JUDGMENT : G.B. Shah, J. We have heard learned counsel Mr. J.V. Japee for the appellant and learned counsel Mr. P.H. Pathak for the respondents. 2. The facts of the above two Letters Patent Appeals are though related to different employees of the appellant Company/Industry, the facts of the cases are almost similar and as common question of facts and disputes are involved, we have heard them together and adjudicate the same by way of this common judgment. 3. In LPA No.877 of 2006 the appellant has challenged the order dated 20.6.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.10265 of 2006 and the order dated 28.4.2005 passed by the Labour Court, Bharuch in Reference (L.C.B.)No.171 of 2000. Likewise, in LPA No.878 of 2006 the appellant has challenged the order dated 20.6.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.10266 of 2006 and the order dated 28.4.2005 passed by the Labour Court, Bharuch in Reference (L.C.B.)No.170 of 2000 directing to reinstate the respondents in service with full back wages. 4. The facts of the case in brief are that the appellant Surmount Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. is a Pharmaceutical Industry producing various types of allopathic medicines having its Factory at Ankleshwar. The respondents had joined service with the appellant in the beginning of June, 1983 as Machine Operators. The appellant company was paying to its workmen the annual increments and other service benefits. The respondents had raised demand of increase of annual increment and for treating them as skilled workers for which negotiations were going on. Meanwhile, to bring undue pressure on the appellant company, the respondents of both the appeals, in collusion with each other, refused to discharge the day-to-day duties. The appellant had, therefore, given show cause notice dated 7.8.1999 to the respondents and as the explanation given by the respondents was not satisfactory, charge sheet was issued on 17.8.1999 to initiate disciplinary proceedings and the respondents were placed under suspension pending inquiry. The inquiry was initiated and concluded in consonance with the principles of natural justice by giving sufficient and adequate opportunity to the respondents. The Inquiry Officer had given report wherein the allegations were held to be proved. The inquiry was initiated and concluded in consonance with the principles of natural justice by giving sufficient and adequate opportunity to the respondents. The Inquiry Officer had given report wherein the allegations were held to be proved. Thereafter the appellant had given a second show cause notice dated 14.1.2000 along with the report of the Inquiry Officer and as the explanation given by the respondents was not found satisfactory, the appellant had passed order dated 9.2.2000 discharging the respondents from service. The appellant had paid all the legal dues by Account Payee cheque to the respondents. Since the general demand of the workmen was pending before the Labour Court, the appellant had filed an approval application under section 33-2(B) before the Labour Court. 5. The respondents have raised industrial disputes challenging the order of discharge from service and claiming reinstatement with full back wages. The case of the respondents is that they were victimised by the appellant as they have raised the demand as stated before the Labour Court and as such according to the respondents, they had never refused to discharge their day-to-day duties. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has mainly argued that the learned Single Judge has erred in believing the case of the respondents that they were victimised and wrongly held that the disciplinary action taken against the workmen was with ulterior motive and that the reasons given by the learned Single Judge in support of the allegations of victimisation are not borne out from the award passed by the Labour Court. 7. We have carefully perused the entire award and all the relevant papers forthcoming on the record. Referring the awards dated 28.4.2005 passed by the Labour Court, Bharuch, it is the specific finding of the Labour Court that in June, 1983, the respondents workmen had joined services of the appellant as Helper-unskilled Labourer and after completion of one year of their service, the respondents were discharging their duties as skilled Labourer as had been directed by the appellant. In spite of that, the fact remains that the appellant had never given the designations and pay of skilled labourer to the respondents. On this issue, the respondents had raised their demands before the appellant and on the basis of the incident dated 7.8.1999, the respondents were given charge sheet dated 17.8.1999 and after disciplinary inquiry the respondents were discharged from service. On this issue, the respondents had raised their demands before the appellant and on the basis of the incident dated 7.8.1999, the respondents were given charge sheet dated 17.8.1999 and after disciplinary inquiry the respondents were discharged from service. It further appears that the Labour Court also found that termination of service of the workmen was void ab initio and the Labour Court has further given their specific finding that the case of the workmen is a case of malafide and arbitrary exercise of the power by the appellant management. Thus there appears no force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the findings given by the learned Single Judge is independent finding of facts and the allegations of victimisation are not borne out from the award passed by the Labour Court. The learned Single Judge had, at length, covered all the points considering the award passed by the Labour Court and relevant paragraphs No. 