JUDGMENT R.C. Mishra, J. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :-This appeal has been preferred against the judgment-dated 03/10/2001, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short "the 1988 Act") and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 2 years and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- and in default, to suffer R.I. for 1 year. Further, a direction was also given to confiscate the assets found disproportionate to the known sources of appellant's income. 2. During the check period from 1st January, 1984 to 25th Feb. 1994, the petitioner had remained posted in various Telecom Offices at Jabalpur as Junior Accounts Officer, Accounts Officer and Senior Accounts officer. In this period, he had received the salary and other allowances as reflected in the statements (Ex.P/1.1 to P/1.4, Ex.P/2.1 & P/2.2, Ex.P/3.1 to P/3.4 and Ex. P/4.1 and P/4.2). He had invested a sum of Rs. 1000/- in Share (Ex.P/11) and spent (a) Rs.20,155/- to purchase a Motorcycle (b) Rs.4150/- to purchase a cooler (c) Rs.8950/- to purchase Luna Super and (d) Rs.800/- towards TMT Test and Rs.950/- and Rs. 1745/- on LPG connection and cylinders. These facts are not in dispute. 3. The prosecution case, in short, may be stated thus: (i) While working as a public servant in the aforesaid official capacities, during the check period, the appellant had amassed pecuniary resources and property disproportionate to his known sources of income. On 4/2/94, upon the corresponding information, the then S.P. (CBI) Jabalpur registered a case by recording the FIR (Ex.P/49) and entrusted the investigation to Inspector Dhirendra Kumar (PW14). He, in turn, conducted a search on 25/ 2/1994 at the appellant's residence located at 813/6, Shiv Nagar, Garha, Jabalpur and seized documents described in the list (Ex.P/ 34) and valuables described in the list (Ex.P/35). The Inspector also searched the office chamber of the appellant and seized certain documents as per list (Ex.P/36). (ii) During investigation, Padam Singh (PW3), an Assistant Engineer posted as Assistant Surveyor (Works) in the CPWD, Jabalpur, was requested to ascertain value of the house owned by the appellant. (iii) Outcome of the investigation indicated that the appellant was found to be in possession of property/assets disproportionate to his known sources of income earned during the check period to the extent of Rs.3,31,382.46. 4. The appellant abjured the guilt. (iii) Outcome of the investigation indicated that the appellant was found to be in possession of property/assets disproportionate to his known sources of income earned during the check period to the extent of Rs.3,31,382.46. 4. The appellant abjured the guilt. He not only furnished, in his examination, under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, elaborate explanation for the disproportion in question but also sought to prove the corresponding facts by examining himself and 17 other witnesses as against 14 witnesses examined by the prosecution. Upon a critical appreciation of the entire evidence on record, learned trial Judge, for the reasons assigned in the impugned judgment, proceeded to hold that the appellant had not been able to satisfactorily account for acquisition of disproportionate assets to the extent of Rs. 1,22,000/- and not that of Rs.3,31,382.46 as alleged by the prosecution. However, he was further of the opinion that, even after giving a benefit of 10% of the income in view of the principle laid down in Krishnanand Agnihotri vs. State of M.P. ( AIR 1977 SC 796 ), the disproportionate assets would have been worth Rs.86,900/-. 5. Legality and propriety of the conviction in question have been challenged primarily on the following grounds - (a) Non-consideration of the explanations given by the appellant in respect of every questioned item of the income, expenditure, movable and immovable assets in a proper perspective and; (b) Mistakes in calculation. 6. According to learned counsel for the appellant, his conviction for being found in possession of assets disproportionate to the known sources of income to the extent of Rs.86,900/-, is not sustainable as even without giving margin of 10% of the total income, acquisition of additional pecuniary resources and property worth Rs. 1,21,778/- could be satisfactorily explained from the evidence brought on record. To support the contention, he has given a detailed note showing that a total amount of Rs. 1,21,778/- could be satisfactorily explained from the evidence brought on record. To support the contention, he has given a detailed note showing that a total amount of Rs. 1,21,778/- ought to have been deducted from the total value of the assets as per the following details :- Income to be added - 59,650/- Expenditure to be reduced - 15,453/- Value of movable assets to be reduced - 34,800/- Value of immovable assets to be reduced 11,875/- Total 1,21,778/- In response, learned counsel for the CBI, while making reference to the corresponding reasonings assigned by learned trial Judge, has submitted that the conviction for being found in possession of disproportionate assets worth Rs.86,900/-, is well-founded on merits. 