on the part of the District Collector, lies in making an application, under Section 18, seeking 'reference' if the person, claiming compensation, is aggrieved by such an 'award'. 114. 114. The limited question, therefore, which has remained unsettled and needs to be settled, in this review petition, is as to whether this Court has committed any error in not agreeing with the review petitioner's conten­tion that, in terms of the Clause 'secondly' of Section 23 (1), the potential value of the trees, which existed on the land on the date of the issuance of the notification under Section 4, has been paid to the review petitioner, but the market value thereof has not been paid to the review petitioner inasmuch as the 'felled' trees and bamboos had not been handed over to the review petitioner. 115. What is, now, pertinent to note is that in the case at hand, it was contended by NBCC before the LA Collector that the 'felled' trees had already been handed over to the review petitioner. This was in response to the review petitioner's contention that the 'felled' trees and bamboos had not been handed over to them. The LA Collector has clearly stated in his order, dated 27.04.2007, that there is nothing on record to show that the 'felled' trees and bamboos were handed over to the review petitioner. This statement was, rightly contended by Mr. Poddar, never put under challenge, in the 'second writ peti­tion', by the respondents. There can, there­fore, be no doubt that the LA Collector's find­ing, that the 'felled' trees and bamboos had not been handed over to the review petitioner, has attained finality. 116. On being pointed out that Clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) comes into play in respect of trees or crops, which may have been grown by a person after the notification under Section 4(1) was published, Mr. 116. On being pointed out that Clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) comes into play in respect of trees or crops, which may have been grown by a person after the notification under Section 4(1) was published, Mr. Poddar, learned Senior Counsel, in his usual fairness, accepts, eventually, this position of law, but insists that even if the Clause 'sec­ondly' of Section 23(1) does not apply to the case at hand, the review petitioner's case would nevertheless be covered by the Clause 'firstly' of Section 23(1) inasmuch as the re­view petitioner is entitled to receive not only the 'market value' of the 'land', but also the 'market value' of the 'trees and bamboos', which were standing on the acquired land and which had to be, admittedly, 'felled' for the purpose of construction of the barbed wire fencing on the Indo-Bangladesh Border, and those felled trees and bamboos were neither returned to the review petitioner nor any com­pensation was paid therefor, though the LA Collector's finding, recorded in his order, dated 27.04.2007, that the felled trees and bamboos have not been returned to the re­view petitioner and that the review petitioner is entitled to the compensation, remained un­challenged till date. 117. It has been further pointed out by Mr. Poddar, learned Senior counsel, that what has been acquired, in the present case, is the 'land' of the tea estate, which was not being used for the purpose of growing tea. The market value of such a land, concedes Mr. Poddar, would be different from the value of such a land of a tea estate, which gives a regular yield. For instance, points out Mr. Poddar, when the land of a tea estate, where labour quar­ters stand, is acquired, the assessment thereof would not be the same as the land of the tea estate, which is being used for the purpose of production of tea, though the labour quarters also form part of the whole scheme of pro­duction. 118. We are conscious of the fact that it is the duty of the Court to ensure that the State pays compensation, which is just and fair and that too, without delay. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Karigowda & Ors, reported in (20JO) 5SCC 708, which Mr. 118. We are conscious of the fact that it is the duty of the Court to ensure that the State pays compensation, which is just and fair and that too, without delay. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Karigowda & Ors, reported in (20JO) 5SCC 708, which Mr. Poddar relies upon, wherein the Court has clearly observed that the power of com­pulsive acquisition has an inbuilt element of duty and responsibility upon the State to pay the compensation, which is just, fair and with­out delay. 119. Equally true will be the principle that the extent of compensation would always de­pend on the facts and circumstance of a given case and it is not possible to set any absolute legal principle as a panacea, which uniformly will be applicable or capable of being applied as a binding precedent de hors the facts of a given case. 120. Keeping in view the scheme of the new LAAct and the interpretation, which these provisions have received in the past, it is dif­ficult even to comprehend that there is possi­bility of providing any straitjacket formula, which can be treated as a panacea to resolve all controversies uniformly in relation to de­termination of the value of the acquired land. The Supreme Court has, therefore, clearly pointed out, in Special Land Acquisition Of­ficer (supra), that there is no uniform formula for determination of compensation and it would really depend on the facts of a given case. 121. Having come to a finding in its order, dated 27.04.2007, that the felled trees and bamboos had not been returned to the re­view petitioner, it had became the duty of the LA Collector to make an assessment of the felled trees and bamboos and award com­pensation therefor accordingly. This having not been done, the review petitioner could have sought for a 'reference' to be made, but chose to challenge, by way of second writ petition, the LA Collector's failure to assess the 'mar­ket value' of the 'felled' trees and bamboos and make an award for compensation accordingly. 122. What is, now, of crucial importance to note is that the second writ petition was dismissed 'on merit' and the writ appeal, which arose therefrom, has also been dismissed 'on merit'. 