I.A Ansari, J.;- 1. We have heard Mr. S. Deb learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant, and Mr. B. Das learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner-respondent. 2. Before we deal with the question, which has been raised in the present appeal, and enter into the merit of appeal, certain salient facts, which are necessary to be taken into consideration for the purpose of disposal of this appeal, are set out, in brief, as under : (i) The writ petitioner-respondent, while working as a Fire Supervisor under the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation CONGC'), hereinafter referred to as the 'respondent-Corporation', was granted leave and allowed to go, accompanied by his wife, to Kolkata for medical check­up/treatment by order, dated 28.2.1995, issued, in this regard, by the ONGC authority. By a subsequent order, dated 29.9.1995, issued by the ONGC authority, permission was accorded for treatment of the petitioner. However, the petitioner, thereafter, came to this court by filing a writ petition, under article 226 of the Constitution of India, with the grievance that when he, coming back from Kolkata, had reported, on 1.1.1995, to rejoin his duties, he was not allowed by the respondent-Corporation to rejoin his duties on the alleged ground that the petitioner had, without prior permission, absented from duties with effect from 12.12.1994, and that he had been called upon to explain his alleged unauthorized absence from duties. The said writ petition gave rise to Civil Rule No. 141/1998, wherein the petitioner prayed, inter alia, that the respondent-Corporation be directed to allow the petitioner to rejoin his duties and also to make payment of his salary since 1.1.1995 till date treating the period as spent on duties by the petitioner for all purposes and intents. The petitioner also brought on record, in his writ petition (Civil Rule No. 141/1998), that an order had been passed by the Deputy Manager (P&A) of the respondent-Corporation calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be initiated against him for his unauthorized absence with effect from 12.12.1994 and the petitioner submitted his reply to the said show cause notice on 22.11.1995. Instead of initiating any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, the respondents/authorities concerned, once again, issued another notice, dated 9.11.1995, directing the writ petitioner to submit his written reply to the charge of his unauthorized absence. Instead of initiating any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, the respondents/authorities concerned, once again, issued another notice, dated 9.11.1995, directing the writ petitioner to submit his written reply to the charge of his unauthorized absence. The respondent-Corporation did not, eventually, initiate any disciplinary proceeding against the writ petitioner. Taking these facts into account coupled with the facts, that the medical report, placed on record, reflected that the petitioner had gone to Kolkata for treatment on being permitted by the respondents/authorities concerned, that after returning from Kolkata, the petitioner had duly submitted his joining report and that the respondent-Corporation had not, without assigning any reason, allowed the petitioner to resume his duties, the writ petition (Civil Rule 141/1998) was disposed of, on 12.5.2000, with the direction to the respondents/authorities concerned to allow the writ petitioner to resume his duties forthwith and to make payment of the petitioner's pay and allowances, as may be permissible under the provisions of law, with further direction that the petitioner shall submit application for regularization of leave and, on receipt thereof, the respondent-Corporation/authorities concerned shall consider and dispose of the same in accordance with the provisions of relevant rules. (ii) The learned Single Judge, while disposing of the writ petition, as indicated hereinabove, also gave liberty to the respondent-Corporation to take any such appropriate action against the petitioner as may be deemed necessary and permissible under provisions of the relevant service rules making it, however, clear that under no circumstances, the petitioner shall be prevented from resuming his duties. The relevant observations made, and the directions given, in the order, dated 12.5.2000, are reproduced below : "It would, appear from the medical report in file that the medical petitioner had undergone the treatment in Kolkata on being permitted by the respondents and thereafter he had submitted his joining report. It is not known as to why the authorities failed to permit him to resume his duties. This, in my opinion, it not permissible. It is apparent that the writ petitioner replied to the first notice on 26.9.1995. Although no reply to the second notice dated 9.11.1995 was passed, it was within the competence of the disciplinary authority to proceed against him and to take appropriate action in accordance with the law. That not having been done, the authority can not arbitrarily prevent from joining the post he left vacant for his treatment in Kolkata. Although no reply to the second notice dated 9.11.1995 was passed, it was within the competence of the disciplinary authority to proceed against him and to take appropriate action in accordance with the law. That not having been done, the authority can not arbitrarily prevent from joining the post he left vacant for his treatment in Kolkata. The show cause notice issued on 26.9.1995 indicates that