7. In the light of the rival contentions, we, for the sake of convenience, propose to examine the material points in controversy under these heads:- (i) Income (ii) Expenditure (iii) Movable assets (iv) Immovable assets INCOME 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that a total sum of Rs.59,650/- ought to have been added to his income in view of the under-mentioned details - Item Particulars Amount (inRs.) I/A Savings during period preceding check period to the extent of 34150/- I/B Sale proceed of TVS Moped sold to L.C. Jaisinghani 4500/- I/C Financial assistance given by Ramesh in the year 1990 for purchasing motorcycle 10000/- I/D Interest 600/- I/E Price of dolomite tiles purchased on credit basis 10,400/- Total 59,650/- ITEM (I/A) (Savings during the period preceding the check period claimed to be Rs.34150/- by the appellant) - 9. As per statement of the appellant Kamal Lal Gharde (DW18), -he was appointed on 15.12.1971; was married to Shashikala in May, 1973 and at the time of commencement of the check period i.e. 1.1.1984, his family comprised of his wife and two sons namely, Pankaj and Utpal, who were then aged about 81/2 years and 51/4 years. Making reference to certain documents relied on by the prosecution, Ex.P/21 and (Ex.P/1 (2), P/1 (4), P/1 (3), he has submitted that during the period from 17/5/1977 to 13/12/1980, he had earned a total amount of Rs.24,042.90 as salary and during the period from December 1982 to December 1983, his income from salary was Rs.15,808.60. Making reference to certain documents relied on by the prosecution, Ex.P/21 and (Ex.P/1 (2), P/1 (4), P/1 (3), he has submitted that during the period from 17/5/1977 to 13/12/1980, he had earned a total amount of Rs.24,042.90 as salary and during the period from December 1982 to December 1983, his income from salary was Rs.15,808.60. According to him, he had also proposed to examine other witnesses to show that during the period from 15/12/1971 to 16/5/1977,1/1/1981 to 31/3/1982 and 1/4/1982 to 30/11/1982, he had received amounts of Rs. 16,640/-, 11,382.50 and 6347.20/- as salary and other emoluments but his prayer was rejected vide order dated 1/6/2001. Attention has also been drawn to the contents of- (a) the document (Ex.P/1) suggesting that he had obtained an amount of Rs.3500/- as loan for purchasing TVS 50 and (b) sale-deed (Ex.P/ 43) reflecting that Prakash (PW6) had sold the plot of land whereupon appellant's house was constructed in favour of his wife Shashikala for a consideration of Rs.9135/-. As further pointed out, value of the articles relating to the check period was Rs.8,140/- whereas TVS was purchased in the year 1983 for Rs.6,000/-, out of which only Rs.3.500/- was received by way of government loan. In the light of the aforesaid facts, it has been urged that the appellants net savings, at the beginning of the check period, ought to have been calculated in the following manner - • Notional Expenditure = 41% of Rs.74,221 /- (total income) = Rs.30,431/- (rounded up to Rs.30,430/-). • Likely savings = Income minus Notional expenditure = 74221 minus 30430 = Rs.43,790/- • Net Savings = Likely savings Rs.43,790/- minus Rs.8140/-(value of the articles pertaining to the check period) minus Rs.2500 (used in purchase of TVS 50 from own savings) = Rs.34,150/- [there is mistake in calculation and difference should have been projected as Rs. 33,150/-) 10. This Court has also been requested to take judicial notice of the income and calculate likely savings during the period preceding the check period in accordance with the mode adopted by the trial Court for calculating the notional expenditure during the check period. 33,150/-) 10. This Court has also been requested to take judicial notice of the income and calculate likely savings during the period preceding the check period in accordance with the mode adopted by the trial Court for calculating the notional expenditure during the check period. To buttress the contention that the income during the period anterior to the check period ought to have been given credit as its existence was probablised from the evidence on record and, accordingly, corresponding savings should have been also included in the income of the appellant, learned counsel for the appellant has made reference to following precedents - (i) Krishnanand's case ( AIR 1977 SC 796 ) (ii) State of Maharashtra v. Pollonji Darabshaw Daruwalla AIR 1988 SC 88 , (iii) N. P. Lotlikar v. C.B.I. 1993 CRI. L. J. 2051 (iv) Judgment rendered by single Bench of this Court on 10/12/04 in Cr.A. No.35/1989 (A.G. Kale v. State of M.P.) and (v) Judgment rendered by single Bench of this Court on 11/11/06 in Cr.A. No. 1060/2004 (Bhogilal Saran v. State of M.P). In N. P. Lotlikar's case (supra), income of the accused, while serving the Government Department before joining the custom department in the year 1954, was taken into consideration whereas in Bhogilal Saran's case (above), learned single Judge had taken into account the salary drawn during the period preceding the check period to assess the total household expenses. 11. In Krishnanand's case (ibid), while considering the question as to whether the facts thereof justified the raising of presumption under Section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short "1947 Act"), the Supreme Court took into account items of income relating to the past period and proceeded to add (to his income) Rs.3,200/- as tuition charges received by the appellant during the period from 1943 to 1947 and Rs. 1,240/- as the scholarships and fellowships earned by him during his college days. Observing that sub-section (3) of S.5 provides an additional mode of proving an offence punishable under sub-section (2) for which any accused person is being tried, the Apex Court in Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 464 , propounded that the pecuniary resources or property acquired before the enforcement of 1947 Act could be taken into consideration. Observing that sub-section (3) of S.5 provides an additional mode of proving an offence punishable under sub-section (2) for which any accused person is being tried, the Apex Court in Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 464 , propounded that the pecuniary resources or property acquired before the enforcement of 1947 Act could be taken into consideration. However, by the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964, sub-section (3) of S.5 was repealed and clause (e) in Section 5 of the 1947 Act, that corresponds to clause (e) of Section 13(1) of the 1988 Act, was added but clause (e) of Section 13(1) is materially different from clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the 1947 Act inasmuch as the presumption permitted to be raised under the explanation to Section 13(1)(e) was not available to be raised under Section 5(1)(e). The explanation reads - Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "known sources of income" means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. 12. In this way, under the new clause, the earlier concept of "known sources of income" has undergone a radical change. As per the explanation appended, the prosecution is relieved of the burden of investigating into "source of income" of an accused to a large extent. Accordingly, in order to ascertain likely savings during the check period, the investigating agency, is expected to prepare (a) statement containing details of movable assets including cash balance, bank balance, jewellery, household effects and that of immovable assets at the beginning of the check period (b) statement containing the details of verified moveable and immovable assets acquired by the public servant either in his name or held on his behalf during the check period and (c) statement containing the progressive total income from all the known sources during the check period. 13. However, placing reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in Pollonji's case (supra), learned counsel has submitted that a somewhat liberal view ought to have been taken while determining as to what proportion of assets in excess of the known sources of income constitutes "disproportion". 13. However, placing reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in Pollonji's case (supra), learned counsel has submitted that a somewhat liberal view ought to have been taken while determining as to what proportion of assets in excess of the known sources of income constitutes "disproportion". Reference has also been made to the decision of Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar ( AIR 1981 SC 1186 ), wherein while explaining the nature of onus on the accused to satisfactorily account for his possession of the disproportionate assets, it was laid down that all that he need to do is to bring out a preponderance of probability. But, in that case, the Supreme Court also characterized the approach of the High Court as erroneous in holding that a public servant charged for having disproportionate assets in his possession for which he cannot satisfactorily account cannot be convicted of an offence under Section 5(1)(e) read with 5(2) of the 1947 Act unless the prosecution disproves all possible sources of income. 14. Further, as per the explanation to Section 13(1)(e), for the purpose of satisfying the Court, the "known sources of income" of the public servant should be "any lawful source" and it further enjoins that receipt of such income should have been intimated by the public servant in accordance with the provisions of any law applicable to such public servant at the relevant time (See. P. Nallammal v. State rep. by Inspector of Police AIR 1999 SC 2556 ). As an obvious corollary, on one hand, income from legally forbidden sources cannot be considered at all and on the other, income from any lawful source can be taken into account only when its existence is duly proclaimed under the relevant Service Rules. Moreover, it is not, and cannot be contended that 'known sources of income' means sources known to the accused. (State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore AIR 2004 SC 517 referred to). Moreover, it is not, and cannot be contended that 'known sources of income' means sources known to the accused. (State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore AIR 2004 SC 517 referred to). In addition, as explained in Pollonji's case (supra) - in order to establish that a public servant is in possession of pecuniary resources and property, disproportionate to his known sources of income, it is not imperative that the period of reckoning be spread out for the entire stretch of anterior service of the public servant......It is for the prosecution to choose what according to it is the period which having regard to the acquisitive activities of the public servant in amassing wealth and characterise and isolate that period for special scrutiny. 15. Coming to the facts of the case, it may be observed that no cogent documentary evidence in the form of entries in any saving bank account etc. is available to prove existence of the so-called savings during the period anterior to the check period. The Investigating Officer Dhirendra Kumar (PW14) clearly asserted that the appellant was not able to furnish information as to any Bank Account/NSC/FDR pertaining to the pre-check period. His statement that in January, 1984, the appellant was drawing a net salary of Rs.944.20, was not subjected to challenge. Admittedly, the appellant had to maintain a family comprising of wife and two school going children. Thus, there was hardly any scope for saving and availability of the fund at the beginning of the check period. It is relevant to note that out of the consideration payable under the sale-deed (Ex.P/43), only a sum of Rs.635/- was paid to the vendor viz. Prakash (PW6) on the date of its execution i.e. 15/2/1984. On these facts, the decisions in the cases of N.P. Lotlikar and A.G. Kale, which relate to Cl. (e) of sub-section (1) of S. 5 of the 1947 Act are of no avail to the appellant. 16. In the light of the well-settled position of law on the subject, learned trial Judge, in absence of supportive documentary evidence, did not commit any illegality in declining to take into account the notional savings during the pre-check period as projected by the appellant. 17. 16. In the light of the well-settled position of law on the subject, learned trial Judge, in absence of supportive documentary evidence, did not commit any illegality in declining to take into account the notional savings during the pre-check period as projected by the appellant. 17. ITEM (I/B) (Sale proceed of TVS Moped sold to L.C. Jaisinghani -Rs.4500/-) Although L.C. Jaisinghani (DW7) corroborated the fact that he had purchased the Moped from the appellant for a consideration of Rs.4500/-yet, learned trial Judge declined to include the aforesaid sum in the income of the appellant for the following reasons:- • In the record of the RTO, Jabalpur, the Moped was not found transferred in the name of L.C. Jaisinghani. • L.C. Jaisinghani clearly deposed that amount of Rs.4500/-was paid in equal installments of Rs.500/- whereas the receipt (Ex.D/14) evidenced a single payment of Rs.4500/-. However, fact of the matter is that Madhu Jaisinghani, in whose name the Moped was found transferred on 18/9/1989, is none other than the wife of L.C. Jaisinghani. Further, mode of payment of price also did not assume any significance in the light of the entry (Ex.D/17) regarding transfer of the vehicle as proved by R.K. Hela (DW10), Clerk in the office of the RTO. As such, this amount ought to have been included in the income. 