JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. The petitioner, who is the husband of the detenue Smt. Kh. (N) Subhashini Devi, is assailing the impugned detention order dated 6.12.2010 passed by the District Magistrate, Thoubal District in exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (2) of section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 read with Government of Manipur, Home Department Notification No. 17(1)/49/80-H(Pt-I) dated 15.11.2010 until further order, the approval order of the State Government dated 14.12.2010 and also the confirmation order of the State government dated 15.01.2011 for confirming the impugned detention order dated 6.12.2010 and fixed the period of detention for 12(twelve) months from the date of detention on the ground that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenue is likely to be released on bail is based on no materials, as a result, the continued detention of the detenue is illegal. 2. Heard Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and also Mr.Th.Ibohal, learned Sr. Government Advocate appearing for the respondents No.1 and 2 as well as Mr. Amarjit Naorem, learned CGSC appearing for the respondent No.3. 3. The succinct facts, sufficient for deciding the issue in the present writ petition, are noted. On 29.11.2010 at about 11.30 a.m., when the detenue had gone out of her residence to buy some kitchen items, two unknown women, who were coming in an auto rickshaw approached her near the bus stop and asked for the direction to Charangpat. Suddenly, a police vehicle of Thoubal Commando appeared and picked up the said two unknown women and took them away along with them and the detenue was shocked and scared and did not know what to do. She returned home and narrated the incident to the members of her family. After half an hour of the incident, the Commando personnel of Thoubal again came to her residence and directed her to come to the office of the Superintendent of Police, Thoubal District. Accordingly, she went along with her eldest son in an auto rickshaw to the office of the Superintendent of Police, Thoubal District. On reaching the police station, one of the police personnel directed her son to go back to her house stating that she will be released after some verifications. She was not allowed to return home and detained the whole night. On reaching the police station, one of the police personnel directed her son to go back to her house stating that she will be released after some verifications. She was not allowed to return home and detained the whole night. On the next day i.e. on 30.11.2010, she was produced before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal along with the said two unknown ladies who she saw on an auto rickshaw and another lady. Later on, the detenue came to know that she had been arrested in connection with a police case being FIR Case No.190(11) 2010 TBL. P.S. u/s17/19/30 UA(P) A. Act and further she also learnt that a sum of Rs.2.80,000/- was seized from the physical possession of one of the two unknown ladies. On 06.12.2010, when she was produced before the Court, she was informed by the concerned police officer that she had been detained under the National Security Act, 1980 in pursuance of a detention order passed by the District Magistrate, Thoubal. Only on 10.12.2010, the jail staffs of the Manipur Central Jail, Imphal, furnished a copy of the impugned detention order dated 6.12.2010 along with several documents. 4. The detaining authority under his letter dated 06.12.2010 furnished the grounds of detention along with the copies of the documents which formed the basis of the grounds of detention to the detune. A copy of the said letter dated 6.12.2010 (the ground of detention) is available at Annexure-N/2 to the present writ petition. For easy reference, the said grounds of detention dated 6.12.2010 (Annexure-N/2 to the writ petition) are quoted hereunder:- Annexure, N/2 IN THE COURT OF DC/DISTRICT MAGISTRATE: THOUBAL DISTRICT No. Cril. NSA, 1980 Case No. 44 of 2010 Thoubal, the 6th Dec. 2010 To, Smt. Khumathem (n) Thingujam (o) Subhashini Devi (47) yrs w.o. Shri Th. Dillip Singh of Charangpat Mamang Leikai, P.S. Thoubal, District -Thoubal, Manipur. Subject:- Grounds of detention order under Sub-Section 2 of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980. In pursuance of the Sub-Section 2 of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 and on the satisfaction of the report of SP/Thoubal under his letter No. 9/37/2010/SP-TBL/3081 dated 4th December, 2010, I, the undersigned have to inform you, Smt. Khumanthem (n) Thingujam (o) Shubhashini Devi (47) yrs w/o Shri Th. In pursuance of the Sub-Section 2 of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 and on the satisfaction of the report of SP/Thoubal under his letter No. 9/37/2010/SP-TBL/3081 dated 4th December, 2010, I, the undersigned have to inform you, Smt. Khumanthem (n) Thingujam (o) Shubhashini Devi (47) yrs w/o Shri Th. Dillip Singh of Charangpat Mamang Leikai, P.S. Thoubal, District-Thoubal, Manipur the grounds of your detention as below :- 1. You joined the banned organization namely, Kangleik Yaol Kanna Lup (KYKL in short) in the month of October, 2010 as an over ground member through Shri Prem @ Ch. Ranjit Singh of Waheng khuman, an important member of KYKL. 2. The avowed aim and object of the party namely, Kanglei Yaol Kanna Lup (KYKL in short) is to secede the state of Manipur from the Union of India & to create an independent, sovereign state of Manipur. For this purpose, the said organization started procuring of arms and ammunition through foreign countries and recruited youngsters from various communities in Manipur. In pursuance of the objectives, the members of the organization have committed series of heinous crimes such as murder, dacoit, robbery, extortion, kidnapping for ransom from different parts of Manipur. The ringleader have sought foreign assistance and established links with countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, etc. and committed series of prejudicial activities affecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. 