the writ petitioner was absent from duty without authority with effect from 12.12.1994. This was undoubtedly prior to his leaving for Calcutta for treatment. The authority should have taken action in accordance with the provision of law and awarded him punishment as may be permissible in accordance with the leave rules/service rules. Authorities also appeared to have defaulted on this count. Be that as it may, the factual position as emerges is that the petitioner's right to resume his duties can not be taken away arbitrarily by refusing him to join the post to which he is legally entitled to. For any misconduct, on his par, the authority is at liberty to proceed in accordance with the provisions of law. In view of the matter, I propose to dispose of the writ petition with a direction to the respondents to allow the writ petitioner to resume his duties forthwith and to make payment of pay and allowances as may be permissible under the provisions of law. The petitioner shall also submit application for regularization of leave which the respondents shall on receipt thereof consider and dispose of in accordance with the provisions of leave rules. This will not, however, prevent the authorities concerned from taking any other appropriate action, as they deem necessary in accordance with the provisions of the service rules. But under no circumstances, the petitioner shall be prevented from resuming his duties. Subject to the observation above the writ petition is disposed of with no order as to costs." (emphasis added) (iii) Neither the writ petitioner nor the respondent-Corporation (i.e., the present appellant) preferred any appeal against the above directions given by the order, dated 12.5.2000, passed in Civil Rule No. 141/1998. The findings of the learned Single Judge and the reliefs granted by the judgment and order, dated 12.5.2000, therefore, remained unchallenged and, thus, attained finality. The findings of the learned Single Judge and the reliefs granted by the judgment and order, dated 12.5.2000, therefore, remained unchallenged and, thus, attained finality. (iv) In course of time, the petitioner approached this court with another round of litigation by filing another writ petition, under article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking directions to be issued to the respondent-Corporation/authorities concerned to allow the petitioner full pay and allowances for the period from 1.1.1995 to 4.6.2000. This second writ petition gave rise to WP(C) No. 49/2003. However, during pendency of this writ petition, the petitioner died on 20.11.2005; consequently, the petitioner's wife and his daughter have been brought on record as legal representatives of the petitioner (since deceased). (v) The respondent-Corporation resisted the second writ petition [WP(O 49/2003] contending to the effect that while disposing of the first round of litigation (i.e., Civil Rule 141/1998) by order, dated 12.5.2000, the court had chosen not to direct payment of the petitioner's salary with effect from 1.1.1995, though such a prayer had been made by the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner stood debarred by the principle of res judicata from agitating the matter, once again, and seek the relief of payment of salary with effect from 1.1.1995. In support of this submission, made on behalf of the respondent-Corporation, a reference was made to the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra. (1990) 2 SCC 715 . (vi) The second writ petition was disposed of by judgment and order, dated 21.3.2007, holding to the effect, inter alia, that the purport of the order of the learned Single Judge, while disposing of the first writ petition (Civil Rule 141/1998), was not only to permit the petitioner to resume his duties, but also to consider payment of his salaries and allowances for the period during which he had stood illegally prevented from resuming his duties. By judgment and order, dated 21.3.2007, the respondent-Corporation was directed to take requisite steps for disbursal of the entitled amount to the legal heirs of the deceased employee. (vii) The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant (i.e., the respondent-Corporation) against the judgment and order, dated 21.3.2007, passed in the second writ petition. 2. By judgment and order, dated 21.3.2007, the respondent-Corporation was directed to take requisite steps for disbursal of the entitled amount to the legal heirs of the deceased employee. (vii) The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant (i.e., the respondent-Corporation) against the judgment and order, dated 21.3.2007, passed in the second writ petition. 2. While considering the present appeal, it needs to be noted that the learned Single Judge, while dealing with, and disposing of, the second writ petition, found and observed that in the earlier writ petition, specific directions had been given to the respondent-Corporation to allow the petitioner to resume his duties making it clear that the action of the respondent-Corporation, in not allowing the petitioner to resume his duties, was arbitrary and impermissible in law and, in the backdrop of the findings, so reached, it was directed to the effect that the respondent-Corporation shall allow the petitioner to resume his duties forthwith and make payment of pay and allowances as may be permissible in law. It has also been noted by the court, while disposing of the second writ petition, that the learned Single Judge had also observed, in the first writ petition, that