18. ITEM (I/C) (Financial assistance given by Ramesh in the year 1990 for purchasing motorcycle - Rs.10,000/-) Learned trial Judge rejected the plea on two grounds - firstly, the appellant had not given any intimation to his department regarding receipt of the said amount from his brother Ramesh and secondly, he had taken a vehicle loan in August 1989 only. However, the grounds were not tenable in view of a categorical admission made by Subal Chand Rai (DW16), Additional General Manager (Administration), Telecom Stores, Calcutta that the permission to purchase Motorcycle was given only after taking into account the sources of income disclosed by the appellant in the corresponding intimation in the prescribed form (Ex.D/29-C). Hence, the amount of Rs. 10,000/- (supra) should have been included in the income of the appellant (See. M. Krishna Reddy v. State Deputy Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad ( AIR 1993 SC 313 ). 19. ITEM (I/D) (Interest - Rs. Hence, the amount of Rs. 10,000/- (supra) should have been included in the income of the appellant (See. M. Krishna Reddy v. State Deputy Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad ( AIR 1993 SC 313 ). 19. ITEM (I/D) (Interest - Rs. 600/-) As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, while calculating the interest, the trial Court only considered the entries in the Pass-Books (EX.P-24 and P-25) pertaining to Saving Bank Account of Pankaj and Utkal whereas the Pass-Book (Ex.P/29) relating to Saving Bank Account of their mother Shashikala was also exhibited in evidence. Considering the entries made in that passbook, a total amount of interest ought to have been calculated as Rs.598.95/- (which can be rounded to Rs.600). 20. ITEM (I/E) (Price of dolomite tiles Rs. 10,400/taken on credit basis) - It is true that the credit vouchers (Ex.D/15 and Ex.D/16) seized during search suggested that on 13/9/93, - (i) dolomite tiles and Chips and Powder costing Rs.5916/- were purchased by Smt. Shashikala Gharde on credit basis from Tara Minerals, 600 Napier Town, Jabalpur. (ii) Romano Tiles worth Rs.4500/- were purchased by her from Agrawal Glass and Frameworks. But, Ramesh Delhiwal (DW9), examined as the common proprietor of both the firms, could not produce the carbon copies of the credit vouchers. Since the items were purchased from two different firms, entries in a common ledger brought by the Proprietor, would not have been sufficient to prove that the balance amounts against the vouchers were paid after expiry of the check period. Further, Ramesh clearly admitted that except the aforesaid items, he had not sold any other item to a private individual on credit basis for more than a month. Moreover, signature of the purchaser viz. Shashikala was also not available on anyone of the aforesaid documents. In these circumstances, learned trial Judge was justified on facts in rejecting the contention based on the credit vouchers. EXPENDITURE 21. Moreover, signature of the purchaser viz. Shashikala was also not available on anyone of the aforesaid documents. In these circumstances, learned trial Judge was justified on facts in rejecting the contention based on the credit vouchers. EXPENDITURE 21. Submissions as to expenditures may be discussed under the following heads - Item Particulars Amount sought to be deducted from expenditure (in Rs.) E/A Pankaj's admission fee and school fee payable for the academic session 1983-1984(Ex.P/44) 410/- E/B Utpal's admission fee and school fee payable for the academic session 1983-1984(Ex.P/44) 265/- E/C Electricity charges 2378/- E/D Expenditure on purchase of plot vide agreement dated 13/8/91 12,400/- Total 15,453/- ITEM (E/A) (Admission fee and School fee, of Pankaj for the academic session 1983-1984 (Ex.P/44) As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, an amount of Rs.410 (Rs.200/- as admission fee that was paid in the year 1981 and Rs.210/- as the fee for the period from 1/7/1983 to 31/12/1983) ought to have been excluded from the amount of Rs.620/- as assessed by the trial Court. ITEM (E/B) (Admission fee and School fee of Utpal for the academic session 1983-1984 (Ex.P/44) Learned counsel for the appellant is also right in contending that an amount of Rs.265/- (Rs.200/- as admission fee for the academic session 1983-1984 and Rs.65/- as the fee for the period from 1/7/1983 to 31/12/1983) ought to have been excluded from the amount of Rs.330/- as assessed by the trial Court. ITEM (E/C) (Electricity Charges (Ex.P/46 & Ex.P/47) - Out of the amount of Rs.9,696/- described by the prosecution, learned trial Judge deducted only an amount of Rs. 1520/- as it was paid after the check period. However, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, a further amount of Rs.2378/- ought to have been excluded as during the period from 1989 to 1994, only an amount of Rs.5,798/- was paid and not Rs.8,176/-as assessed by the trial Court. ITEM (E/D) (Expenditure of Rs. 12,400/- on purchase of plot vide agreement dated 13/8/91) According to learned counsel for the appellant, he is a stranger to the agreement to sell (Ex.P/40) in view of the fact that it does not bear his signature. ITEM (E/D) (Expenditure of Rs. 12,400/- on purchase of plot vide agreement dated 