3. After joining the banned organization Shri Prem @ Ch. Ranjit Singh directed you to work as over ground member under his command in the finance section of KYKL organization. Further Shri Prem @ Ch. Ranjit Singh further directed you to work in Thoubal District Finance Section along with Smt. Oinam(O) Shanti Devi (36) yrs. w/o O. Ibohal Singh of Heirok Part-I and Smt. Ningthoujam(N) Laishram (O) Bhani Devi of Heirok Part-I to collect the demanded money of KYKL from the general public, Government offices, Private firms, Engineers, Pradhans, etc. Accordingly, since the 1st part of October, 2010, you and your associates started to collect the demand money of KYKL from the general public, Government offices, Private firms, Engineers, Pradhans, etc. located in the Thoubal District and made over the same to Shri Prem @ Ch. Ranjit Singh. Your house were used as contact and meeting place of the KYKL members who were operating in Thoubal District. located in the Thoubal District and made over the same to Shri Prem @ Ch. Ranjit Singh. Your house were used as contact and meeting place of the KYKL members who were operating in Thoubal District. You and your associates watch the movement of security forces and pass on the information to the KYKL members for their easy movement. Over and above the services of you and your associates were utilized in transporting arms and ammines from one place to another for use of the KYKL members. You carried out similar task till your arrest. Such act of extortion of money you carried out gave rise to panic and created at terror wave to the general public, which is prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order. 4. On 29.11.2010 at about 1.00 pm, you along with your associates noted above collected a sum of Rs.2.8 lacs from Smt. Th. Roma Devi, Pradhan of Heirok Part-II, Gram Panchayat as per direction of Shri Prem Singh @ Ch. Ranjit Singh and went towards Charangpat Mamang Leikai in an Auto-Rickshaw in order and to hand over the same to Shri Prem @ Ch. Ranjit Singh. On arrival at Charangpat Mamang Leikai at about 1.30 pm, you were arrested along with your associates by a team of CDO/TBL led by JC No.504 Md. Daulat Shah and recovered a sum of Rs.2.8 lacs from the possession of Smt. Libyan Devi. Observing formality seized the same. Then you were handed over to O.C./TBL - P.S. with a report and seized articles. On the strength of the report O.C/TBL - P.S. registered a regular case under FIR No. 190(11)2010 TBL-PS u/s 17/19/39 UA(P)A. Act and investigated. During the course of the investigation of the case you were arrested on 29.11.2010 and remanded into police custody till 6.12.2010 and you are now in policy custody. On the strength of the report O.C/TBL - P.S. registered a regular case under FIR No. 190(11)2010 TBL-PS u/s 17/19/39 UA(P)A. Act and investigated. During the course of the investigation of the case you were arrested on 29.11.2010 and remanded into police custody till 6.12.2010 and you are now in policy custody. From the points enumerated above, it is seen that you are a hard core member of the banned organization namely "Kanglei Yaol Kanna Lup" (KYKL in short) which aim at establishing a sovereign independent State of Manipur waging war against the lawfully established Government of India and Manipur holding arms, I am satisfied that after having availed of bail facilities and becoming a free person, you being a hard core member of the said organization would continue to indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of the public order. Hence, the application of normal criminal law against you will not at all be effective to prevent you from the commission of further prejudicial activities. An alternative measure is, therefore, immediately called for. The following copies of the documents are supported for your detention order: (1) The statement of Smt. Khumanthem (n) Thingujam (o) Subhashini Devi (47) yrs w/o Shri Th. Dillip Singh of Charangpat Mamang Leikai, given before the I.O. on 30.11.2010. (2) Statement of JC NO. 504 MD Daulat Shah of CDO/TBL recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. in c/w FIR No. 190(11)2010 TBL-PS u/s 17/19/39 UA(P)A Act. (3) Statement of C/No. 012006181 K. Boy Singh of-do-recorded under Section -do- (4) Statement of W/C No. 0780020 M. Lata Devi of Thoubal District recorded -do- (5) Copy of Arrest Memo dated 29.14.2010 (6) Copy of seizure Memo dated 29.11.2010 (7) Copy of Notification under No. S.O.2883 (E) dated 13.11.2009 (8) Copy of FIR No. 190(11) 2010 TBL- PS under Section17/19/39 UA(P) A. Act. That, you are hereby informed that you have the right to make representation to the Govt. of Manipur as well as to the Central Govt. against the order of detention passed against you and you are hereby afforded the earliest opportunity for making such representation, if you wish to do so. The representation is to be sent through Superintendent/Addl. Superintendent, Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa/Imphal to the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Manipur in respect of representation to the Govt. of Manipur and to the "Secretary to the Govt. The representation is to be sent through Superintendent/Addl. Superintendent, Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa/Imphal to the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Manipur in respect of representation to the Govt. of Manipur and to the "Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs" (Department of Internal Security) North Block, New Delhi-110001 in respect of representation to the central government and should be submitted within 3(three) weeks from the date of detention. Further, you are informed that you have right to make representation to the detaining authority within 12(twelve) days from the date of