Judgment Smt. Abhilasha Kumari, J.—By preferring this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for directions to respondent No. 1 (State Government) to recommend his name for appointment as Notary, pursuant to advertisements published in various newspapers on different dates, in various parts of the State, and thereafter, to appoint him as Notary. 2. The brief factual background, as stated in the petition and discernible from the documents on record is that, the petitioner joined service in the Revenue Department in the year 1955. He was promoted as Deputy Mamlatdar on 01.06.1967. The petitioner performed duties as Deputy Mamlatdar and Executive Magistrate, and was promoted as Mamlatdar, in which capacity he worked till his superannuation, on 29.02.1992. According to the petitioner, he was assigned duties as in-charge Magistrate during his service career. The assertion of the petitioner is that he has performed duties of an Executive Magistrate and in-charge Magistrate for a long period of time during his career, which means that he was a member of the Judicial Service. 3. The State Government issued advertisements in the daily Newspaper “Gujarat Samachar”, which were published on various dates, namely, 09.06.2009, 22.08.2009, 29.08.2009 and 17.09.2009, for appointment of Notaries in various parts of the State. Applications were invited from eligible candidates in the prescribed form. Two appointments as Notary were to be made from the area of Kalavad (District: Jamnagar), where the petitioner resides. The petitioner filled in his form for appointment as Notary for Kalavad, and submitted the same on 05.10.2009. The petitioner was called for a personal interview at Gandhinagar on 03.12.2009, by interview call letter dated 16.11.2009. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that during the interview, he was asked to produce his “Sanad” (Certificate of enrolment as an advocate). The petitioner asserted that he has applied for appointment as Notary on the basis of his Judicial Service, which is one of the eligibility criteria, and did not possess a “Sanad”. According to the petitioner, he was informed by the respondent authority that his name cannot be recommended as Notary and that the interview call letter was probably issued by mistake. Apprehending that his name would not be recommended for appointment, the petitioner approached this Court by way of the present petition. 5. According to the petitioner, he was informed by the respondent authority that his name cannot be recommended as Notary and that the interview call letter was probably issued by mistake. Apprehending that his name would not be recommended for appointment, the petitioner approached this Court by way of the present petition. 5. Notice was issued in the petition on 19.01.2010, making it returnable on 28.01.2010, on which date a statement was made on behalf of the State government that no appointments as Notaries had been made for the area of Kalavad. The matter was adjourned on two occasions. On 09.02.2010, the respondent State was directed to keep one post vacant. However, on 18.02.2010, the Court was informed that appointments of Notaries for Kalavad had already been made. The Court issued Rule in the petition on 18.02.2010 and directed that the persons who are appointed as Notaries in Kalavad shall not act as such, pending the petition. The persons who had been so appointed filed Civil Application No. 3127 of 2010 for permission to join them as party respondents in the petition, which came to be allowed by order dated 07.07.2010. They are, therefore, joined as Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in the petition. 6. Mr. Pratik Y. Jasani, learned advocate for the petitioner, has submitted that:— (i) The petitioner has performed duties of an Executive Magistrate for several years during his service career, which means that he is a part of the Judicial Service, as required by the eligibility criteria stated in the advertisement and required under the Notaries Act, 1952, and the Notaries Rules, 1956, (“the Rules” for short) therefore, his name ought to have been recommended by respondent No. 1. (ii) The petitioner has cleared many examinations for which various subjects of law such as the Evidence Act, Indian Penal Code, Bombay Police Act, Gujarat Panchayats Act, Land Acquisition Act, Bombay Land Revenue Code and Constitution of India, were studied by him, and has acquired adequate knowledge and experience of law. The petitioner has undergone legal training, just like an advocate, and has adequate experience to perform the duties and undertake the responsibilities of a Notary. The petitioner has undergone legal training, just like an advocate, and has adequate experience to perform the duties and undertake the responsibilities of a Notary. The powers exercised by the petitioner as Mamlatdar and Executive Magistrate are akin to judicial powers, therefore, the petitioner has rightly laid claim for appointment as Notary, on the ground that he has been a member of the Judicial Service, therefore, his name ought to have been recommended and appointment given to him. 7. The learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of Statesman (P) Ltd vs. H.R. Deb, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1495 , in support of his submission that the petitioner, while performing duties as an Executive Magistrate, performed duties of a judicial officer and is, therefore, part of the Judicial Service. 