the respondent-Corporation was not only required to permit the petitioner to resume his duties, but also to make payment of the petitioner's pay and allowances as may be permissible in law. It has been further observed, in the impugned judgment and order, that, although no specific direction had been given earlier by the court, in its order, dated 12.5.2000, indicating that the petitioner should be allowed to join with retrospective effect, yet, the court had recorded in its order, dated 12.5.2000, that the refusal by the ONGC authorities to allow the petitioner to resume his duties was not permissible in law and that the authorities had arbitrarily refused the petitioner to rejoin the post, although the petitioner was legally entitled to do so. Having pointed out these facts, the second writ petition was disposed of by judgment and order, dated 21.3.2007, with the direction to the respondent-Corporation to take necessary steps for disbursement of the dues of the petitioner to his legal representatives. Having pointed out these facts, the second writ petition was disposed of by judgment and order, dated 21.3.2007, with the direction to the respondent-Corporation to take necessary steps for disbursement of the dues of the petitioner to his legal representatives. The relevant observations made, and the directions given in the judgment and order, dated 21.3.2007, read as under : "This court on 12.5.2000 in Civil Rule No. 141 of 1998 gave a specific finding that the refusal by the ONGC authorities to allow the petitioner to resume his duties was not permissible and that the authorities have arbitrarily refused him to join the post, although the petitioner was legally entitled to do so. On the basis of such specific finding recorded in the judgment and order dated 12.5.2000, the learned Single Judge permitted the petitioner to resume his duties forthwith and consequently, directed payment of his pay and allowances as may be permissible under the provisions of law. Thus, the ONGC authorities were not only required to permit the petitioner to resume his duties, which they did by order dated 5.6.2000, but was also required to make payment of pay and allowances as may be permissible under the provisions of law. In the directions given by this court, there is no indication whatsoever, that the period after the petitioner wanted to join his service till 5.6.2000 when he was allowed to resume his duties, was to be considered on the basis of the leave entitlement of the petitioner under the Rules of the ONGC. The reference to regularization of the leave of the petitioner in the judgment dated 12.5.2000 was obviously with reference to the earlier period during which the petitioner remained absent without authorization and cannot be said to be related to the period when the petitioner's absence was on account of obstruction to his joining put by the respondent-ONGC. The reference to regularization of the leave of the petitioner in the judgment dated 12.5.2000 was obviously with reference to the earlier period during which the petitioner remained absent without authorization and cannot be said to be related to the period when the petitioner's absence was on account of obstruction to his joining put by the respondent-ONGC. Thus, although no specific direction was given by the learned Single Judge indicating that the petitioner will be allowed the benefit of joining with retrospective effect, in the context of the direction, I am of the view that as the learned Single Judge concluded that the ONGC arbitrarily refused the petitioner to resume his duties, the absence occurring on account of such obstruction ofthe'ONGC, cannot now be taken as absence of the petitioner from duty on his own violation requiring consideration of granting leave to the petitioner for the said period. Thus, the submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-ONGC regarding the interpretation of the directions in the judgment and order dated 12.5.2000 is not accepted by this court. 11. Coming now to the date from which the writ petitioner would be entitled for payment of wages. It is seen from the materials adduced in Civil Rule No. 141 of 1998 that the petitioner was availing medical treatment up till 9.11.1995 in the Calcutta Medical Research Institute and he was declared fit for resumption of his duties only on 6.12.1995 by the Deputy Chief Medical officer of the ONGC, Tripura Project. Thus, in no case the petitioner can be considered to be entitled for payment of salaries till he was declared fit to resume his duties, which declaration was made only 6.12.1995. The writ petitioner did not make a mention of the specific date on which he reported for duty after 6.12.1995 and the learned Single Judge also while disposing of Civil Rule No. 141 of 1998 did not record the date on which the petitioner reported before the ONGC authorities for resumption of his duties. Under such circumstances, to decide on the exact date on which the petitioner reported for his duties it may be appropriate to refer to the pleadings in Civil Rule No. 141 of 1998. Under such circumstances, to decide on the exact date on which the petitioner reported for his duties it may be appropriate to refer to the pleadings in Civil Rule No. 141 of 1998. In that writ petition the petitioner stated that soon after obtaining the medical fitness certificate on 6.12.1995, the petitioner submitted his joining report, which, however, was not accepted by the respondent-ONGC. But in paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit filed by