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2011 DIGILAW 628 (AP)

Yeruva Sayireddy v. State of A. P.

2011-08-11

G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY, V.ESWARAIAH

body2011
EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, Sections 32 and 8 - Penal Code, 1860, Section 302- Murder - Conviction of appellant-accused for offence u/s 302 IPC for causing death of deceased (his daughter-in-law) by pouring kerosene on her and setting her ablaze using lighted match stick - Deceased succumbed to burn injuries after sevendays of the incident, in hospital - Appeal - Two dying declarations, one recorded by MRO and the other recorded by ASI - What is common in both dying declarations is that in the evening her father-in-law poured Kerosene and set her ablaze and at that time, no other person was present in the house - Motive - Three days prior to the incident deceased protested against proposal of accused to sell hayrick yard site and on date of incident when deceased was working lonely in kitchen in her matrimonial house, accused picked up quarrel with her with an intention to kill her, poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze and went away - No contradictions or controversial statements in the two dying declarations - Improvement in dying declaration recorded by ASI, not fatal and on the other hand, can be taken into consideration for purpose of ascertaining motive to kill deceased - Evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 8, sufficiently corroborating said declarations - Nothing favourable to defence, elicited from evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 8 that accused is innocent of the charge - Medical evidence providing that deceased received burn injuries as she caught fire - No need for deceased to give false declarations and P.Ws. 7 and 8 got no need to give false evidence against accused - Nothing adverse in the evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 8 that accused is innocent of the charge - Medical evidence providing that deceased received burn injuries as she caught fire - No need for deceased to give false declarations and P.Ws. 7 and 8 got no need to give false evidence against accused - Nothing adverse in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 about the conduct of behaviour of deceased to suspect or conclude that there was a possibility of giving false dying declarations against accused - (Case law discussed).(Paras 22 to 32) EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, Sections 3 and 32 - Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 - Medical evidence - Dying declarations - Medical evidence proved that deceased was in a fit and conscious state of mind at the time of giving her statements - It is not in medical evidence specifically that because she received extensive burns, she was not in fit and conscious state of mind to give dying declarations - It rules out that she was not in a position to give her statement properly to the fact that she received extensive burns - Therefore, the two dying declarations coupled with evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 8 and also medical evidence, are quite reliable being credible which therefore are accepted rejecting the contentions raised on behalf of accused.(Paras 35 and 36) PENAL CODE, 1860, Section 302 - Applicability of charge u/s 302 IPC - Conduct of accused - Emphasis to be given to the fact that accused went into Kitchen of the house when deceased was cooking there, picked up a quarrel with her with reference to selling the property and as she did not agree for his proposal to do so, he involved in setting her ablaze using kerosene - Normally, when daughter-in-law is in kitchen, father-in-law does not enter the kitchen for any purpose - Conduct of accused therefore, showing that he went there with a definite purpose i.e., to prevail upon her to achieve his object of selling the property - From evidence on record, it is clear that her say in the house was predominant which must be the reason as to why the accused was not able to fulfil his desire to sell the property - He went into the kitchen of the house taking advantage of the fact that she was alone in the house not only to prevail upon her to accede to his proposal but also to cause her death unless his proposal was acceded with a pre-determined mind - Trial Court properly examined the matter - No reasons to interfere with it - Appeal dismissed.(Para 37) JUDGMENT (Per G. Krishna Mohan Reddy, J.) This Criminal Appeal is preferred under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. against judgment and conviction recorded against the appellant-accused(for short 'the accused') for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC in Sessions Case No. 255 of 2006 dated 5-3-2007 on the file VI Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Markapur, Prakasam district. 2. The accused having been found guilty of committing the said offence was sentenced to life and also to pay a fine of ` 2,000/- and in default of payment of the fine amount, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two months. It is necessary to note briefly the prosecution case, which is as follows: 3. The accused is a resident of Tippayapalem village, Markapur mandal, Prakasam district and he was the father-in-law of late Yeru Laxmi (for short ('the deceased'). It is necessary to note briefly the prosecution case, which is as follows: 3. The accused is a resident of Tippayapalem village, Markapur mandal, Prakasam district and he was the father-in-law of late Yeru Laxmi (for short ('the deceased'). The accused, after the demise of his wife, developed illegal contacts with ladiesat Tippayapalem village and used to spend his earnings for his vices. He also used to ill-treat two innocent sons namely Yeruva Swamy Ranga Reddy i.e. husband