ORDER G.V. Seethapathy, J. 1. CRP No.4162 is directed against the order in EA No. 132 of 2003 in EP No. 153 of 2002 in OP No.33 of 1982; CRP No.4163 is directed against the order in EA No.133 of 2003 in EP No. 151 of 2002 in OP No.81 of 1981; CRP No.4164 is directed against the order in EA No.134 of 2003 in EP No.169 of 2002 in OP No.83 of 1981; CRP No.4165 is directed against the order in EA No. 136 of 2003 in EP No. 152 of 2002 in OP No.99 of 1981; CRP No.4166 is directed against the order in EA No.635 of 2003 in EP No. 190 of 2002 in OP No. 100 of 1981; CRP No.4167 is directed against the order in EA No.945 of 2004 in EP No. 125 of 2004 in OP No.93 of 1981; CRP No.4168 is directed against the order in EA No. 1070 of 2005 in EP No. 192 of 2004 in OP No.84 of 1981; CRP No.4169 is directed against the order in EA No. 1071 of 2005 in EP No.52 of 2005 in OP No.97 of 1981; CRP No.4170 is directed against the order in EA No. 1072 of 2005 in EP No.119 of 2004 in OP No.34 of 1982; CRP No.4171 is directed against the order in EA No. 135 of 2003 in EP No. 170 of 2002 in OP No.98 of 1981 and CRP No.5431 is directed against the order in EA No. 1347 of 2005 in EP No. 106 of 2004 in OP No.82 of 1981, dated 9.5.2006, on the file of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, wherein the said applications filed by the first respondent herein in all the revision petitions, under Section 47 CPC was allowed in part, holding that the decree is a nullity so far as it relates to the additional market value of 12% and interest thereon. 2. Heard the Learned Counsel for the petitioners and the Learned Counsel for the first respondent in all the matters. Perused the record. As the first respondent in all the matters is one and the same and the point involved in all revisions is also one and the same, they are all heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. Perused the record. As the first respondent in all the matters is one and the same and the point involved in all revisions is also one and the same, they are all heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. It is not disputed that on the request of the first respondent herein, the 2nd respondent-Land Acquisition Officer passed, awards in the year 1979 granting compensation at the rates ranging between Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 15,000/- per acre. Some of the land owners, including the petitioners, sought reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short 'the Act'). During the pendency of the said OPs, the Act was amended by Act 68 of 1984 (amendment came into force with effect from 30.4.1982), providing for additional market value at 12% under Section 23(3-A) and also enhancing solatium from 15% to 30% and interest from 6% to 9% and 15% by amending Sections 23 and 25 of the Act. 4. The reference Court by order dated 30.4.1987 enhanced the market value and also extended the benefits as per the amended Act 68 of 1984. The first respondent herein preferred appeals before this Court and by judgment dated 24.1.1990, all the appeals were allowed in part reducing the market value from Rs.96,800/- to Rs.72,600/- . The first respondent herein preferred review against the said order, but the same was also dismissed on 9.7.1990. The first respondent preferred appeals before the Apex Court and the petitioners herein also filed appeals questioning the market value. The first respondent herein raised an issue in their appeals as to whether the benefits under the amended Act 68 of 1984 regarding additional market value at 12% could be applicable even though the award was passed prior to 30.4.1982. However, when the matter came up for hearing, the first respondent herein appears to have given consent for dismissal of the appeals and consequently, appeals were dismissed on 5.9.2001. The first respondent filed applications seeking clarification and the same were also dismissed on 1.3.2002. Thus, the order passed by the reference Court as modified by this Court attained finality. 5. Subsequently, the petitioners herein filed execution petitions for recovery of the amounts due under the decree. The first respondent filed applications seeking clarification and the same were also dismissed on 1.3.2002. Thus, the order passed by the reference Court as modified by this Court attained finality. 5. Subsequently, the petitioners herein filed execution petitions for recovery of the amounts due under the decree. In the said execution petitions, the first respondent filed applications under Section 47 CPC seeking declaration that the order in the original petitions insofar as it relates to awarding 12% additional market value, solatium and interest on the same, is without jurisdiction and to that extent, the decree is nullity and in-executable. 6. The first respondent herein sought to rely upon the decision of the apex Court in K.S. Paripurnan v. State of Kerla, (1994) 5 SCC 593 , wherein the apex Court held that 'the benefit under Section (1-A) of Section 23 of the Act can be extended only to those cases where the award is passed by the Land Acquisition Officer subsequent to 30.4.1982'. According to the first respondent, in view of the decision of the apex Court, the decree sought to be executed becomes nullity insofar as granting 12% additional market value under Section 23(1-A) of the Act (Amendment Act 68 of 1984) and the same can be raised under Section 47 CPC. 7. The petitioners herein filed counters in their respective petitions, contending that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree unless the decree is passed by the Court having no jurisdiction and even otherwise, if the decree is erroneous in law or on facts, executing Court cannot go into the said question. The learned Senior Civil Judge, by impugned order allowed the said applications holding that the petitioners herein are not entitled for the additional benefit under Section 23(1-A) of the Act, as the award was passed prior to 30.4.1982. Aggrieved by the same, the claimants preferred the present revisions. 