the ONGC in Civil Rule No. 141 of 1998, it is stated that petitioner submitted his joining report on 7.12.1995 before the ONGC authorities, but the said joining report was not accepted as it was required to be cleared from the Headquarter because of prolonged absence of the petitioner. It can fee seen from the above averments that the ONGC authorities did not act on the joining report given by the petitioner because according to them the said joining report could not be accepted without approval of the Headquarter for whose approval communication was made by the local authorities. It can be clearly discerned from the above narration that the absence of the writ petitioner after 7.12.1995 was because of refusal by the respondent-authorities to allow the petitioner to resume his duties and not because of any unilateral act of the employee to remain absent from duty. 12. In view of above, the employee cannot be denied his wages for the period when he was prevented from resuming his service. Accordingly, the ONGC authorities are directed to consider the entitlement of the writ petitioner for wages from 7.12.1995 to 4.6.2000 as during the said period, the employee was prevented from joining his duties although he submitted joining report on 7.12.1995. This direction is passed as I am of the opinion, that the purport of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 12.5.2000 was not only to permit the petitioner to resume his duties but also to consider payment of his wages and salaries for the period during which he was illegally prevented from resuming his duties. The authorities would consider the entitlement of the employee for the aforesaid period without referring to the leave account of the employee as the absence in the instant case was forced by the refusal of the ONGC authorities to permit the employee to resume his duties. The authorities would consider the entitlement of the employee for the aforesaid period without referring to the leave account of the employee as the absence in the instant case was forced by the refusal of the ONGC authorities to permit the employee to resume his duties. They permitted him to resume his duties only on 5.6.2000 on the basis of the direction given by this court on 12.5.2000. 13. After determining the entitlement of the employee as aforesaid, the ONGC would take requisite steps for disbursal of the entitled amount to the legal heirs of the deceased employee Nikhilendra Debbarma. The authorities would complete the exercise for computing the entitlement as well as for arrangement of disbursal to the legal heirs within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order." (emphasis added) 3. The arguments, which were raised on behalf of the respondents (i.e., the present appellants) in the second writ petition, have also been raised before us by Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel, inasmuch as Mr. Deb reiterates that the learned Single Judge, in the order, dated 12.5.2000, passed in the first writ petition, having not granted the relief of payment of pay and allowances to the petitioner with effect from 1.1.1995, the petitioner could not have sought for, and the learned Single Judge, therefore, fell in error, in the second writ petition, in allowing the legal representatives of the deceased petitioner to obtain the relief of payment of pay and allowances with effect from 1.1.1995, for, such a direction, according to Mr. Deb, could not have been made under the principle of constructive res judicata as discernible from the provisions of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Support for his submissions is sought to be derived by Mr. Deb from the cases of Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961SC 1457; Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association (supra) and M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408 . 4. Support for his submissions is sought to be derived by Mr. Deb from the cases of Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961SC 1457; Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association (supra) and M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408 . 4. Before considering the question as to whether the second writ petition ought not to have been allowed on the ground that the second writ petition was barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata, it may be noted that in the case of Daryao (supra), the question arose as to whether the principle of res judicata, as embodied in section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is applicable to a writ proceeding, when the question of enforcement of fundamental rights arises. The court held that the doctrine of res judicata, though technical in nature, is based on considerations of public policy and, hence, it must be applied to a writ proceeding for enforcement of fundamental rights, for, one important consideration of public policy is that the decisions, pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction, should be final unless they are modified or reversed by appellate courts; and the other principle is that no one should be made to face the same kind of litigation twice over, because, such a process would be contrary to considerations of fair play and justice. Taking a cue from the decision, in Daryao (supra), Mr. S. Deb reiterates that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief, under the principle of constructive res judicata. 