Dr. TIWARI, M.—This is a second appeal under Section 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (in short 'the Act of 1955') against the impugned judgment and decree dated 26.5.2005 of Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur. 2. Briefly stated, the facts leading to the second appeal are that the respondents-plaintiffs No.1 and 2 filed a suit under Section 88 and 183 of the Act of 1955 against the appellants-defendants in the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer Sambhar Lake District Jaipur. The suit was filed by the plaintiffs mainly on the ground that the disputed lands were deity-lands being managed by the plaintiff No.2 as a pujari and cultivated by the appellants-defendants on behalf of the deity; but in course of time the names of the deity was removed from the revenue records and defendants figured as khatedar tenants of the deity lands. A prayer was made for declaration of khatedari rights in the name of the deity and ejectment of the defendants from the suit land. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Sambher Lake allowed the suit vide his judgment and decree dated 14.9.2004 which was challenged in first appeal by the appellants under Section 223 of the act of 1955 in the Court of Revenue Appellate Authority Jaipur who dismissed the appeal by his impugned judgment against which the present second appeal is preferred in this Court. 3. We have heard the learned counsels of both the parties at length. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that both the lower courts passed erroneous judgments considering the suit-lands as khatedari lands of Thakur Ji gopal Ji Maharaj (the deity) whereas there is no evidence to prove that the suit lands were ever deity-lands. The earlier record shows that the deity was only a 'maufidar/jagirdar' of the suit lands and on resumption of jagir, the appellants-defendants became khatedar tenants of the suit lands under the provision of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952 (in short 'the Act of 1952'). It was also contended that the father of the defendants No.2 Sitaram sold the disputed khasra No. 696 (Gair-mumkin-Chah) through registered sale-deed dated 18.10.1995 to defendants as such the plaintiffs are bound by the registered sale deed and their admission of the fact of sale. Unless this sale deed is got cancelled by the competent civil Court, the suit was not maintainable before the revenue Court. Unless this sale deed is got cancelled by the competent civil Court, the suit was not maintainable before the revenue Court. But both the lower courts ignored this legal position. The learned counsel objected to the order of appointment of a committee by the trial Court for management of the disputed land; the learned counsel described this act of Sub-Divisional Officer as beyond his discretion. The learned counsel further reiterated that the suit land was not a khudkasht land of the deity as such after resumption of jagir, the appellants-defendants became khatedar tenants of the suit land under Section 15 of the Act of 1955. The learned counsel argued at length about various provisions of the Act of 1952 - particularly section 2(1)(h), Section 9, 10, 21 and 22 of the Act of 1952 - treating the suit lands as 'jagirs/muafi lands' which purportedly got automatically resumed under the Act of 1952 with consequent accrual of khatedari rights in the appellants. The learned counsel cited 1984 RRD 940, 1977 RRD 440, AIR 1955 SC 504 , 1977 RRD 400, ILR 1966 Raj. 1105, 1991 RRD 6, 2000 RRD 14, 2000 RRD 189, AIR 2010 SC 2777 and AIR 2004 SC 4269 in support of his contentions. 5. Opposing the contentions of the appellants, the learned counsel for the respondents pleaded that the suit lands were recorded in the name of a deity. A deity is always considered to be a perpetual minor and as such cultivation done by any person on the deity-lands will be deemed to be the cultivation of the deity as is held in 1984 RRD 1 (L.B.). The name of the deity was unlawfully removed during the settlement operations which was an illegal act. The lands of a deity cannot be alienated. The learned counsel cited 1987 RRD 261, 2009 RBJ 251 and 2007 SCC 482 in support of his contention. It was also pleaded that there is no issues framed about the disputed lands being the 'jagir lands'. The disputed lands were never jagir lands as such he appellants-defendants cannot claim any khatedari rights under Section 15 of the Act of 1955. It was also contended that both the courts below have given concurrent judgments which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal, as no specific legal question is involved. 6. The disputed lands were never jagir lands as such he appellants-defendants cannot claim any khatedari rights under Section 15 of the Act of 1955. It was also contended that both the courts below have given concurrent judgments which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal, as no specific legal question is involved. 6. The Government Advocate contended that the claim of the appellants-defendants for acquisition of khatedari right under Section 15 of the Act of 1955 is not tenable as no tenancy is proved between the alleged landholder/ jagirdar and the appellant-defendants. The suit lands have been proved to be the deity lands and these concurrent findings of facts by both the courts below cannot be interfered with in the second appeal. No khatedari rights accrue in the deity-lands, as such he appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have given thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, perused the judgments of courts below and gone through the material on record. 8. Perusal of the court file of Sub-Divisional Officer shows that the respondents No. 1 and 2 Thakurji Gopal Ji Maharaj Virajman (the deity) and pujari Sitaram Chela Bhura Das (respondent No.2) filed a suit in the court of Sub-Divisional Officer for declaration of khatedari rights and restoration of the possession of the suit lands on the ground that in khatauni jamabandi Svt. 2011 to 2029, the deity Gopal Ji Maharaj was recorded as khatedar tenant of the suit lands, but in course of time the name of the deity was removed from the revenue record without any order of the competent Court; and the appellants-defendants got entered as khatedar tenants which was illegal. Sub-Divisional Officer decreed the suit and Revenue Appellate Authority, by the impugned judgment, concurred in the judgment and decree of the Sub-Divisional Officer. the learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that the disputed lands were earlier recorded in the name of the deity as Muafidar/Jagirdar and with resumption of muafi/jagir under the act of 1952, the appellants-defendants became khatedar tenants of the suit lands under Section 15 of the Act of 1955. Strangely, contrary to this argument advanced by the appellants' advocate, the appellants had categorically denied in para 2 and 3 of their written statement that the disputed lands were ever entered in the name of the deity as muafidar/jagirdar. Strangely, contrary to this argument advanced by the appellants' advocate, the appellants had categorically denied in para 2 and 3 of their written statement that the disputed lands were ever entered in the name of the deity as muafidar/jagirdar. No issue is framed about he acquisition of khatedari right in respect of the disputed land consequent upon the alleged resumption of the suit lands as jagir/muafi land. Thus, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants about the suit land being jagir lands are squarely against the pleadings/averments made in the written statement submitted by the defendants. 9. Nonetheless, in the larger interest of justice we would like to examine whether the deity was a jagirdar/muafidar of the suit lands and whether the appellants became entitled to conferment of khatedar right under Section 15 of the act, notwithstanding the fact that no such claim is made by the defendants (appellants) in their written statement. According to Section 2(h) of the Act of 1952, jagir lands mean "any land in which or in relation to which jagirdar as right in respect of the land revenue or any other kind of revenue and includes any land held at any of the tenure specified in the First Schedule. In the given First Schedule at Serial No.15, the term 'muafi' is written. Presuming for the sake of argument that the deity was a jagirdar of the suit lands, the defendants have to prove that they were paying rent and revenue to the said jagirdar (deity) in respect of the suit lands. Neither any such averment or pleading is made in the written statement nor any such issue is framed nor any evidence is adduced by the appellants-defendants to prove that the suit lands was a jagir land. A jagir is always bestowed upon a person by a Ruler of the land through some grant or a 'royal fiat'. Nothing of the sort is proved by an iota of evidence to establish the suit lands as jagir lands. In absence of such evidence, a simple mention of Muafi in the khatauni (Jamabandi) means that the deity was exempted from paying the rent to the ex-ruler in whatsoever denomination he was known as; it does not make the deity as a jagirdar in respect of the disputed land. In absence of such evidence, a simple mention of Muafi in the khatauni (Jamabandi) means that the deity was exempted from paying the rent to the ex-ruler in whatsoever denomination he was known as; it does not make the deity as a jagirdar in respect of the disputed land. Besides it, no annuity whatsoever is ever fixed on the deity consequent upon the alleged resumption of the muafi/jagir in respect of the suit lands. Thus, the status of the suit lands as jagir lands is not proved. This is further corroborated by the fact that the appellants themselves have denied the suit lands as being muafi/jagir lands of the deity in their written statement. Therefore, all the above mentioned citations referred to at para 3 of this judgment by the learned counsel for the appellants about resumption of jagir and consequent accrual of khatedari rights to them, do not apply with regard to the suit lands. 10. Another argument submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the suit land is not recorded in the khudkasht of the deity; as such the appellants became khatedar tenants under Section 15 of the Act of 1955. In the first place, as stated above, no such pleadings about the 'khudkasht' of the land and accrual of khatedari rights under Section 15 of the Act of 1955 is made by the appellants-defendants in the written statement; nonetheless we would like to examine the matter in light of the 'khudkasht' and 'land cultivated personally'. 11. In the first place, as stated above, no such pleadings about the 'khudkasht' of the land and accrual of khatedari rights under Section 15 of the Act of 1955 is made by the appellants-defendants in the written statement; nonetheless we would like to examine the matter in light of the 'khudkasht' and 'land cultivated personally'. 