JUDGMENT R.S. Jha, J. 1. In this batch of petitions, the petitioners have challenged the constitutional, validity of the amendments made by the State Government by Notification dated 24-11-2010 published in M.P. Rajpatra, dated 24-11-2010 in Rules 64, 67, 77, 103, 116 and 204 of the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules') and the insertion of Rule 116-A in the aforesaid Rules. As the issues involved in all the petitions are similar, they are heard and decided concomitantly by a common order. 2. Most of the petitioners in the instant petitions, except a few, hold temporary permits issued for plying stage carriages while some hold regular permits for plying stage carriages. It is submitted that the petitioners have been in the transport business and have been obtaining regular stage carriage permits under section 72 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for short) and mostly temporary permits under section 87 of the Act and are regularly plying stage carriages on various routes in the State of M.P. 3. It is submitted that the petitioners after purchasing vehicles by investing huge amounts of money and obtaining loan for that purpose from various banks have obtained the aforesaid stage carriage permits under the provisions of the Act and the petitioners are plying ordinary buses having the capacity to carry less than 50 passengers on long routes which are beyond 150 K.Ms. 4. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that vide Notification dated 24-11-2010 the impugned amendment has been made by the State by inserting Rule 77(1 a) in the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules of 1994') whereby it has been prescribed that while granting the stage carriage permits, the permit granting authority shall not do so in respect of a vehicle which has completed 10 years from the year of its manufacture in case of inter-state route, 15 years from the year of manufacture in case of ordinary route within the State and 20 years from the year of manufacture in case of any other route and has further provided that permits of long distance routes of 150 K.Ms, and above in a single trip shall be granted to ordinary buses only in cases where the buses are having a seating capacity of not less than 50+2 seats excluding the driver and conductor. 5. The petitioners have also challenged amendments made in Rules 64 and 67 in the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 by which provision has been made for the appointment of District Transport Officers and to confer powers upon them to grant, refuse or renew stage carriages or contract carriage permits and the classification of routes as ordinary routes and rural routes that has been made by inserting Rule 116-A in the Rules of 1994. 6. In one of the petitions, namely, W.P. No. 2080/2011 the petitioner has challenged insertion of sub-rule (4)(a) in Rule 204 of the Rules of 1994 which enables the State Government to authorize any person, officer or body to collect fees from vehicle owners using bus stand facilities at the rate of fees specified from time to time. 7. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the aforesaid amendments have been made by the State Government ignoring the fact that the petitioners are holders of valid permits and have the right to continue to ply stage carriages under the same conditions and their right to renewal of the stage carriage permits on the same conditions cannot be taken away or restricted by bringing in and enforcing the impugned amendments in the rules. 8. 8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power to fix the age of the motor vehicle has been conferred only upon the Central Government by section 59 of the Act. It is stated that there is no other provision under the Act which empowers the State to fix the age of a motor vehicle and, therefore, the amendment made by the impugned notification by inserting Rule 77(1 a) in the Rules of 1994 is beyond the competence and authority of the State to prescribe under section 96 of the Act and deserve to be quashed. 9. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that section 96 of the Act gives powers to the State to make rules for the purpose of control of transport vehicles and specifically enumerates the subjects and the matters in respect of which rules can be framed by the State Government. It is submitted that section 96 does not confer any power on the State Government to prescribe the minimum seating capacity of 50+2 passengers as a condition subject to which a vehicle could be granted a stage carriage permit on a long route of 150 kms and beyond. It is submitted that section 96 also does not empower the State to prescribe a route as a long route and in such circumstances the amendment made by the State in Rule 77(1 a) is ultra vires the powers conferred upon the State and, therefore, deserves to be declared as such. 10. It is submitted that section 96 also does not empower the State to prescribe a route as a long route and in such circumstances the amendment made by the State in Rule 77(1 a) is ultra vires the powers conferred upon the State and, therefore, deserves to be declared as such. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that section 68 of the Act specifies the transport authorities which are to be appointed for the purposes of implementation of the Act and a perusal of the aforesaid section makes it abundantly clear that the District Transport Officer is not one of the transport authority prescribed therein and in such circumstances, as the State has not been conferred with the powers to create any transport authority like the District Transport Officer and to confer upon it the power to grant or refuse permits which is specifically conferred upon the Regional Transport Authority under sections 72 and 74 of the Act, therefore, the impugned amendments made in Rules 64 and 67 of the Rules is ultra vires the powers conferred upon the State and deserves to be quashed more so, as the creation of such an authority would deprive the petitioners of a right to appeal or revision as conferred by the Act. 11. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the classification of ordinary routes and rural routes as made by the State by inserting Rule 116-A in the Rules of 1994 is also beyond its powers as no such power has been conferred under section 96 upon the State to classify the routes and, therefore, it discriminates between the stage carriage transport operators by treating them as ordinary operators or rural operators. It is submitted that in such circumstances, the classification sought to be made in Rule 116-A by way of the impugned amendment deserves to be quashed as it amounts to discrimination and is beyond the authority and powers of the State. 12. It is further submitted that the provisions of the Act do not confer any power upon the State to delegate powers to collect bus stand fees on any individual person, body or authority as the collection of bus stand fees can only be made by the transport authority and nobody else. 12. It is further submitted that the provisions of the Act do not confer any power upon the State to delegate powers to collect bus stand fees on any individual person, body or authority as the collection of bus stand fees can only be made by the transport authority and nobody else. It is submitted that the provisions of the impugned amendment in Rule 204 of the Rules of 1994 which confers powers on the State to do so is, therefore, ultra vires the provisions of the Act and deserves to be quashed. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the impugned amendment made in the Rules amounts to imposition of unreasonable restrictions and conditions on the fundamental and statutory rights of the petitioners to ply the stage carriages and, therefore, is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of India, The Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules made thereunder. It is further submitted that as the buses purchased and owned by the petitioners have been constructed strictly in accordance with the provisions of Rule 158 of the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 which prescribe the specifications for the same and, therefore, as the buses owned by the petitioners conform to the specification mentioned in Rule 158 they cannot be debarred from grant or renewal of stage carriage permits by inclusion of the rule relating to seating capacity by the impugned amendment in the Rules. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioners have also submitted that the stipulation specifying the seating capacity of 50+2 passengers for long routes of 150 K.Ms, in one trip is unreasonable, arbitrary and without application of mind as it is contrary to the object sought to be achieved and has no reasonable nexus with the grant of stage carriage permits as it does not in any manner relate to convenience and comfort of the travelling passengers. It is submitted that the impugned amendment creates a monopoly in the big operators and shall exclude small operators like the petitioners who do not have the financial capacity to purchase new stage carriages conforming to the impugned amendments in the Rules. 15. It is submitted that the impugned amendment creates a monopoly in the big operators and shall exclude small operators like the petitioners who do not have the financial capacity to purchase new stage carriages conforming to the impugned amendments in the Rules. 15. It is submitted that the petitioners had purchased new vehicles for the purposes of obtaining stage carriage permits after investing huge amounts of money but as a result of the impugned amendments the buses purchased by the petitioners would be scraped and the petitioners would suffer a huge loss and they would also not be in a position to purchase new buses or convert the existing ones in accordance with the prescribed seating capacity mentioned in the amendment which would involve huge investment of Rs. 20 to 22 lacs. It is stated that the impugned amendments in the Rules are contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Mithilesh Garg etc. etc. v. Union of India and others, etc. etc., AIR 1992 SC 443 . 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submits that the old Motor Vehicles Act was replaced by the Act of 1988 with a view to liberalize the provisions of the old Act and to simplify the procedure with the object of encouraging more and more persons to obtain permits and, therefore, the impugned amendments in the Rules which impose unreasonable restrictions on the right to obtain permits is contrary to the object of the provisions of the Act. 17. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India and others, AIR 1992 SC 443 , Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 , Mohammad Hanan v. The Regional Transport Authority, Indore Region and another, AIR 1990 M.P. 158 , Laghu Udyog Bharti and another v. Union of India and others, (1999) 6 SCC 418 , Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and another v. Union-of India and others, (1990) 3 SCC 223 , Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice and others v. Bar Council of India and another, (1995) 1 SCC 732 , Kunj Behari Lal Butail and others v. State of H. P. and others, (2000) 3 SCC 40 , and Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State of Kerala and others, (2006) 4 SCC 327 in support of their submissions. 18. The learned Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents, per contra, submits that the State has the power to frame rules and impose the impugned conditions under section 96(2)(xiv) and (xv) of the Act which specifically empowers the State to make rules regarding seating capacity etc. and in such circumstances, the contention of the petitioners to the contrary deserves to be rejected. He further contends that under section 96 the State also has the power to frame rules and impose any restriction on the grant of permits and, therefore, prescribing the age of the vehicle or seating capacity is not beyond the authority or jurisdiction of the State. He further submits that the impugned conditions relating to the age of the vehicle and seating capacity in respect of long routes beyond 150 K.Ms, has been imposed to ensure the safety, security and convenience of the passengers and, therefore, the same has nexus with the object of providing the aforesaid facilities of security, safety and convenience. 19. In response to the contentions of the petitioners it is submitted that the State with a view to make available transport facilities to passengers of rural areas at reasonable rates has classified routes into ordinary routes and rural routes and have conferred the powers for granting stage carriage permits in respect of the rural routes on the District Transport Officers. In response to the contentions of the petitioners it is submitted that the State with a view to make available transport facilities to passengers of rural areas at reasonable rates has classified routes into ordinary routes and rural routes and have conferred the powers for granting stage carriage permits in respect of the rural routes on the District Transport Officers. It is submitted that looking to the road conditions in rural areas and to ensure cheaper transport, vehicles of less seating capacity and body weight have been permitted to be operated on rural routes. 20. It is submitted that with a view to reduce heavy traffic on longer routes and to ensure convenience and security of the travelling passengers the impugned amendments in the rules have been made so as to ensure that only larger buses with more passenger carrying capacity ply on long distance routes of 150 K.Ms, and above which restriction would automatically reduce the number of buses that would ply on long routes and it is with the same object i.e. to provide quality transport services that the conditions regarding age of the stage carriages has been fixed in the rules. 