of the deceased (P.W.1) and Yeruva Ranga Reddy (P.W. 2). In order to meet the vices, the accused wanted to sell their Hayrick yard site for which his sons and the deceased objected. In fact, the deceased strongly protested against the proposal made by the accused there by the accused quarreled with the deceased for three days prior to the incident in question i.e. 17-6-2004. On 17-6-2004 at about 9.00 p.m. when the deceased was working in her matrimonial house lonely, he picked up quarrel with her with an intention to kill her and all of a sudden, he poured kerosene upon her and set her ablaze using lighted match stick and went away. Consequently, the deceased madehue and cry and on hearing her cries, Yeruva Ranga Reddy, Thamidala Venkata Reddy, Yeruva Appi Reddy, Kunduru Rangamma and Udumula Ramulu (P.Ws. 2 to 6)who were present nearby, rushed to the house and in the meanwhile the husband of the deceased (P.W.1) who went in search of their she-buffalo returned to the house and found the deceased in flames and immediately he pulled the saree of the deceased and tried to rescue her by reason of which, he received burn injuries over both of his hands and P.W.3 put a cloth mattress over the deceased and put off the flames and then they shifted the deceased to the hospital of Dr. Ranganayakulu (P.W.9). Further, the parents and brother of the deceased on coming to know about the incident, went to the hospital on18-6-2004 and she informed them about the incident and thereafter the deceased was taken to the Government Hospital, Markapur for better treatment and there, the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Markapur Rural P.S. (P.W. 16) recorded herstatement, on the basis of which, the S.I. of Police (P.W.) registered the casein Cr.No. 70 of 2004 under Section 307 IPC and took up the investigation of the case. Further, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Markapur (P.W. 13) on receiving requisition, went to the hospital and recorded dying declaration of the deceased (Ex.P-16). On 24-6-2004 at 10 a.m. i.e. after (7) days of the incident, the deceased succumbed to the injuries consequent upon which, the S.I. of Police altered the section of law from Section 307 to Section 302 IPC. Further, the Inspector of Police (P.W. 18) conducted the investigation of the case and subsequently filed charge sheet in the case. 4. After the completion of necessary formalities, the charge under Section 302 IPC was framed, read over and explained to the accused and he pleaded not guilty of the charge. 5. For the prosecution, P.Ws. 1 to 18 were examined andExs.P-1 to P-34 and M.Os. 1 and 2 were marked. After the closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused was examined with reference to incriminating material recorded against him, which he denied to be true and correct. 6. P.Ws. 1 and 2 who are the sons of the accused/husband and brother-in-law of the deceased, and P.Ws. 3, 4 and 6 who are the neighbors of the accused and P.W. 5 relative of the accused examined to speak about what transpired soon after the alleged incident of setting the deceased ablaze, did not support the prosecution version about the complicity of the accused and therefore the learned Public Prosecutor of the Court declared them as hostile witnesses of the prosecution and while cross-examining them, got marked relevant portions of their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. asExs.P-1 to P-12 respectively. 7. P.Ws. 7 and 8 brother and mother of the deceased deposed that the deceased informed them about the incident when they met her in the hospital after the incident. P.W. 9 Doctor deposed about giving first-aidto the deceased. P.Ws. 10, 11 and 12 examined with regards to inquest over the dead body, did not support it and hence the prosecution declared them also as hostile witnesses. P.W 13 the MRO and P.W. 14 Medical Officer deposed about the first dying declaration of the deceased recorded by her and P.W. 14 also deposed about the post-mortem examination over the dead body. P.W. 15 examined as mediator for the scene of offence observation panchanama did not support that and therefore he was also declared as hostile witness of the prosecution. P.W. 15 examined as mediator for the scene of offence observation panchanama did not support that and therefore he was also declared as hostile witness of the prosecution. Further, P.W. 16 the A.S.I. of Police deposed about the second dying declaration (Ex.P-27) said to be given by the deceased to him. P.W. 17 S.I. of Police deposed about the registration of the case and conducting part of the investigation of the case and P.W. 18 the Inspector of Police deposed about conducting the remaining part of the investigation of the case. 8. Consequently, it is to be determined mainly as to whether the two dying declarations one recorded by the MRO and the other recorded by the ASI coupled with other relevant evidence are credible and on that basis, the conviction and sentence recorded against the accused are sustainable. 9. It is the testimony of P.W. 14 that at first he sent requisition (Ex. P-17) to the Judicial Magistrate of First Class for recording the dying declaration of the deceased, but as he was not available, he telephone to the M.R.O. (P.W. 16) to do so and accordingly the M.R.O. came and recorded the dying declaration (Ex.P-16) of the deceased and the deceased was in a conscious and coherent state to give her statement and accordingly he made endorsements as in Exs. P-19 and 20 to that effect in the dying declaration marked. Further his evidence is that he gave treatment to the deceased and she succumbed to the injuries received by her while undergoing treatment in Area Hospital, Markapur and Ex. P-1 is her death intimation sent by her. It is further his evidence that he conducted post-mortem examination over the dead body and opined that the deceased received 90% burns from superficial to deep extended burns which was the cause of death. 