8. The petition has been strenuously opposed by Mr. J.K. Shah, learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for Respondent No. 1 (State Government), by submitting that no document was submitted by the petitioner along with the application made by him, to show that he had been appointed in the Judicial Service and was a member thereof. It is submitted that, as per the Gujarat State Judicial Service Rules, 2005, ‘Service’ means the State Judicial Service. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner has been appointed in the State Judicial Service or is governed by the said Rules. The petitioner has been appointed in the Revenue Department of the State Government and was promoted as Deputy Mamlatdar and further, to the post of Mamlatdar, which post he held at the time of his superannuation. It is contended that as per Section 12 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, the Mamlatdar has to perform many duties, and even if the petitioner has performed duties as an Executive Magistrate, it cannot be said that he is a member of the Judicial Service. To be a member of a Judicial Service, the petitioner would have to be appointed in the Judicial Service, which is not the case. It is urged that, as the petitioner does not possess the requisite eligibility criteria as per Rules, his name has rightly not been recommended for appointment as Notary, and the petition may be dismissed. 9. Mr. P.R. Abichandani, learned advocate, has appeared on behalf of Respondents Nos. It is urged that, as the petitioner does not possess the requisite eligibility criteria as per Rules, his name has rightly not been recommended for appointment as Notary, and the petition may be dismissed. 9. Mr. P.R. Abichandani, learned advocate, has appeared on behalf of Respondents Nos. 2 and 3, who have been appointed as Notaries, and has strongly resisted the petition. He has submitted that the petitioner does not fulfil any of the eligibility criteria for appointment as a Notary. It is contended that the petitioner has been appointed in the Revenue Service and has superannuated on the post of Mamlatdar. Merely because powers of an Executive Magistrate may have been conferred upon him for some time during his service career, does not mean that the petitioner is a member of the Judicial Service, which is the basis for his claim to the post of Notary. On the other hand, respondents Nos. 2 and 3, have been found to meet the eligibility criteria, and have been rightly appointed as Notaries. 10. Referring to the judgment in Statesman (P) Ltd. vs. H.R. Deb (Supra), relied upon by the petitioner, it is submitted that the said judgment does not lay down that a Mamlatdar, appointed in the Revenue Service, is a member of the Judicial Service, therefore, reliance on the said judgment will not help the petitioner. It is contended that, just because the petitioner may have studied certain legal subjects for his departmental examinations, he cannot claim to be a member of the Judicial Service, without being appointed in the said service. It is forcefully submitted, that the ground of sufficient experience urged by the learned advocate for the petitioner cannot be considered, as that is not one of the eligibility criteria laid down by the Rules, and as stipulated in the advertisement. 11. It is further submitted by Mr. Abichandani that, as per Article 236(b) of the Constitution of India, “Judicial Service”, is defined as “a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of district judge”. The petitioner has been appointed in the Revenue Department and was promoted to the post of Deputy Mamlatdar, and later, as Mamlatdar. The petitioner has been appointed in the Revenue Department and was promoted to the post of Deputy Mamlatdar, and later, as Mamlatdar. The eligibility criteria on which the petitioner is relying is that the candidate should have been a member of the Judicial Service for ten years and as the petitioner has never been appointed in the Judicial Service, and does not fulfil any of the other criteria laid down by the Rules, his name has rightly not been recommended for appointment. It is contended that though Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 fulfil the requirements of the Rules and their appointments are in accordance with law, however, they are unable to function as Notaries due to the interim relief granted by this Court. It is further urged that the petitioner does not have a fundamental right for appointment, especially as he does not fulfil the requirements of the Rules, therefore, the interim relief may be vacated and the petition dismissed. 12. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed by Mr. Abichandani upon the following judgments:— (1) Chandra Mohan vs. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1966 SC 1987 . (2) S.D. Joshi v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, JT 2010 (12) SC 347. 