8. The short question which arises for consideration is whether the decree or portion thereof, which has attained finality, can be set aside, as being null and void in view of any subsequent change of law? 9. Admittedly, the awards were passed in the year 1979, much prior to 30.4.1982, the date on which the amendment Act 68 of 1984 came into force. 9. Admittedly, the awards were passed in the year 1979, much prior to 30.4.1982, the date on which the amendment Act 68 of 1984 came into force. The reference Court passed orders on 30.4.1987 extending the benefits of the amended provisions under Section 23(1-A) of the Act i.e., awarding additional market value at 12% and solatium at 30% under Section 23(2) and also interest. In the grounds of appeal filed before this Court, the first respondent herein while contending that the petitioners herein are not entitled for any enhanced compensation, nor for any solatium, did not however specifically raise any contention regarding additional market value. By judgment dated 24.1.1990 this Court allowed the appeals in part, fixing the market rate at Rs.15/- per square yard and observing that no other point was urged and therefore, confirming the decree of the lower Court in all other respects. The first respondent filed review applications and the same were also dismissed on 9.7.1990. In the review applications, it was contended that the lower Court went wrong in awarding 12% additional market value under Section 23(1-A) of the Act for the period from the date of notification, till the date of taking possession. this Court observed that it was not the point taken either in the grounds of appeal or at the time of hearing and no other point was taken or argued in the appeal, except regarding the market value of the land. The review petitions were accordingly dismissed. Subsequently, the first respondent filed appeals before the apex Court and the same were also dismissed on 5.9.2001, as the Learned Counsel for both parties agree that the appeals be dismissed. The first respondent filed applications for clarification, wherein it was inter-alia contended that they are not liable to pay 12% additional market value in view of the decision in K.S. Paripoornan's case (supra). In the said applications, the first respondent had expressed an apprehension that the petitioners/claimants might ask for additional market value, despite issue pertaining to the additional market value stands decided in favour of the first respondent herein in terms of the judgment in K.S. Paripoornan's case (supra). On 11.3.2002, the said applications IA Nos.65 to 80 filed by the first respondent herein were also dismissed. On 11.3.2002, the said applications IA Nos.65 to 80 filed by the first respondent herein were also dismissed. Thus, the first respondent herein has already put forward his contention pertaining to liability for payment of 12% additional market value under Section 23(1-A) of the Act before the apex Court in IA Nos.65 to 80 in the Civil Appeal Nos.3627 to 3642 of 1991, but without any success. The decree passed by the reference Court awarding 12% additional market value has thus attained finality and the first respondent herein, having raised the contention that they are not liable to pay the additional market value in view of the pronouncement in K.S. Paripoornan's case before the Apex Court, but no success, is not entitled to raise the selfsame contentions once again, that too in the execution proceedings by way of applications under Section 47 CPC. With the dismissal of the civil appeals filed by the first respondent before the apex Court and further dismissal of the applications seeking clarification, the decree passed by the reference Court, which inter-alia directs the first respondent to pay 12% additional market value, has attained finality and it is not open to the first respondent now to contend that the said portion of the decree insofar as it directs payment of 12% additional market value is a nullity. 10. The sole ground on which the first respondents based his contention is that in Paripoornan's case (supra), the apex Court held that the benefit under Section 23(1-A) of the Act can be extended only to those cases, where award is passed by the Land Acquisition Officer subsequent to 30.4.1982, whereas, in the present cases, the awards were passed in the year 1979. It is to be noted that it was on the same ground that the clarification applications were filed by the first respondent in IA Nos.65 to 80 in the civil appeals and the said applications were also dismissed by the Apex Court. 11. It is to be noted that it was on the same ground that the clarification applications were filed by the first respondent in IA Nos.65 to 80 in the civil appeals and the said applications were also dismissed by the Apex Court. 11. The contention that they were not liable to pay 12% additional market value was raised by the first respondent, of course on different grounds in the review CMP Nos.7379, 7380 and 7381 of 1990 and Batch, but they were not considered by this Court on the ground that the same were not raised either in the grounds of appeal or at the time of hearing of the appeals and therefore, whether the award of 12% under Section 23(1-A) of the Act is justified or not, cannot be considered in review petitions, as the first respondent has raised the same contentions in the grounds of civil appeals filed before the apex Court, but the said civil appeals were dismissed. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision in Jaya Chandra Mohapatra v. Land Acquisition Officer, Rayagada, (2005) 9 SCC 123 , wherein the apex Court held as follows: Indisputably, the correctness or otherwise of the said order was not questioned by the respondent. It, therefore, attained finality. The said amended decree was put in execution by the appellant which was registered as EP No.7 of 1996. An objection in the said proceeding was filed by the respondent herein purported to be under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By an order dated 28.8.1999, the said objection was allowed by the executing Court holding that as the decree had once been amended the same became final and as such the Reference Court had no jurisdiction to amend the decree further. Furthermore, in this case the aforementioned order dated 8.10.1996 has attained finality by reason whereof the original decree stood amended. The executing Court in view of the decision in Bai Shakriben's case itself could not have gone behind the decree. The executing Court, thus, proceeded to pass the impugned judgment on a wrong premise. The executing Court keeping in view its limited jurisdiction could not have gone into the question as to whether the Reference Court was correct in passing the order dated 8.10.1996 amending the decree or not. The executing Court did not have any jurisdiction to go into the said question. The executing Court keeping in view its limited jurisdiction could not have gone into the question as to whether the Reference Court was correct in passing the order dated 8.10.1996 amending the decree or not. The executing Court did not have any jurisdiction to go into the said question. A decree passed by a competent Court of law can be suitably amended. A decree, so amended on an application filed by the claimant for review thereof, becomes final. If the State was aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, it could have taken the matter by filing an appropriate application before the High Court. But keeping in view the fact that the said order was allowed to attain finality, the Court could not have permitted the State to reagitate the said question before the executing Court by filing an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise. In a case of this nature, the principle of estoppel by records shall come into play. 13. The said decision was also cited before the executing Court, but the learned Senior Civil Judge in the impugned order expressed inability to understand the purport of the decision and the principle laid down therein in the absence of full text of the decision, being made available to him. In the above case, the award was passed on 13.9.1981 and on reference, the civil Court enhanced the market value by order dated 27.11.1990 but the other statutory benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act were not granted. An appeal against the said order by the State was dismissed by the High Court. Thereafter, the claimant filed application for enhancement of the solatium @ 30% and the same was allowed by order dated 21.12.1990. He also filed application for amendment for grant of benefit under Section 28 of the Act, which was also allowed by the reference Court on 30.7.1993. The claimant filed another application under Section 151 read with 152 CPC and under Order 47 Rule 1 for review, seeking certain clarification regarding the benefits under Section 23(1-A) and 23(2) of the Act. The said application was allowed directing necessary corrections to be made in the decree regarding rate of solatium and also interest. The correctness or otherwise of the said order was not questioned by the State and therefore, it attained finality. The said application was allowed directing necessary corrections to be made in the decree regarding rate of solatium and also interest. The correctness or otherwise of the said order was not questioned by the State and therefore, it attained finality. When the said amended decree was put in execution, the State raised an objection under Section 47 CPC and by order dated 28.8.1999, the said objection was upheld by the executing Court holding that the reference Court had no jurisdiction to amend the decree further. Aggrieved by the same, the claimant filed civil revision application before the High Court, which was dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the claimant carried the matter to the apex Court. The apex Court allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned orders, directed the executing Court to proceed in terms of the amended decree. The proposition laid down in the above decision is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case as well and the executing Court purporting to act under Section 47 CPC cannot hold that portion of the decree, which has already attained finality, even at the apex Court level, is a nullity. 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Randhawan, AIR 1992 SC 473 , wherein it was held that 'when the appellate decree directing payment of enhanced solatium was not challenged, the same cannot be questioned in execution on the ground that payment under Section 23(1-A) of the Act was not admissible. In the present cases, the appellate decrees in fact were challenged before the apex Court and the said civil appeals (SLPs) were dismissed. 15. In G. Gouri Naidu v. T. Bodemma, AIR 1997 SC 808 = 1997 (3) ALD (SCSN) 35, also relied upon by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners, it was held that 'the law is well settled that even if erroneous, an inter-party judgment binds the party if the Court of competent jurisdiction has decided the Its'. 16. In Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited v. Gulshan Lal, 2009 (5) ALD 52 (SC) = (2009) 13 SCC 354 , the apex Court held as follows: As indicated hereinbefore, for the purpose of allowing an objection tiled on behalf of a judgment-debtor under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was incumbent on him to show that the decree was ex facie nullity. For the said purpose, the Court is precluded from making an in-depth scrutiny as regards the entitlement of the plaintiff with reference to not only his claim made in the plaint but also the defence set up by the judgment-debtor. As the judgment of the trial Court could not have been reopened, the correctness thereof could not have been put to question. It is also well known that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree. If on a fair interpretation of the judgment, order and decree passed by a Court having appropriate jurisdiction in that behalf, the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff appear to have been granted, there is no reason as to why the executing Court shall deprive him from obtaining the fruits of the decree. It was further held as follows: It is also not a case where this Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to mould an order. The decree passed by the learned trial Court has attained finality. Whether rightly or wrongly, the judgment of the learned Trial Judge has been affirmed by this Court, ft is one thing to say that no right having crystallized in favour of a party to the lis, this Court can mould the relief appropriately, but it is another thing to say that despite the decree being found to be an executable one, this Court will refuse to direct execution thereof. We are not oblivious of the fact that the respondents legally would not have been entitled to the reliefs prayed for by them. However, as a decree has been passed, we do not intend to go behind the same. The executing Court shall, it goes without saying, execute the decree strictly in terms thereof. 17. In Public Vigilance v. The Chief Secretary, Government of A.P., 1992 (3) ALT 725 (DB), relied on by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners, the Division Bench of this Court held as follows: Under Article 375 of the Constitution of India, all Courts and all authorities throughout the territory of India shall continue to exercise their respective functions subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Under Article 141 the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. Under Article 141 the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. In the hierarchical set up of the Courts in our country, as ordained by the Constitution, the High Court compared to the Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction of an inferior nature. The decree granted by a higher Court must be obeyed by the lower Court. Any attempt, either directly or indirectly, to enquire into the validity or otherwise of the decree granted by the higher Court would be subversive of judicial discipline, and negation of the Rule of Law. 18. In the above decision, a reference was made to a decision in Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, AIR 1982 SC 686 , wherein the apex Court held that 'any decision rendered by any Court if in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court "would be non-est and absolutely without jurisdiction and violative of Article 141 of the Constitution of India". 19. In Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 2005 SC 3165 , the apex Court held that when the High Court issue directions by way of mandamus and the Land Acquisition Officer while passing award took into consideration said directions and awarded 12% additional compensation at market value and the said order having attained finality, the reference Court or for that matter High Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction could not have dealt with said question and the principle of res judicata shall fully apply'. 20. In the above decision, reference was made to a decision in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 803, wherein the apex Court held as follows: ...Here, the judgment given by the Calcutta High Court, which is relied upon by the petitioners, is not a mere declaratory judgment holding an impost or tax to be invalid, so that a validation statute can remove the defect pointed out by the judgment amending the law with retrospective effect and validate such impost or tax. But it is a judgment giving effect to the right of the petitioners to annual cash bonus under the settlement by issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Life Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of such bonus. But it is a judgment giving effect to the right of the petitioners to annual cash bonus under the settlement by issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Life Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of such bonus. If by reason of retrospective alteration of the factual or legal situation, the judgment is rendered erroneous, the remedy may be by way of appeal or review, but so long as the judgment stands, it cannot be disregarded or ignored and it must be obeyed by the Life Insurance Corporation. We are, therefore, of the view that, in any event, irrespective of whether the impugned Act is constitutionally valid or not, the Life Insurance Corporation is bound to obey the writ of mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court and to pay annual cash bonus for the year 1.4.1975 to 31.3.1976 to Class III and Class IV employees." 21. In K.P. Antony v. Thandiyode Plantations, AIR 1996 Ker. 37 , the Full Bench of Kerala High Court held as follows: It will not be open to a party to challenge a judgment when it is sought to be enforced on the ground that the judgment is based on wrong conclusions or on erroneous findings or on wrong application of law. As the remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is to challenge the same in appeal or revision as the case may be and not to challenge it when it is sought to be enforced, the respondents challenge in this case against the judgment cannot be sustained." 