JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, J. 1. The most prominent question, which this revision begs for an answer, is: Whether the word 'appeal', which appears in Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990, shall be read as an 'application'? Amongst others, the other important question, which this revision seeks an answer, is: When no period of limitation is prescribed by a statute for an 'appeal', which can be preferred to a Court by a person, who is aggrieved by the decision of an adjudicating authority, whether it is possible for the Court, while dealing with such an 'appeal' to hold the appeal time-barred or to refuse to give relief on the ground of laches or negligence? The material facts, which have led to this revision, raising, amongst others, the questions, which I have posed above, may, in a nutshell, be set out as under: (i) The petitioner No. 1, namely, M/s. Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. (in short, 'petitioner company') is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Rajgarh Road, Guwahati, with the petitioner No. 2 as its Managing Director. The respondent No. 1, namely, M/s. North Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd., (in short, 'the respondent company') is also a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Hajobari, Chandrapur, Guwahati. (ii) On 09.11.1982, the respondent Company had received orders from the petitioner Company for supply of goods. Having made supplies, respondent Company raised three bills for diverse sums of money, namely, bill, dated 20.01.1983, for Rs. 84,595/-, bill, dated 26.01.1983, for Rs. 86,812.13/- and bill, dated 31.03.1983, for Rs. 21,433.81/-. The bills of the respondent Company had not been, according to the respondent Company, fully paid by the petitioner Company. (iii) The petitioner Company was declared as a sick company by the Board for Industrial and Financial Re-organization under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, popularly knows as 'BIFR', necessitating its rejuvenation and rehabilitation. This necessity was sought to be filled up by the State by enacting Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990, which came into force, on 12.09.1990, by virtue of a notification, dated 24.09.1990, under the Assam Gazette (Extra-ordinary) on 25.09.1990. This necessity was sought to be filled up by the State by enacting Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990, which came into force, on 12.09.1990, by virtue of a notification, dated 24.09.1990, under the Assam Gazette (Extra-ordinary) on 25.09.1990. This apart, Section 4(b) of the Assam State Industrial Relief Undertaking Act, 1984, (in short, 'the Act of 1984'), made all contracts of Ashok Paper Mill Ltd. (i.e., the petitioner company) with the respondent Company unenforceable in law and the Act of 1984 continued till 04.01.1992. Consequently, during the period, when the Act of 1984 remained in force, respondent Company could not file any suit, in any Court of competent jurisdiction, against Ashok Paper Mill (i.e., the petitioner company) for recovery of the money, which the respondent Company claimed to be its dues. (iv) By taking resort to the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990, the respondent Company lodged, in terms of Section 16thereof, a claim before the Commissioner, appointed under the Act, for payment of principal amount with interest. By an order, dated 17.08.94, the Commissioner awarded Rs. 1,58,375/- towards principal amount. As no interest was awarded by the Commissioner, the respondent Company filed a writ petition, which gave rise to Civil Rule No. 4210/1997, whereby the respondent Company sought for a direction to be issued to the Commissioner for passing necessary order for payment of interest as per the representation, dated 16.07.1997, submitted by the respondent Company to the Commissioner. This writ petition, i.e., Civil Rule No. 4210/97, was disposed of by directing the Commissioner to consider, within a period of three months, the respondent Company's representation, dated 16.07.97. The Commissioner, then, awarded, on 03.11.2001, interest to the respondent Company, for the period from 23.09.92 to 31.07.2001, which came to the tune of Rs. 6,83,688/- as against the total claim of interest of Rs. 21,49,610/-, which the respondent Company had raised. The Commissioner, then, awarded, on 03.11.2001, interest to the respondent Company, for the period from 23.09.92 to 31.07.2001, which came to the tune of Rs. 6,83,688/- as against the total claim of interest of Rs. 21,49,610/-, which the respondent Company had raised. (v) Aggrieved by the denial of payment of interest amount, as claimed by the respondent Company, respondent Company, once again, filed a writ petition claiming to the effect, inter alia, a direction to be issued to the Commissioner to make a fresh award with regard to the interest payable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Interest on Delayed Payment to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Act, 1993, over and above the amount of Rs. 6,83,688/-, which was already paid to them by virtue of the Commissioner's award, dated 03.11.2001. This writ petition gave rise to WP(C) No. 4520/2002, wherein it was claimed by the respondent Company that it was entitled to interest for delayed payment on the amount of their bills for supply of goods to the petitioner Company, namely, Ashok Paper Mill. This writ petition was disposed of by judgment and order, dated 19.05.2004, wherein the Court observed, at para 7, that the Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, was not required to embark upon an arithmetical calculation for computation of interest payable and that there being no dispute about the respondent Company's entitlement to interest, as provided in the Delayed Payment to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Act, 1993, it was apposite to refer the matter back to the Commissioner for calculation of interest afresh in compliance with the provisions of Sections4 and 5 of the Act of 1993. Having come to this conclusion, the writ petition was disposed of by the Court with a direction to the Commissioner to re-calculate the amount of interest, payable to the respondent Company herein, on the value of the goods supplied, on three occasions, as mentioned hereinbefore, at the rate applicable as per the provisions of Section 4 and excess amount of interest, if any, found payable, shall be paid immediately, preferably, within a period of 60 days from the date of such calculation. By the judgment and order, dated 19.05.2004, aforementioned, the Court further directed that the Commissioner shall, on receiving a copy of the judgment and order, complete the assessment within a period of 30 days. By the judgment and order, dated 19.05.2004, aforementioned, the Court further directed that the Commissioner shall, on receiving a copy of the judgment and order, complete the assessment within a period of 30 days. (vi) Aggrieved by the decision, which had been reached in WP(C) No. 4520/2002, the petitioner Company herein filed a petition seeking review of the directions, given by the judgment and order, dated 19.05.2004, passed in WP(C) No. 4520/2002. This application gave rise to Review Application No. 91/2004. In the Review Application, the Court came to the conclusion that the Act of 1993 was brought into force, on 23.09.1992, with retrospective effect and the provisions for delayed payment interest was made effective from 23.09.1992. By order, dated 20.12.2004, while disposing of the review petition, the Court clarified that interest, on delayed payment, has to be calculated, with effect from 23.09.1992, on the principal as well as the normal interest due. With the clarification so made, the review petition was disposed of by directing the Commissioner to re-calculate the amount of interest in terms of the provisions of the Act of 1993 for any amount due on or after 23.09.1992. (vii) Following the directions, given in the review petition, though the matter came to the Commissioner, the Commissioner declined, by its order, dated 13.04.2005, to direct payment of any further interest to the respondent Company. Aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner, the respondent Company herein preferred an appeal, to the District Judge, Kamrup, by taking recourse to Section 22(8) of the Joghighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990. This appeal gave rise to Misc. Appeal No. 18/2008. The appeal was resisted by the Ashok Paper Mills Limited (i.e., present petitioner Company) on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation inasmuch as, according to the present petitioner Company, an appeal or application, in terms of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, must be made, at the most, within a period of three years from the date, when the right to apply accrues. The petitioner Company further contended, in the appeal, that the appeal was time-barred and may, therefore, be dismissed. (viii) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the learned District Judge passed an order, on 14.05.2009, in Misc. The petitioner Company further contended, in the appeal, that the appeal was time-barred and may, therefore, be dismissed. (viii) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the learned District Judge passed an order, on 14.05.2009, in Misc. Appeal No. 18/2008, holding the 'appeal' maintainable on the ground that no specific time limit had been fixed, under the Limitation Act, 1963, for filing of appeal. The appeal was accordingly admitted for hearing. It is this order, dated 14.05.2009, which stands impugned by the present petitioner Company by making this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. I have heard Mr. B.D. Das, learned Senior counsel, for the petitioner Company, and Mr. G.P. Bhowmik, learned counsel, for the respondent Company. I have also heard Mr. D. Baruah, learned counsel, as amicus curiae. 