10. The first dying declaration marked as Ex. P-1 is her death intimation sent by her. It is further his evidence that he conducted post-mortem examination over the dead body and opined that the deceased received 90% burns from superficial to deep extended burns which was the cause of death. 10. The first dying declaration marked as Ex. P-16provides that on 19-6-2004, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Markapur mandal on receiving requisition immediately proceeded to the Government Hospital, Markapur and reached the patient at 7.45 a.m. and found that one Medical Officer was attending the deceased and he made necessary arrangements to see that no body was present there and then he put some questions to the deceased initially and elicited answers from her upon which, he was satisfied that the deceased was in conscious state of mind to give coherent statement and the Medical Officer present there also certified to that effect and then here corded her dying declaration. It further provides that when the MRO asked the deceased as to how she received the burns, she answered "I do not remember the date and week. On the evening at 5.00 p.m. my father-in-law i.e. father of my husband by name Sai Reddy poured kerosene and lit fire" and when she was further asked as to who were present in the house at that time and whether there was any thing more to say, she replied "no body was present except myself" and "nothing to say" respectively. 11. On the other hand, Ex.-27 recorded by the ASI agrees with Ex.P-16. It also provides that she stated then in addition that as she refused the sale of Hayrick yard site, quarrel took place between her and her father-in-law and on 17-6-2004 at about6 p.m. she herself and he father-in-law were in the house and as she refused for the disposal of the hayrick yard, he quarreled with her further and poured kerosene on her body and lit fire and fled away and at that time, her husband was not in the house as he went out for the she buffaloes and further in order to kill her, her father-in-law did so and when she cried as she received burns neighbours came and took her and admitted her in a private hospital at Markapur. 12. 12. It is definitely improvement over what is stated to the MRO covered by Ex.P-16, that she does not remember the date and week and in the evening at 5 p.m. her father-in-law poured kerosene on her and set fire to her. What is common in both the dying declarations is that in the evening her father-in-law poured kerosene and set her ablaze and at that time, no other person was present in the house. 13. The learned defence counsel mainly attacks the two dying declarations marked as Exs. P-16 and 27 and the evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 8. He has not disputed about the place of occurrence and inquest conducted over the dead body, which according to the trial Court are established through the evidence of the Investigating Officer. He also does not dispute about the post-mortem examination except with regards to receiving kerosene smell from the body when that examination was done. There is no need to re-discuss the facts which are undisputed, unless it is necessary with regards to the question of homicidal death. The learned defence counsel has further contended that in the alleged dying declaration recorded by P.W. 13 the MRO, the question of motive to kill the deceased is not found and in the alleged dying declaration recorded by P.W. 16 the ASI that part was included which therefore determines that she made the improvement over what exactly would have happened and therefore, she is to be termed as untruthful deponent to give any credibility to the two dying declarations. According tot the learned counsel, the deceased must have given the two dying declarations at the instance of some body else, probably at the instance of P.Ws. 7 and 8 her brother and mother or they were concocted at their instance. It is also her contention that there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 6 and there is no dispute that P.W. 1 tried to save the deceased and received injuries in the process and when some part of his evidence is acceptable the remaining part of his evidence is also to be accepted and a different view cannot be taken in that regard. Further it is contended by her that it is unbelievable that when she received extensive burns, she was in a position to give the declarations. Further it is contended by her that it is unbelievable that when she received extensive burns, she was in a position to give the declarations. Ultimately, she has pleaded for setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the accused. 14. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that it is not a case of long standing harassment of the deceased for dowry and there is no basis to say that the deceased was adamant or in the habit of marking false allegations against the other inmates of the house to suspect her veracity found in the two dying declarations and in addition to that, even though in fact there is some improvisation in the second dying declaration which is with regards to the motive of the accused to kill her, the same is not inconsistent with the other dying declaration or other circumstances of the case and the dying declaration recorded by the police officer is also credible when it is trustworthy and it must be that the deceased got no comprehension being an illiterate person as to what was to be presented to the M.R.O. while giving her first dying declaration, because of her illiteracy and also because of the situation, she was facing soon after the incident and absolutely there is no reason to discard the two dying declarations which are not tainted with any discrepancies and the trial Court properly examined the matter and there is no reason to interfere with the findings of the trial Court relying upon the following decisions to uphold his claim. 1. Vithal Sadshiv Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra (1) 1994 Crl.L.J. 2035. 2. P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka (2) AIR 2003 SC 2859 = 2003 (5) ALT 38 .3 (DN SC). 3. J. Ramulu v. State of A.P., (3) (2009)16 SCC 432 . 4. Puran Chand v. State of Haryana (4) (2010) 6 SCC 566 . 5. Nanhar and others v. State of Haryana(5) (2010) 11 SCC 423 and 6. Bhagirath v. State of Haryana (6) 1996(2) ALT (Crl.) 404 (SC) = AIR 1997 SC 234 . 15. 3. J. Ramulu v. State of A.P., (3) (2009)16 SCC 432 . 4. Puran Chand v. State of Haryana (4) (2010) 6 SCC 566 . 5. Nanhar and others v. State of Haryana(5) (2010) 11 SCC 423 and 6. Bhagirath v. State of Haryana (6) 1996(2) ALT (Crl.) 404 (SC) = AIR 1997 SC 234 . 15. In Bhagirath v. State of Haryana (6 supra)it is observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regards to the veracity of a dying declaration recorded by a Head Constable and with reference to relevant facts and circumstances that he genuinely made an attempt to get the dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate taking necessary measures but the said Magistrate was not available and the Doctor who was present attested the statements recorded by the Head Constable wherein it was specifically stated that the statement was read over to the patient who admitted the same to be true and correct and the Doctor also recorded that he was satisfied about the correctness of the statement recorded by the Head Constable putting necessary questions to the victim and the statement recorded by the Head Constable was therefore admissible as evidence. In Ganpat Mahadeo Mane v. State of Maharashtra (7) AIR 1993 SC 1180 it is held while considering three dying declarations, one recorded by a Doctor, on recorded by a Police Officer and one recorded by an Executive Magistrate, by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the dying declaration recorded by P.W. 4, the Executive Magistrate is entitled to great weight that the Doctor also endorsed that the patient was in the condition of giving the statement that the Executive Magistrate in his evidence clearly stated that he enquired the injured and recorded her statement as per her narration, whereas the statement recorded by the police official was consistent with the other statements recorded and that none of them suffered from any infirmity and hence the conviction could be based upon the statements and soon. 16. Therefore, even though the statement or statementswere not recorded by any Judicial Officer, still they can be accepted if the yare found to be trustworthy. 17. In Nanhar v. State of Haryana (5 supra), it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court: "In our considered opinion, the dying declaration should be such, which should immensely strike to be genuine and stating true story of its maker. 17. In Nanhar v. State of Haryana (5 supra), it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court: "In our considered opinion, the dying declaration should be such, which should immensely strike to be genuine and stating true story of its maker. It should be free from all doubts and on going through it, an impression has to be registered immediately in mind that it is genuine, true and not tainted with doubts. It should not be the result of tutoring. But dying declaration in the present case does not fulfil these conditions". 18. Further in P.V. Radhakrishna's case (2supra), it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with reference to facts and circumstances of that case: "The situation in which a person is on deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in afit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence." 19. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence." 19. In J. Ramulu's case (3 supra), it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court: "This Court in P. Mani v. State of T.N.[ (2006) 3 SCC 161 ], while dealing with the question of dying declaration, held that conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying declaration alone but the same must be wholly reliable. In a case where suspicion can be raised as regards the correctness of the dying declaration, the Court before convicting an accused on the basis thereof would look for some corroborative evidence. Suspicion is no substitute for proof. It evidence brought on records suggests that such dying declaration does not reveal the entire truth, it may be considered only as a piece of evidence in which event conviction may not be rested only on the basis thereof. The question as to whether a dying declaration is of impeccable character would depend upon several factors; physical and mental condition of the deceased is one of them." 20. In Puran Chand's case (4 supra), it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with reference to relevant circumstances: "The Courts below have to be extremely careful when they deal with a dying declaration as the marker thereof is not available for the cross-examination which poses a great difficulty to the accused person. A mechanical approach in relying upon a dying declaration just because it is there is extremely dangerous. The Court has to examine a dying declaration scrupulously with a microscopic eye to find out whether the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful, made in a conscious state of mind and without being influenced by the relatives present or by a investigating agency who may be interested in the success of investigation or which may be negligent while recording the dying declaration. When there are more than one dying declarations, the intrinsic contradictions in those dying declarations are extremely important. It cannot be that a dying declaration which supports the prosecution alone can be accepted while the other innocuous dying declarations have to be rejected. When there are more than one dying declarations, the intrinsic contradictions in those dying declarations are extremely important. It cannot be that a dying declaration which supports the prosecution alone can be accepted while the other innocuous dying declarations have to be rejected. Such trend will be extremely dangerous. However, the Courts below are fully entitled to act on the dying declarations and make them the basis of conviction, where the dying declarations pass all the above tests. The court has to weigh all the attendant circumstances and come to the independent finding whether the dying declaration was properly recorded and whether it was voluntary and truthful. The courts must bear in mind that each criminal trial is an individual aspect. If after careful scrutiny the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it a basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. The dying declaration of S passes all the tests." 21. In the light of the principles laid down as narrated above, it is to be examined as to how far the statements recorded as Exs. P-16 and P-27 are reliable and acceptable examining the material available for consideration. The issue is to be analyzed in a broader perspective instead of rejecting it on narrow considerations. 22. Emphatically, Exs. P-16 and 27 provide that he LTI was taken under the two depositions respectively, which clearly proves that she was only a marker/illiterate. Presentation of past events by a person depends upon comprehension as to what was to be disclosed and what was not to be disclosed and also capacity to do so which further depend upon his or her mood at a particular juncture followed by the alleged incident and mental caliber. Literate and experienced persons are always better capable of presenting past events more comprehensively when necessity arises compared to illiterate persons normally. Every bodies comprehensions, expressions and actions depend upon how he has evolved by his experiences independently and also by his contracts with others in his life. Literate and experienced persons are always better capable of presenting past events more comprehensively when necessity arises compared to illiterate persons normally. Every bodies comprehensions, expressions and actions depend upon how he has evolved by his experiences independently and also by his contracts with others in his life. What is important here is the determination of the veracity of the two statements if it is proved on the consideration of the totality of the circumstances of the case that the improvised statement is true or not tainted with falsity that is suffice. It is not proper to reject them on the apparent consideration of the fact that in the second one there isthe improvised statement. 23. Regard has to be given as to why she had chosen to speak against the accused who happened to be her own father-in-law in the light of which, her veracity can be determined. In fact, this aspect can be best explained by the accused or his kith and kin, but significantly there is nothing about it in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 (sons of the accused). 24. P.W. 1 in fact deposed that at the time of incident, he was in front of his house and because the deceased cried, he went inside and found the deceased in flames and he immediately rushed to her and in order to rescue her, he removed her saree, by reason of which, he received burns on both of his hands and then P.W. 3 and another came and put off the flames using 'bontha' and so on, whereas P.W. 9 deposed that he treated P.W. 1and found injuries on his body and issued Ex. P-13 wound certificate about which there is no dispute. It is also the evidence of P.W. 1 that the deceased died having received burn injuries accidentally wile cooking and the accused used to behave properly and his conduct was good. P.Ws. 2 to 4 deposed similarly. It is also found in the evidence of P.W. 4 that on enquiry, the deceased replied that the tail of her saree caught fire from the flames of oven while she was cooking food, which is not found in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3specifically. 25. P.Ws. 2 to 4 deposed similarly. It is also found in the evidence of P.W. 4 that on enquiry, the deceased replied that the tail of her saree caught fire from the flames of oven while she was cooking food, which is not found in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3specifically. 25. Pertinently, there is nothing from their evidence against the deceased with regards to her behaviour and tendency to make false accusations against the accused or give false dying declarations against the accused or she was in depression of any kind. If there was a reason to give false dying declarations they would have definitely deposed before the court accordingly. It is something unbelievable being unnatural that she had chosen to give false dying declarations against her father-in-law i.e. the accused even though he was treating her properly and she got no specific grouse against him. If there is evidence to the effect that she was very adamant or very quarrelsome or vindictive and she had the habit of making false accusations against the accused or others in the house or she was in depression, it may be necessary to view the matter from a different angle and also suspiciously. Emphatically, she had chosen to give the two dying declarations only against her father-in-law excluding the other members of the family. There is no dispute about what is claimed by the prosecution that the marriage of the deceased took place 13 years prior to the filing of the charge sheet and absolutely there is no evidence that any unpleasant