13. The sole issue that falls for determination is whether the petitioner has been a Member of the Judicial Service for at least ten years, making him eligible for appointment as Notary as per the Notaries Rules, 1956, or not? 14. In order to decide this issue, it would be appropriate to refer to the eligibility criteria as mentioned in the advertisement, which are the same as laid down in the Rules. The relevant rule is Rule 3 of the Rules, which is reproduced hereinbelow: “3. 14. In order to decide this issue, it would be appropriate to refer to the eligibility criteria as mentioned in the advertisement, which are the same as laid down in the Rules. The relevant rule is Rule 3 of the Rules, which is reproduced hereinbelow: “3. Qualifications for appointment as a notary.—No person shall be eligible for appointment as a notary unless on the date of the application for such appointment— (a) a person had been practising at least for ten years, or (aa) a person belonging to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes had been practising at least for seven years, or (ab) a woman who had been practising at least for seven years, as a legal practitioner, or (c) he had been at least for ten years,— (i) a member of Judicial Service; or (ii) held an office under the Central Government or a State government requiring special knowledge of law after enrolment as an advocate, or (iii) held an office in the department of Judge Advocate General or in the legal department of the armed forces.” 15. It is not the case of the petitioner that he is enrolled as an advocate and has practiced as such for at least ten years as required by Rule 3(a). It is also not the case of the petitioner that he has been a member of the Indian Legal Service under the Central Government, as required by Rule 3(b). The claim of the petitioner for appointment as Notary is based on Rule 3(c), which stipulates that the candidate must have been “a member of Judicial Service” for at least ten years. 16. There is no dispute regarding the fact that the petitioner was appointed in the Revenue Service of the State Government in the year 1955, was promoted as Deputy Mamlatdar on 01.06.1968 and was further promoted as Mamlatdar, which post he occupied till his superannuation on 29.02.1992. The assertion of the petitioner is that he has performed duties as an Executive Magistrate while he was posted as Deputy Mamlatdar and Mamlatdar, till his retirement, which are akin to “Judicial Service”, and as he has been in judicial service and has adequate experience of legal subjects which he studied for departmental examinations, he is eligible for appointment as Notary, under the Rules. 17. 17. At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to Article 234 of the Constitution of India, which falls in Chapter VI, titled “Subordinate Courts”. Article 234 reads as below:— “234. Appointments of persons other than district judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State.” 18. The Gujarat State Judicial Service Rules, 2005 (“the Judicial Service Rules” for short) has been enacted in supersession of the Gujarat Judicial Services Recruitment Rules, 1961, to regulate the recruitment to the Gujarat State Judicial Service. Rule 2(i) states, “Service” means the State Judicial Service. Rule 3 of the Judicial Service Rules states: “3(1) On and from the date of commencement of these Rules, there shall be constituted a State Service known as the Gujarat State Judicial Service. (2) With effect from the commencement of these Rules, the Service shall consist of the cadres and the posts specified below in column 2 and 3 respectively, and the existing posts specified in column 4 shall stand designated as the cadres specified in the corresponding entries in column 2 below. Sr.No. Cadres Posts Existing Posts 1 2 3 4 1. District Judge 1. Principal district Judge 1. Principal Judge and and other judges of the Other Judges of the City Civil Court City Civil Courts 2. Principal District Judges 2. District Judges 3. Additional District 3. Joint District Judges Judges 2. Senior Civil 1. Principal Senior Civil 1. Assistant Judges Judge Judge 2. Additional Senior Civil 2. Chief Judge and Judge Additional Chief Judge, Small Causes Court 3. Chief Judge and 3. Chief Metropolitan Additional Chief Judge, Magistrate and Small Causes Court Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate 4. Chief Metropolitan 4. Civil Judge Magistrate and (Senior Division) Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate 5. Chief Judicial Magistrate 5. Chief Judicial Magistrates 6. Metropolitan Magistrates 6. Metropolitan Magistrates 7. Judges of Small Causes 7. Judges of Small Court Causes Court 3. Civil Judge 1. Principal Civil Judg 1. Civil Judge (Junior Division) 2. Additional Civil Judg 2. Judicial Magistrate First Class 3. Judicial Magistrates First Class Rule 4 refers to the Appointing Authority as below:— “4. Chief Judicial Magistrates 6. Metropolitan Magistrates 6. Metropolitan Magistrates 7. Judges of Small Causes 7. Judges of Small Court Causes Court 3. Civil Judge 1. Principal Civil Judg 1. Civil Judge (Junior Division) 2. Additional Civil Judg 2. Judicial Magistrate First Class 3. Judicial Magistrates First Class Rule 4 refers to the Appointing Authority as below:— “4. Appointing Authority – The appointing authority for the cadre of District Judges and Civil Judges shall be the Government of Gujarat and for the cadre of Senior Civil Judges shall be the High Court.” 