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the order dated 20.6.2006 passed in Special Civil Applications No.10265 of 2006 with Special Civil Application No.10266 of 2006 which is extracted below: "6. I have considered the submissions made by learned advocate Mr. Japee and I have perused the award passed by the Labour Court, Bharuch. The Labour Court has discussed the statement and written statement filed by both the parties. The Labour Court has also considered the decision relied by both the parties. Thereafter, issue has been framed whether punishment of discharge by order dated 9th February 2000 is unjustified or harsh or not and whether workmen are entitled for the reinstatement with continuity in service and whether workmen are entitled for full back wages of interim period or not. These issues were framed by the Labour Court and in paragraph 18, Labour Court has given detail reason in support of its conclusion. Initially, both the workmen were working as unskilled workmen, but by experience, according to them, they becomes skilled workmen. Therefore, both the workmen made request to the petitioner that while comparison to the work of other workmen, they are also performing skilled work. Therefore, they are entitled for the salary as a skilled employees. The another request was made by the workmen that annual increments are not giving regularly and to give slip of over time wages. This request was turned down by the petitioner. Therefore, they are entitled for the salary as a skilled employees. The another request was made by the workmen that annual increments are not giving regularly and to give slip of over time wages. This request was turned down by the petitioner. Ultimately, both the workmen were approached to the Labour Union and Labour Union has filed complaint in respect to the demand made by both the workmen. Therefore, sudden reaction of employer was that they orally terminated the services immediately on 20th June 1999 by oral order. Therefore, against that oral order of termination, both the workmen raised industrial disputes before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bharuch to reinstate with continuity of service with full back wages of interim period. A moment that notice received from the Conciliation Officer, they realise their mistake as hurriedly services were terminated without following due process of law, therefore, immediately, petitioner was agreed to reinstate both the workmen in service with full back wages of interim period before the Conciliation Officer. Then both the workmen were allowed to resume duty and back wages was paid. Then both the workmen raised industrial disputes through Labour Commissioner about their demand and that demand was raised by the Labour Union before the appropriate authority immediately. It is a second reaction of the petitioner to serve charge-sheet on 7th August 1999 and suspended to both the workmen. Thereafter, the charge-sheet was served dated 7th August 1999 within a short period after reinstatement and inquiry was completed on 14th January 2000, calling the explanation from the workmen and then terminated the service of workmen by order dated 9th February 2000. Thus, this was back ground which ultimately with ulterior motive, the management has taken action against the workmen on the ground that they disobey the order and direction of the superior and they refused to except the letter of the petitioner. This being a show create to discharge both the workmen and merely/empty formality was followed that after due process of law, order of discharge has been passed. The legality and validity of departmental inquiry was not challenged by the workmen and finding given by inquiry officer also not much in dispute. But, Labour Court has considered this back ground in his mind while exercising the power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The legality and validity of departmental inquiry was not challenged by the workmen and finding given by inquiry officer also not much in dispute. But, Labour Court has considered this back ground in his mind while exercising the power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court has exercised the power under Section 11-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on the ground that allegations which were made against the workmen are not such so serious which requires extreme penalty of discharge. The past conduct has been totally ignored by the petitioner and it is not the case of the petitioner that in past, any misconduct has been committed by either of workmen. Therefore, Labour Court has considered this aspect while exercising the power and come to the conclusion that it is clear case of victimise and unfair labour practise adopted by the petitioner. This being a clear case of legal victimization. The Labour Court has also appreciated that reply to charge-sheet and reply to show cause notice by the workmen also not properly appreciated by the competent authority. Therefore, once the employer with clear motive and that clear intention discharged the workmen and departmental inquiry is merely a formality which can be understood by the independent authority being a Labour Court that on what basis and in which manner and what purpose the order of discharge has been passed by the employer. The petitioner has not proved the gainful employment of either of workmen. Both the workmen were deposed before the Labour Court that after the discharge order, they remained without work and in spite of the sincere efforts made by both of them, they are not able to obtain any work / job and they remained unemployed. In light of this evidence before the Labour Court and coming to the conclusion that discharge order has been passed by the petitioner to remove the workmen on the ground that why they raised hands before the petitioner for making some demands about their legal rights. This punishment being a clear answer of demand raised by the workmen before the petitioner to receive the discharge order. Such type of action cannot be approved by an individual authority being a Labour Court. This punishment being a clear answer of demand raised by the workmen before the petitioner to receive the discharge order. Such type of action cannot be approved by an individual authority being a Labour Court. Therefore, legislation has given wide power being an independent authority to consider all the aspects of discharge order passed by the employer and find out whether order of discharge is suffered from victimisation and unfair labour practise or not. The Labour Court has power under Section 11-A, if Labour Court is satisfied that order of punishment is unjustified or harsh then Labour Court is entitled to pass appropriate orders at thinks fit by him and in exercising the power, Labour Court can set aside the discharge order and grant full relief to the workmen when Labour Court has satisfied that discharge order is nothing but an ulterior motive of the employer has been materialised by passing discharge order. If inquiry has been held to be legal or either not challenged by the workmen and finding recorded by the inquiry officer is legal and valid, even though, Labour Court has power to pass appropriate order while exercising the power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. That view has been taken by the Apex Court in case of Scooter India Limited v. Labour Court, Lakhnaw, reported in AIR 1989 SC 149 . 7. In view of this, I have considered the reasoning given by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has given cogent reason in support of each issue framed by him and passed an order of granting reinstatement with continuity of service with full back wages of interim period. Accordingly to my opinion, Labour Court has rightly exercised the power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. For that, Labour Court having the jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders when looking to gravity of misconduct, past record, if discharge order is unjustified then it is a duty of the Labour Court to grant proper relief to the workmen which according to my opinion, proper relief rightly has been granted by the Labour Court. The submission of learned advocate Mr. The submission of learned advocate Mr. Japee that not to obey the order of superior officer, it gives wrong signals to other workmen, but, if employer on such allegations wherein only demand of legal right raised by the workmen before the employer and if employer passed such order to materialise his ulterior motive in this fashion then according to my opinion, it also gives a wrong signals to the society. Therefore, considering this aspect, Labour Court has not committed any error including jurisdictional error while passing such award. 8. This Court having a limited power to scrutinse the award in question while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The view express by Apex Court in case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh pardeshi reported in (1995)6 SCC 576 . The following observations are relevant which are quoted as under : “The High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave in justice would be done unless the High Court interferes.” 9. After considering this observation of Apex Court and reasoning given by the Labour Court, according to my opinion, there is no grave injustice would be done to the petitioner if this Court will not interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Labour Court has perfectly justified in passing such award. There is no infirmity in the award. This Court cannot act as an appellate authority. Even, in case of two views are possible no interference called for while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This Court cannot interfere with such award. The submissions made by learned advocate Mr. Japee cannot be accepted in light of the above observation made by this Court. Learned advocate Mr. Japee is not able to point out any infirmity in the award, therefore, when there is no error committed by the Labour Court while passing such award, is not required any interference by this Court while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned advocate Mr. Japee is not able to point out any infirmity in the award, therefore, when there is no error committed by the Labour Court while passing such award, is not required any interference by this Court while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. There is no substance in both the petitions and therefore, both the petitions are disposed of." From the discussion made herein above, we do not find any merit or substance in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. We have also carefully perused the orders dated 20.6.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Applications No.10265 and 10266 of 2006. We do not find any infirmity or illegality in the same and we find ourselves in complete agreement with the same. 8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the following decisions: 1. Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh v.Management of M/s Usha Breco Lrd. and Anr. AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 994 2. U.B. Gadhe & Ors. etc.etc. v. G.M. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Pvt. Ltd. AIR 2008 SC 99 3. J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal and Anr. AIR 2007 SC (supp) 637 (1) 4. M/s. L & T Komatsu Ltd. v. N. Udayakumar AIR 2007 SC (supp) 1752 5. M/s.Laxmi Rattan Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1 6. U.P. State Brassware Corpn Ltd. & Anr. v. Udai Narain Pandey AIR 2006 SCC 586 We are in agreement with the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decisions. According to us, none of the above decisions is applicable to the case on hand because the facts and circumstances of the case on hand are quite different and peculiar from the above cases. The Labour Court had dealt with each issue at length and found that the charges levelled against the workmen were not proved and it was a case of clear victimisation of the respondents and malafide and arbitrary exercise of powers by the appellant management. In our view, on the first ground of malafide exercise of power, the Labour Court had allowed the References and it was rightly upheld by the learned Single Judge. Looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the present Letters Patent Appeals being meritless, deserve to be dismissed. 9. In our view, on the first ground of malafide exercise of power, the Labour Court had allowed the References and it was rightly upheld by the learned Single Judge. Looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the present Letters Patent Appeals being meritless, deserve to be dismissed. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, these Letters Patent Appeals No.877 of 2006 and 878 of 2006 are devoid of any merit and are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.