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2011 DIGILAW 618 (PNJ)

Jagat Sarup v. State Of Haryana

2011-02-21

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, RANJAN GOGOI

body2011
Judgment Ranjan Gogoi, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed challenging the constitutional validity of Section 30 of the Societies Registration Act as introduced by the Societies Registration (Haryana Amendment) Act, 2007. 2. To appreciate the contentions advanced, Section 30 of the Act, as introduced by the Haryana Amendment Act, is extracted below:- "30. Appointment of Administrator.- (1) Where on receipt of a complaint from three office-bearers of a society or three affected persons or on inspection of records, the Registrar is satisfied,- (i) that the society is working against the objectives and ideals as per sections 1 and 20 on the basis of which the society was granted certificate; (ii) that the society is not working democratically or the elections have not taken place within the specified time or the elections have taken place fraudulently or against the clauses of memorandum of association; (iii) that the office-bearers have been nominated against the clauses of memorandum of association; (iv) that the number of members in a trustee mandal has been purposely kept below seven, the Registrar may recommend to the State Government to appoint an Administrator: Provided that no adverse order shall be passed unless an opportunity of being heard has been given to the concerned society: Provided further that the action of the Registrar in this behalf shall be final and no appeal shall lie in any court against such action. (2) The State Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, shall appoint an Administrator of such society who shall not be below the rank of Deputy Secretary for such period, not exceeding six months, as may be specified in the order to manage the affairs of the society: Provided that for reasons to be recorded in writing, the State Government may, by like order, extend the said period for a further duration of six months. (3) On the appointment of the Administrator under subsection (2), the governing body of the society shall cease to exercise any powers and perform and discharge any functions or duties conferred or imposed on it by this Act, or its memorandum of association or the rules and regulations or any other law and subject to any directions which the State Government may from time to time issue, all such functions or duties shall be performed or discharged by the Administrator. (4) The Administrator shall, before the expiry of the period of his appointment, take necessary action to convene the general body meeting of the society and hold election for the constitution of the governing body. (5) If the Administrator is not, for reasons beyond his control, able to convene the general body meeting or in spite of such meeting being convened the general body fails to elect the governing body, the Administrator shall forthwith send a report to the State Government who may pass such orders as are considered necessary, either extending the period of appointment of the Administrator for a further duration or if satisfied that public interest so requires, for the dissolution of the society. (6) The State Government may, if it thinks fit, appoint a committee to advise and assist the Administrator appointed under sub-section (I) in the exercise of the powers and performance and discharge of the duties and functions conferred or imposed on him under this Act. The members of the committee shall have such qualifications as may be prescribed and shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government. (7) Where an order of dissolution is passed under subsection (5), the assets of the society shall vest in and the liabilities shall devolve on the State Government." 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that Section 30 of the Act is ultra vires Article 19(c) read with Article 19(4) of the Constitution. The second ground urged is that the State Legislature is not competent to enact the Amendment Act as the field is already covered by a parliamentary enactment i.e. The Khadi and Village Industries Commission Act, 1956. There has been a transgression into an occupied field by the enactment of the Amendment Act according to the learned counsel. 4. Article 19(1)(c) confers all citizens the fundamental right to form associations or unions. However, under Article 19(4), the said fundamental right is subject to the State making a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred. Such law can be made by the State in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality. However, under Article 19(4), the said fundamental right is subject to the State making a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred. Such law can be made by the State in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality. According to the learned counsel, the Haryana Amendment Act does not have any reasonable nexus with the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality and, therefore, the restrictions that have been imposed by the Amendment Act is ultra vires Article 19(4). 5. The argument, on the face of it, is not tenable. The Haryana Amendment Act which introduced Section 30 to the Societies Registration Act in its application to the State of Haryana, is not a legislation imposing any restriction on the functioning of a society. The right of a society to run its affairs through a system of self-governance is recognized all through out except in the situations contemplated by Section 30, in which situations the society is to be run by the Administrator. However, the later provisions of Section 30 make it clear that it would be the endeavor of the Administrator to hold the elections of the society within a period of six months, which is the outer limit of time for functioning by the Administrator. The said outer limit, in no case, can be extended beyond a period of further six months. In view of the scheme visualized by Section 30 of the Act it is difficult to see how the said provision can be understood to be imposing any kind of restriction on the self governance of the society by its members. Section 30 must be understood to be containing self regulatory measures which are not restrictive in nature. 6. Insofar as the argument on the basis of the doctrine of occupied field is concerned, a perusal of the provisions of Khadi and Village Industries Act would go to show that the said enactment has nothing to do with the affairs of the society like the petitioner whose aims and objectives are to produce and popularize the use of Khadi. Nowhere in the Act of 1956, there is any provision with regard to the internal management of societies like the petitioner. Rather, the provisions of the said Act are exclusive to. the Commission established by the Act. Nowhere in the Act of 1956, there is any provision with regard to the internal management of societies like the petitioner. Rather, the provisions of the said Act are exclusive to. the Commission established by the Act. In such a situation, it is difficult to appreciate as to how by enacting the Amendment Act the State Legislature can be understood to have encroached a field occupied by a Central Act. Both the enactments operate in unconnected/different fields. 7. Both the issues raised on behalf of the petitioners having been answered in the manner indicated above, we are of the view that the challenge to the vires of the Act must fail. 8. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.