detention, which is to be sent to the District Magistrate Thoubal. Your representation, if any, would be placed before the Advisory Board within 3(three) weeks time from the date of your detention along with such other documents/papers connected with your detention as the Govt. is bound under law to produce before the Board for its consideration. (W. Rajen Singh) District Magistrate, Thoubal District, Manipur 5. In the grounds of detention, it is clearly stated that the members of the unlawful organization i.e. Kanglei Yaol Kanna Lup (KYKL in short) committed series of heinous crimes such as murder, dacoit, robbery, extortion, kidnapping for ransom from different parts of Manipur and the ring leaders have sought foreign assistance and established links with countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, etc. and committed series of prejudicial activities affecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. The detenue after joining the said organization i.e. KYKL, one Shri Prem @ Ch. Ranjit Singh directed her to work as over ground member under his command in the finance section of KYKL organization and Shri Prem @ Ch. Ranjit Singh further directed the detenue to work in Thoubal District Finance Section along with Smt. Oinam(O) Shanti Devi (36) yrs. w/o O. Ibohal Singh of Heirok Part-I and Smt. Ningthoujam(N) Laishram'(O) Bhani Devi of Heirok Part-I to collect the demand money of KYKL from the general public, Government offices, Private firms, Engineers, Pradhans, etc. Accordingly, since the first part of October, 2010, the detenue and her associates started to collect the demand money of KYKL from the general public, Government offices, Private firms, Engineers, Pradhans, etc. located in the Thoubal District. Over and above, the services of the detenue and her associates were utilized in transporting arms and ammunitions from one place to another for use of the KYKL. located in the Thoubal District. Over and above, the services of the detenue and her associates were utilized in transporting arms and ammunitions from one place to another for use of the KYKL. On 29.11.2010 at about 1.00 pm, the detenue along with her associates mentioned above collected a sum of Rs.2.8 lacs from Smt. Th. Roma Devi, Pradhan of Heirok Part-II, Gram Panchayat as per direction of Shri Prem Singh @ Ch. Ranjit Singh and went towards Charangpat Mamang Leikai in a auto rickshaw in order to hand over the same to Shri Prem @ Ch. Ranjit Singh. On arrival at Charangpat Mamang Leikai at about 1.30 pm, the detenue was arrested along with her associates by a team of CDO/TBL led by JC No.504 Md. Daulat Shah and recovered a sum of Rs.2.8 lacs from the possession of Smt L. Bhani Devi. In the grounds of detention, it is also mentioned that after having availed of bail facilities and becoming a free person, the detenue being a hard core member of the organization (KYKL) would continue to indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of the public order and hence, the application of normal criminal law against the detenue will not at all be effective to prevent the detenue from the commission of further prejudicial activities. An alternative preventative measure is immediately called for. 6. The present writ petition is filed, as stated above, mainly on the ground that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenue is likely to be released on bail is based on no materials and also the detaining authority had overlooked the fact that the detenue has been arrested for the first time in her life at the time of passing the impugned detention order and also that the circumstances, in the present case, for releasing the detenue on bail are quite remote. 7. Deprivation of personal freedom must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objective of the society, specified in the Constitution. The object of law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. Prevention detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence. 7. Deprivation of personal freedom must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objective of the society, specified in the Constitution. The object of law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. Prevention detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence. It is resorted to when the Executive is convinced that such detention is necessary in order to prevent a person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The framers of our Constitution, no doubt, being aware that preventive detention involves a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty, took care to incorporate, in Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22, certain minimum safeguards for the protection of persons sought to be preventively detained. 8. No doubt, the doctrine of preventive power of the Administrative/Executive authority constitutionally validate preventive process for maintaining the public order i.e. the security of the State National security, defense of India and relations of India with the foreign powers. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Amir Shad Khan Vs. L. Hmingliana & Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 39 held that The law of preventive detention is harsh to the person detained and, therefore, there can be no doubt that it must be strictly construed. Article22(3)(b) denies to a person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention the protection of clauses (1) and (2) of the said article. Clause (4) thereof enjoins that the preventive detention law must conform to the limitations set out there under. Clause (5) of Article 22 reads as under: 22. (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. (Ref. : Para 3 of the SCC in Amir Shad Khan's case (supra)). 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Maharastra Vs. (Ref. : Para 3 of the SCC in Amir Shad Khan's case (supra)). 