3. Terming the appeal, which the opposite party herein has filed before the District Judge, Kamrup, as wholly not maintainable, Mr. B.D. Das, learned Senior counsel, has submitted that the appeal, which has been filed by the claimant-opposite party, is wholly misconceived in law inasmuch as when the scheme of the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990, is considered, in the light of the schedule of the Act, it would transpire, submits Mr. Das, that a creditor, who had made supply of materials to Ashok Paper Mill (i.e., the petitioner Company) would riot be entitled to recover his dues by taking recourse to the Act. According to Mr. Das, learned Senior counsel, the Act envisages, apart from recovery of dues of the employees on account of salary, wages, provident fund, etc., the recovery of loans, both secured and unsecured, of the banks and financial institutions, revenue, taxes, etc., but it does not envisage payment of dues of private creditors, such as, the respondent Company, which had made supplies of materials to the petitioner Company. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. B.D. Das, learned Senior Counsel, has also submitted that the procedure, prescribed for disposal of claim in Section22 of the Act, makes it clear that a claim, when made, shall be disposed of expeditiously and, hence, in such circumstances, the word 'appeal', appearing in sub-section (8) of Section 22, shall be read as an 'application' and if so read, then, the period of limitation for such 'appeal', which has to be regarded as an 'application', becomes, by virtue of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, three years from the time, when the right to apply accrues inasmuch as Article 137lays down that the period of limitation, within which an 'application', other than the applications, which are provided under the Limitation Act, 1963, shall be three years from the time, when fight to apply accrues. 5. In the present case, according to Mr. Das, the decision of the Commissioner was passed as far back as on 13.04.2005 and the 'appeal', in the present case, which ought to have been treated as an 'application', having been preferred, admittedly, beyond the period of three years, the 'appeal' ought to have been held to be time-barred. 6. In support of his submission that the word 'appeal', appearing in Section 22(8), shall be read as an 'application', Mr. Das relies upon Snehadeep Structures Private Limited vs. Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 34 . Mr. Das further submits that an 'appeal', when treated as an 'application', must be preferred, in terms of Article 137, within three years from the time, when the right to apply accrues. In support of his submission, Mr. Das refers to, and relies upon, Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum vs. T.P. Kunha-liumma, reported in (1976) 4 SCC 634 . 7. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. G.P. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent company, contends that the word 'appeal', which appears in Section 22(8), cannot be treated as 'application' inasmuch as Section 22(8) provides for an 'appeal', as a remedy, against the decision, which the Commissioner takes with regard to the claim raised by a claimant. Since the appeal, in Section 22(8), has been provided as a remedy against the decision of the Commissioner, if a claimant is dissatisfied by the Commissioner's decision, Mr. Since the appeal, in Section 22(8), has been provided as a remedy against the decision of the Commissioner, if a claimant is dissatisfied by the Commissioner's decision, Mr. Bhowmik submits that apart from the fact that an 'appeal' as envisaged by Section 22(8), ought to be treated as 'appeal', the legislature, having not provided for any period of limitation for such an 'appeal', the 'appeal', which Section 22(8)provides, cannot be saddled with any period of limitation and the 'appeal' ought to be construed as an 'appeal', which suffers from no period of limitation. 8. Appearing as Amicus Curiae, Mr. D. Baruah, learned counsel, has elaborately taken this Court through various provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and comparing the provisions contained therein with the provisions embodied in the Limitation Act, 1963, has pointed out that Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, provided that applications, for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be made within a period of three years from the time, when the right to apply accrues; whereas the Limitation Act, 1963, points out Mr. Baruah, stands divided into three clear divisions. The first division, further points out Mr. Barua, prescribes different periods of limitation for different classes of suits, the second division prescribes different periods of limitation for different classes of appeals and the third division covers 'applications'. 9. Mr. Baruah also submits that when the Indian limitation Act, 1908, was in force, the Courts were of the view that Article181, which prescribes a period of limitation of three years, relates to 'applications', which are made under the Code of Civil Procedure and not the 'applications', which may be made under statutes other than the Code of Civil Procedure; but, on coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, the question arose as to whether, with the change in the designing of the Limitation Act, 1963, and in the light of the language in which Article 173 is couched, the 'applications', which the Limitation Act, 1963, refers to, must still be treated to be 'applications' covered by the Code of Civil Procedure, or, whether 'applications', made under statutes, other than the Code of Civil Procedure, would also be covered by Article 137. This question, according to Mr. This question, according to Mr. Baruah, learned amicus curiae, was answered in Town Municipal Council, Athani, vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, reported in (1969) 1 SCC 873 , by holding that even under the Limitation Act, 1963, an 'application', which Article 137 speaks of, has to be an 'application' under the Code of Civil Procedure, made to a Court and not under any other statute. 10. The correctness of the decision, rendered in Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra), points out Mr. Baruah, was doubted by the Supreme Court, in Nityananda M. Joshi vs. LIC of India, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 199 . Eventually, however, submits Mr. Baruah, it was the Kerala State Electricity Board (supra), which Mr. Das relies upon, wherein the question was answered by a three Judge Bench holding that Article 137 would apply not only to those 'applications', which are filed under the Code of Civil Procedure, but also to the 'applications', made under any other statute, though such 'applications' must be made to Courts and not to any statutory body other than Courts. In the light of the decision, in Kerala State Electricity Board (supra), there is no escape from the conclusion, concedes Mr. Baruah, that Article 137 covers not merely 'applications' made under the Code of Civil Procedure, but also under any other statute, though the 'applications', under a statute other than the Code of Civil Procedure too, must, according to Mr. Baruah, be made to a Court and not to any Tribunal or any other statutory body other than the Court. 11. Referring to the provisions of subsection (8) of Section 22, Mr. Baruah points out that as far as the case of Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation limited (supra) is concerned, the Court found that Section 7of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, provided for an 'appeal' against, amongst others, award and since Section 7 would have become redundant if an 'application', which is made under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking setting aside of an award, is not treated as an 'appeal', the Supreme Court concluded, in Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited (supra), points out Mr. Baruah, that an application, which Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provides for, shall be treated as an 'appeal' for the purpose of Section 7 so as to make Section 7 meaningful, or else, an award, though appealable under Section 7, would not be covered by Section 7. In the case at hand, according to Mr. Baruah, there is no such provision, which can be used for the purpose of construing the word 'appeal', which appear in Section 22(8), as an 'application'. 12. In order to sustain the distinction, which he has drawn between the meaning of the expression 'application', which appears under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as against the word 'application', which appeared in Article 141 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Mr. Baruah has taken me through the case of The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma, reported in, (1976) 4 SCC 634 , which Mr. Das relies upon. 13. Mr. Baruah further points out that a Division Bench of this Court, in Abdul Gani Sarkar vs. Assam Board of Revenue & Ors., reported in AIR 1970 Assam & Nagaland 82, has taken the view that since Section 151 of the Assam Land & Revenue Regulations, which provides for revision to the Board of Revenue, has not prescribed any period of limitation, exercise of revisional jurisdiction, under Section 151 of the Regulations, must be treated to be not restricted by any period of limitation and it is, thus, possible for the Board of Revenue to entertain a revision at any point of time however belated the revision may be. 14. Notwithstanding the decision in Abdul Gani Sarkar (supra), which lays down that Section 151 of the Regulations having not prescribed any period of limitation, the revisional jurisdiction must be treated to be exercisable at any point of time, Mr. Baruah, referring to Makbool Fatma (Smt.) & Ors. vs. Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property & Anr., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 493 . The Gram Panchayat, village Kanonda vs. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Haryana; Chandigarh & Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 763 and Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Baruah, referring to Makbool Fatma (Smt.) & Ors. vs. Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property & Anr., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 493 . The Gram Panchayat, village Kanonda vs. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Haryana; Chandigarh & Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 763 and Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Thakoredas, Major & Ors., reported in (1997) 11 SCC 412 , submits that all these cases clearly take the view that even where no period of limitation is prescribed, an 'application', which is made belatedly and suffers from latches, shall not be entertained. What, will be the reasonable period, for the purpose of such an 'application' in the setting of the facts of a given case, would, according to Mr. Baruah, depend on the facts of the given case. 15. It is also, submitted by Mr. Baruah that the decisions in Makbool Fatma (Smt.) & Ors. vs. Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property & Anr., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 493 . The Gram Panchayat, village Kanonda vs. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Haryana, Chandigarh & Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 763 and Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer vs. Thakoredas, Major & Ors., reported in (1997) 11 SCC 412 , show that when no period of limitation is prescribed for a revision or appeal, the Court cannot treat the appeal or revision as time-barred, but it can, certainly, refuse to grant any relief if the appeal or revision, though not restricted by any period of limitation, is filed after a long lapse of time, particularly, if, in the meanwhile, rights of some other parties get matured. In such cases, according to Mr. Baruah, non-interference by the Court by refusing to grant relief is not due to the fact that the Court does not have the power to entertain such an 'appeal' or revision, but the laches or negligence, on the part of the person, who claims to be aggrieved, while preferring appeal or filing revision, disentitles him from raising his claim. 16. Mr. Baruah also points out that 'appeal' has been provided, in the Act, as a remedy to an aggrieved' person against the decision, which the Commissioner takes on a claim, which such a person makes. When legislature has made such a provision for 'appeal' in favour of that person, who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner, such an 'appeal', contend Mr. When legislature has made such a provision for 'appeal' in favour of that person, who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner, such an 'appeal', contend Mr. Baruah, cannot be interpreted as an 'application', for, had the legislature intended to provide for an 'application' and not an 'appeal', nothing had really' stopped the legislature from using the word 'application' in place of 'appeal'. This apart, according to Mr. Baruah, the Word 'application' would make the scheme of sub-section (8) of Section22 otiose inasmuch as the legislature, in the light of the language used in Section 22(8); intended to provide for an 'appeal' to the District Judge against the decision of the Commissioner. In such circumstances, submits Mr. Baruah, the Court cannot apply the word 'application' as a substitute for the word 'appeal'. Support for his submission is sought to be derived by Mr. Baruah from the case of Union of India vs. Rajiv Kumar, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 516 . 17. Repelling the submissions made by Mr. Baruah, Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel, points out that an 'application', in order to fall within the provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, must not only be provided by way of a statute, but that such an application must be provided to a Court and not to bodies other than Court, Such as, a tribunal. Mr. Das points out that the cases, namely, Makbool Fatma (Smt.) & Ors. vs. Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property & Anr., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 493 . The Gram Panchayat, village Kanonda Vs. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Haryana, Chandigarh & Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 763 and Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer vs. Thakoredas, Major & Ors., reported in (1997) 11 SCC 412 , which Mr. Baruah has relied upon, shows that in all these cases, the appeal or revision was provided to a body, other than Court, and it is for this reason that it was held by the Supreme Court that such an appeal or revision, as the case may be, must be made within a reasonable period but what would the reasonable period, in a given case, would depend on the facts and the scheme of the statute. 18. Let me, first, determine as to what 'applications' can fall within the expression 'application,' which appears in Article137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 18. Let me, first, determine as to what 'applications' can fall within the expression 'application,' which appears in Article137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In order to understand the difference between what Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, provided and how the same differs from Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, both the Articles are reproduced below: "6. The provision contained in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is as follows: Description of application Period of limitation Time from which period begains to run Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided else where in this Division Three years When the right apply accrues "8. Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was as follows: Description of application Period of limitation Time from which period begains to run Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided else where in this schedule or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Three years When the right apply accrues 19. On a comparative study of the provisions made in Article 173 vis-a-vis Article 181, what can be clearly gathered is that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to such 'application's for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere "in this Division"; whereas Article 181. of the Indian Limitation Act provided that any other 'application' for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule of the Limitation Act or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the period of limitation will be three years from the time, when the right to apply accrues. Thus, while Article 173 speaks of Division, Article 181 spoke of the Schedule. It is the scheme of the Division in the Limitation Act, 1963, which needs to be clearly understood. 20. With regard to the above, it needs to be noted that Mr. Baruah, learned amicus curiae, is correct, when he points out that the Schedule of the Limitation, Act, 1963, now, stands divided, unlike the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, into three clear Divisions. The first Division, which deals with suits, stands divided into 10 parts, which prescribe different periods of limitations for different classes of suits. Baruah, learned amicus curiae, is correct, when he points out that the Schedule of the Limitation, Act, 1963, now, stands divided, unlike the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, into three clear Divisions. The first Division, which deals with suits, stands divided into 10 parts, which prescribe different periods of limitations for different classes of suits. Article 113, which falls under Part-X, states that any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule, the period of limitation shall be three years from the time, when the right to sue accrues. Thus, for different classes of suits, as indicated hereinbefore, different periods of limitations have been prescribed under the First Division, but as far as suits in respect whereof, no period of limitation has been prescribed, Article 113 makes three years as the period of limitation for such suits from the time, when the right to sue accrues. 21. The Second Division of the Limitation Act, 1963, which has not been divided into any part, prescribes different periods of limitations for different classes of appeal unlike 10 different parts in which periods of limitations for suits are divided. 22. What is of utmost importance to note, while dealing with appeals, is that the Second Division does not prescribe any specific period of limitation in respect of those appeals for which no period of limitation has been prescribed elsewhere in the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. Thus, what becomes abundantly clear is that where no period of limitation is prescribed for an appeal, there is no general provisions under the Limitation Act, which can be resorted to for prescribing the period of limitation for such appeals. 