22. Learned Counsel for the first respondent relied upon the decision in Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain, AIR 1996 SC 1819 , wherein the apex Court held as follows: A decree can be said to be nullity if it is passed by a Court having no inherent jurisdiction, but erroneous decree cannot be said to be a nullity nor can a decree based on an error be a nullity. Nullity has to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the power of the Court passing the decree and not merely avoidable decree. As stated earlier, if the decree strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court or the Court lacks jurisdiction it strikes at the very root of the authority to pass the order or the decree. Nullity has to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the power of the Court passing the decree and not merely avoidable decree. As stated earlier, if the decree strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court or the Court lacks jurisdiction it strikes at the very root of the authority to pass the order or the decree. As seen, the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 has no application to the lands acquired under the Act. It was amended only w.e.f. August 1, 1987 and it was made applicable only to the pending proceedings. It would, therefore, be clear that the order awarding additional benefits is clearly without jurisdiction and thereby it is a nullity. Its nullity can be assailed at any stage including at the execution or in a collateral proceedings since it strikes at the very jurisdiction and authority of the Court." 23. In the above case, under Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act 1959, the land of first respondent herein along with other land owners, was acquired. The Additional Collector made an award dated 30.6.1976 and on appeal, the District Judge enhanced the compensation. Both the appellant and respondents carried the matter to the High Court and the High Court remanded the matter to the District Judge with certain directions, for fresh disposal. The District Judge while reconsidering the matter applied the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, Amendment Act 68 of 1984, and awarded additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Act. The Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act 1959 was amended by Rajasthan Amendment Act 29 of 1987, which came into force w.e.f. 1.8.1987 and by reason thereof, the Central Amendment Act 68 of 1984 became applicable to the acquisition under the Act from 1.8.1987 with a transitory provision. The Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act 1959 was amended by Rajasthan Amendment Act 29 of 1987, which came into force w.e.f. 1.8.1987 and by reason thereof, the Central Amendment Act 68 of 1984 became applicable to the acquisition under the Act from 1.8.1987 with a transitory provision. It was contended for the appellants therein-Urban Improvement Trust, that the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 was extended to the land acquired under Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, only with effect from 1.8.1987 and under the said Act, there was no provision for payment of solatium, interest and additional market value and so, the District Judge went wrong in applying the provisions of the Central Act, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, as he inherently lacked jurisdiction to apply the provisions of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 and the order dated 18.12.1989 passed by the District Judge is a nullity insofar as it awards interest, solatium on the market value and the said objection can be raised even in execution. It was contended on behalf of the respondents/ claimants therein that the order awarding additional benefits under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 was allowed to become final and it was not open to the appellant trust to contend that the decree is a nullity. In the factual matrix, it was held by the apex Court that under the Central Amendment Act, payment of additional market value under Section 23(1-A) and of solatium under Section 23(2) cannot be applied to the award made prior to coming into force of the Rajasthan Amendment, Act 29 of 1987 and so, the District Judge was not right in applying the Amendment Act on 18.12.1989 awarding enhanced solatium and interest and additional amount. The question which then arose for consideration was whether the objection could be raised in execution and observed that the said controversy is no longer res Integra, the apex Court held that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction over the subject-matter or on any other ground which goes to the root of its exercise of jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction, is a nullity and its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right even at the stage of execution or collateral proceedings. It was further observed that the defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the Court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party and the Court has jurisdiction, but if there is any defect in its exercise of jurisdiction, it does not go to the root of its authority. 24. In the present cases, it is to be noted that the reference Court was not lacking any authority or jurisdiction when the order was passed awarding compensation and granting other benefits under the amended Act. It was only subsequently in 1995 in Paripoornan's case (supra), it was held by the apex Court that the benefits under Section 23(1-A) of the Act can be extended only in those cases where award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer subsequent to 30.4.1982. It is therefore not a case where the Court lacked inherent jurisdiction or there was any defect in exercise of the jurisdiction striking at the authority of the Court to pass a decree, but it is a case where there has been subsequent change in law by way of a pronouncement by the apex Court in Paripoornan's case (supra). Even in the above decision, it was held that when the Court has jurisdiction to assess any defect in exercise of jurisdiction, it does not go to the root of its authority. It was further observed that erroneous decree cannot be said to be a nullity nor can a decree based on a nullity and the nullity has to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the power of the Court passing the decree and not merely avoidable decree. In fact, the first respondent sought to avoid the decree by preferring appeal before this Court and on its dismissal by filing a review petition and on its dismissal by filing civil appeals (SLPs) before the apex Court and on the same being dismissed, by filing an application seeking clarification, which was also dismissed. The decision cited by the Learned Counsel for the first respondent is therefore not applicable to the facts of the present case. 25. The decision cited by the Learned Counsel for the first respondent is therefore not applicable to the facts of the present case. 25. He also relied on a decision in Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin, (2004) 1 SCC 287 = 2004 AILD 336 (SC), wherein, the apex Court held as follows: A distinction exists between a decree passed by a Court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and not executable and a decree of the Court which is merely illegal or not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. A decree suffering from illegality or irregularity of procedure, cannot be termed in-executable by the executing Court; the remedy of a person aggrieved by such a decree is to have it set aside in a duly constituted legal proceedings or by a superior Court failing which he must obey the command of the decree. A decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by any collateral attack or in incidental proceedings. 26. He further relied on a decision in Hasham Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad, 2007 (2) ALD 59 (SC) = (2007) 2 SCC 355 , wherein it was held as follows: The core question is as to whether an order passed by a person lacking inherent jurisdiction would be a nullity. It will be so. The principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence or even res judicata which are procedural in nature would have no application in a case where an order has been passed by the Tribunal/Court which has no authority in that behalf Any order passed by a Court without jurisdiction would be coram non judice, being a nullity, the same ordinarily should not be given effect to. 27. The principle laid down in the above case is not applicable to the facts of the present cases, for the reason that the present cases are not one where the reference Court was lacking inherent jurisdiction to pass a decree and it was passed and therefore, the decree cannot be branded as a nullity even if it is erroneous in fact or in law. 28. Learned Counsel for the first respondent relied on the decision in Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ajit Singh, (2005) 3 SCC 232 , wherein it was held that 'the principle of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure. 28. Learned Counsel for the first respondent relied on the decision in Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ajit Singh, (2005) 3 SCC 232 , wherein it was held that 'the principle of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure. When the decision relates to the jurisdiction of a Court to try an earlier proceeding, the principle of res judicata would not come into play'. 29. The question of jurisdiction did not arise in the present cases, inasmuch as the reference Court when it passed the order on 30.4.1982 extending the benefits under Section 23(1-A) of the Act was not lacking any jurisdiction but only subsequently in the year 1995, it turned out that such benefits cannot be extended to the awards passed by the Land Acquisition Officer prior to 30.4.1982 in view of the pronouncement of the apex Court in Paripoornan's case (supra). 30. In support of his contention that the dismissal of civil appeals by the apex Court based on the consent of both parties is of no consequence, Learned Counsel for the first respondent seeks to rely upon the decision in Union of India v. Mohanlal Likumal Punjabi, 2004 (1) ALD (Crl.) 739 (SC) = (2004) 3 SCC 628 , wherein the apex Court held that 'in our view the concession, if any, is really of no consequence, because the wrong concession made by a Counsel cannot bind the parties when statutory provisions clearly provided otherwise.' 31. It is to be noted that subsequent to dismissal of the civil appeals, the first respondent filed application seeking clarification on the very same grounds that the issue in regard to the question of interest and solatium, stood concluded against the petitioners herein by judgment of the apex Court and that the omission to mention the same at the time of making submission in the civil appeals was unintentional. However, the fact remains that the said applications filed by the first respondent seeking modification of the earlier order passed in the civil appeals were also dismissed observing that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court was not inclined to recall the order. It is no longer open for the first respondent to contend that the concession was a wrong concession made by the Counsel and the same does not bind the parties. 32. It is no longer open for the first respondent to contend that the concession was a wrong concession made by the Counsel and the same does not bind the parties. 32. In the circumstances and in view of the principles laid down in the above decisions, it is held that the impugned orders passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge holding that the decree in the original petitions is a nullity to the extent it relates to payment of additional market value at 12% and interest thereon, is clearly unsustainable and is therefore liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. Consequently, the respective EAs filed by the first respondent herein in all the execution petitions under Section 47 CPC stand dismissed. 33. In the result, all the civil revision petitions are allowed as stated above. No order as to costs.