13/8/91) According to learned counsel for the appellant, he is a stranger to the agreement to sell (Ex.P/40) in view of the fact that it does not bear his signature. He is further of the opinion that the corresponding evidence of Ravi Anvore (PW4), son of S.K. Anvore (since dead), the executant of the document, did not assume any significance, as he was not expected to have a personal knowledge with regard to the transaction. To strengthen the argument that as an stranger, the appellant was entitled to lead evidence in rebuttal of the contents of the document, reliance has been placed on the following observations made by the Supreme Court in Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam ( AIR 2004 SC 2299 ) - A stranger to the document is not bound by the terms of the document and is, therefore, not excluded from demonstrating the untrue or collusive nature of the document or the fraudulent or illegal purpose for which it was brought into being. However, the contentions are apparently misconceived in view of the following facts - (i) The appellant was the only beneficiary under the agreement (Ex.P/40). (ii) As defence witness no. 18, the appellant Kamal Lal had not been able to explain satisfactorily as to why the agreement, purporting to be executed by S.K. Anvore, to sell a piece of land situated at village Karmeta in his favour for a consideration of Rs.30,400/- after obtaining a sum of Rs. Rs.12,400/- was found in his house. (iii) The agreement was scribed on a stamp paper that was sold in favour of the appellant only. (iv) Ravi duly corroborated the fact that the amount of Rs.12,400/- was actually paid as advance against the total consideration. (v) It also came in Ravi's evidence that the piece of land described in the agreement was in existence. Accordingly, the reasons assigned by the trial Court for declining to exclude the aforesaid amount from expenditure, deserves to be affirmed as justified. MOVABLE ASSETS 22. Only two movable assets in the form of Colour TV and VCP, having a total value of Rs.34,800/-, are subject matter of the controversy. Accordingly, the reasons assigned by the trial Court for declining to exclude the aforesaid amount from expenditure, deserves to be affirmed as justified. MOVABLE ASSETS 22. Only two movable assets in the form of Colour TV and VCP, having a total value of Rs.34,800/-, are subject matter of the controversy. In order to support the argument that it must be presumed, unless contrary was shown by the prosecution, that the aforesaid electronic items belonged to Maya Ganveer (DW3), the sister-in-law of the appellant, in whose name they were purchased, learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the following observations made by the Supreme Court in Krishnand's case (supra) - It is well settled that the burden of showing that a particular transaction is benami and the appellant-owner is not the real owner always rests on the person asserting it to be so and this burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact of benami or establish circumstance unerringly and reasonable raising an inference of that fact. The essence of benami is the intention of the parties and not unoften, such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of the serious onus that rests on him, nor justify the acceptance of mere conjecture or surmises as a substitute for proof. It is not enough merely to show circumstances which might create suspicion, because the Court cannot decide on the basis of suspicion. It has to act on legal grounds established by evidence. Making reference to the decision of the Apex Court in Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari v. State (N.C.T of Delhi) (2005) 5 SCC 258), learned counsel has further urged that he could rely upon evidence of Mukund Shah (PW7), the Proprietor of M/s Shah Brothers, to the effect that he had sold the TV and the VCP to Maya Ganveer in view of the fact that Mukund was not declared hostile by the prosecution. 23. 23. Although, the Bill (Ex.P/16) and Delivery Memo (P/15) reflect that an Uptronica Colour TV and Uptronica VCP were purchased from M/s Shah Brothers by Smt. Maya Ganveer (DW3) representing herself to be resident of Tumsar Road, Gondia, on 23/1/93 and 29/1/93 respectively yet, no evidence was brought on record to prove actual place of her residence. Moreover, none of these documents bore her signature. As per her statement, she had left these items at the residence of the appellant in view of the fact that only two or three days after her purchase a defect had cropped up in the TV with the result that no picture was visible on it. However, fact of the matter is that the VCP was purchased only six days after purchase of the TV. This apart, Mukund Shah (PW7) did not support the assertion that the TV was subjected to any repair within three days of its sale. Furthermore, Maya's other explanation for non-shifting of electronic items from the appellant's house for a considerable period of more than a year to the effect that she had a child in her lap, was far from being plausible. Admittedly, she had no source of income of her own. The fact that her husband was not even made aware of the purchase of such costly electronic items also created suspicion as to veracity of the claim that the electronic items, in fact, belonged to Maya. Her assertion that the amount used for purchasing the TV and the VCP was gifted by relatives at the time of her marriage also remained unsubstantiated. 