23. Coming to the Third Division of the Limitation Act, 1963, it needs to be noted that the Third Division, as rightly submitted by Mr. Baruah, learned amicus curiae, deals with 'application's and stands divided into two parts. While the Part I deals with 'application's in specific cases and prescribes different periods of limitation for different specified classes of 'application's, Part-II of the Third Division deals with such classes of 'application's in respect whereof, no period of limitation has been prescribed. Baruah, learned amicus curiae, deals with 'application's and stands divided into two parts. While the Part I deals with 'application's in specific cases and prescribes different periods of limitation for different specified classes of 'application's, Part-II of the Third Division deals with such classes of 'application's in respect whereof, no period of limitation has been prescribed. Article 137 falls under Part-II and reads, as reproduced above, that any other 'application' for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division, the period of limitation shall be three years from the time, when the right to apply accrues. 24. I may point out that so long as the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, remained in force, the judicial interpretation, in India, was that Article 181 applies to only such 'application's, which are covered by the Code of Civil Procedure and would not, therefore, apply to 'applications', which can be made under any other statute meaning thereby that an 'application', which can be made under the Code of Civil Procedure, but has no prescribed period of limitation, the period of limitation shall be, in the light of Article 181, three years from the time, when the right to sue accrues; but as regard 'applications', which can be made under other statues, there was no prescribed period of limitation inasmuch as Article 181 did not cover such an 'application'. However, on coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, the question arose in, in Town Municipal Council, Athani vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubil, reported in (1969) 1 SCC 873 , as to whether construction of Article 137 shall be same as was in the case of Article 181, namely, whether Article 137 applies to only such 'applications', which may be filed under the Code of Civil Procedure, or would Article 137 also cover such 'applications', which may be filed under any other statute. 25. In Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra), In Town Municipal Council, Athani vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubil, reported in (1969) 1 SCC 873 , a workman had applied to the Labour Court, under Section33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, for computation of benefit in respect of overtime duty, which he had performed. When the Labour Court accepted the 'application', the Athani Municipal Council challenged the Labour Court's decision by way of a writ petition. When the Labour Court accepted the 'application', the Athani Municipal Council challenged the Labour Court's decision by way of a writ petition. In course of time, when the matter reached the Supreme Court, it was contended, on behalf of Athani Municipal Council, that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is barred by the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and, secondly, 'application's to the Labour Court were time barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court held, in Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra), that the alteration in the 1963 Limitation Act by Article 137, namely, the inclusion of the words "other proceedings" in the long title to the 1963 Limitation Act, the omission of the preamble and the change in the definition so as to include petition in the word "application" do not show any intention to make Article 137 applicable to proceedings before bodies other than courts, such as, quasi-judicial tribunals and executive bodies. The word "other" in the first column of the article giving the description of the 'application' "any other 'application' for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division" indicates that the interpretation of Article 181 in the 1908 Limitation Act on the basis of ejusdem generis should be applied to Article 137. The 'application' was presented to the Labour Court, a tribunal, which was not a court governed by the Civil or Criminal Procedure Codes, and, therefore, the 'application' was not governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 26. From the observations made, in Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra), two things became clear, namely, that according to the Supreme Court, in Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra), the expression "any other 'application' for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division" must be read as ejusdem generis and an 'application' for the purpose of Article 137 must, therefore, be treated as an 'application' made under the Code of Civil Procedure for which no period of limitation has been provided and, secondly, such an 'application' must be to a Court governed by the Civil or Criminal Procedure Codes meaning thereby that if an 'application' is made under a statute other than the Code of Civil Procedure or when such an application is made to a body other than Court, such an 'application' cannot be treated as an 'application' under Article 137. 27. 27. The correctness of this decision was doubted in Nityananda M. Joshi vs. LIC of India, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 199 . It was, however, in Kerala State Electricity Board (supra), which Mr. Das relies upon, wherein the question arose, once again, as regards the correct interpretation of Article 137, namely, whether Article 137 would apply to only those 'applications', which are filed under the Code of Civil Procedure or this Article (Article 137) would apply even to cases, where 'applications' are filed to Courts under any other statute. 28. Apart from the fact that in Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra), the Supreme Court had taken the view that Article137 would not apply to 'application's made under any statute other than the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court had also pointed out that 'application', which Article 137 conceives of, must be 'application's, which are presented to a Court and as the 'application', in Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra), had been made to the Labour Court, the Supreme Court pointed out that the Labour Court, being a Tribunal, was not a Court and, therefore, Article 137 had no 'application'. 29. Thus, the decision in Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra), had two parts. One part of the decision was that Article137 applies to only such 'application's, which are made under the Code of Civil Procedure, and the other part was that in order to fall within the ambit of the 'application', as envisaged under Article 137, an 'application' must be made to a Court and not to Tribunal or bodies, which are not Courts. 30. Dissenting with its earlier decision, in Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra), a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum (supra), speaking through A.N. Ray, C.J., held that the 'application', referred to under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not confined to 'application's contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure and since, in The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum (supra), the statutory provisions, under interpretation, contemplated determination of compensation by the District Judge, the Supreme Court took the view that the same calls for a judicial decision and such an "application" must be treated as an 'application' falling under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 31. 31. In short, thus, two things become transparent from the decision in The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum (supra), namely, that the word 'application', which appears in Article 137, applies not only to 'applications', which may be made under the Code of Civil Procedure, but would also cover 'applications' other than 'application's made under Code of Civil Procedure and, secondly, an 'application', in order to fall within the expression 'application', appearing under Article137, must be made to a Court and not to any other Body. 32. To put it a little differently. The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum (supra), holds that while Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, was confined to 'applications' under the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has extended its scope by bringing, within its sweep, not only 'applications', which may be made under the Code of Civil Procedure, but also the 'applications, which may be made under statutes other than the Code of Civil Procedure; but whether made under the Code of Civil Procedure or under any other statute, an 'application', in order to fall within the ambit of Article 137, must be made to a Court and not to a Tribunal or any body other than Court. In effect, thus, the prescribed period of limitation of three years from the time, when right to apply accrues, as envisaged by Article137, relates to not only such an 'application', which may be made under the Code of Civil Procedure, but which may also be made under any other statute provided that the 'application' is required to be made to a Court. 33. As far as the cases of Makbool Fatma (Smt.) & Ors. vs. Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property & Anr., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 493 . The Gram Panchayat, village Kanonda vs. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Haryana, Chandigarh & Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 763 and Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Thakoredas, Major & Ors., reported in (1997) 11 SCC 412 , are concerned, it may be noted that all these cases are cases, where appeal, 'application' or revision were required to be made, as correctly pointed out by Mr. Das, learned Senior counsel, to adjudicatory bodies other than Court. When 'applications', appeals or revisions are not made to Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, do not come into play. Das, learned Senior counsel, to adjudicatory bodies other than Court. When 'applications', appeals or revisions are not made to Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, do not come into play. To this extent, there is no dispute. What is, however, of vital importance to note is that in such cases, the Court may not, because of absence of any prescribed period of limitation, but because of delay or lashes, refuse to grant relief to the party concerned, particularly, when, as correctly pointed out by Mr. Baruah, learned amicus curiae, when third party right matures. Thus, when an 'application' or revision can be made under a statute to an adjudicatory body other than Court and there is no prescribed period of limitation, the adjudicatory body would have the jurisdiction to entertain such an 'application', appeal or revision, but it has the responsibility, as a public policy, to decide in an appeal, 'application' or revision, whether such an appeal, revision or 'application' suffers from delay or lashes and whether it should grant relief and, in a given case, it is open to adjudicatory body not to grant relief if the 'application', appeal or revision suffers from delay, lashes or negligence. 34. Now, turning to the question as to whether Mr. Das is correct in suggesting that creditor, such as, the respondent Company's dues cannot be realized by taking resort to the Act, in question, inasmuch as the schedule of the Act covers the dues of only employees on account of unpaid salaries, wages, Provident Fund, etc, secured as well as unsecured loans of banks and financial institutions, it is apposite to take note of the Schedule, which reads as under: "THE SCHEDULE (See Sections 9, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 24) Order of priority for the discharge of the liabilities of the Company in respect of the Undertaking. Pre-appointed Day Management Period. CATEGORY: I Employees' dues on account of unpaid salaries and wages, provident fund, Employees' State Insurance Contribution and any other amounts due to employees before the date of taking of the management of the Undertaking of the Company on the appointed day. CATEGORYH: II Secured loans of the Bank and Financial Institutions. CATEGORY: III Revenue, taxes, cesses, rates and other due to the Central and State Government and local authorities of State Electricity Board. CATEGORY: IV Principal amount of unsecured loans advanced by Banks and Financial Institutions. CATEGORYH: II Secured loans of the Bank and Financial Institutions. CATEGORY: III Revenue, taxes, cesses, rates and other due to the Central and State Government and local authorities of State Electricity Board. CATEGORY: IV Principal amount of unsecured loans advanced by Banks and Financial Institutions. CATEGORY: V Amounts due by way of interest on unsecured loans referred to the Category IV. CATEGORY: VI Any other credit availed of for the purposes of carrying on any trading or manufacturing operations and any other dues." (Emphasis is added) 35. From a bare reading of the above Schedule, it becomes clear that the Schedule has really fixed the order of priority for discharge of liabilities of the petitioner Company. Though, it is true, that the priority, as regards realization of dues, has to be given to the dues of the employees and, then, to the secured and unsecured loans of the banks and financial institutions, revenue, tax, cess, etc, category VI refers to any 'other credit availed of for the purposes of carrying on any trading or manufacturing operations and any other dues'. 36. From what have been stated in Category VI, there can be no escape from the conclusion that in the present case, the respondent Company had made supplies on the basis of the orders placed by the petitioner Company and the petitioner Company had availed credit for the purpose of carrying of trading or manufacturing operations, the respondent Company's dues fall within the ambit of Category VI. Above all, the expression, 'any other dues', which appears in Category VI, would, at any rate, cover the case of the respondent Company. 37. On drawing attention of Mr. Das to this aspect of the Act, Mr. Das could not assign any reason as to why 'any other dues' shall not cover the dues of the creditors, in general, and the case of creditors, such as, the respondent Company, in particular, who had supplied materials on credit to the petitioner Company for carrying on their trading and manufacturing operations. There is, thus, no substance in the contention of Mr. Das that the Act does not cover the claim of the respondent Company. 38. Let me, now, turn to the last, but significant contention of Mr. Das, learned Senior counsel, that the word appeal, which appears in Section 22(8) of the Act, shall be construed as an 'application'. There is, thus, no substance in the contention of Mr. Das that the Act does not cover the claim of the respondent Company. 38. Let me, now, turn to the last, but significant contention of Mr. Das, learned Senior counsel, that the word appeal, which appears in Section 22(8) of the Act, shall be construed as an 'application'. Suffice it to point out, in this regard, that it is, undoubtedly, permissible to interpret the term appeal, appearing in a statute, as an 'application', because the term appeal cannot be treated as an appeal in all contexts and all purposes. However, ordinarily, a word in a statute has to be given the meaning, which is general in nature unless the legislative intent is indicated otherwise. It is not really for the Court to substitute a word used by the legislature by any other word of its own choice unless such an intent is clearly discernible from the scheme of the statute. 39. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of Union of India vs. Rajiv Kumar, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 516 , wherein the Supreme Court has pointed out that a Court can only interpret a law and cannot legislate and that legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. In a case of casus omissus, Court cannot supply any word unless the reason for such supplying the word is found within the four comers of the statute itself. The relevant observations made, in this regard, in Rajiv Kumar's case (supra), read as under: "22. While interpreting a provision, the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend,' modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (SeeCommissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular Trading Company. Ujjain). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. 23. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute/statutory provision as a whole - appear to be well settled.Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. But, at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC (1966 AC 557) where at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not anew problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges". 24. It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but do to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequencies accidunt." "But," on the other hand," it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom" (See Fentop v. Hampton 11 Moore, P.C. 345). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretations, save in some case of strong necessity. A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretations, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis exist it proetereunt legislatores, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute - Casus omissus et oblivion datum disposition communis juris relinquitur; "a casus omissus," observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1 I.R. 52), "can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws." 25. The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The grammatical and ordinary sense of the towards is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey v. Pearson 6 H.L. Case 61). The latter part of this "golden rule" must, however, be applied with much caution, "if," remarked Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are plain and unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning" (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B. 378)." (Emphasis is added) 40. As far as the case of Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited (supra) is concerned, which Mr. B.D. Das, learned Senior counsel, relies upon in order to contend that the word appeal, appearing in Section22(8), must be construed as an application, because the scheme of the Act, in question, is to dispose of the claims expeditiously, it needs to be noted, as correctly pointed out by Mr. Baruah, that Section 7 of the Interest Act, while providing for an appeal, read as under: "7. Appeal. Baruah, that Section 7 of the Interest Act, while providing for an appeal, read as under: "7. Appeal. No appeal against any decree, award or other order shall be entertained by any court or other authority unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, other order in the; manner directed by such court or, as the case may be, such authority." 