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Maharastra Vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande (2008) 3 SCC 613 held that the Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that jurisdiction of preventive detention is "suspicious jurisdiction" based on suspicion and an action is taken with a view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the certain activities enumerated in the detention law. Interference by a court of law at that stage, must be an exception rather than a rule because the exercise can be undertaken by a writ court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. Para No.63 of the SCC in Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande (supra) reads as follows :- 63. From the foregoing discussion, in our judgment, the law appears to be fairly well settled and it is this. As a general rule, an order of detention passed by a detaining authority under the relevant "preventive detention" law cannot be set aside by a writ court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage unless the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances specified in Addl. Secy. To the Govt. of India vs. Alka Subhash Gadia, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496 : 1992 SCC (Cril) 301. The Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that this is a "suspicious jurisdiction" i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken "with a view to preventing" a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the relevant detention law. Interference by a court of law at that stage must an exception rather than a rule and such an exercise can be undertaken by a writ court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. A detenue cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of such order. 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court (3 Judges) in Rekha Vs. State of T.N. 20114 Scale 387 also reiterated that the preventive detention is often described as jurisdiction of suspicion. Para No.40 of the SCC in Rekha's case (supra) reads as follows:- 40. 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court (3 Judges) in Rekha Vs. State of T.N. 20114 Scale 387 also reiterated that the preventive detention is often described as jurisdiction of suspicion. Para No.40 of the SCC in Rekha's case (supra) reads as follows:- 40. It must be remembered that in cases of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is often described as a 'jurisdiction of suspicion', (Vide State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharurao Punjabrao Gawande, (supra) - para 63). The detaining authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clauses (1) and (2), the detenue is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. 11. From the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande's case (supra) and Rekha Devi's case (supra), it is clear that jurisdiction to order preventive detention is a suspicious jurisdiction i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken with a view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the certain activities enumerated in the relevant detention law. The interference of Court of law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule. It is quite well settled that the suspicion should be based on materials i.e. on the objective basis. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi Vs. State of Manipur & Ors. (2010) 9 SCC 618 held that there must be a reasonable basis for the detention order. There must be material to support the same and Court is entitled to scrutinize the material relied upon by the authority in coming to its conclusion and accordingly determined if there is any objective basis for the subjective satisfaction. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that the grounds stated in the order of detention and the grounds of detention are sufficient or not is not within the ambit of the discretion of the Court. It is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which is implied. Para No.26 of the SCC in Mikoi's case (supra) reads as follows :- 26. It is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which is implied. Para No.26 of the SCC in Mikoi's case (supra) reads as follows :- 26. What emerges from these rulings is that, there must be a reasonable basis for the detention order, and there must be material to support the same. The Court is entitled to scrutinize the material relied upon by the authority in coming to its conclusion, and accordingly determine if there is an objective basis for the subjective satisfaction. The subjective satisfaction must be twofold. The detaining authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the authority must be further satisfied that it is necessary to detain the said person in order to prevent from so acting. 13. This Court (one of us is the party) in Lourembam Sana Singh Vs. State of Manipur & Ors. 2008 (2) GLT 813, held that- 13. It is well settled law that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at for detaining the detenue as a preventive measure under the preventive law is invalid if such satisfaction is based on non-existent or irrelevant ground only. Reference in Dwarika Prasad Sahu vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in AIR 1975 SC 134 . The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while considering the materials and records was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention and the involvement of the detenue in different activities. Reference may be made in A.P. Saravanan vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2001) 10 SCC 212. There is no set standards laid down by the NSA for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of all the materials placed before it by the police. In the present case as stated above, the detaining authority had arrived at, on subjective satisfaction, for detaining the detenue under the NSA on the basis of the materials and the information placed by the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West. Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the ground of non application of mind. Reference in Gurudayal Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2002) 1 SCC 545 . Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the ground of non application of mind. Reference in Gurudayal Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2002) 1 SCC 545 . The Apex Court in Union of India vs. Paul Manikham reported in (2003) 8 SCC 342 held that: Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. It is resorted to when the executive is convinced on the materials available and placed before it that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authorities. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct, the failure to confirm to which alone should lead to detention. 14. This Court in Thongam (Ongbi) Sanatombi Devi Vs. District Magistrate, Imphal West & Ors. 2007 (4) GLT 931 also held- 13. It is a settled position of law that the nature of satisfaction of the detaining authority in issuing the detention order under National Security Act for preventing a detenue from indulging in such activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the security of the State is only a subjective satisfaction but subjective satisfaction should not be on no material. 14. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while considering the materials and records was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in (2001) 10 SCC 212 A.P. Saravanan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu. According to the learned counsel for the respondents no set standards have been laid down by the Act for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The subjective satisfaction in the present case had been arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of all the materials placed before him. State of Tamil Nadu. According to the learned counsel for the respondents no set standards have been laid down by the Act for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The subjective satisfaction in the present case had been arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of all the materials placed before him. Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the grounds of non-application of mind in view of the principles laid down in Gurdev Singh Vs. Union of India (2002) 1 SCC 545 . 19. As we have discussed above, the satisfaction of the (sic) authority for issuing the detention order is only a subjective satisfaction. We, within the four corners of law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases discussed above, perused the materials available on record to see as to whether the relevant materials were placed before the detaining authority at the time of passing the detention order or not be effective to prevent him from the commission of further prejudicial activities. 15. We again recall the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court made more than half a century ago in State of Bombay Vs Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya : AIR (38) 1951 SC 157 that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must be based on some grounds. The question whether such grounds can give rise to the subjective satisfaction required for making the order is outside the scope of the inquiry of the court. 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India Vs. Paul Manickam & Anr. AIR 2003 SC 6422 held that the detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenue and if the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent materials that there is likelihood of release on bail and in view of the antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging such prejudicial activities. In Paul Manickam's case (supra), three conditions had been laid down which are to be satisfied for detaining a detenue already in custody under the detention order. Para No. 12 of AIR in Paul Manickam's case (supra) reads as follows:- 12. In Paul Manickam's case (supra), three conditions had been laid down which are to be satisfied for detaining a detenue already in custody under the detention order. Para No. 12 of AIR in Paul Manickam's case (supra) reads as follows:- 12. So far as this question relating to procedure to be adopted in case the detenue is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in Jail under some other laws, the detaining authority should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody the detenue by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. ordinarily, it is not needed when detenue is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenue and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging such prejudicial activities the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenue was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu. AIR 1989 SC 2027 ; Dharmendra Suganchand v. Union India, AIR 1990 SC 1196 . The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 1640 . The principles were set out as follows. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu. AIR 1989 SC 2027 ; Dharmendra Suganchand v. Union India, AIR 1990 SC 1196 . The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 1640 . The principles were set out as follows. Even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed, (1) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him; (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities, and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand, the order of detention and grounds of detention show awareness of custody and/or possibility of release on bail. 17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in T. V. Sravanan @ S.A.R. Prasana Venkatachaariar Chaturvedi Vs. State through Secretary & Anr. (2006) 2 SCC 664 held that even if the bail application moved by the applicant (detune) had been rejected by the Court, if there is cogent materials before the detaining authority for satisfying that the