24. From a conjoint reading of Sections 3 and 114 of the Evidence Act, it can easily be concluded that the fact is said to be proved when after considering the matters before it, the Court believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. In coming to its belief the Court may presume existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened having regard to the natural course of event, human conduct and public and private business, in relation to the facts of each case. (See. K. Ponnuswamy v. State of T.N. ( AIR 2001 SC 2464 ). 25. In coming to its belief the Court may presume existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened having regard to the natural course of event, human conduct and public and private business, in relation to the facts of each case. (See. K. Ponnuswamy v. State of T.N. ( AIR 2001 SC 2464 ). 25. Upon analysis of the factual scenario and applying the principles of law as highlighted above, we are of the opinion that learned trial Judge did not commit any error of fact or of law in including aforesaid electronic items in appellant's movable assets. IMMOVABLE ASSETS (Valuation of House Property) - 26. Even though, Padam Singh (PW3), the then Assistant Surveyor (Works) in CPWD Jabalpur, assessed the value of the house belonging to the appellant as Rs.2,30,000/- yet, learned trial Judge, while taking note of the certain discrepancies, proceeded to allow corresponding deductions as enumerated below - (a) As per map of ground floor (P/38A) width of room was shown as 3.08 meters but during calculation in the chart (P/38C) it has been taken as 3.80 meters. The cost of construction of 2 square meter i. e. Rs.1300 should have been reduced. (b) Construction of porch in 10.20 sq. meter has been shown, but it has not been considered that full height walls and gates were not provided in the porch. Thus, a margin of Rs. 5270 should have been allowed. (c) Open space in the backside of the house was measured as 16.53 meters but in calculation cost of walls was not excluded. Although the accused had claimed 40% deduction but taking note of the fact that the space is surrounded by 4 rcc pillars and a room has been constructed on this space, only margin of 30% would be justified and as such, an amount of Rs. 5000 should be reduced. (d) Brick work at foundation and ground floor level was done by using mud mortar but valuation was done assuming it to be cement work. Further, the valuation was done on the basis of marble flooring in fact dolomite tiles were used for flooring. Even though no suggestion was made in the cross-examination of Padam Singh, the valuer, the version as to use of mud mortar and dolomite was acceptable and, accordingly, an amount of Rs. 6000 and not Rs. Further, the valuation was done on the basis of marble flooring in fact dolomite tiles were used for flooring. Even though no suggestion was made in the cross-examination of Padam Singh, the valuer, the version as to use of mud mortar and dolomite was acceptable and, accordingly, an amount of Rs. 6000 and not Rs. 8915 as difference in the cost of construction involving use of cement and mud mortar and an amount of Rs. 5371 as claimed by the accused as a difference between cost of marble flooring and dolomite tiles are allowed. (e) Service tax assessed as Rs. 5000 should have been reduced from the valuation as there was no corresponding evidence. (f) Cost of construction should be allowed to be reduced by 17% in view of the fact that the house was not constructed on contract basis and there was considerable difference in the prices of the construction material in Delhi and Jabalpur. He, accordingly, assessed the value of the house as Rs. 1,70,780/- and Rs. 14,686/- as the cost of the land (including stamp duty & registration charges) and determined the total value of the immovable property as Rs. 1,85,466/-. Still, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, in Para 74 of the judgment, learned Judge fell into an arithmetical error by deducting the excess amount of Rs.27,941/- (towards margins/reductions) from Rs.2,33,701/- instead of Rs.2,30,000/- ascertained by Padam Singh as the total value of the house vide his report (Ex.P-39). Thus, allowing a margin of 17%, the actual value of the construction would be Rs. 1,67,708/- as 83% of Rs.2,02,059/- (Rs.2,30,000 minus Rs.27,941/-). 