5. It may also be pointed out that in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association (supra), the Constitution Bench laid down that the principles of res judicata are applicable to writ proceedings. The reference, which Mr. Deb has made to the case of M. Nagabhushana (supra), also reiterates the same position of law. 6. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the principle of res judicata and/or constructive res judicata is applicable to a writ proceeding even when the writ petition seeks enforcement of fundamental right(s). The rule of res judicata embodies principle of public policy, which is an essential part of the rule of law and, being a part of the rule of law, there can be no objection to invoking of this rule even when enforcement of fundamental rights is sought for. The rule of res judicata embodies principle of public policy, which is an essential part of the rule of law and, being a part of the rule of law, there can be no objection to invoking of this rule even when enforcement of fundamental rights is sought for. It is in the interest of public at large that finality is attached to the decisions pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction and it is also in public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. When these two principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata, the rule can not be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with writ petitions seeking enforcement of fundamental rights. 7. In fact, even the Hindu and Mohammedan jurisprudence approve and enforce the principles of res judicata. This aspect was considered long ago by a Full Bench, in Lachhmi v. Bhulli, ILR (1927) 8 Lah. 384. In Lachhmi (supra), the Full Bench traced the history of the doctrine of res judicata both in Hindu and Mohammedan jurisprudence as follows: "In the Mitakshra (Book II, Chapter I, Section V, verse 5) one of the four kinds of effective answers to a suit is "a plea by former judgment" and in verse 10, Katyayana is quoted as laying down that "one against whom a judgment had formerly been given, if he brings forward the matter again, must be answered by a plea of purva nyaya or former judgment" (Macnaughten and Colebrooke's translation, p. 22). The doctrine, however, seems to have been recognized much earlier in Hindu jurisprudence, judging from the fact that both Smriti Chandrika (Mysore edn., pp. 97-98) and Virmitrodaya (Vidya-Sagar edn., p. 77) base the defence of prang nyaya (former decision) on the following text of the ancient law­giver Harita, who is believed by some Orientalists to have flourished in the 9th Century BC and whose Smriti is now extant only in fragments - 'The plaintiff should be non-suited if the defendant avers : "in this very affair, there was litigation between him and myself previously", and it is found that the plaintiff had lost his case." There are texts of Prasara (Bengal Asiatic Society edn., p. 56) and of Mayukha (Pane's edn., p. 15) to the same effect. Among Muhammadan law-givers similar effect was given to the plea of ' Niza-i-munfasla' or 'Amar Mania taqrir mukhalif. Under Roman law, as administered by the Proctors' courts, a defendant could repel the plaintiff's claim by means of exception re-judicatoe or plea of former judgment. The subject received considerable attention at the hands of Roman jurists and as stated in Roby's Roman Private Law (Vol. II, p. 338) the general principle recognized was that "one suit and one decision was enough for any single dispute" and that "a matter once brought to trial should not be tried except, of course, by way of appeal"." 8. The submissions made by Mr. B. Das, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner-respondent, that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied to a writ proceeding, does not, therefore, hold water. 9. The question, however, remains as to whether, in the present case, the reliefs, which the writ petitioner (since deceased) had sought for, were barred by the principle of constructive res judicata? This question brings us straight to the reliefs, which the petitioner had sought for. The relevant part of the relief sought for by the writ petitioner, to allow him to rejoin his duties and to make payment of his pay and allowances, read as under : "(b) Issue writ directing the respondents and each of them to allow the petitioner to have his salaries for the periods since 1.1.1995 till date and thereafter treating the same as spent on duty by the petitioner for all purposes and intents." 10. In the face of the reliefs, which the petitioner had sought for, it becomes clear that the petitioner had sought for a direction to be issued to the respondent-Corporation to pay his salary since 1.1.1995 till date and to treat his said period of absence as the period spent on duties for all purposes and intents. In the face of the reliefs, which the petitioner had sought for, it becomes clear that the petitioner had sought for a direction to be issued to the respondent-Corporation to pay his salary since 1.1.1995 till date and to treat his said period of absence as the period spent on duties for all purposes and intents. Dealing with the grievances of the petitioner, and the reliefs, which the petitioner had sought for, the court, while disposing of the first writ petition by order, dated 12.5.2000, clearly recorded its finding that though it was open to the respondent-Corporation to take appropriate disciplinary action against the petitioner, if the petitioner had committed any breach of the service rules of the respondent-Corporation and had remained absent unauthorisedly, the refusal of the respondent-Corporation to allow the petitioner to rejoin his duties was illegal and arbitrary. This finding of the learned Single Judge was never put to challenge by the respondent-Corporation. 