things occurred between her and the accused otherwise earlier during that entire period, which strengthen the view that she got no need to give false dying declarations against the accused in any way. 26. P.W. 7 brother of the deceased deposed to the effect that having received necessary information from P.W. 1, he along withothers proceeded to the hospital of Dr. 26. P.W. 7 brother of the deceased deposed to the effect that having received necessary information from P.W. 1, he along withothers proceeded to the hospital of Dr. Ranganayakulu at Markapur and found the deceased with burn injuries and when he asked the deceased while she was in conscious state of mind as to what happened, she replied that the accused poured kerosene and set fire to her and she also stated that dispute arose with regards to the disposal of Hayrick yard site by the accused, whereas the version of the prosecution is that as the deceased refused for the sale of the property, the accused involved in the alleged act, which discrepancy need not be given any importance in the facts and circumstances of the case as such discrepancies do occur in the depositions of even truthful witnesses. P.W.8 the mother of the deceased deposed similarly, whereas she further deposed that the incident took place while the deceased was cooking food in the house and P.W. 1came and put off the flames, due to which he also received burn injuries. The evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 8 corroborates with each other with regards to the complicity of the accused in the matter. 27. Section 32 of Indian Evidence Act postulates. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant-Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured, without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable and sub- section (1) thereof provides, when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question and such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. 28. 28. Therefore, the statements said to have been given by the deceased to her brother and mother to the effect that the accused poured kerosene and set fire to her while she was in the house or cooking in the house are the statements pertaining to the cause of her death, which following the incident and certainly their statements are to be taken as evidence for the purpose of establishing the charge against the accused. 29. Nothing was elicited from the evidence of P.Ws. 7and 8, which is favourable to the defence version that the accused is innocent of the charge. They too got no need to speak falsehood against the accused particularly, when it is not a case of harassing the deceased for bringing additional dowry, mentally and physically for the non-performance of the demand to do so and killing her to death consequentially in order to draw any inference in that context that as they got grouse against the accused, they might have given false evidence before the Court. 30. In Vithal Sadshiv Gaikwad's case (1 supra),it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court; "In Panibens, case the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the law with regard to dying declarations threadbare. The Supreme Court however did not have occasion to consider one more aspect that needs to be taken very serious note of particularly in cases of the present type. Where there is a background of unhappiness, marital discord, violence accusations against fidelity and the like and where it is highly suggestive of the fact that the deceased wife had been the victim of harassment torture, and character assassination over a period of time and consequently can never be favourably disposed towards the husband, the Court would have to put itself on guard. In such cases the principle "nemo moriturus proesumitur ementiri" the principle which governs the credibility that is attributed to dying declarations, namely that a dying person would not normally tell a lie, does require serious examination. Having regard to the mental disposition of the victim one cannot rule out the possibility on the part of some persons to implicate, purely out of a sense of vendetta, the husband who has been responsible for prolonged and protracted ill-treatment. Having regard to the mental disposition of the victim one cannot rule out the possibility on the part of some persons to implicate, purely out of a sense of vendetta, the husband who has been responsible for prolonged and protracted ill-treatment. Cases are quite common where the wife is virtually pushed to a position of a utter desperation and which results in an attempted suicide and at a later point of time when questions are put one cannot completely eliminate the possibility of false implication, if the background has been extremely hostile, and the victim feels guilty of having attempted the suicide. That aspect therefore does require serious examination. Conversely, it would certainly appear correct that if, over a period of time, statements made to different persons both oral and in writing consistently setout the same version and if that version does find support from the evidence of other witnesses also, then a Court could safely act on what is contained in the dying declarations, as in the present case." 31. This decision is relevant here in the context that because it is not a case of long harassment meted out to the deceased for bringing additional dowry mentally and physically and there was no background of unhappiness, marital discord, violence or any other accusations, otherwise the question of viewing the case with some suspicion of the possibility of giving false or exaggerated dying declarations does not arise at all and further it contemplates that the statements made by different persons consistently set out one version, which are supported by the evidence of the witnesses examined, the Court can safely act upon what is contained in the dying declarations. 