detenue is likely to be released on bail, the detenue can still be detained under the order of detention; and that if there is cogent materials before the detaining authority, on the basis of which the detaining authority could be satisfied that the detenue was likely to be released on bail. Para Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the SCC in T.V. Sravanan's case (supra) reads as follows:- 7. The question is whether on the basis of such material, an order of detention was justified, even though the appellant was in custody on the date of issuance of the order of the detention. The principle in this regard is well settled. In Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan, (1964) 4 SCR 921 : AIR 1964 SC 334 : (1964) 1 Cril LJ 257 this Court observed: (SCRpp. The principle in this regard is well settled. In Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan, (1964) 4 SCR 921 : AIR 1964 SC 334 : (1964) 1 Cril LJ 257 this Court observed: (SCRpp. 929-30) [12] As an abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that Section 3(1)(a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against the person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order be passed against a person in jail.....Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each case. 8. The principle was further elucidated in Binod Singh vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, (1986) 4 SCC 416 : 1986 SCC (Cril) 490, in the following words: (SCC pp. 420-21, para 7) 7. It is well settled in our constitutional framework that the power of directing preventive detention given to the appropriate authorities must be exercised in exceptional cases as contemplated by the various provisions of the different statutes dealing with preventive detention and should be used with great deal of circumspection. There must be awareness of the facts necessitating preventive custody of a person for social defense. If a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the power of preventive detention should not be exercised. In the instant case when the actual order of detention was served upon the detune, the detenue was in jail. There is no indication that this factor or the question that the said detenue might be released or that there was such a possibility of his release, was taken into consideration by the detaining authority properly and seriously before the service of the order. A bald statement is merely an ipse dixit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenue might be released then these should have been made apparent. A bald statement is merely an ipse dixit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenue might be released then these should have been made apparent. Eternal vigilance on the part of the authority charged with the both law and order and public order is the price which the democracy in this country extracts from the public officials in order to protect the fundamental freedoms of our citizens. 9. In Kamarunnisa vs. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC(Cril)88, this Court observed : (SCC p. 140, para 13) 13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher court. 10. Apart from these decisions learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on the decisions in Rajesh Gulati vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2002) 7 SCC 129 : 2002 SCC (Cril) 1672; K. Varadharaj vs. State of T.N. (2002)6 SCC 735 : 2002 SCC (Cril) 1514; Amriltal vs. Union Govt. (2001) 1 SCC 341 : 2001 SCC(Cril) 147; Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin vs. Govt. of the NCT of Delhi 1994 Supp (1) SCC 597 : 1994 SCC (Cril) 354 and Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik vs. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 1 : 1992 SCC (Cril)1. 18. (2001) 1 SCC 341 : 2001 SCC(Cril) 147; Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin vs. Govt. of the NCT of Delhi 1994 Supp (1) SCC 597 : 1994 SCC (Cril) 354 and Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik vs. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 1 : 1992 SCC (Cril)1. 18. The Apex Court in Senthamilselvi Vs State of T.N. & Anr: (2006) 5 SCC 676 (para 10 of the SCC p.679) held that "It was also submitted that since the detenue had not filed any bail application, the detaining authority could not have inferred that there was possibility of his being released on bail. Strong reliance is placed on several decisions of this Court. It has to be noted that whether prayer for bail would be accepted depends on circumstances of each case and no hard-and-fast rule can be applied. The only requirement is that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenue is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenue may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority. On the basis of materials before him, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenue being released on bail. That is his subjective satisfaction based on materials. Normally, such satisfaction is not to be interfered with. On the facts of the case, the detaining authority has indicated as to why he was of the opinion that there is likelihood of detenue being released on bail. 19. We have given our anxious consideration, keeping in view of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cases, to the impugned order of detention and the grounds of detention but we cannot persuade ourselves to come to the conclusion that there is no objective basis for the subjective satisfaction that the detenue is likely to be released on bail and the application of normal criminal law against the detenue will not at all be effective to prevent the detenue from the commission of further prejudicial activities; and an alternative preventive measure is, therefore, immediately called for. Accordingly, we have no alternative except to come to the conclusion that this writ petition is devoid of merit. 20. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed