JUDGMENT D.N. Patel, J. - 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner limits his prayer only to the extent that for the year, 1993-94, the calculation shown in the impugned order at Annexure 6 gives lesser amount of remission and, in fact, as per Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement (Annexure 5 to the memo of petition) to be read with several decisions, rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, even for less than a period of 30 minutes, the demand charges and the guaranteed energy charges, set out in the schedule, shall be reduced, pro-rata for that period, and, therefore, for the year, 1993-94, instead of 761 hours' calculation, it should have been 1462 hours and, therefore, the calculation, shown in the impugned order at Annexure 6 to the memo of petition for the year, 1993-94 should be on the basis of 1462 hours, instead of the calculation based upon 761 hours. 2. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that for the year, 1997-98 the bill for energy charges raised by the respondent-Jharkhand State Electricity Board (Annexure 3 to the memo of petition) covers the last date of payment as 30th May, 1998 and, therefore, as per Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement (Annexure 5 to the memo of petition), a letter dated 28th May, 1998 (Annexure 7 to the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner) was written and the petitioner has also offered 50% payment under protest of the amount of bill, which is at Annexure 3 to the memo of petition and has demanded a proforma, fixed by the respondent- Board for claim of refund/remission under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement (Annexure 5 to the memo of petition). It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the amount of 50% of the bill at Annexure 3 to the memo of petition has already been accepted by the respondent-Board. It is further submitted that there is no statutory proforma fixed under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement to claim refund. In fact, on the basis of the data available, it requires a simple calculation, but, nonetheless, the aforesaid letter dated 28th May, 1998 was written, so that the claim of the petitioner may not be rejected by the respondents, on the ground that the petitioner has not applied in the proforma published by the respondent-Board. 3. In fact, on the basis of the data available, it requires a simple calculation, but, nonetheless, the aforesaid letter dated 28th May, 1998 was written, so that the claim of the petitioner may not be rejected by the respondents, on the ground that the petitioner has not applied in the proforma published by the respondent-Board. 3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as per Clause 4(b) of the notification, issued by the respondents at Annexure A to the counter affidavit, filed by the respondent-Board, the claim can be made by the petitioner under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, only in the Board's prescribed proforma and that too within ninety days after the due date of the bill. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as the authorities of the respondent-Board have not supplied the Board's prescribed proforma within time, some delay has caused in claiming the refund and, therefore, the delay, if any, is on the part of the respondent-Board and hence the claim of the petitioner cannot be brushed aside by the respondents, as per the impugned order at Annexure 6 to the memo of petition. In fact, the Board cannot take the advantage of its own wrong. The Board's prescribed proforma is not available in the open market and the same is available only with some peculiar officers of the respondent-Board and, therefore, to obey every “now & then” the petitioner has to approach those officers to make the claim of refund as per Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. Thus, the impugned order at Annexure 6 of the memo of petition, so far it relates to the year, 1997-98, has wrongly been issued by the respondents and, therefore, let the matter be remanded to the concerned respondent authority for a fresh decision for the year, 1993-94 (as wrong calculation has been done by the respondents as “761 hours” and, in fact, it should have been “1462 hours”) as well as for the year, 1997-98, directing the respondents to calculate the amount of refund/remission, without considering the fact regarding delayed application. 4. 4. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Board, who has fairly submitted that now so far as refund/remission for a period of less than 30 minutes non-supply of electrical energy and, therefore, remission of demand charge and guaranteed charges is concerned, it has already been held in the case of General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, Ranchi Area Electricity Board & ors. etc. v. M/s Roll Well Enterprises, Ranchi etc. (L.P.A. No. 430 of 2001 and other analogous cases) vide order dated 10th March, 2003 that if the respondent-Board has not supplied the electric energy for less than 30 minutes, then this period will also be taken for giving remission/refund for demand charges and guaranteed energy charges, because in Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, the locking period of 30 minutes has not been mentioned at all. Thus, learned counsel for the respondent-Board is not submitting anything more so far as the calculation for the year, 1993-94 is concerned. So far as the claim of the petitioner regarding refund for the year, 1997-98 is concerned, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that as per Clause 4(b) of the circular, issued by the respondents at Annexure A to the counter affidavit, such an application ought to have been preferred by the petitioner within ninety days after the due date of the bill. In the facts of the present case, the petitioner has applied after 20 days' delay and, therefore, because of this delay, the claim of the petitioner for the financial year, 1997-98 has been rejected by the impugned order at Annexure 6 to the memo of petition. Thus, for the year, 1993-94 the matter requires remand to the concerned respondent authority for recalculation of the hours in the light of the aforesaid decision dated 10th March, 2003 , rendered in L.P.A. No. 430 of 2001 and other analogous cases. 5. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that : - (i) The petitioner is challenging the order, passed by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer dated 29th April, 2002 (Annexure 6 to the memo of petition) for the year, 1993-94 as well as for the year, 1997-98. (ii) The bone of contention has arisen because of Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement in between the petitioner and the respondent-Board. (ii) The bone of contention has arisen because of Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement in between the petitioner and the respondent-Board. Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement reads as under: - “13. If at any time the consumer is prevented from receiving or using the electrical energy to be supplied under this agreement either in whole or in part due to strikes, riots, fire, floods, explosions, act of God or any other case reasonable beyond control or if the Board is prevented from supplying or unable to supply such electrical energy owing to any or all of the causes mentioned above then the demand charge and guaranteed energy charge set out in the Schedule shall be reduced in proportion to the ability of the consumer to take or the Board to supply such power and the decision of the Chief Engineer, Bihar State Electricity Board, in this respect shall be final. Note.- the term Chief Engineer includes Additional Chief Engineer for the area concerned.” (Emphasis Supplied) In view of the aforesaid Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, it appears that if the Board is unable to supply the electrical energy for some period, pro-rata for that period, demand charges and guaranteed energy charges, set out in the Schedule, should be reduced. (iii) The respondent-Board has issued a bill dated 8th May, 1998, which is at Annexure 3 to the memo of petition. The petitioner wanted refund/remission as per the aforesaid Clause No.13 of the High Tension Agreement. (iii) The respondent-Board has issued a bill dated 8th May, 1998, which is at Annexure 3 to the memo of petition. The petitioner wanted refund/remission as per the aforesaid Clause No.13 of the High Tension Agreement. For claiming refund under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, one more circular has been issued by the respondent-Board dated 29th April, 1994 (Annexure A to the counter affidavit, filed by the respondents), Clause 4(b) thereof reads as under : “4(b) The bill, served for the full amount of shortfall in AMG charges shall contain a clause that “If the consumer challenges the demand made, he may submit a claim under appropriate clause of agreement within a period of three months (90 days) after due date of the bill with details on the basis of which relief has been claimed in Board's prescribed proforma.” (Emphasis Supplied) In view of the aforesaid Clause, there are two conditions for preferring an application for refund under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, which are as under : (a) Such an application should have been preferred within a period of ninety days after the due date of the bill (in the facts of the present case, due date of the bill at Annexure 3 is 30th May, 1998); and (b) Such an application under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement ought to have been made by the claimant in a Board's prescribed proforma. (iv) Thus, in pursuance of the aforesaid circular, issued by the respondent-Board dated 29th July, 1994 a letter was written by the petitioner dated 28th May, 1998, which is at Annexure 7 to the rejoinder affidavit, filed by the petitioner, wherein, it has been mentioned that the petitioner is claiming refund, under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement and 50% of the amount was offered under protest and the petitioner has also requested to supply the form to enable it to lodge the claim and an endorsement has been made upon this application by the respondents to accept the 50% of Annual Minimum Guaranteed Charges for the year, 1997-98, but, since there was some delay in supply of the Board's prescribed proforma and, therefore, the petitioner could lodge its claim in the prescribed proforma with a delay of twenty days (as per the respondents) or with a delay of two days (as per the petitioner) and because of this delay, looking to the impugned order, the whole claim of the petitioner for the year, 1997-98 has been rejected. The decision of the respondents rejecting the claim of the petitioner for the year, 1997-98 is illegal. In fact, the respondents cannot take advantage of their own wrong. If they are prescribing proforma for claim of refund, it should be made easily available to the petitioner. This type of Board's prescribed proforma is not available in the open market. Moreover, claim was already lodged by the petitioner for refund under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, prior to the due date of payment of the bill i.e. within the period of limitation, but, if the Board requires accurate details of the claim, then the prescribed proforma is required, which the authorities of the Board have supplied lately and, therefore, there is a maximum delay of twenty days as per the respondents and two days as per the petitioner. (v) Moreover, looking to Clause 4(b) of the Circular dated 29th July, 1994, it appears that the bill, which has been issued by the respondents for the shortfall in the Annual Minimum Guaranteed Charges, should contain the details given into inverted comma. (v) Moreover, looking to Clause 4(b) of the Circular dated 29th July, 1994, it appears that the bill, which has been issued by the respondents for the shortfall in the Annual Minimum Guaranteed Charges, should contain the details given into inverted comma. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no such clause was ever shown in the main bill at Annexure 3 to the memo of petition, which is silent about what is directed in Clause 4(b) of the Circular dated 29th July, 1994, issued by the respondent-Board. Moreover, whenever there is any statutory proforma for claiming refund, the respondent-Board should have supplied immediately such type of prescribed proforma and if the authorities of the respondent-Board have supplied the same at some belated stage, there is no fault on the part of the petitioner in claiming the refund, because the refund was already claimed on 28th May, 1998 as per Annexure 7 to the rejoinder affidavit, filed by the petitioner. As such, the respondent-Board cannot take advantage of the wrong committed by its officials. There is no delay on the part of the petitioner in lodging the claim under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. Such type of Board's prescribed proforma is not available in the open market. These type of proforma are kept with the specific officers of the respondent-Board. There is no further affidavit, filed by the respondent-Board of the averments, made by the petitioner in the affidavit in rejoinder. Thus, Annexure 7 of the affidavit in rejoinder has been accepted by the respondent-Board. As such, as per Annexure 7 the claim, made by the petitioner under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, was within the time limit. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated while passing the impugned order dated 29th April, 2002 by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer of the respondent-Board. I, therefore, quash and set aside the impugned order dated 29th April, 2002 at Annexure 6 to the memo of petition, so far it relates to the year, 1997-98. The claim of the petitioner under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement will be considered on its own merits, as there is no delay in lodging the claim by the petitioner. The claim of the petitioner under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement will be considered on its own merits, as there is no delay in lodging the claim by the petitioner. So far as the year, 1993-94 is concerned, a Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 10th March, 2003 in L.P.A. No. 430 of 2001 and analogous cases, has held at paragraph nos.8 to 10 as under : “8. The learned single judge observed that the Board was empowered to formulate such conditions in order to safe-guard its interest and also to provide mode of disposal of the claims and held that Notification dated 29.7.1994 and its clarificatory letter dated 13.7.1996 issued by the Board were perfectly legal, valid and binding on the consumers. Time limit for filing claim under clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement fixed by the Board was justified and in accordance with law. Prescribing the period of more than 30 minutes' interruption in supply of electricity for the purpose of granting remission in payment of A.M.G. charges was wholly unjustified and against the law laid down in Suprabhat Steel Limited versus Bihar State Electricity Board (1994(1) BBCJ 369). While making the claim under clause 13 for proportionate remission in payment of AMG charges, the consumer has to deposit 50% of the dues along with the claim. 9. The Electricity Board has, therefore, preferred Appeals, against part of the impugned order, whereby only the interruption for more than 30 minutes' duration were to be considered for the purpose of remission was held to be unjustified and the consumers preferred Appeals against the observations/findings of the learned single Judge that Regulation in question issued by the Board under section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act was legal and the limitation prescribed for filing claim under clause 13 and asking to deposit 50% amount of the Bill by way of condition to consider the objection under clause 13 were also legal and justified. 10. After hearing the parties at length and on considering the various pronouncements of the Apex Court and the High Courts, we are in agreement with the decision in Jamshedpur Roller Flour Mills (P) Ltd., versus Bihar State Electricity Board (2000 (1) All. 10. After hearing the parties at length and on considering the various pronouncements of the Apex Court and the High Courts, we are in agreement with the decision in Jamshedpur Roller Flour Mills (P) Ltd., versus Bihar State Electricity Board (2000 (1) All. PLR 231) and find that the present matters are covered by the said decision and as such the learned single Judge rightly decided the writ application by the impugned order in these appeals and remitted the matter for reconsideration by the General Manager- cum-Chief Engineer and decision on the question of proportionate remission in payment of the AMG charges in the light of the aforesaid pronouncements referred to in Jamshedpur Flour Mills (P) Ltd. (supra)” (Emphasis Supplied) (vi) Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision, the respondent-Board cannot reject the claim of the petitioner for the year, 1993-94 for the reasons that if there is any non-supply of the electrical energy for the period less than thirty minutes, the claim of remission/refund under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement will not be considered. Moreover, there is nothing in Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, which permits the Board not to supply electrical energy for thirty minutes and to charge the guaranteed energy charges. Looking to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, “locking- period' of thirty minutes, applied by the respondent-Board is an arbitrary action. (vii) It is further pointed out by the learned counsel for both the sides that initially it was 59 minutes viz. If the electrical energy is not supplied for 59 minutes by the respondent-Board, then also the Board was entitled to charge guaranteed energy charges. This clause was challenged and the said clause relating to 59 minutes was quashed and set aside in the case of Suprabhat Steel Limited v. B.S.E.B., as reported in 1994 B.B.C.J. 369. In view of the aforesaid decision, the Board has reduced the locking period to 30 minutes, which was initially 59 minutes, by the aforesaid circular dated 29th July, 1994. In view of the aforesaid decision, the Board has reduced the locking period to 30 minutes, which was initially 59 minutes, by the aforesaid circular dated 29th July, 1994. This new clause was also under challenge in the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeals and it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that looking to Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, no such “locking-period” of 30 minutes has been mentioned in the said Clause No. 13 of the High Tension Agreement and, therefore, even for any interval lesser than 30 minutes if there is any non-supply of electrical energy by the respondent-Board, then also the industry is entitled to pro-rata reduction in the guaranteed energy charges, as set out in the Schedule. This aspect of the matter has also not been properly appreciated by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer of the respondent-Board, while passing the impugned order dated 29th April, 2002 for the year, 1993-94. 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and also the judicial pronouncements, the calculation in the impugned order for the year, 1993-94 is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded to the concerned respondent authority so far it relates to the year 1993-94 as well as 1997-98 for calculation of the remission/ refund charges under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. The concerned respondent authority will consider the aforesaid decision given in LPA No.430 of 2001 and other analogous cases as well as the observations made in this order. This exercise will be completed by the concerned respondent authority within a period of sixteen weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order, passed by this Court, Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner shall also cooperate in supply of the necessary data to the respondent concerned. This writ petition is, accordingly, allowed and disposed of to the aforesaid extent.