21. As far as the amendment in Rule 204 is concerned, it is stated that the said amendment has been made to facilitate collection of bus stand fees on the rates fixed by the State by a person, authority or body particularly one who has either constructed or is maintaining the bus stop with a view to provide better facilities to the travelling passengers. 22. The learned Advocate General submits that to enable the existing permit holders to bring their stage carriages within the framework of the amended rules and to mitigate the hardship, if any, the State vide notification dated 24-11-2010 has granted four months' time to all permit holders by postponing the date of coming into operation of the amended rules notified on 24-11-2010 to 24-3-2011 and therefore, the contention regarding abrupt change and hardship is factually incorrect. 23. The respondents have also denied the contention that the impugned rule would create monopoly in favour of big transport operators or that the impugned amendments suffer from unreasonableness or arbitrariness. The respondents in support of their contentions have relied on the decisions rendered in Subhash Chandra and others v. State of U.P. and others, (1980) 2 SCC 324 , Sheelchand and Co. The respondents in support of their contentions have relied on the decisions rendered in Subhash Chandra and others v. State of U.P. and others, (1980) 2 SCC 324 , Sheelchand and Co. v. State Transport Appellate Authority Gwalior and another, 1964 MPLJ 311 = AIR 1964 M.P. 8 , State of Mysore and another v. K.G. Jagannath, AIR 1973 SC 2165 , Smt. Uma Devi Sharma v. State of M.P. and others, AIR 2008 M.P. 110 , Vivek Dwivedi and another v. Prem Narayan and others, 1998(2) MPLJ 618 = AIR 1999 M.P. 1 , M/s Balaji Travels v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and another, 2008(II) MPJR CG 78 and Shiv Adhar Yadav v. The State of Maharashtra and ors., AIR 2009 (NOC) 2159 (Bom.). 24. From a perusal of the rival contentions of the parties, the main questions that arise for adjudication in the present petitions are as under:-- (1) Whether the State has the power or authority under the Motor Vehicle Act, specifically, section 96, to frame the impugned rules ? (2) Whether the State has the power to impose a condition regarding minimum seating capacity of 50+2 passengers for grant of permits on long routes beyond 150 kms. ? (3) Whether the State has the power to prescribe the life of a vehicle in view of the provisions of section 59 of the Act ? (4) Whether the State has the power to appoint District Transport Authorities and confer powers of granting or refusing permits upon them ? (5) Whether the State has the power to classify routes into ordinary and rural routes ? (6) Whether the State has the power to delegate the authority to collect bus stand fees to any person, authority or body ? (7) Whether the impugned amendments violate the rights of the existing permit-holders by modifying the conditions for grant of permit ? (8) Whether the restrictions and conditions imposed by the impugned amendments in the rules are unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of the fundamental right to business and statutory rights of the petitioners ? 25. For proper adjudication of the issues involved in these petitions it is necessary to analyze the scheme of the Act with specific reference to the provisions relating to grant of stage carriage permits. 26. 25. For proper adjudication of the issues involved in these petitions it is necessary to analyze the scheme of the Act with specific reference to the provisions relating to grant of stage carriage permits. 26. From a careful perusal of the provisions of the Act it is clear that the Act is divided into 14 chapters each dealing with various and separate subjects, for example, Chapter II deals with Licencing of drivers of motor vehicles, Chapter III - deals with Licencing of conductors of stage carriages, Chapter IV -deals with Registration of motor vehicles, Chapter V - deals with Control of transport vehicles, Chapter VI - deals with Special provisions relating to State transport undertakings, Chapter VII deals with the Construction, equipment and maintenance of motor vehicles, Chapter VIII provides for Control of traffic and so on. 27. From a perusal of the scheme of the Act it is also clear that the Act makes specific and separate provisions in each chapter empowering the State Government or the Central Government, as the case may be, to make rules for carrying into effect the provisions of the concerned chapter. For example, section 28 empowers the State Government to make rules for the purposes of Chapter II which relates to licencing of drivers of the motor vehicles, section 38 confers power on the State Government to make rules relating to Chapter III governing licencing of conductors of stage carriages, section 65, confers power on the State Government to make rules to carry out the provisions of Chapter IV relating to registration of motor vehicles, sections 95 and 96 confer power on the State Government to make rules relating to stage carriages and contract carriages and for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of Chapter V relating to control of transport vehicles, section 107 confers power on the State Government to make rules relating to Chapter VI which deals with the special provisions relating to State transport undertakings, section 111 confers power on the State Government to make rules relating to Construction, equipment and maintenance of motor vehicles, as contained in Chapter VII, section 138 empowers the State Government to make rules relating to Chapter VIII dealing with control of traffic and section 176 empowers the State Government to make rules relating to Chapter XII which deals with Claims Tribunals. It is, therefore, apparent that the Act confers powers on the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the objects of various chapters of the Act which practically covers the entire field and all the subjects relating to motor vehicles except those matters which are provided for by the Act itself or are within the rule making powers conferred upon the Central Government by specific provisions of the Act. 28. As far as the provisions relating to grant of stage carriage permits are concerned, the same are contained in Chapter V which consists of sections 66 to 96 and deals with the control of transport vehicles. Section 66 lays down that no vehicle shall be used as transport vehicle in any public place save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted by a competent authority. Section 68 provides for constitution and powers of the transport authorities while section 70 prescribes the form of application for stage carriage permits. Section 71 lays down the procedure for consideration of applications for stage carriage permits by Regional Transport Authorities and also empowers the State to issue directions to the transport authorities to take into consideration matters that may be prescribed by the State Government while considering the applications for grant of stage carriage permits. Section 72 empowers the transport authorities to grant or refuse stage carriage permits and further empowers the Regional Transport Authority to attach any of the conditions enumerated therein subject to any rules that may be framed under the Act. Section 72(2)(xxii) and (xxiv) empowers the Regional Transport Authority to vary any condition or attach further conditions to a stage carriage permit and also empowers it to impose any other conditions which may be prescribed. Sections 73 and 74 are in similar terms as sections 71 and 72 but relate to grant of contract carriage permits. Section 84 prescribes general conditions attaching to all kinds of permits. Section 87 confers power on the Regional Transport Authority to issue temporary permits for limited periods not exceeding four months. Section 95 empowers the State Government to make rules to regulate stage carriages and contract carriages and the conduct of passengers in such vehicles. Section 84 prescribes general conditions attaching to all kinds of permits. Section 87 confers power on the Regional Transport Authority to issue temporary permits for limited periods not exceeding four months. Section 95 empowers the State Government to make rules to regulate stage carriages and contract carriages and the conduct of passengers in such vehicles. Section 96 empowers the State Government to make rules for the purposes of Chapter V relating to control of transport vehicles and as it is relevant for the purposes of adjudicating the issues raised herein, the same is reproduced below for ready reference: - “96. Power of State Government to make rules for the purposes of this Chapter. - (1) A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter. Power of State Government to make rules for the purposes of this Chapter. - (1) A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, rules under this section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters, namely:- (i) the period of appointment and the terms of appointment of and the conduct of business by Regional and State Transport Authorities and the reports to be furnished by them; (ii) the conduct of business by any such authority in the absence of any member (including the Chairman) thereof and the nature of business which, the circumstances under which and the manner in which, business could be so conducted; (iii) the conduct and hearing of appeals that may be preferred under this Chapter, the fees to be paid in respect of such appeals and the refund of such fees; (iv) the forms to be used for the purposes of this Chapter, including the forms of permits; (v) the issue of copies of permits in place of permits lost, destroyed or mutilated; (vi) the documents, plates and marks to be carried by transport vehicles, the manner in which they are to be carried and the languages in which any such documents are to be expressed; (vii) the fees to be paid in respect of applications for permits duplicate permits and plates; (viii) the exemption of prescribed persons or prescribed classes of persons from payment of all or any or any portion of the fees payable under this Chapter; (ix) the custody, production and cancellation on revocation or expiration of permits, and the return of permits which have been cancelled; (x) the conditions subject to which, and the extent to which, a permit granted in another State shall be valid in the State without counter signature; (xi) the conditions subject to which, and the extent to which, a permit granted in one region shall be valid in another region within the State without counter signature; (xii) the conditions to be attached to permits for the purpose of giving effect to any agreement such as is referred to in clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 67; (xiii) the authorities to whom, the time within which and the manner in which appeals maybe made; (xiv) the construction and fittings of, and the equipment to be carried by, stage and contract Carriage, whether generally or in specified areas; (xv) the determination of the number of passengers a stage or contract carriage is adapted to carry and the number which may be carried; (xvi) the conditions 'Subject to which goods may be carried on stage and contract carriages partly or wholly in lieu of passengers; (xvii) the safe custody and disposal of property left in a stage or contract carriage; (xviii) regulating the painting or marking of transport vehicles and the display of advertising matter thereon, and in particular prohibiting the painting or marking of transport vehicles in such colour or manner as to induce any person to believe that the vehicle is used for the transport of mails; (xix) the conveyance in stage or contract carriages of corpses or persons suffering from any infectious or contagious disease or goods likely to cause discomfort or injury to passengers and the inspection and disinfection of such carriage; if used for such purposes; (xx) the provision of taxi meters on motor cabs requiring approval or standard types of taxi meters to be used and examining, testing and sealing taxi meters; (xxi) prohibiting the picking up or setting down of passengers by stage or contract carriages at specified places or in specified areas or at places other than duly notified stands or halting places and requiring the driver of a stage carriage to stop and remain stationary for a reasonable time when so required by a passenger desiring to board or alight from the vehicle at a notified halting place; (xxii) the requirements which shall be complied with in the construction or use of any duly notified stand or halting place, including the provision of adequate equipment and facilities for the convenience of all users thereof; the fees, if any, which may be charged for the use of such facilities, the records which shall be maintained at such stands or places, the staff to be employed thereat, and the duties and conduct of such staff, and generally for maintaining such stands and places in a serviceable and clean condition; (xxiii) the regulation of motor cab ranks; (xxiv) requiring the owners of transport vehicles to notify any change of address or to report the failure of or damage to any vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers for hire or reward; (xxv) authorising specified persons to enter at all reasonable times and inspect all premises used by permit holders for the purposes of their business; (xxvi) requiring the person in charge of a stage carriage to carry any person tendering the legal or customary fare; (xxvii) the conditions under which and the types of containers or vehicles in which animals or birds may be carried and the seasons during which animals or birds may or may not be carried; (xxviii) the licensing of and the regulation of the conduct of agents or canvassers who engage in the sale of tickets for travel by public service vehicles or otherwise solicit custom for such vehicles; (xxix) the licensing of agents engaged in the business of collecting for forwarding and distributing goods carried by goods carriages; (xxx) the inspection of transport vehicles and their contents and of the permits relating to them; (xxxi) the carriage of persons other than the driver in goods carnages; (xxxii) the records to be maintained and the returns to be furnished by the owners of transport vehicles; and (xxxiii) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed.” 29. A perusal of the aforesaid section makes it clear that while sub-section (1) generally confers powers on the State Government to make rules for carrying into the effect of the provisions of the Chapter, sub-section (2) enumerates certain matters in respect of which rules may be made without prejudice to the general rule making powers conferred by sub-section (1). A perusal of section 96(2)(xiv) and (xv) indicates that the State has the power to make rules relating to construction and fitting of and the equipment to be carried by stage and contract carriages and to determine the number of passengers a stage or contract carriage is adapted to carry and the number which may be carried. Section 96(2)(xxxiii) is a residuary clause which confers powers on the State Government to make rules in respect of any other matter which is to be and may be prescribed. 