32. It is emphatically that there are no contradictions or controversial statements in the two dying declarations when they are compared with each other, whereas there is an improvement in the dying declaration recorded by the ASI, which in the circumstances of the case, already discussed above, is not fatal and on the other hand, which can be taken into consideration for the purpose of ascertaining the motive to kill the deceased. Further, there is sufficient material which corroborates with the dying declarations in the form of the evidence of P.Ws. Further, there is sufficient material which corroborates with the dying declarations in the form of the evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 8, which is to the effect that subsequent to the incident in question, they met the deceased in the hospital and she informed that the accused poured kerosene and set herablaze while she was in the matrimonial house or in the kitchen of the matrimonial house and also in the form of medical evidence which provides that she received burn injuries as she caught fire, apart from which, significantly there was no need for her to give false dying declarations and P.Ws. 7 and 8got no need to give false evidence against the accused and much emphasis is tobe given to the effect that there is nothing adverse in the evidence of P.Ws. 1and 2 about the conduct or behaviour of the deceased to suspect or conclude that there was a possibility of giving false dying declarations against the accused. 33. With regards to the veracity of the evidence ofP.Ws. 1 to 6, it is natural that P.Ws. 1 and 2 being the sons of the accused and P.Ws. 3 to 6 being their neighbour are interested to save the accused. When there is a strong evidence otherwise, which is sufficient to establish the complicity of the accused in attempting to kill the deceased which really resulted ultimately in her death, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 6 which is to be termed as interested in favour of accused only, is to be discarded. 34. No doubt, there is truth in the evidence of P.W.1that he tried to save the deceased while she was in flames which resulted in causing of burn injuries to him, but simply because a portion of his deposition is true, it does not mean that the remaining portion of his evidence to the effect that the deceased caught fire accidentally which in fact is only hearsay cannot be held to be true. It is the duty of the Court to weigh the evidence and decide which part of it is true and which part of it is not true, in other words, truth and falsehood are to be separated like separating grain from chaff to determine the charge against the accused. It is to be reiterated the principle that justice should be done not only to the accused, but also to the accuser. 35. It is to be reiterated the principle that justice should be done not only to the accused, but also to the accuser. 35. The medical evidence amply Proves that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state of mind at the time of giving her statements. It is not in the medical evidence specifically that because she received extensive burns, she was not in fit and conscious state to give dying declarations. It rules out that she was not in a position to give her statement properly owing to the fact that she received extensive burns. 36. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the two dying declarations coupled with the evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 8 and also the medical evidence are quite reliable being credible which therefore are accepted rejecting the contentions raised on behalf of the accused. 37. With regards to the applicability of the charge under Section 302 IPC, much emphasis is to be given to the fact that the accused went into the kitchen of the house when the deceased was cooking the reand picked up a quarrel with her with reference to selling the property and as she did not agree for his proposal to do so, he involved in setting her ablaze using kerosene after collecting it. Normally, when daughter-in-law is in kitchen, her father-in-law does not enter the kitchen for any purpose. The conduct of the accused therefore shows that he went there with a definite purpose i.e. to prevail upon her to achieve his object of selling the property. If he was conscious of his relationship with the deceased, he would not have involved in doing such acts even supposing that she was adamant and strong enough mentally to prevent him from doing so. In spite of the fact that the second dying declaration provides that the accused at first picked up a quarrel with her before embarking upon taking the extreme step to kill her, the same is not sufficient to hold that he did so not of some provocation from her. No doubt, it is clear from the evidence recorded that her say in the house was predominant which must be the reason as to why the accused was not able to fulfil his desire to sell the property. No doubt, it is clear from the evidence recorded that her say in the house was predominant which must be the reason as to why the accused was not able to fulfil his desire to sell the property. Unless she got necessary support from her husband and brother-in-law, probably she would not be in a position to defy the demand of the accused to sell the property. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that he went into the kitchen of the house taking advantage of the fact that she was alone in the house not only to prevail upon her to accede to his proposal but also to cause her death unless his proposal was acceded with a pre-determined mind. We are further of the view that the trial Court properly examined the matter and we do not find any reasons to interfere with it. In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court.