11. The definitions of khudkasht under the Act of 1952 and the Act of 1955 are just and same; according to Section 2(i) of the Act of 1952 khudkasht' is defined as follows : "(i) 'Khudkasht' means any land cultivated personally by a jagirdar and includes- (i) any land recorded as khudkasht, Sir, or Hawala in settlement record; and (ii) any land allotted to a jagirdar as khudkasht under Chapter VI." According to Section 5(23) of the Act of 1955:- Section 5(23) "Khudkasht shall mean land in any part of the State cultivated personally by an estate holder and shall include- (i) land recorded as khudkasht, sir, havala, niji-jot, gharkhed in settlement records at the commencement of this Act in accordance with law in force at the time when such record was made, and (ii) land allotted after such commencement as khudkasht under any law for the time being in force in any part of the State]." Thus, there is no contradiction between the definitions of khudkasht given in both the Acts. 12. In this regard it would be worthwhile to go into the definition of 'land cultivated personally' as defined in both he Act. According to Section 2(k) of the Act of 1952:- "2(K) 'Land cultivated personally' with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means land cultivated on one's own account- (i) by one's labour; or (ii) by the labour of any member of one's family; or (iii) by servants on wages payable in cash or in kind (but not way of a share in crops) or by hired labour under one's personal supervision or the personal supervision of any member of one's family. Provided that in the case of a person who is a widow or a major or his subject to any physical or mental disability or is a member of the Armed Forces of the Union, or who being a student of an educational institution recognized by the Government is below the age of twenty five years, land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally even in the absence of such personal supervision." According to Section 5(25) of the Act of 1955- "Section 5(25) - 'land cultivated personally' with all its grammatical variations and cognates expressions, shall mean land cultivated on one's own account - (i) by one's labour; or (ii) by the labour of any member of one's family; or (iii) under the personal supervision of oneself or any member of one's family by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or in kind but not by way of a share in crop:] Provided that in the case of a person who is a widow or a minor or it subject to any physical or mental disability or is a member of the Military, Naval or Air Services of India or who, being a student of an educational institution recognized by the State Government is below the age of twenty-five years, shall be deemed to be cultivated personally even in the absence of such personal supervision." Thus, the definitions given for the land cultivated personally in both the Acts are similar and congruent. 13. In light of above mentioned definitions, 'Khudkasht' always connotes jagir land which is in personal cultivation of the jagirdar or the landholder in whatsoever manner he is known as. As discussed above, the above suit land is not proved to be a jagir land as such there is no relevance of term 'khudkasht' in he context of the suit land. Still presuming, without inferring though, that the suit land is jagir land, 'khudkasht' will be presumed to vest in the deity because a deity is always considered to be a minor as held in 1984 RRD 1 (L.B.) and 1994 RRD 1 (HC); and any person who is cultivating the land recorded in the name of deity cultivates such lands on behalf of the deity and such deity being perpetual minor would continue to be in personal cultivation of the land perpetually as per definition of 'Land cultivated personally' discussed above. In this regard Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court (D.B.) has categorically held in Ram Pratap and Anr. vs. Board of Revenue and Others as reported in 1994 RRD 1 as follows :- "(B) Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagirs Act-(a) Section 2(i) and sub-section (23) of Section 5 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act – When there was no provision in the law or in the proforma for preparation of the land records for the entry of the word 'khudkasht', the entry of merely the name of the khatedar in the column provided therefor (without the word 'khudkasht') did not detract from the 'khudkasht' nature of the tenure. (b) Section 2(k) – Land cultivated personally – It is settled law that an idol is a perpetual minor and, therefore, it is not expected to cultivate the land personally and in such a case, the land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally even in the absence of such personal supervision." Thus, there is no question of conferment of khatedari right, on account of possession howsoever long it may be, on a person/persons who cultivated the deity-lands on behalf of the deity. In this regard citations of 1987 RRD 261 (L.B.), 2009 RBJ 251, 2007 SCC 482 are also relied upon by us. 14. We are not inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that Sub-Divisional Officer is not competent to provide for the modality of management of the deity-lands through appointment of a committee. Sub-Divisional Officer, in the given context, has simply acted in the larger interest of the deity (minor) abiding by the prescribed Government circular/guidelines. there is nothing illegal about it. 15. Both the courts below - trial court as well as first appellate Court - have given concurrent finding of the fact that the suit lands were recorded in the name of the deity (respondent-plaintiff) and the name of deity was removed from the revenue record without any order of the competent Court. As such the concurrent judgments given by both the Courts below do not require any interference in the second appeal which is devoid of merit, as discussed and deliberated above. Thus, the appeal fails. 16. Resultantly, the second appeal stands dismissed.