30. The State Government in exercise of powers conferred by sections 28, 38, 65, 95, 96, 107, 111, 138, 159, 176, 211 and 213 of the Act has framed rules after previous publication which are known as the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994. Rule 77 provides that in addition to the conditions prescribed in section 72(2) of the Act, the transport authorities may attach additional conditions while granting stage carriage permits which are enumerated in Rule 77. By the impugned amendments in Rule 77 of M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 dated 24-11-2010 by inserting Rule 77(1 a) therein further additional conditions have been prescribed to ensure safe, secure and convenient transport services to the passengers. Rule 77 as it stood prior to the impugned amendment was in the following terms:- “77. Additional conditions in respect of certain permits. - (1) In addition to the conditions prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 72, the Regional Transport Authority or State Transport Authority granting a stage carriage permit may attach any of the following conditions, namely:- (i) that the permit holder, shall not use the stage carnage in a public place for the purpose of carrying or intending to carry passengers unless it carries in addition to the driver, a conductor who holds an effective conductor's licence issued under Chapter III of the Act. (ii) that there shall be exhibited on the vehicle adequate particulars indicating to the public the place to which and the route by which the vehicle is proceeding. (ii) that there shall be exhibited on the vehicle adequate particulars indicating to the public the place to which and the route by which the vehicle is proceeding. (iii) that the service shall be regularly operated on the specified route in accordance with the approved time table except - (a) when prevented by accident, unmotorability of the route, of any unavoidable cause; and (b) when otherwise authorised in writing by the Regional Transport Authority. (2) A permit in respect of a public service vehicle may be subject to the conditions that its holder shall make provision on such vehicle for the conveyance of a reasonable quantity of passenger's luggage with efficient means for securing it and protecting it against rain. (3) A permit in respect of a goods carriage may be subject to one or more of the following conditions:- (i) that the vehicle shall not be used for the conveyance of any class or description of goods in contravention of any law or any rule or order made thereunder prohibiting or regulating the import, export, or transport of such goods. (ii) that the number of persons to be carried in the vehicle shall not exceed the number which may be specified in the permit. (iii) that no goods shall be picked up or set down between any two points lying wholly within the countersigning State. (4) It shall be a condition of every permit that taxes shall be paid in respect of the vehicle in accordance with the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Yan Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1991 (No. 25 of 1991) and the rules made thereunder. When the Transport Authority has suspended a permit for non-payment of tax the order of suspension shall be in force as long as the tax remains unpaid and shall become inoperative immediately on payment of the tax due on the vehicle.” 31. When the Transport Authority has suspended a permit for non-payment of tax the order of suspension shall be in force as long as the tax remains unpaid and shall become inoperative immediately on payment of the tax due on the vehicle.” 31. By way of the impugned amendment dated 24-11-2010 the State has inserted a new Rule 77(1a) in the Rules of 1994 which is to the following effect:- “(1a) In order to ensure safe, secure and convenient transport services to the passengers, the permit granting authority while granting a stage carriage permit shall abide the following conditions, namely:- (i) that no stage carriage permit shall be granted on inter-State route to a vehicle which has completed 10 years from the manufacture year; (ii) that no stage carriage permit shall be granted for ordinary route within the State to a vehicle which has completed 13 years from the year of manufacture; (iii) that no stage carriage permit shall be granted for any route to the vehicle which has completed 20 years from the year of manufacture; (iv) that for long distance route of 150 Kms. or above in a single trip the following category of vehicles with seating capacity shown against each shall be permitted to ply- 1. Deluxe/Air - not less than 35+2 seats excluding conditioned bus driver and conductor. 2. Express bus - not less than seats 45+2 excluding driver and conductor. 3. Ordinary bus - not less than 50+2 seats excluding driver and conductor.” 32. To properly appreciate the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned amendments in the rules are beyond the powers conferred by section 96 of the Act as the power to restrict the grant of stage carriage permits to vehicles of a particular seating capacity in a long route of over 150 K.Ms, and prescribing the restriction regarding year of manufacture is beyond the powers conferred as there is no specific enumeration in that respect in various clauses of section 96(2), it is necessary to analyze the provisions of section 96. 33. 33. It is noteworthy that Chapter V makes provisions relating to the control of “transport vehicles” which words have been defined under section 2(47) of the Act to mean “a public service vehicle, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a private service vehicle” and covers the entire field relating to the grant of permits in respect of the transport vehicles including stage carriages and contract carriages, the powers and the authority to refuse or grant permits, the conditions subject to which the permits shall be granted and also empowers the State Government to “prescribe” the conditions subject to which permits may be granted and to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the purposes of Chapter V. 34. It is luminously clear from a perusal of section 96(1) that it confers powers upon the State Government in broad and wide terms to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter V which governs the field relating to control of transport vehicles and includes the provisions relating to grant and refusal of permits as well as imposition of conditions subject to which permits can be granted. Section 96(2) starts with the words “without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power” and thereafter goes on to provide that the rules under this section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters which are enumerated in section 96(2)(i) to (xxxiii). It is, therefore, clear that while the State Government has been conferred with general and wide power to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter V relating to control of transport vehicles, section 96(2) without restricting this general rule making -power conferred on the State enumerates certain matters in respect of which rules may be made. It is further clear that in view of the specific words used in the section the general rule making power conferred under section 96(1) cannot be confined or restricted only to the illustrations given in section 96(2) in respect of the matters enumerated therein. This interpretation of the section is further strengthened from a perusal of section 96(2)(xxxiii) which in an open ended manner prescribes and provides that the rules under the section may be made in respect of any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed. 35. This interpretation of the section is further strengthened from a perusal of section 96(2)(xxxiii) which in an open ended manner prescribes and provides that the rules under the section may be made in respect of any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed. 35. When the general rule making power conferred by section 96(1) is read in juxtaposition with the words “without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power” mentioned in section 96(2) and the provisions of section 96(2)(xxxiii), it becomes abundantly clear that the State has been conferred with wide and general powers to make rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter V and the matters mentioned in section 96(2) are only by way of illustrations and do not in any way restrict or confine the general and wide rule making power conferred upon the State and, therefore, the only limitation, if any, on this power is that the rules should be framed for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of Chapter V which relates to control of transport vehicles. 36. At this stage to further appreciate the scope and ambit and the field of operation of Chapter V of the Act it is necessary to take into consideration various provisions of Chapter V. Section 67 of the Act gives power to the State to issue notifications to the transport authorities having regard to the advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by the development of motor transport, the desirability of preventing the deterioration of the road system and the desirability of preventing uneconomic competition among holders of permits. Section 72(2) of the Act provides that a stage carriage permit may be granted by the concerned authority to a stage carriage of “specified description” and that “subject to the rules framed under the Act” the authority may attach such conditions to the permit which relate to the use of the vehicle only in specified area or on a “specified route or routes” and the minimum and maximum number of daily trips in relation to the route and, therefore, it is clear that the powers conferred upon the Transport Authority to grant a stage carriage permit is wide but is “subject to” any rules framed under “the Act” and not just to rules framed under Chapter V. It is also clear from a plain reading of section 72(2)(xxiv) that it specifically empowers the authority to impose any other conditions which may be “prescribed”. 37. We, therefore, have no doubt in our minds that general rule making power relating to all aspects connected with the control of transport vehicle has been conferred upon the State Government under section 96 of the Act including the power to specify and prescribe the conditions subject to which stage carriage permits and contract carriage permits can be granted and that such conditions may relate to matters regarding long routes, seating capacity, safety security and comfort of passengers as well as conditions of the roads and traffic conditions which are all matters that are intricately related to transport vehicles and, therefore, it cannot, by any stretch pf interpretation of the provisions, be held that the impugned rules are ultra vires the rule making powers conferred upon the State. 38. Quite apart from the above it is also pertinent to take note of the fact that a bare perusal of section 72 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the grant of stage carriage permits under section 72 is subject to the rules framed under “the Act” and not just subject to the rules framed under section 96 or under Chapter V and that the Act confers power on the State to make rules in respect of various matters provided in different chapters of the Act relating to motor vehicles, traffic and transport under sections 28, 38, 65, 95, 96, 107, 111, 138, 159, 176, 211 and 213 of the Act. In fact, a perusal of Chapter V as well as the other chapters under which rule making power has been conferred upon the State along with the statement of objects and reasons of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 makes it clear that the Act confers power upon the State to frame rules keeping in mind the fast increasing number of commercial vehicles and personal vehicles in the country to ensure greater flow of passengers with least impediments and for making adequate provisions dealing with passenger and road safety standards and pollution control measures etc. and that the State in exercise of powers under all the above sections has framed the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 as is clear from a mere perusal of the notification of 1994 notifying the rules. A perusal of the provisions of Chapter V, along with the other inter-related chapters of the Act, therefore, makes it further clear that the State has been conferred with wide rowers to frame rules to specify conditions for the grant of stage carriage and contract carriage permits keeping in mind safety and security of the passengers as well as prevention of pollution, to prevent deterioration of road conditions and to regulate traffic conditions and, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the rules framed by the State are not beyond or ultra vires the powers conferred on the State Government by the provisions of section 96 of the Act and other provisions of the Act conferring rule making powers on the State. 