41. From a bare reading of Section 7, it clearly transpires that it provides for an appeal not only, against decree or order but also against an award. There can be no doubt that Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provides for making of an application by a person, who is aggrieved by an award to get the award set aside. If the expression 'application', which Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, uses, is refused to be treated or read as 'appeal, Section 7 of the interest Act becomes redundant so far as award is concerned, though Section 7 provides for an appeal against an award too. 42. Thus whole of the Interest Act becomes inapplicable if the word application, which appears in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is not read as an appeal. It was for this limited reason that the Supreme Court pointed out, in Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited (supra), that the word application, appearing in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, must be read as an appeal so as to make application of Section 7 feasible. The relevant observations, appearing in this regard, in para 46, in Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited (supra), read as under:- "46. Further, if the word "appeal" is not construed as including an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we are afraid that it would render the term 'award' redundant and the requirement of pre-deposit a total nullity with respect to all cases where a small-scale industry undertaking preferred arbitral proceedings, prior to the incorporation of the reference procedure in 1998. Arbitration necessarily has to result in ant award. The only way of challenging an award in a court, in accordance with Section 5 read with the opening clause of Section 34 is by foiling an application under the latter section. Arbitration necessarily has to result in ant award. The only way of challenging an award in a court, in accordance with Section 5 read with the opening clause of Section 34 is by foiling an application under the latter section. If such challenge is not construed as an "appeal", the requirement of pre-deposit of interest before the buyer challenging an award passed against him becomes a total nullity. The fact that an order passed on such application/challenge under section 34 is appealable under Section 37 is of no consequence. As the learned counsel for the appellant Company rightly argued, such appeal filed against an order passed by the court under Section 34, not against an award passed against the buyer and in favour of the small-scale industry undertaking. In all cases where the small-scale industry undertaking enters into arbitration proceedings to obtain payment of interest, if we limit the requirement of pre-deposit to appeal under Section 37, therefore, we will be rendering the term "award" a nullity, which we are not empowered to do." (Emphasis is added). 43. In the present ease, sub-section (8) of Section 22, which is material for our purpose, lays down that a claimant, who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner, may prefer an appeal against such decision to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the undertaking of the Government Company is situated: Provided that where a person, who is a Judge of High Court is appointed to be the Commissioner, such appeal shall lie to the High Court, at Guwahati, and such appeal shall be heard and disposed by not less than two Judges of that High Court. 44. A bare reading of Section 22(8) clearly shows that it provides for appeal against the decision of the Commissioner by a person, who is aggrieved by the decision. 44. A bare reading of Section 22(8) clearly shows that it provides for appeal against the decision of the Commissioner by a person, who is aggrieved by the decision. In such circumstances, the word appeal, in me absence of anything else in the Act, cannot be really construed as an 'application' and since there is no period of limitation prescribed for preferring such an appeal, one has no option, but to hold, and I do hold, that there is no limitation in preferring an appeal against the decision of the Commissioner inasmuch as it would not be appropriate, on the part of this Court, to substitute the word appeal by the word 'application,' when the legislature had thought it fit not to prescribe any period of limitation for such appeal. 45. Coming to the case of Abdul Gani Sarkar Vs. Assam Board of Revenue & Ors., (AIR 1970 Assam & Nagaland 82), it may be pointed out that what fell for consideration, in Abdul Gani Sarkar (supra), was Section 151 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations (in short the Regulation). Regulation 151 read as under: "151. The Board, a Deputy Commissioner, a Settlement Officer and a Survey Officer may call for the proceedings held by any officer subordinate to it or him, and pass such orders thereon as it or he thinks fit." 46. A Division Bench of this Court, in Abdul Gani Sarkar (supra), while interpreting Section 151 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, pointed out that Section 151 gives very wide power to the Board of Revenue to invoke, in an appropriate case, its power to call for the proceedings held by any officer subordinate to it or him, and pass such orders thereon as it or he thinks fit and in such case, therefore, the question of limitation would not arise. Otherwise also, considering the fact that life power under Section 151 of the Regulation can be exercised suo motu, it is not possible to construe that the power given by Section 151 is limited by any period of limitation. 47. In Mohd Usman Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1969 SC 474 : (1969) 2 SCR 232 , which Mr. 47. In Mohd Usman Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1969 SC 474 : (1969) 2 SCR 232 , which Mr. Baruah, learned amicus curiae, refers to an application made on 11th July, 1961, by Mohd Usman to the District Judge, Jhansi, under Sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for filing the arbitration agreement and for an order of a reference of the dispute to an arbitrator to be appointed by the Court. Though the Union of India, as a respondent in Mohd Usmain (supra), contended that the application was barred by limitation, the District Judge allowed nevertheless Usman's application by holding that there is no period of limitation prescribed for making of an application under Sections8 and 20. The defendant filed an appeal against the order. The High Court allowed the appeal insofar as it challenged the order under Section 20 by holding that the application was governed by Section 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and was, therefore, barred by limitation as it was more than three years after the dispute had arisen. The point in issue, therefore, was whether an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, is governed by Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. This was replied in the negative on the ground that Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, applies to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure and not to an application under the Arbitration Act, 1940, and as the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, does not prescribe any period of limitation for such an application, the application is not barred. 48. What can be clearly gathered from the decision, in Mohd Usman (supra), is that when there is no period of limitation prescribed in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the Court held that an application, under Sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which is not governed by Article 181, can be filed at any time and is not barred by limitation. One of the principles, which clearly flows out of this decision in Mohd Usman (supra), is that when there is no period of limitation prescribed in respect of an application, no period of limitation can be adopted by the Court. One of the principles, which clearly flows out of this decision in Mohd Usman (supra), is that when there is no period of limitation prescribed in respect of an application, no period of limitation can be adopted by the Court. After coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, an application, in respect whereof, no period of limitation has been prescribed under any article of the Limitation Act, 1963, such an application has to be filed, because of Article 137, within three years from the time, when the right to sue accrues. Had Article 137 not been enacted, an application, falling outside the scope of the Limitation Act, 1963, would have had no period of limitation. 49. Unlike Article 113, which is a residuary Article in respect of suits, prescribing three years as the period of limitation for institution of such a suit for which no period of limitation has been provided elsewhere in the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963, or unlike Article 137, which is the residuary Article relating to applications prescribing, as already discussed above, three years as the period of limitation, there is no residuary Article in respect of appeals in the Limitation Act, 1963. 50. The question, therefore, which naturally arises, in this revision, is: When Section 22(8), while providing for right to 'appeal' for a dissatisfied claimant, has not prescribed any period of limitation, would it be permissible to adopt any specific period as the period of limitation for an 'appeal' under Section 22(8) of the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990? 51. While dealing with the above question, it may, once again, be pointed out that Mr. D. Baruah has submitted that since there is no period of limitation prescribed for an 'appeal' under Section 22(8), the Court cannot adopt any specific period as the period of limitation for such an 'appeal', when there is no residuary Article in the Limitation Act, 1963: The implication is that the legislative intendment was not to provide any residuary period for 'appeals' other than 'appeals', which are provided by the special enactments. An 'appeal', therefore', which Section 22(8) contemplates, is, according to Mr. Baruah, an 'appeal', which does not suffer from any period of limitation. Is this submission correct? 52. An 'appeal', therefore', which Section 22(8) contemplates, is, according to Mr. Baruah, an 'appeal', which does not suffer from any period of limitation. Is this submission correct? 52. While considering the above submission, it needs to be pointed that in the case of Vidyacharan Shukla Vs. Khubchand Baghel ( AIR 1964 SC 1099 ), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the question as to what would be the period of limitation for an 'appeal' under a special Act if the special Act happens to prescribe a period of limitation or prescribes no period of limitation. While holding that when the period of limitation is prescribed by a special enactment, it is the period, which the special enactment prescribes, would be the period of limitation for the 'appeal', the minority, in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra), took the view that where the special enactment does not prescribe any period of limitation, the 'appeal' would have no prescribed period of limitation. The minority view, in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra), as expressed by Ayyangar, J., was that when the right of 'appeal' is given by the special Act and not by the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, 'the Code'), it would not be permissible to read an 'appeal' to a High Court as automatically falling within the period of limitation as prescribed, for an 'appeal', to the High Court, by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the reason being that there is no residuary Article for an 'appeal' provided by a special Act without being restricted by any period of limitation inasmuch as such an interpretation would go against the plain intention of the legislature, which left the period of limitation unrestricted, while providing for a right of 'appeal' under the special enactment. It was pointed out, in this regard, in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra), by the minority, that as far as appeals are concerned, legislature knew that appeals have been provided by special laws, but when it does not provide for any specific period of limitation, it would imply not only that there is no period of limitation for the 'appeal', but also that when the legislature makes no provision for 'appeal', the 'appeal' does not fall within the Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The apparent reason for taking this view, according to the minority, in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra), was that the law, which confers a right of 'appeal', is expected to provide for the period of limitation as well. In this regard, it was also pointed out by the minority view, in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra), that an 'appeal' under the Code is not the same as an 'appeal' arising out of proceedings to which the Code applies. When an 'appeal' arises out of a special Act, it is not the kind of 'appeal', which arises out of the Code. To such an 'appeal', according to the minority, in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra), the procedural provisions of the Code may apply, but such application of the procedural provisions, embodied in the Code, would not embrace the application of the period of limitation provided for an 'appeal' under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The relevant observations, made by the minority, in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra), read as under: "The question would then be whether its view that an 'appeal', though not provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, would yet be deemed to be an 'appeal' under the Code for the purpose of Article156 of the Limitation Act, was right. With respect, I do not think that there was any warrant for holding that an 'appeal', which was not given by the Code, would still be one under the Code merely because the procedural provisions thereof would govern its course. Where the right of 'appeal', is given by some other law, the 'appeal' must be regarded as one under that law and not under the Code. I see no valid reason for construing the words 'under the Code of Civil Procedure' as meaning 'governed in the matter of procedure by the Code of Civil Procedure'. For, that is, in effect, what the High Court has done in this case. By reading the article in the way it has done, the High Court has virtually construed the only provision in the Limitation Act, dealing with normal civil appeals, to the High Court as a residuary article, which would take in all appeals by whatever law they may be provided, merely because the procedure relating to appeals, contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, was applicable to them. This would, in my judgment, go against the plain intendment of the Legislature. This would, in my judgment, go against the plain intendment of the Legislature. Indeed, while a right to institute a suit or make an application is a wider kind of right, there can be no right of 'appeal' unless some statute confers it. That is why the Legislature has expressly enacted residuary provisions, Articles 120 and 180, for suits and applications respectively in the Limitation Act. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx..........The first difficulty, therefore, in interpreting Article 156, in the way contended for by the respondents, is that where a different period of limitation for 'appeal' is expressly provided by a special law Article 156 will riot in terms be attracted. To Bring such an appeal under it would clearly go against the express intention of the Legislature which was to confine that article to appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure. The next difficulty is that the entry deals with appeals "under" the Code of Civil Procedure and not appeals arising out of proceedings to which the Code of Civil Procedure applies. Nor again, does it include an appeal, which is only deemed to be under the Code of Civil Procedure." 53. What is, now, of utmost importance to note is that disagreeing with the above view, the majority, in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra), held that in order to apply Article 156 (now, Article 116) under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, it is not necessary for an 'appeal' to be an "appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure" and/or that the right to prefer the 'appeal' should be conferred by the Code inasmuch as it is sufficient, in this regard, if the procedure for filing of the 'appeal' and the power of the Court, while dealing with the 'appeal', are governed by the Code. The majority approved the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Aga Mohd. Hamdani Vs. Cohen (ILR 13 Cal. 221) and also the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dropadi Vs. Hiralal (ILR 34 All 496). In Aga Mohd. The majority approved the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Aga Mohd. Hamdani Vs. Cohen (ILR 13 Cal. 221) and also the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dropadi Vs. Hiralal (ILR 34 All 496). In Aga Mohd. Hamdani (supra), it had been pointed out by the Calcutta High Court that the Burma Courts Act, while providing for a right of 'appeal', also made provisions for applicability of the Code to such an 'appeal' and the natural meaning of such a provision would be that an 'appeal', to which the Code applies, would be governed by the Code so far as the procedure is concerned. This view, as indicated hereinbefore, was approved in Vidyacharari Shukla's case (supra). 54. The majority view, in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra), further approved, as indicated above; the view of the Allahabad High Court, in Dropadi (supra), wherein it had been held that several Indian enactments, for instance, the Succession Act, the Probate and Administration Act, the Land Acquisition Act and the Provincial Insolvency Act, confer rights of 'appeal' and direct the application of the provisions of the Code to such appeals, but prescribe no period within which such appeals might be filed, the idea being that Article 156 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, would furnish the period of limitation for the filing of such appeals too. 55. On the reasonings as described hereinabove, the majority, speaking through Mudhblkar, J., in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra), held: "To attract Art. 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, it is not necessary for an 'appeal' to be an "'appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure" that the right to prefer the 'appeal' should be conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is sufficient if the procedure for the filing of the 'appeal' and the power of the Court for dealing with the 'appeal', when filed, are governed by the Code." 56. One may pause here to refer to the case of Uttam Namdeo Mahale Vs. Vithal Deo & Ors., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 73 : AIR 1997 SC 2695 . In Uttam Namdeo Mahale (supra), wherein the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with execution of an 'order' of eviction as prescribed by the Mamlatdar's Court Act, 1906, wherein the Court passed an 'order' of eviction and the said 'order' became final. Vithal Deo & Ors., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 73 : AIR 1997 SC 2695 . In Uttam Namdeo Mahale (supra), wherein the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with execution of an 'order' of eviction as prescribed by the Mamlatdar's Court Act, 1906, wherein the Court passed an 'order' of eviction and the said 'order' became final. The 'order' was put to execution after a lapse of 12 years. The judgment-debtor contended that the said 'order' of eviction cannot be executed, because the execution proceeding is barred by limitation inasmuch as 12 years had already elapsed. A three-Judge Bench rejected this contention by taking the view that when no period of limitation has been prescribed for execution of an 'order', the implication was that the general law of limitation, as provided in the Limitation Act, would stand excluded and, hence, such an 'order' of eviction would not suffer from any period of limitation. 