27. Learned counsel has next contended that the house should have been valued at Rs. 1,59,355/- as per assessment made by Prakash Karve (DW17), an Architect and Govt. approved valuer. For this, he has pointed out that Padam Singh (PW3) had erred in applying consolidated cost index @ 517%, while valuing the services, by ignoring the facts that 2/3rd part of the ground floor construction was completed in the year 1987 and also that l/3rd part on the first floor was constructed in the year 1992 and even after admitting the facts that the electrical fittings of the ground floor were installed and further that the ground floor area was constructed in the year 1987 (when the cost index was 258%). According to him, following cost indices ought to have been applied for the purpose - For the year Index In respect of constructed area 1987 258% 91.17 sqm 1992 517% 10.20 sqm 1992 517% 43.55 sqm In the light of these facts, learned counsel has submitted that on 63% of services (proportionate to construction) cost index @ 258% and on remaining 37% services cost index @ 517% ought to have been applied and, therefore, total value of services should have been taken as Rs. 15,922/- instead of Rs. 23,265/- as assessed by Padam Singh. He is further of the opinion that the cost of land should have been taken as Rs. 14,191/- (and neither Rs. 14,686/- as determined by learned trial Judge nor Rs. 14,511/- as assessed by Padam Singh) in view of the fact that it also included an amount of Rs.320/- as Corporation Development Charges. The contentions deserve acceptance. In view of that, a total sum of Rs. 11,875/- has to be deducted from Rs. 1,85,466/-, the value of the immovable property as ascertained by learned trial Judge. In other words, total value of the house ought to have been taken as Rs. 1,73,591 /-. 28. To sum up, our findings are as follows - (a) Income to be added further (I/B + VC + I/D) = Rs. 15,100/-. (b) Expenditure to be reduced further (E/A+E/B+E/C) by = Rs.410/- + Rs.265 + Rs.2,378/- = Rs.3053/- (c) Valuation of the immoveable assets to be reduced further by = Rs.11,875/- The obvious result would be - • Total assets = Rs.3,30,500/- (as assessed by the trial Court) minus Rs.11875/- = Rs.3,18,625/- • Total Income = Rs.3,51,000/- (as assessed by the trial Court) plus Rs.15, 100/- = Rs.3,66,100/- • Total expenditure = Rs.1,42,500/- (as assessed by the trial Court) minus Rs.3053/- = Rs. 1,39,447/- • Savings = Income minus expenditure Savings = Rs.3,66,100/- minus Rs.1,39,447 = Rs.2,26,653/- • Total Assets= Rs.3,18,625/- minus Rs.2,26,653 = Rs.91,972/- • Deducting allowance of 10% of total income=Rs.91,972/-minus Rs.36,610/-= Rs.55,362/- Thus, upon a re-appreciation of the evidence on record in the light of the rival contentions, we are of the opinion that the appellant could not satisfactorily account for assets worth Rs.55,362/-. Although, learned counsel, while making reference to a news item titled as "SC Snubs Govt. Although, learned counsel, while making reference to a news item titled as "SC Snubs Govt. for letting off 'big sharks, crocodiles'" published on 29/10/2010 in Deccan Herald covering decision of the Supreme Court in Anantha Ramulu v. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.931/2005 decided on 27/10/10), has submitted that the disproportion in question being meager/moderate, deserves to be ignored as a probable fault of calculation yet, a bare reading of the judgment would reveal that no such guideline has been laid down by the Apex Court. Taking into consideration the nature of offence and its social impact, the fact that the extent of disproportion has been found to be l/6th of what was alleged by the prosecution, would not be sufficient to absolve the appellant of the misconduct. 29. Coming to the question of sentence, it may be observed that a considerable period of more that 15 years has already elapsed after the search. Considering the quantum of disproportion and other relevant aspects of the sentencing policy, ends of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced from 2 years to 1 year, which is the minimum prescribed for the offence. 30. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The impugned conviction and consequent sentence of fine are hereby affirmed. However, the period of custodial sentence is reduced from 2 years to 1 year. It is further directed that instead of Rs.86,900/- only property worth Rs.55,362/- shall be confiscated. 31. Appellant is on bail. He shall surrender to his bail bonds before the trial Court on or before 20/7/11 for being committed to custody for undergoing the remaining part of the sentence.