39. 39. At this stage, we may profitably refer to the case of Ajay Canu v. Union of India and others, (1988) 4 SCC 156 wherein the Supreme Court, while dealing with the challenge to the validity of Rule 498-A of Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964, framed by the State of Andhra Pradesh making it compulsory for persons driving a motor cycle or a scooter in a public place to wear crash helmets on the ground that it was beyond the general rule making powers conferred by section 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which corresponds to section 138 of the Act, held that even if the matter in respect of which a rule is made, is not specifically mentioned in the illustrations mentioned in sub-section (2), the rule can be framed in exercise of the general rule making power conferred by sub-section (1) of the old section 91 in the following terms:- “12. It is submitted by the learned Attorney General that even assuming that Rule 498-A does not come within the purview of clause (i) of subsection (2) of section 91, still the State Government could frame such a rule under sub-section (1) of section 91. The learned Attorney General submits that the clauses under sub-section (2) of section 91 are only illustrative and not exhaustive and the power is really under sub-section (1). In support of his contention, he has referred to a decision of this Court in Om Prakash and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1971 SC 771 where it has been observed by this Court that it is a well-established proposition of law that where specific power is conferred without prejudice to the generality of the general power already specified, the particular power is only illustrative and does not in any way restrict the general power. In the instant case also, the general power is in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) contains illustrations and does not, in any way, restrict the general power under sub-section (1). Thus, even assuming that Rule 498- A is not covered by clause (i) of subsection (2), it is quite immaterial inasmuch as such a rule can be framed in exercise of the general power under sub-section (1) for the purpose of carrying into effect Chapter VI relating to control of traffic. Thus, even assuming that Rule 498- A is not covered by clause (i) of subsection (2), it is quite immaterial inasmuch as such a rule can be framed in exercise of the general power under sub-section (1) for the purpose of carrying into effect Chapter VI relating to control of traffic. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of the petitioner that Rule 498-A is ultra vires the provisions of the Act.” 40. In the case of Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji and others, AIR (32) 1945 Privy Council 156 while dealing with a similar issue relating to interpretation of section 2 of Defence of India (Amendment) Act 1940 which conferred general rule making powers on the Central Government by sub-section (1) and thereafter gave certain illustrations in sub-section (2) “without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)” the Privy Council was pleased to observe that:- “The material portions of section 2, Defence of India Act, 1939 (Act 35 of 1939), as amended by section 2, Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 1940 (Act 19 of 1940) are as follows: - “2. (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such rules as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), the rules may provide for or may empower any authority to make orders providing for, all or any of the following matters, namely:- ***** ***** ***** ***** ***** ***** ***** ***** ***** *****.***** ***** Their Lordships are unable to agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court on his statement of the relative positions of subsections (1) and (2) of section 2, Defence of India Act, and counsel for the respondents in the present appeal was unable to support that statement, or to maintain that Rule 26 was invalid. In the opinion of their Lordships, the function of sub-section (2) is merely an illustrative one; the rule-making power is, conferred by sub-section (1), and “the rules” which are referred to in the opening sentence of sub-section (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and made under, sub-section (1); the provisions of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub-section (1), as indeed is expressly stated by the words “without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1).” There can be no doubt-as the, learned Judge himself appears to have thought-that the general language of sub-section (1) amply justifies the terms of Rule 26, and avoids any of the criticisms which the learned Judge expressed in relation to sub-section (2).” 41. Again relying upon the judgment in the case of Sibnath Banerjee (supra) a similar view was taken by the Supreme Court while interpreting section 298 (1) and (2) of the U. P. Municipalities Act in the case of Afyal Ullah v. State of M.P. and another, AIR 1964 SC 264 in paragraph 13 in the following terms:- “(13) Even if the said clauses did not justify the impugned bye-law, there can be little doubt that the said bye-laws would be justified by the general power conferred on the Boards by section 298(1). It is now well-settled that the specific provisions such as are contained in the several clauses of section 298(2) are merely illustrative and they cannot be read as restrictive of the generality of powers prescribed by section 298(1) vide Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, AIR 1945 PC 156 . If the powers specified by section 298 (1) are very wide and they take in within their scope bye-laws like the ones with which we are concerned in the present appeal, it cannot be said that the powers enumerated under section 298(2) control the general words used by section 298(1). These latter clauses merely illustrate and do not exhaust all the powers conferred on the Board, so that any cases not falling within the powers specified by section 298(2) may well be protected by section 298(1), provided of course, the impugned bye-laws can be justified by reference to the requirements of section 298(1). These latter clauses merely illustrate and do not exhaust all the powers conferred on the Board, so that any cases not falling within the powers specified by section 298(2) may well be protected by section 298(1), provided of course, the impugned bye-laws can be justified by reference to the requirements of section 298(1). There can be no doubt that the impugned bye-laws in regard to the markets framed by respondent No. 2 are for the furtherance of municipal administration under the Act, and so, would attract the provisions of section 298(1). Therefore we are satisfied that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the impugned bye-laws are valid.” 42. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, (1985) 2 SCC 116 while interpreting section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act wherein sub-section (1) conferred general powers while sub-section (2) enumerated certain illustrations without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-section (1) in paragraph 11 in the following terms:- “11. Learned counsel for the appellant however strenuously contends, that the delegation of powers by the Central Government under section 5 of the Act must necessarily be in relation to 'such matters' and subject to 'such conditions' as may be specified in the notification. The whole attempt on the part of the learned counsel is to confine the scope and ambit of the impugned order to clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act which uses the word 'regulating' and take it out of the purview of sub-section (1) of section 3 which uses the words 'regulating or prohibiting'. That is not a proper way of construction of sub-sections (1), and (2) of section 3 of the Act in their normal setting. The restricted construction of section 3 contended, for by learned counsel for the appellant would render the scheme of the Act wholly unworkable. As already indicated, the source of power to make an order of this, description is sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act and sub-section (2) merely provides illustration for the general powers conferred by subsection (1). Sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act commences with the words “Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)”. Sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act commences with the words “Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)”. It is manifest that sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act confers no fresh powers but is merely illustrative of the general powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 without exhausting the subjects in relation to which such powers can be exercised.” 43. Recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated the law in the case of Ishwar Nagar Co-operative Housing Building Society v. Parma Nand Sharma and others, AIR 2011 SC 548 while interpreting the provisions of section 97(1) and (2) of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act 1973 it paragraphs 10 and 11 of the aforesaid judgment. 44. In view of the aforesaid reasonings given by us, the interpretation of section 96 and other provisions of the Act made hereinabove and the aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court we are also of the considered opinion that the reliance placed by the petitioners on the Supreme Court judgments in support of their submissions that the impugned rules are beyond the rule making powers conferred upon the State; namely Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 , Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice and others v. Bar Council of India and another, (1995) 1 SCC 732 , Kunj Behari Lal Butail and others v. State of H.P. and others, (2000) 3 SCC 40 and Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State of Kerala and others, (2006) 4 SCC 327 is misconceived as the provisions of law interpreted therein were different and, therefore, have no applicability to the issues involved in the present petitions wherein the provisions of the Act specifically confer powers upon the State Government to frame the impugned rules. 45. The petitioners have next assailed the validity of the amendment made by insertion of Rule 77(1a)(iv) on the ground that the said amendment is beyond the powers or authority conferred by the Act, is not based or founded on reasons and amounts to blacklisting of operators having transport vehicles with less than 50 + 2 seating capacity by one stroke. The petitioners have next assailed the validity of the amendment made by insertion of Rule 77(1a)(iv) on the ground that the said amendment is beyond the powers or authority conferred by the Act, is not based or founded on reasons and amounts to blacklisting of operators having transport vehicles with less than 50 + 2 seating capacity by one stroke. It is alleged that it places unreasonable restriction on the right and freedom of trade and commerce of the petitioners and also deprives the passengers from travelling in different type of vehicles of their choice and is contrary to section 72(2) of the Act which only empowers imposition of restrictions relating to maximum seating capacity and not minimum seating capacity. It is further alleged that it is opposed to the liberalized permit policy under the new Act and renders existing permits duly granted under the provisions of the Act redundant even though the permits were granted for periods beyond the date of enforcement of the impugned notification. 46. From a perusal of the opening words of the newly inserted Rule 77(1 a) it is manifest that the aforesaid rule providing for the restrictions on the seating capacity in respect of routes beyond 150 kms. has been incorporated in order to ensure secure and convenient transport services to the passengers. From a perusal of Clause (iv) of Rule 77(1 a) it is further clear that the condition imposed by the aforesaid rule for grant of stage carriage permits in respect of an ordinary bus with which we are concerned in the present petitions, is that it must have a seating capacity of not less than 50 + 2 seats excluding driver and conductor in case a person applies for stage carriage permit for a long distance route of 150 kms. or above in a single trip. As pointed out by the counsel appearing for the parties, Rule 158 gives specific measurements regarding construction of seats and space in respect of each passenger and, therefore, the natural consequence of imposition of the impugned conditions in the rule is that stage carriage permits for long route of more than 150 kms. in a single trip in respect of ordinary buses can only be granted to buses of large size and wheel base. in a single trip in respect of ordinary buses can only be granted to buses of large size and wheel base. Apparently, it goes without saying that if long distance passengers are given the facility of travelling in larger buses, it would ensure safe, secure and convenient transport services to the passengers. 47. Quite apart from the above as an immediate effect of the aforesaid condition each bus would carry larger number of passengers in one trip and consequently less number of buses would be required to ply on long routes for transporting the same number of passengers thereby reducing traffic on these long routes which would automatically reduce the possibility of road accidents and also cause less damage to the roads reducing their wear and tear and, therefore, we have no doubt in our minds that the object of insertion of the aforesaid rule is to provide safe, secure and convenient transport services to the passengers. We are also of the considered opinion that the impugned rule is within the rule making power conferred upon the State, is reasonable and is in consonance with the object sought to be achieved and is, therefore, constitutionally valid. 48. As pointed out by the learned Advocate General the Supreme Court in the case of State of Mysore and another v. K.G. Jagannath, AIR 1973 SC 2165 while dealing with the constitutional validity of a rule fixing the minimum seating capacity to be provided in a bus by the State of Mysore held the same to be valid and having the support of the statutory provisions of section 70 of the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (corresponding to section 111 of the Act) and went on further to hold that the fixing of the minimum number of seats can be provided by the State and that, essentially such a requirement is in the interest of the general travelling public in the following terms: - “9. The validity of the Rule at present has to be considered not merely from the point of view of the effect it has on a particular individual like the respondent. It has to be looked at from the point of view of the generality of the motor vehicles operators as well as the public. The validity of the Rule at present has to be considered not merely from the point of view of the effect it has on a particular individual like the respondent. It has to be looked at from the point of view of the generality of the motor vehicles operators as well as the public. We have shown above that the vehicles with the minimum capacity available in this country can carry 35 passengers and if, as is alleged by the respondent, the average number of passengers in buses over this route is only 25, the proper thing to do in due course is to reduce the number of vehicles plying on this route. Otherwise, it would mean unnecessary waste of valuable transport space and facility. Buses so released could be used elsewhere to much greater advantage to the travelling public. There are many areas and many routes crying for transport facilities and they would be better served. We are unable to place any weight on the basis of an argument which affects one or two individuals, where by insisting upon this provision of a minimum seating capacity the larger public interest will be served. If it causes some inconvenience to a few individuals like the respondent they have got to face the situation. It appears from the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner (respondent herein) that he has got four buses running between Doddaballapur and Tumkur. If it is found that the average number of passengers is only 25, the proper thing to do would be for him to cut down his buses on this route from four to three. In that case there can be no question of his suffering any losses or his being affected in any way in the matter of his carrying on his business. 10. Though it is not in evidence it may be presumed that the cost of operation of a bus whether it is provided with 30 or 40 seats may not be very much different and there will be the additional facility available to the public, if the bus has more seats. Moreover, as traffic grows, as it has a tendency to grow everywhere, the public will be better served. We, are unable to accept the contention that the rule providing for minimum number of seats is intended to secure more revenue indirectly. Moreover, as traffic grows, as it has a tendency to grow everywhere, the public will be better served. We, are unable to accept the contention that the rule providing for minimum number of seats is intended to secure more revenue indirectly. The State can do it directly by increasing the rate of tax. It is really a rule intended for the benefit of the travelling public. We see no reason not to accept the statement made on behalf of the State that the passenger traffic on every route in the State has increased by leaps and bounds, that generally it was found that the stage carriage operators were carrying passengers in excess of the seating capacity specified in the Registration Certificate and the permit to the serious inconvenience and discomfort of the travelling public in addition to causing loss of revenue to the State, and it was with a view to eliminate the above evils that the impugned Rule has been framed. 11. We are unable to agree with the High Court that as usually there are only regulations regarding the maximum number of seats, any regulation regarding the minimum number of seats being very uncommon has to be specially defended. We have shown above that the regulation is really in the interest of the general travelling public. Nor are we able to agree with the High Court that the State has not taken into account the prevailing conditions in the country with regard to the manufacture and availability of bus chassis. The minimum number of seats insisted upon depends upon the chassis. In this very case itself as we have seen the respondent really wants to provide 30 seats in the chassis which can provide 40 seats. It is not necessary to say anything regarding the luxury buses which were considered by the High Court because that matter was not argued before us. Apparently the State has decided to make the necessary provision in this regard. Stage carriage operators exclusively in cities and towns form a class by themselves and the exemption in their case has a direct relation to the objective sought to be achieved. There is no question here of any arbitrary or excessive invasion of the respondent's rights. The Rule is one of general applications which can be justified as being in the interest of the general travelling public. 12. There is no question here of any arbitrary or excessive invasion of the respondent's rights. The Rule is one of general applications which can be justified as being in the interest of the general travelling public. 12. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order of the Mysore High Court is set aside. The respondent will pay the appellants' costs.” 49. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Uma Devi Sharma v. State of M.P. and ors., AIR 2008 M.P. 110 , while upholding the constitutional validity of Rule 158 of the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 providing for minimum seating capacity, by relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Mysore v. K.G. Jagannath (supra) also repelled the challenge to the validity of the said rule based on Article 39(a) in the following terms: - “17. We would be failing in our duty if we do not note a submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners. We have taken note of the said submission as the learned counsel for the petitioners endeavoured and laboured hard to drive home the said point. They referred to Article 39(a) to buttress the stand that adequate means of livelihood is affected. It is settled in law that no legislation or delegated legislation can be declared invalid solely on the ground that Directive Principles of State Policy have not been followed or there has been violation of the same unless the requirement under the said Article which is meant for good governance, establishment of a Welfare State, Social and Economic Revolution and such other aspects read in consonance with the fundamental rights are really infringed and further some facet of fundamental rights are played foul with. Discrimination solely on the ground of sex, as regards pay despite similar work is impermissible-being irrational but one cannot be oblivious of the fact that it is also a part of the fundamental rights. But once no facet of fundamental right is abridged, the challenge exclusively on the ground of non-following the provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution would make a statutory provision or a rule ultra vires is devoid of merit. A piece of legislation may meet the requirement of Directive Principles of State Policy from many aspects and that may sustain the validity of the same, but, the converse is totally unacceptable. A piece of legislation may meet the requirement of Directive Principles of State Policy from many aspects and that may sustain the validity of the same, but, the converse is totally unacceptable. We may only add that the submission has been noted only to be dealt with, and rejected.” In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of K.G. Jagannath (supra) and the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra) read along with the provisions of section 96 of the Act we are of the considered opinion that the State is well within its powers to prescribe the minimum seating capacity as a condition for granting permits and, therefore, the impugned rule is neither invalid or unconstitutional and the contentions of the petitioners in this respect are hereby rejected. 50. We also do not find any force in the submissions and contentions of the petitioners that the impugned rules shall create monopoly in large bus operators and shall also result in the closing down of the transport business of the petitioners as they would be unable to-ply their vehicles which would be rendered useless, for the simple reason that-the contentions are factually and logically misconceived. There could be large bus operators having a fleet of ordinary buses with the seating capacity of less than 50+2 passengers who would not be able to obtain permits on long routes as a consequence of the impugned amendments and at the same time there could be small bus operators having two buses with seating capacity of more than 50+2 passengers and would be able to apply for and obtain a stage carriage permit on a long route and, therefore, in the absence of any data being placed before this Court by the petitioners their contention as to large and small operators is misconceived. Similarly it is a fallacy to say that the ordinary buses of the petitioners having seating capacity of less than 50 + 2 passengers would be rendered useless and off the road for the simple reason that the impugned rule does not prohibit the petitioners to apply for permits in respect of the aforesaid vehicles for routes of less than 150 kms. in a single trip or for using their vehicles for any other purpose. in a single trip or for using their vehicles for any other purpose. The rule only restricts and imposes the reasonable condition of granting stage carriage permits of long routes over 150 kms. to larger buses having higher seating capacity with a view to ensure safe, secure and convenient transport service as well as for preventing accidents and traffic hazards and for the protection of road conditions. 51. We are also of the considered opinion that the reliance placed by the petitioners on the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Mithilesh Garg etc. v. Union of India and others, etc., AIR 1992 SC 443 is also misplaced as it does not render any assistance to the petitioners in this case. In fact a perusal of paragraphs 12 and 15 of the aforesaid judgment makes it abundantly clear that the challenge therein on similar ground regarding ouster of small operators was negatived by holding that this cannot be a ground of challenge. Therefore, we do not find any force in the aforesaid submissions. 52. We now proceed to decide the issue as to whether prescription to the age of the vehicle for the purposes of grant of stage carriage permit by the impugned rules is directly in contravention of the provisions of section 59 of the Act which confers this power exclusively on the Central Government. The fallacy in the aforesaid arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners becomes apparent when we read the provisions of sections 59 and 96 in their proper perspective. Section 59 is part of Chapter TV of the Act which deals with the field of registration of the motor vehicle and provides that the Central Government having regard to public safety, convenience and objects of this Act, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the “life” of a motor vehicle reckoned from the date of its manufacture, after the expiry of which the motor vehicle shall not be deemed to comply with the requirement of this Act and the rules made thereunder. The object and reasons for inserting section 59 of the Act as stated are to empower the Central Government to specify the “life” of a motor vehicle of any class or type beyond which the vehicle will have to be “kept off the roads” that is to say that it cannot thereafter be permitted to ply on the roads. The object and reasons for inserting section 59 of the Act as stated are to empower the Central Government to specify the “life” of a motor vehicle of any class or type beyond which the vehicle will have to be “kept off the roads” that is to say that it cannot thereafter be permitted to ply on the roads. 53. On the other hand, section 96 of the Act which is part of Chapter V of the Act deals with the field of control of transport vehicles and gives power to the State Government to frame rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter V which includes the power to prescribe conditions by framing rules subject to which stage carriage permits may be granted which is also clear from a perusal of section 72(2) and 72(2)(xxiv) and it is in the exercise of this power under section 96 that the impugned rules have been framed which do not in any manner relate to registration of vehicles nor do they provide that the vehicle shall be taken off the road for all times to come as its road “life” shall come to an end. The rule only prescribes the age of the vehicle beyond which it cannot be permitted to be used as a stage carriage by providing that no stage carriage permit can be granted to a vehicle after it has attained a particular age looking to the safety and convenience of the travelling passengers. It is, therefore, clear that while section 59 confers power on the Central Government to prescribe the “life” of a motor vehicle beyond which the vehicle would have to be kept off the roads, as its registration under Chapter IV shall come to an end or lapse. Section 96 is limited to prescribing conditions for grant of stage carriage permits under which it has the power to prescribe a condition regarding the “age” of the vehicle beyond which it cannot be used as a stage carriage permit with a view to ensure the safety and convenience of the passengers. Section 96 is limited to prescribing conditions for grant of stage carriage permits under which it has the power to prescribe a condition regarding the “age” of the vehicle beyond which it cannot be used as a stage carriage permit with a view to ensure the safety and convenience of the passengers. It goes without saying that even though no stage carriage permit may be granted to a vehicle after a particular age, in view of the impugned rules such a vehicle may and can still be continued to be used by the petitioners for all other purposes subject to any notification issued under section 59. 54. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the impugned rules are within the powers conferred upon the State by the Act and do not overlap or intrude into the powers conferred upon the Central Government by section 59 of the Act. We may with profit note that the High Court of Bombay in the case of Shiv Adhar Yadav v. State of Maharashtra and ors., AIR 2009 NOC 2159 (Bom.) and Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of M/s Balaji Travels v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and another, 2008 (11) MPJR-CG 78 have also taken a similar view. 55. We may with profit also refer to the case of the Supreme Court relied upon by the respondent/State wherein it has been held that imposition of such a condition under section 51 of the old Act of 1939 (corresponding to section 74 of the Act) regarding year of manufacture for the purposes of granting permits was valid and in public interest, in the case of Subhash Chandra and others v. State of U.P. and others, (1980) 2 SCC 324 :- “3. Tersely put, the petitioner is the grantee of permits to ply minibuses as contract carriages and in the grant a condition has been fastened that the vehicle shall not be more than seven years old. Tersely put, the petitioner is the grantee of permits to ply minibuses as contract carriages and in the grant a condition has been fastened that the vehicle shall not be more than seven years old. Condition No. 18, relating to Mini-Buses Contract Carnage Permits, and the source of power, section 51(2)(x) read thus: “That the vehicle covered by the permit shall be not more than four years old counted from the date of registration at any time during the validity of the permit.” “51 (2) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a contract carriage permit, may, 'subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely:- (x) any other conditions which may be prescribed.” 'Four years' have been relaxed to seven years since September 23, 1978, the beneficiaries being the bus owners and the potential victims being the unknown casualties who have no 'poor lobby power. The State must remember that it has responsibilities not merely to mini-bus owners, but also to avoid the daily tragedies on the Indian high ways under the lethal wheels of these whirling carriages. Section 51(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is geared to public safety, not private profit and casts a solemn duty not to be deterred by any pressure except the pressure of social justice to Indian lives moving in buses, walking on roads or even standing on margins. If the top killer-road accident-is to be awarded death sentence, section 51 and like provisions must receive severe enforcement. In this spirit-although backtracking from 4-year old models to 7-year old models-the State imposed condition 18. This was challenged artfully but unsuccessfully before the High Court and is attacked before us as ultra vires section 51(2) of the Act. We will examine briefly the submission to reach the conclusion that mere lexical legalism cannot sterilise the sensible humanism writ large on section 51(2)(x). If Indian life is not ultra vires Indian law every condition to save life and limb is intra vires such salvationary provision. This perspective of social justice simplifies the problem and upholds the High Court. 4. Section 51(2)(x) authorises the impost of any condition, of course, having a nexus with the statutory purpose. It is undeniable that human safety is one such purpose. This perspective of social justice simplifies the problem and upholds the High Court. 4. Section 51(2)(x) authorises the impost of any condition, of course, having a nexus with the statutory purpose. It is undeniable that human safety is one such purpose. The State's neglect in this area of policing public transport is deplorable but when it does act by prescribing a condition the Court cannot be persuaded into little legalism and harmful negativism. The short question is whether the prescription that the bus shall be at least a seven-year old model one is relevant to the condition of the vehicle and its passenger's comparative safety and comfort on our chaotic highways. Obviously, it is. The older the model the less the chances of the latest safety measures being built into the vehicle. Every new model incorporates new devices to reduce danger and promote comfort. Every new model assures its age to be young, fresh and strong, less likely to suffer sudden failures and breakages, less susceptible to wear and tear and mental fatigue leading to unexpected collapse. When we buy a car or any other machine why do we look for the latest model ? Vintage vehicles are good for centenarian display of curios and cannot but be mobile menaces on our notoriously neglected highways. We have no hesitation to hold, from the point of view of the human rights of road users, that the condition regarding the model of the permitted bus is within jurisdiction, and not to prescribe such safety clauses is abdication of statutory duty. 5. Two decisions-Masi Ullah v. State Tribunal Appellate, AIR 1967 All. 128 and In re: Ramesh Chandra Tewari etc., Civil Misc. Writ No. 7317 of 1975 of Allahabad High Court (unreported) were cited as striking a contrary note. The first deals with section 48(3) of the Act and prescription of the model or year of the make was held ultra vires because, lexically read, it was held that the expression 'specified description' in section 48(3) did not cover, according to dictionaries, the year of manufacture of the vehicle. We extract Black's Law Dictionary on 'description' to show how the model of a vehicle is obviously a facet of its description. 'Description' means: (Black's Law Dictionary-page 532) A delineation or account of a particular subject by the recital of its characteristic accidents and qualities. We extract Black's Law Dictionary on 'description' to show how the model of a vehicle is obviously a facet of its description. 'Description' means: (Black's Law Dictionary-page 532) A delineation or account of a particular subject by the recital of its characteristic accidents and qualities. So, dictionary versus dictionary leaves the matter at large, apart from the plain function of the Court to gather the meaning, not under the dictatorship of dictionaries but guided by the statutory purpose without being deflected by logomachic exercises, the mischief to be countered and the public interest to be advanced. We are clear that a later model is a better safeguard and, more relevantly to the point, the year of the make and the particulars of the model are part of the description. 6. The unreported ruling in Civil Writ No. 7317 of 1975 interprets section 38 of the Act and the non-issuance of the fitness certificate because the model was not recent enough. May be the vehicle, regardless of the year of its make, may befit and the refusal to certify fitness merely because it is old may not always be right. But we see no conflict between a vehicle being fit to ride and the condition, as an additional requirement and safety factor, in the shape of the year of the model. This is an extra measure, a further insurance against machine failure and cannot contradict the 'fitness' provision.” 56. In the case of Sheelchand and Co. v. State Transport Appellate Authority Gwalior and another, 1964 MPLJ 311 = AIR 1964 M.P. & a Division Bench of this Court has gone on to hold that even the Regional Transport Authority in exercise of powers under section 48(3) of the Act of 1939 (which corresponds to section 72 of the Act) can impose a condition regarding year of manufacture while granting stage carriage permits and that such a condition is to ensure reliability and safety of the services and the safety of the travelling public and has also held that the provisions of the Act which permit the authorities to issue permits with certain conditions are in fact meant for the benefit of the general public and not meant for the benefit and protection of permit holders. We fully agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case. 57. We fully agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case. 57. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the impugned condition regarding age prescribed by the State Government by framing the impugned rules is not beyond the rule making power conferred upon the State and is also not in contravention of the provisions of section 59 of the Act and that the State has the power to prescribe such a condition for the purposes of granting stage carriage permits and that such a condition is for the safety of the travelling passengers and the public at large, and in public interest as has been held by the Supreme Court and, therefore, the contention to the contrary of the petitioners deserves to be and is hereby rejected. 58. It is contended by the petitioners that the petitioners have obtained permits under the provisions of the Act in respect of buses having seating capacity of less than 50 + 2 passengers for long routes exceeding beyond 150 kms. which are still subsisting, however, the impugned rules have rendered the same non est and redundant and have also taken away the rights of the petitioners to obtain permits on the same terms and Conditions. 59. We do not find any force or substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners firstly, for the reason that practically all the petitioners are holders of temporary permits period of existence of which has already come to an end and, therefore, the issue raised by them does not arise as far as holders of temporary permits are concerned. That apart, the right claimed by the petitioners is also misconceived for the reasons that the provisions of the Act do not confer any such statutory right on the petitioners. On the contrary, a perusal of the provisions of sections 70, 71 and 96 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the terms and conditions of the permits granted to the petitioners can be changed during the subsistence of the permit. On the contrary, a perusal of the provisions of sections 70, 71 and 96 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the terms and conditions of the permits granted to the petitioners can be changed during the subsistence of the permit. In fact, section 72(xxii) of the Act gives power to the authority to change any condition of the permit during its subsistence and, therefore, the contention of the petitioners that they have an absolute statutory right to operate the stage carriages without any change in the terms and conditions during its subsistence is legally and factually misconceived. The right granted to the petitioners by issuance of stage carriage permits is subject to the provisions of the statute and as the statutory provisions themselves give power to the authority to change or modify the conditions of the permit, no right to the contrary can be claimed by the petitioners and, therefore, the contention of the petitioners is accordingly rejected. 60. That apart, it is stated by the respondents on record that the respondent/State vide notification published in the M.P. Gazette, dated 10-2-2011 has further inserted Rule (1b) after Rule 77(1a) of the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 and provided that the amendments made in Rule 77(1 a) as far as they relate to stage carriages registered before coming into force the said rule shall not be operative for a period of four months from the date of commencement of the said sub-rule i.e. from 24-11-2010. It is, therefore, apparent that the State has given due notice and sufficient time to the petitioners to change their vehicles and to bring them in conformity with the impugned amendments in the rules and, therefore, on that count also no infirmity or illegality can be found in the aforesaid amendments in the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rule, 1994. We may with profit note that such changes during subsistence and at the time of renewal of the permits were upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of K.G. Jagannath (supra) and the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra) wherein a provision Rule 158(4) which is in similar terms as Rule 77(1b) was also inserted along with the amendment postponing the date of operation of the amendments made in rule 158 by four months, although the issue raised by the petitioners herein was not directly addressed or decided. In view of the aforesaid we find no merit in the contentions and submissions of the petitioners. -- 61. The next issue raised by the petitioners relates to the power of the State Government to appoint District Transport Authorities and to confer powers of granting or refusing permits upon them. 62. To properly appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners it is appropriate to take into consideration the provisions of section 68 of the Act which confers power on the State Government to constitute Regional Transport Authorities and at the same time section 68(5) which in the following terms, provides for delegation of, powers by the transport authorities to any authorities or persons for convenient despatch of business if authorised in this behalf by rules made under section 96: - “68(5) The State Transport Authority and any Regional Transport Authority, if authorised in this behalf by rules made under section 96, may delegate such of its powers and functions to such authority or person subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the said rules.” 