57. Referring to the decision in Uttam Namdeo Mahale (supra), the Bombay High Court has taken the view, in ONGC Ltd. Vs. M/s. Jagson Intl. Ltd. ( AIR 2005 Bom. 335 ), that when the legislature, while providing for a right of 'appeal' under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, against an 'order' setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, has not prescribed any period of limitation, an 'appeal', under Section 37, would not suffer from any period of limitation. The relevant observations, made in M/s. Jagson Intl. Ltd. (supra), read as under: "14. .............. Perusal of Section 37 also shows that there is no period of limitation laid down for filing an 'appeal' under that provision. Perusal of the provision of Section 34 shows that there is a clear provision made for filing an application under that provision for challenging an award made by the Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, when the Legislature provided the remedy against the arbitral award, it also provided a period of limitation for making an application under Section 34. Perusal of the provisions of Section 11, Section 13 and Section 16 show that the Legislature has mentioned a period of time for taking various steps. Therefore, when the Legislature provided the remedy against the arbitral award, it also provided a period of limitation for making an application under Section 34. Perusal of the provisions of Section 11, Section 13 and Section 16 show that the Legislature has mentioned a period of time for taking various steps. Therefore, it is clear that while the Legislature was aware of the necessity of providing a period of limitation and wherever the Legislature thought that providing a period of limitation is necessary it has been so provided for by various provisions of the, Act. However, while providing an 'appeal' under Section 37, the Legislature has chosen not to prescribe any period of limitation. In this view of the matter, therefore, in my opinion, the Court will not be justified in importing the period of limitation provided by Section 34 for filing an application and making it applicable to an 'appeal' filed under Section 37. Sub-section 1 of Section 43 makes the provisions of Limitation Act applicable to arbitration as it applies to proceedings in Court. Perusal of the provisions of the Limitation Act also shows that the Limitation Act does not provide for any period of limitation for filing an 'appeal' under Section 37. It is second Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act which deals with 'appeal'. Perusal of those provisions show that Articles 114 and 115 lay down period for filing an 'appeal' under the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 116 provides for limitation for filing an 'appeal' under the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 117 provides period of limitation for filing an 'appeal' from decree or 'order' passed by the High Court to the same court. Thus, in the Limitation Act, there is no provision made prescribing the period of limitation for filing an 'appeal' under Section 37. Perusal of Article 119, which is found in Third Division, the heading of which is "application" shows that there is a period of limitation laid down by Article 119 for making application under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The intention of the Legislature, in my opinion, therefore is clear that there is no period of limitation laid down for filing an 'appeal' under Section 37. The intention of the Legislature, in my opinion, therefore is clear that there is no period of limitation laid down for filing an 'appeal' under Section 37. In my opinion, in this situation, therefore, the observations of the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Uttam Namdeo Mahale vs. Vithal Deo and Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 73 , are relevant." 58. While considering the case of Uttam Namdeo Mahale (supra), what needs to be borne in mind is that the Supreme Court was dealing with an application for execution of an 'order' and an application for execution of an 'order' is not the same as an 'appeal'. What one can clearly notice is that Article 136, which provides the period of limitation of 12 years for execution of any 'decree' or 'order' of a civil court, falls under the Third Division of the Limitation Act, 1963, which embodies different periods of limitation for different types of applications. Referring to, and depending upon, therefore, the decision, in Uttam Namdeo Mahale (supra), it would, with great respect, not be correct to hold, in the teeth of the majority decision in Vidya Charan Shukla (supra), that when an 'appeal' is provided by a special Act to the High Court without prescribing any period of limitation therefore, such an 'appeal' would not suffer from any period of limitation. 59. Coupled with the above, one may also pause here to point out that since there are various types of suits, the Legislature, while prescribing different periods of limitation for such 'suits', deemed it wise to prescribe a residuary Article in the form of Article 113 in respect of a 'suit' for which no period of limitation has been provided in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. 60. Similarly, there can be variety of applications to a Civil Court. Necessarily, therefore, while prescribing various periods of limitation in respect of such applications, a residuary Article was necessary in respect of an application for which no period of limitation has been prescribed and it is for this reason that the residuary Article, in the form of Article 137, has been enacted by the Legislature in the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes three years as the period of limitation for an 'application', where no period of limitation has been elsewhere provided, in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, for making an 'application'. 61. 61. Coming, however, and more importantly, to appeals, it is imperative to note mat it is only one Article, namely, Article116, which deals with 'appeal' under the Code, namely, (i) 'appeal' to a High Court from any 'decree' or 'order' or (ii) an 'appeal' to any other Court from any decree or 'order' or from a decree or (iii) 'order' of any High Court in the same Court. Thus, Article 116 prescribes 'three' distinct fora for 'appeals' and not with different kinds of 'appeals', for, there can either be a right of 'appeal' or no right to 'appeal'. 62. To put it a little differently, a microscopic examination of Article 116 would reveal that unlike suits or applications, there cannot be 'appeals' of different kinds. The meaning of 'appeal' remains the same whether the 'appeal' is provided to the High Court or to a Court subordinate to the High Court or to the High Court from decree or 'order' of the same High Court. It was, therefore, not necessary, one can clearly notice, to provide a residuary Article in respect of an 'appeal' so long as an 'appeal' is provided to a High Court or to a Court subordinate to the High Court or to the High Court from its own 'decree' or 'order'. 63. In the backdrop of the position of law as discussed above, when one reverts to the present revision, it becomes clear that the expression 'appeal', which appears in Section 22(8), is an 'appeal' and not an application. Since an 'appeal', under Section 22(8), has been provided to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction without having been restricted by any period of limitation, it would be treated as an 'appeal' provided, under the Code, to a Court subordinate to the High Court and to such an 'appeal', period of limitation, as prescribed by Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would apply. 64. In the case at hand, the 'appeal' was preferred against the order of the Commissioner long after one month, which is the prescribed period for an 'appeal' under the Code to a Court subordinate to the High Court. Such an 'appeal' was, thus, not maintainable. The learned District Judge, therefore, fell in error in taking the view that since no period of limitation having been prescribed for the 'appeal' in the Act, the 'appeal' cannot be treated to be time barred. 65. Such an 'appeal' was, thus, not maintainable. The learned District Judge, therefore, fell in error in taking the view that since no period of limitation having been prescribed for the 'appeal' in the Act, the 'appeal' cannot be treated to be time barred. 65. Because of what have discussed and pointed out above, what surfaces is that the 'appeal', in question, was barred by limitation by Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and that being so, the 'appeal' ought to have been dismissed as not maintainable. 66. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this revision succeeds. The impugned 'order' is set aside, the 'appeal' is held to be barred by limitation and not maintainable. With the above observations and directions, this revision shall stand disposed of. Disposed off.