11. Thus, the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge, which remained undisputed, is that the respondent-Corporation had illegally and arbitrarily stopped the petitioner from rejoining his duties on 1.1.1995. No wonder, therefore, that the learned Single Judge, by order, dated 12.5.2000, directed the respondent-Corporation to "allow the petitioner to resume his duties forthwith and make payment of the pay and allowances as may be permissible under the provisions of law". 12. By order, dated 12.5.2000, aforementioned, when the direction was given to the respondent-Corporation to allow the petitioner to resume his duties forthwith, it obviously meant that the petitioner had been illegally and arbitrarily prevented from resuming his duties. The resumption of the duty, which the learned Single Judge had so directed, being immediate in nature, this direction to allow the petitioner to rejoin his duties would, obviously, relate back to the date on which the petitioner was arbitrarily and illegally disallowed from resuming his duties, i.e., 1.1.1995, or, in other words, ought to have been allowed to resume his duties. 13. 13. Notwithstanding, therefore, the fact that there was no specific direction in the order, dated 12.5.2000, given to the respondent-Corporation and its employees to allow the petitioner to resume his duties with effect from 1.1.1995, the fact of the matter remains that the direction, given by the order, dated 12.5.2000, passed in the first writ petition, was that the respondent-Corporation shall forthwith allow the petitioner to resume his duties and since the refusal to allow him to iesume his duties was illegal and arbitrary, his resumption of duties would take effect from the date, when he was arbitrarily and illegally refused to be permitted to rejoin his duties, i.e., with effect from 1.1.1995. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the directions of the learned Single Judge, given to the respondent-Corporation, that the respondent-Corporation shall allow the petitioner to resume his duty forthwith and that, under no circumstances, the petitioner shall be prevented from resuming his duties, having never been challenged by the respondent-Corporation, the same had attained finality. 14. Coming to the question of the relief of payment of pay and allowances, it needs to be noted that though there was no specific direction to the respondent-Corporation to make payment of the petitioner's pay and allowances with effect from 1.1.1995, the fact of the matter remains that the learned Single Judge had directed, by judgment and order, dated 12.5.2000, that the pay and allowances of the petitioner shall be paid as may be permissible under the law. Such direction was necessary, because of the fact that two notices had been issued to the petitioner directing him to show cause against his alleged unauthorized absence from duties. When the respondent-Corporation did not, eventually, initiate any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, the consequence was that they were bound to make payment of pay and allowances to the petitioner in accordance with law. When the respondent-Corporation did not, eventually, initiate any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, the consequence was that they were bound to make payment of pay and allowances to the petitioner in accordance with law. As the directions were not complied with, the second writ petition was necessary and the second writ petition was not barred, and cannot be treated to have been barred, by the doctrine of constructive res judicata inasmuch as the relief, which the petitioner was entitled to in the facts and attending circumstances of the case, still remained alive as it existed on 12.5.2000 and, when the respondent-Corporation had failed to take any disciplinary action against the petitioner justifying their action in-not allowing the petitioner to resume his duties, the petitioner was within his right to claim payment of his salary and allowances with effect from 1.1.1995. This relief could not have been denied to the petitioner on the ground that, in the earlier round of litigation, the court had not given the relief, which he has, now, sought for. 15. We have considered, with great patience, the rival submissions, made on behalf of the parties concerned, and we have come to the conscious conclusion that the court, by order, dated 12.5.2000, did direct the respondent-Corporation/authorities concerned to make payment of the petitioner's pay and allowances in accordance with law, but the payment has not been made in accordance with law and, aggrieved by non-compliance of the direction of the court, the petitioner filed the second writ petition. Having considered the pros and cons of the matter, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge, while disposing of the second writ petition, did not fall in error in directing the respondents, who are appellants in this appeal, to determine the entitlement of the writ petitioner for payment of his salary and allowances in respect of the period, during which the petitioner had been prevented from rejoining his duties, and disburse the entitled amount to the legal heirs of the deceased employee, i.e., the writ petitioner. 16. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed with cost of Rs. 5,000.