63. From a perusal of the aforesaid provisions of law it is clear that the transport authorities are authorised to delegate the powers conferred upon them by Chapter V of the Act to such authority or person authorised in this behalf by rules made under section 96 subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the rules and the State Government in exercise of this rule making power under section 96, has provided under Rule 64(1) of the M.P. Rules 1994 that the Regional Transport Authority may apart from others also have an Assistant Secretary not below the rank of the Assistant Regional Transport Authority as may be nominated by the Chairman. Regional -Transport Authority. Rule 67 of the Rules of 1994 framed under section 96 provides for delegation of powers by the Regional Transport Authority and states in no uncertain term that a Regional Transport Authority may by resolution delegate to various authorities including the Assistant Secretary of the Authority any of the powers enumerated therein subject to restrictions and limitations prescribed. 64. Rule 67 of the Rules of 1994 framed under section 96 provides for delegation of powers by the Regional Transport Authority and states in no uncertain term that a Regional Transport Authority may by resolution delegate to various authorities including the Assistant Secretary of the Authority any of the powers enumerated therein subject to restrictions and limitations prescribed. 64. A perusal of the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of 1994 also makes it clear that the delegation of powers by the Regional Transport Authority shall be subject to the direction and prescription issued by it as to the manner in which the powers are to be exercised. It is further clear from a perusal the provisions of various clauses under Rule 67(1) that powers in relation to grant, refuse and renew permits of various kinds have already been permitted to be delegated to various authorities by the Regional Transport Authority. 65. It is further clear that now by the impugned notification the provisions of Rule 64 referred to above have been amended and the “District Transport Officer” has also been prescribed as an Assistant Secretary along with the “Assistant Regional Transport Authority” under sub-rule (1) of Rule 64 and a new clause (a) has been inserted in Rule 67(1) which permits the Regional Transport Authority to delegate powers relating to grant, refuse or renew a stage carriage and contract carriage permit within a district under section 72 and 74 of the Act. 66. 66. When we read the provisions of section 68, specifically section 68(5), which provides for delegation of powers by the Transport Authorities, as authorised by rules under section 96, specifically section 96(1) and section 96(2)(xxxiii) which permits the State to frame rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of Chapter V, it becomes luminously clear that the State has the power to authorise the delegation of powers by the Regional Transport Authorities by framing rules under section 96, to such other authorities as may be prescribed by the rules and in exercise of the, aforesaid powers the State has framed Rule 67 of the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules 1994 and by the impugned amendment has prescribed the District Transport Officer as one of the Authorities to whom the powers of by the Regional Transport Authority can be delegated including the power to grant, refuse or renew a stage carriage or contract carriage permit within a district. 67. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it abundantly clear that the prescription of the District Transport Officer in Rule 64 and the insertion of clause (a) in Rule 67(1) of the Rules regarding grant, refuse or renewal of the stage and contract carriage permit within a district, as made by the impugned notification dated 24-11-2010 in Rules 64 and 67 of the Rules of 1994 is within the power and the authority conferred upon the State under section 68(5) read with section 96 of the Act and, therefore, the contention to the contrary of the petitioners deserves to be and is hereby rejected. 68. For the sake of completeness we also propose to deal with the challenge by the petitioners to the powers of the State to classify routes as well as the classification of routes into ordinary routes and rural routes made by the State by the impugned amendments at this stage itself. By the impugned notification a new rule i.e. 116-A has been inserted in the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 which is in the following terms:- “116-A. Classification of routes in the State of Madhya Pradesh and control of plying vehicles thereon. By the impugned notification a new rule i.e. 116-A has been inserted in the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 which is in the following terms:- “116-A. Classification of routes in the State of Madhya Pradesh and control of plying vehicles thereon. - (1) The routes shall be classified in the following categories: - (i) “ordinary route “ means a route which connects one town or city with another town or city which are either Tahsil headquarter or urban area under the Municipal Corporation, Municipality or Nagar Panchayat. Any part of such route shall also be called “ordinary route”. (ii) “rural route” means a route which connects one village to town with another village or town but does not include portion of ordinary route exceeding 5 km. (2) On “ordinary route” a passenger vehicle having seating capacity of less than 22 seats excluding driver and conductor shall not be permitted to ply. (3) On “rural route” a passenger vehicle having seating capacity of less than 22 seats excluding driver and conductor shall be permitted to ply” 69. Section 70(1)(a) of the Act provides that a person while applying for grant of a stage carriage permit shall give particulars of the route or routes to which the application relates and section 72(2)(i) provides that a stage carriage permit shall be granted subject to the rules made under this Act with a condition that the vehicle shall be used only in a specified area or on a “specified route or routes” and, therefore, it is apparent that stage carriage permits can be granted under section 72 or section 74 as the case may be, for specified routes subject to the rules made under the Act and the State, in exercise of its rule making power under section 96 has classified the routes under Rule 116-A into ordinary routes and rural routes. An “ordinary route” means routes or part thereof which connect one town or city with another town or city which are either Tahsil headquarter or urban areas, and “rural routes” have been specified as routes which connect one village to a town with another village or town but does not include portion of an ordinary route exceeding 5 km. An “ordinary route” means routes or part thereof which connect one town or city with another town or city which are either Tahsil headquarter or urban areas, and “rural routes” have been specified as routes which connect one village to a town with another village or town but does not include portion of an ordinary route exceeding 5 km. Rule 116-A (2) and (3) further prescribes that passenger vehicles having seating capacity of less than 22 seats excluding driver and conductor shall not be permitted to be plied on ordinary routes while vehicle having less than 22 seats' seating capacity excluding driver and conductor shall only be permitted to ply on rural area. 70. If we read the amended provisions of Rules 64, 67 and 116-A in juxtaposition, it becomes apparent that the object behind the impugned amendments is to provide that the rural routes or short routes which connect a village to another village or town within a district have been classified as rural routes and it has further been provided that the authority to grant stage carriage or contract carriage permits for these rural routes within the district may be delegated to the District Transport Officer by the Regional Transport Authority with a condition that only passenger vehicles having seating capacity of less than 22 seats excluding driver and conductor shall be permitted to ply on such rural routes. 71. It is pointed out by the learned Advocate General that by notification dated 26-11-2010, which has been filed as Annexure P-3 in W.P. No. 1212/2011 issued under the provisions of M.P. Motoryan Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1991 the State has also notified much lesser and different rates of tax in respect of vehicles plying on such rural routes with a view to provide cheap transport facilities to persons residing in the rural areas and have also restricted the grant of permits on such rural routes to smaller vehicles having capacity of not more than 22 passengers with a view to prevent deterioration of the condition of rural roads as well as control of transport vehicles keeping in mind the facility, security and convenience of the rural population. 72. 72. In view of the aforesaid analysis we are of the considered opinion that the classification of the routes by the impugned rules is within the power and authority of the State conferred by the provisions of the Act and that the object behind the same is also in the interest of the public at large with specific reference to the public residing in the rural areas and has been made with a view to simplify the permit granting procedure in respect of the rural routes as well as in line the object or providing cheaper and better transport facilities to the rural public. In the circumstances, we hold that the impugned amendment made in Rules 64, 67 and the insertion of new Rule 116 A of the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 does not suffer from any unconstitutionality and the challenge to the same by the petitioners, is, therefore, rejected. 73. It is also worth noting that as the authorities specified in Rule 64 exercise the powers of the Regional Transport Authority delegated to them under rule 67 and as they pass orders under delegated authority, their orders are appealable in the usual manner in accordance with the provisions of section 89 of the Act, therefore, the submission of the petitioners that no appellate authority against an order of the District Transport Authority has been prescribed or that the petitioners would in any way be deprived of a right to appeal is factually and legally misconceived. 74. We also do not, find any force in the contention of the petitioners that the amendments made in Rule 204 of the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 by inserting sub-rule (4) therein thereby enabling the State to issue a notification declaring any person, officer or body to be the agency for maintenance and upgradation of bus stand and making further provision enabling the State to authorise any body, officer or person to collect fees from the vehicle owners using such bus stand on the rates prescribed by the State Government is contrary to law. There is no basis or reasons mentioned in the petitions for declaring the said provision to be unconstitutional. On the other hand, it is apparent that the provisions have been incorporated for providing better facilities at bus stands and for their better management. There is no basis or reasons mentioned in the petitions for declaring the said provision to be unconstitutional. On the other hand, it is apparent that the provisions have been incorporated for providing better facilities at bus stands and for their better management. As we have already held that the impugned rules have been framed in exercise of powers which have been conferred upon the State by various provisions of the Act and as no averment or foundation have been made in the petition to establish that the provisions are in any manner unconstitutional, the challenge to the same by the petitioners deserves to be and is hereby rejected. 75. Another important issue raised by the petitioners also needs to be addressed. It is alleged that the impugned rules violate the petitioners' fundamental rights conferred by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India which guarantees freedom of trade and commerce to all citizens. The tests for adjudging the constitutional validity of any legislation with reference to Article 19 of the Constitution of India have been summarised and stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Dutt and others v. Union of India and others, (2004) 1 SCC 712 , in the following terms:- “21. The Constitution Bench in State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 laid down twin tests on which the constitutional validity of a legislation under Article 19 is to be tested. The first test is the test of reasonableness which is common to all the clauses under Article 19(1); and the second test is to ask for the answer to the question, whether the restriction sought to be imposed on the fundamental right, falls within clauses (2) to (6) respectively qua sub clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19(1). The test of reasonableness, according to the Constitution Bench, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The test of reasonableness, according to the Constitution Bench, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the Social philosophy and the scale of values of the Judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint, and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the 'people have, in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions; considered them to he reasonable........” “37. The Court, confronted with a challenge to the constitutional validity of any legislative enactment by reference to Article 19 of the Constitution, shall first ask what is the sweep of the fundamental right guaranteed by the relevant sub-clause out of sub-clauses (a) to (g) of clause (1). If the right canvassed falls within the sweep and expanse of any of the sub-clauses of clause (1), then the next question to be asked would be, whether the impugned law imposes a reasonable restriction falling within the scope of clauses (2) to (6) respectively. However, if the right sought to be canvassed does not fall within the sweep of the fundamental rights but is a mere concomitant or adjunct or expansion or incidence of that right, then the validity thereof is not to be tested by reference to clauses (2) to (6). However, if the right sought to be canvassed does not fall within the sweep of the fundamental rights but is a mere concomitant or adjunct or expansion or incidence of that right, then the validity thereof is not to be tested by reference to clauses (2) to (6). The test which it would be required to satisfy for its constitutional validity is one of reasonableness, as propounded in the case of V.G. Row (supra) or if it comes into conflict with any other provision of the Constitution.” “49...........The questions: (i) Whether the right claimed is a fundamental right, (ii) whether the restriction is one contemplated by any of the Clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19, and (in) whether the restriction is reasonable or unreasonable, are all questions which shall have to be decided by keeping in view the substance of the legislation and not being beguiled by the mere appearance of the legislation.” 76. The contentions of the petitioners regarding violation of their fundamental right to trade and commerce conferred by Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution of India and as to whether the impugned rules impose reasonable restrictions on the right to trade and commerce in the interest of the general public as permitted under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India has, therefore, to be adjudged on the basis of the tests and parameters summarised and stated in the case of Dharam Dutt (supra). 77. The Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Chandra (supra) has stated that the provisions of the Act are geared for public safety and not private profit and casts a duty upon the authorities to protect Indian lives moving in buses, walking on roads or even standing on margins. This aspect is exemplified on a bare perusal of the provisions of the Act which makes it luminously clear that the Act has been enacted not for granting benefit to stage carriage operators or to facilitate or guarantee profit and benefits to transport operators but with the object of regulating the entire field of motor vehicles, transport, traffic, road safety, compensation to victims of motor accidents, Security comfort and protection of passengers, public safety, prevention of pollution, protection of road conditions, regulation and control of transport vehicles including provisions for grant of permits, preventing unhealthy competition between the transporters amongst several other issues relating to motor vehicles and transport. It is therefore clear from a perusal of the provisions of the Act that the extent of the right to operate stage carriages under the Act is subservient and subject to the right, amongst others, to safe and secure transport of the travelling passengers and the right to pollution free environment and good road conditions of the public at large. 78. From the above analysis it is clear that prima facie, the contentions of the petitioners suffer from a basic fallacy. Apparently, While the petitioners may have a fundamental right to trade and commerce, the said right cannot be extended or translated by any stretch of imagination to encompass a fundamental right to operate stage carriages unfettered by any conditions or restrictions in total disregard of the security, safety and convenience of the passengers and the public at large. The petitioners having themselves realised this fact, have not even challenged the provisions of the Act or the provisions of the unamended rules which impose several restrictions and conditions on the right of the petitioners subject to which the petitioners have been granted permits to operate stage carriages. It is, therefore, clearly established that while the petitioners may have a fundamental right to trade and commerce of their choice, they do not have any fundamental right to operate stage carriages without any restrictions and conditions and even this right is inferior and subordinate and has to give way to the paramount considerations of public and traffic safety, security and convenience of the passengers, road conditions and pollution amongst others stated in the Act. 79. In the instant case we have already held that the conditions imposed by the impugned amendments in the Rules of 1994 are with a view to ensure safe, secure and convenient transport services to the passengers to provide cheaper and safer facilities to rural public, to protect and preserve the road conditions, for better traffic management and to reduce traffic on long routes thereby reducing chances of untoward incidents and accidents and as such are in the interest of public at large. It is, therefore, clear that although we have already held that the petitioners do not have a fundamental right to operate stage carriages even otherwise, the impugned amendments in the rules are in consonance with and in furtherance of the object and purpose of the Act and are reasonable restrictions which can legitimately be imposed as provided by and permissible under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India on the fundamental right to trade and commerce granted under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. We have no doubt in our minds that the conditions imposed by the impugned rules are in the interest of the public at large as well as in furtherance of the object of the Act as stated above. As the impugned amendments are not in violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, are reasonable restrictions imposed in the interest of the general public and have been framed in exercise of powers vested by the provisions of the Statute, they do not fall foul of the tests prescribed for adjudging the constitutionality of all types of legislation under Article 19(1)(g) and 19(6) of the Constitution of India as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Dutt (supra). 80. Quite apart from the above it is noteworthy that the constitutionality of subordinate legislation like the impugned, rules, is open to challenge on the ground that it is unconstitutional, or violative of the fundamental rights or ultra vires powers conferred by the statutory provisions or totally unreasonable and arbitrary or is contrary to statutory provisions as has been summarised and stated by the Supreme Court in the case of J.K. Industries Limited and another v. Union of India and others, (2007) 13 SCC 673 in the following terms:- “127...........Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned on the, ground, that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or that it is contrary to some other statute applicable on the same subject-matter. Therefore, it has to yield to plenary legislation. It can also be questioned on the ground that it is manifestly arbitrary and unjust. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or that it is contrary to some other statute applicable on the same subject-matter. Therefore, it has to yield to plenary legislation. It can also be questioned on the ground that it is manifestly arbitrary and unjust. That, any inquiry into its vires must be confined to the grounds on which plenary legislation may be questioned, to the grounds that it is contrary to the statute under which it is made, to the grounds that it is contrary to other statutory provisions or on the ground that it is so patently arbitrary that it cannot be said to be in conformity with the statute. It can also be challenged on the ground that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution.” 81. It is also settled law that in cases where subordinate legislation passes the aforesaid tests and is validly framed in exercise of powers conferred by the relevant statutory provisions and is in consonance with the object and purpose of the Act then an enquiry as to the wisdom and unwisdom of the rules or to judge as to whether the purpose would be better served by adopting a different policy than the one laid down by the rules, is beyond the scope and powers of the Courts to examine as it is the sole prerogative of the legislature and the rule making authority to decide which policy would best serve the purpose and object sought to be achieved and any drawback in that respect would not render the provisions of the rules ultra vires. In other words, if the provision satisfies the test of constitutional validity then legislative policy or wisdom cannot be looked into by the Courts as that is the exclusive domain of the legislature or rule making authority as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others, (1984) 4 SCC 27 as follows:- “14..........In our opinion, this approach made by the High Court was not correct or proper because the question whether a particular piece of delegated legislation - whether a rule or regulation or other type of statutory instrument - is in excess of the power of subordinate legislation conferred on the delegate has- to be determined with reference only to the specific provisions contained in the relevant statute conferring the power to make the rule, regulation, etc. and also the object and purpose of the Act as can be gathered from the various provisions of the enactment. It would be wholly wrong for the Court to substitute its own opinion for that of the legislature or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act and to sit in judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the regulation-making body and declare a regulation to be ultra vires merely on the ground that, in the view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not help to serve the object and purpose of the Act. So long as the body 'entrusted with the task of framing the rules or regulations acts within the 'scope of the authority conferred on it, in the sense that the rules or regulations made by it have a rational nexus with the object and purpose of the Statute, the Court should not concern itself with the wisdom or 'efficaciousness of such rules or regulations. It is exclusively within the province of the legislature and its delegate to determine, as a matter of policy, how the provisions of the Statute can best be implemented and what measures, substantive as welt as procedural would have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations for the efficacious achievement of the objects and purposes of the Act. It is exclusively within the province of the legislature and its delegate to determine, as a matter of policy, how the provisions of the Statute can best be implemented and what measures, substantive as welt as procedural would have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations for the efficacious achievement of the objects and purposes of the Act. It is not for the Court to examine the merits or demerits of such a policy because its scrutiny has to be limited to the question as to whether the impugned regulations fall within the scope of the regulation-making power conferred on the delegate by the Statute. Though this legal position is well established by a long series of decisions of this Court, we have considered it necessary to reiterate it in view of the manifestly erroneous approach made by the High Court to the consideration of the question as to whether the impugned clause (3) of Regulation 104 is ultra vires..............” “16. In our opinion, the aforesaid approach made by the High Court is wholly incorrect and fallacious. The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the legislature and the subordinate regulation-making body. It may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of the Act. The legislature and its delegate are the sole repositories of the power to decide what policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered by the Act and there is no scope for interference by the Court unless the particular provision impugned before it can be said to suffer from any legal infirmity, in the sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of the regulation-making power or its being inconsistent with any of the provisions of the parent enactment or in violation of any of the limitations imposed by the Constitution..................” 82. In the instant case as we have held that the impugned rules do not violate any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners, have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by the statutory provisions validity of which has not been challenged, are not ultra vires the statutory provisions of any Act, are reasonable and in furtherance of the object and purpose of the Act and are in public interest they satisfy the parameters on which subordinate legislation is to be tested and we, therefore, cannot look into the wisdom or unwisdom of the policy behind them. Consequently, we have no hesitation in declaring the impugned amendments made in the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 vide notification dated 24-11-2010 to be constitutional and valid. 83. In view of the aforesaid discussions and the facts and the circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned amendments in Rules 64, 67, 77, 103, 116 and 204 and the insertion of Rule 116-A in the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 are valid and do not fall foul of the statutory provisions of the Act and are also constitutionally valid as they do not violate any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners. Consequently, we do not find any merit in the petitions filed by the petitioners assailing the constitutional validity of the aforesaid amendments. The petitions being meritless are accordingly dismissed. A copy of this order be placed in the records of W.P. Nos. 18200/2010, 18014/2010, 18163/2010, 18203/2010, 18428/2010, 18720/2010 18734/2010, 18739/2010, 18742/2010, 18781/2010, 18783/2010, 18784/2010 18865/2010, 18868/2010, 18900/2010, 18914/2010, 680/2011, 1212/2011 1399/2011, 2080/2011, 2215/2011, 3939/2011 and 3776/2011. Petitions dismissed.