122. What is, now, of crucial importance to note is that the second writ petition was dismissed 'on merit' and the writ appeal, which arose therefrom, has also been dismissed 'on merit'. However, the fact of the matter re­mains that the findings, reached by the LA Collector, in his order, date 27.04.2007, hav­ing attained finality, there is no escape from the conclusion for this Court, rather it is the duty of this Court to ensure, that, in terms of the observations made in the order, dated 27.04.2007, the 'market value' of the felled trees and bamboos be determined and com­pensation be paid by making requisite award in this case. This having not been done by the appellate Court, we, to our mind, committed an error apparent on the face of the record, which needs to be, now, corrected, when our attention has been drawn thereto. 123. The situation may, in a nut-shell, be summarized, a little differently, thus: (i) In the backdrop of the above find­ing, which has attained finality, namely, that there stood trees and bamboos, on the acquired land, which had been felled for the purpose of using the land to put barbed wire fencing at the Indo-Bangladesh Bor­der, Mr. Poddar, learned Senior counsel, submits that compensation having neither been assessed nor having been paid in re­spect of these trees and bamboos, this Court, while deciding the appeal, on merit, ought to have directed the LA Collector to determine the compensation for the felled tress and bamboos, which had not been handed over to the review petitioner. According to Mr. Poddar, the learned Single Judge as well as this Court, while dealing with the appeal, seriously fell into error in not issuing proper direction to the District Collector to determine the com­pensation, which the review petitioner is entitled to be paid for the felled trees and bamboos, which have not been, till date, returned to the review petitioner. (ii) Mr. Poddar, the learned Single Judge as well as this Court, while dealing with the appeal, seriously fell into error in not issuing proper direction to the District Collector to determine the com­pensation, which the review petitioner is entitled to be paid for the felled trees and bamboos, which have not been, till date, returned to the review petitioner. (ii) Mr. Poddar hastens to clarify that the review petitioner, now, having under­stood the scheme of the new LAAct, as explained by this Court, seeks neverthe­less review of the appellate order to the extent that the same, while deciding the appeal, omitted to take note of the fact that the 'market value' of the 'land' even under Clause 'first' of Section 23(1) would include not only the value of the land, but also the value of trees and bamboos stand­ing thereon and since what has been paid to the petitioner is the value of the acquired land and not the value of the trees and bamboos standing thereon, a direction ought to have, according to Mr. Poddar, given to the District Collector to determine the value of compensation of the felled trees and bamboos and pass order ac­cordingly. To the submission, so made, nothing could be really submitted, on be­half of the respondents inasmuch as we have already indicated, in the order, dated 09.06.2011, while closing the hearing of this review petition, that none had ap­peared on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2,3 and 4, though Mr. JMAChoudhury, learned Central Government Counsel, appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 1, namely. Union of India, and he could not say anything in rebuttal of the submis­sions made on behalf of the review peti­tioner. (iii) Situated thus, we find considerable force, in the submissions made on behalf of the review petitioner, that the finding of the LA Collector, recorded in his order, dated 27.04.2007, being that the felled trees and bamboos, in question, have not been returned to the review petitioner, there ought to have been a direction given by this Court to the LA Collector that the 'market value' of the felled' trees and the bamboos aforementioned be assessed. We also find great force in the submission of Mr. We also find great force in the submission of Mr. Poddar, learned Senior counsel, that the omission to give appropriate di­rection, while dealing with the writ appeal, on merit, to the District Collector (as is, now, submitted on behalf of the review pe­titioner), was an error apparent on the face of the record and if this error is not cor­rected, it would cause irreparable dam­age and serious prejudice to the review petitioner inasmuch as the writ appeal hav­ing been decided 'on merit', there is no purpose, now, in making any application, under Section 18, seeking a reference in­asmuch as the 'reference' Court would not be able to override the findings of this Court, reached in the appeal, though in­correctly. Unless, therefore, this Court cor­rects the error, which it has committed, as indicated hereinbefore, the loss caused to the review petitioner would be irreparable. 124. In the result and for the reasons dis­cussed above, this review petition succeeds. The judgment and order, under review, shall accordingly stand set aside and vacated and the appeal stands disposed of with direction to the respondent No. 4, namely, Land Ac­quisition Collector, North Tripura, Kailas-hahar, to determine the value of the felled trees and bamboos, which have not been returned to the review petitioner and pass award ac­cordingly. Any sum of money, which may have already been paid to the review petitioner as damage under clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1) of the LA Act, shall accordingly be adjusted inasmuch as the review petitioner is not entitled to receive any sum of money un­der Clause 'secondly' of Section 23(1). It is further directed that the determination of the value, in terms of the direction given herein, shall be completed by the respondent-author­ity concerned within a period of three months from today. 125. With the above observations and di­rections, this review petition shall stand dis­posed of. 126. No order as to costs.