19. Indisputably, the petitioner has not been appointed under the Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1961, which were in force when he was appointed in the Revenue Service, which contain a similar definition of “service”. The service of the petitioner has never been governed by the said Rules, or the Rules of 2005. It, therefore, follows that the petitioner has not been recruited, or appointed, in the Gujarat State Judicial Service. 20. The appointment of the petitioner has not been made as per the provisions of Articles 234. The duties performed by the petitioner as Executive Magistrate would flow from the powers conferred upon him to act as such by the Competent Authority, but this, in itself, cannot be stretched to mean that the appointment of the petitioner has been made as per Article 234 of the Constitution and in accordance with the Judicial Service Rules. 21. Reference may also be made to the provisions of Article 236 of the Constitution of India, which has some significance for the purpose of determining the issue that arises in the petition. Article 236 appears in Chapter VI and is elucidatory in nature. It reads as below: “236. In this Chapter— (a) the expression “district judge” includes judge of a city civil court, additional district judge, joint district judge, assistant district judge, chief judge of a small cause court, chief presidency magistrate, additional chief presidency magistrate, sessions judge, additional sessions judge and assistant sessions Judge; (b) the expression “judicial service” means a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of district judge.” 22. As per Clause (b) of Article 236, “Judicial Service” means a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of District Judge and Civil Judicial Posts inferior to the post of District Judge. 23. It is not the case of the petitioner, and neither is it borne out from the material on record, that the petitioner was ever appointed in the hierarchy of judicial posts mentioned in Clause (b) of Article 236. The claim of the petitioner that he has been in Judicial Service is not supported by any material on record. The petitioner does not fall within the purview of the provisions of Article 234, the State Judicial Service Rules or Article 236 of the Constitution of India, especially, Clause (b) thereof. The appointment of the petitioner has been made in the Revenue Service of the State and he has, by promotion, occupied the posts of Deputy Mamlatdar and Mamlatdar in the hierarchy of posts in the Revenue Department. During his career, the petitioner may have performed duties as an Executive Magistrate but those duties have been performed by him during the course of his service in the Revenue Department. The question that falls for determination is not whether an Executive Magistrate is a member of the Judicial service, or whether the duties performed by a Magistrate are judicial in nature, but whether the petitioner fulfills the eligibility criterion stipulated in Rule 3(c) of the Notaries Rules, 1956, to the effect that he has been a member of the Judicial Service for at least ten years. As the petitioner has never been appointed to the State Judicial Service, has not been recruited in accordance with the provisions of Article 234, is not governed by the State Judicial Service Rules and is not a member of the “Judicial Service” as defined in Clause (b) of Article 236 of the Constitution, the answer to this question, in my considered view, must necessarily be in the negative. In addition thereto, it is relevant to note that the educational qualification of the petitioner is Old S.S.C. pass, meaning thereby that he does not possess the qualifications for entering into the judicial service. 24. I may now refer to the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respective parties. The learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Statesman (P) Ltd vs. H.R. Deb (Supra). 24. I may now refer to the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respective parties. The learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Statesman (P) Ltd vs. H.R. Deb (Supra). The issue involved in that case was the challenge of the appellant therein, to an award of the Labour Court reinstating, with back wages for the period of his “forced unemployment”, one of its employees. The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned award. During the course of the appeal, the Company filed an application, stating that the Tribunal presided over by one Mr. H.R. Deb was not qualified in law to adjudicate upon the dispute, inasmuch as the appointment of Mr. Deb was in violation of the provisions of Section 7(3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as he had not held a “judicial office” in India for not less than seven years, which was a condition precedent, therefore, his appointment was illegal and the award made by him was a nullity. While examining the issues that arose for determination, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion, as reflected in Paragraph 12 of the judgment, that “a Magistrate holds a judicial office”, and dismissed the appeal. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:— “12. It is not necessary to go over this field. All learned Judges seem to agree that a Magistrate exercises judicial functions. This does not admit of any doubt and no reasons are required. That his duties are partly judicial and partly other do not in any way detract from the position that while acting as a Magistrate he is a judicial officer. The dispute, therefore, really reduces itself to this: Does the Magistrate hold an “office”. An office means no more than a position to which certain duties are attached. According to Earl Jowitt’s Dictionary a public office is one which entitles a man to act in the affairs of others without their appointment or permission. The ‘office of a Magistrate’ is a correct expression in English and in law. Indeed the well-known maxim of Coke on Littleton (234a) officia magistratus non debent-esse venalia (the offices of a Magistrate ought not be saleable) clearly brings out that the word office use be applied to Magistrates. The ‘office of a Magistrate’ is a correct expression in English and in law. Indeed the well-known maxim of Coke on Littleton (234a) officia magistratus non debent-esse venalia (the offices of a Magistrate ought not be saleable) clearly brings out that the word office use be applied to Magistrates. Thus there may be an office of a judge (officii judicis) which in ecclesiastical law at least was said to be promoted when criminal proceedings were taken. But there may be also the office of a Magistrate. Cicero in his De Legibus and De officus makes no difference between a magistratum and a judex. His famous saying Magistratum legem esse loquentem, legem autem mutum magistratum (The Magistrate is a speaking law, but the law is a silent Magistrate) was intended to apply to all judges of all kinds. The word ‘office has been applied to Magistrates by Tacitus, Ovid and others. Bachawat J. has given many references to bear out the meaning we have given and has very pertinently pointed out that the Judicial Officers Protection Act, is intended to protect not Civil Judges alone but also Magistrates. The distinction between judicial function and judicial office in this context is artificial and unsubstantial. We agree with Bachawat J., that a Magistrate holds a judicial office.” 25. There can be absolutely no dispute regarding the principles of law laid down in the above-quoted judgment rendered in the factual matrix of that case. However, in my view, the said judgment will not come to the aid of the petitioner, as the issue that is to be considered in this petition is not whether the petitioner has held any “judicial office”, but whether he has been a member of the “Judicial Service”, which is a different issue altogether. The enunciation of law made by the Supreme Court in the judgment of Statesman (P) Ltd vs. H.R. Deb (Supra) has to be read, understood and applied in the facts of that case. The factual background of the present case is entirely different, as are the eligibility criteria, therefore, the said judgment will not be applicable to the facts of this case. 26. The learned advocate for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 has relied upon Chandra Mohan vs. State of U.P and others (Supra), wherein the appellant challenged the appointments of advocates and judicial officers as District Judges. 26. The learned advocate for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 has relied upon Chandra Mohan vs. State of U.P and others (Supra), wherein the appellant challenged the appointments of advocates and judicial officers as District Judges. A question arose whether the Governor can appoint as District Judges, persons from services other than the Judicial Service. In this context, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held:— “16. So far there is no dispute. But the real conflict rests on the question whether the Governor can appoint as district Judges persons from services other than the judicial service; that is to say, can he appoint a person who is in the police, excise, revenue or such other service as a district Judge? The acceptance of this position would take us back to the pre-independence days and that too to the conditions prevailing in the Princely States. In the Princely States one used to come across appointments to the judicial service from police and other departments. This would also cut across the well-knit scheme of the Constitution and the principle underlying it, namely, the judiciary shall be an independent service. Doubtless, if Article 233(1) stood alone, it may be argued that the Governor may appoint any person as a district Judge, whether legally qualified or not, if he belongs to any service under the State. But Article 233(l) is nothing more than a declaration of the general power of the Governor in the matter of appointment of district Judges. It does not lay down the qualifications of the candidates to be appointed or denote the sources from which the recruitment has to be made. But the sources of recruitment are indicated in Cl. (2) thereof. Under Clause. (2) of Article 233 two sources are given, namely, (i) persons in the service of the Union or of the State, and (ii) advocate or pleader. Can it be said that in the context of Ch. VI of Part VI of the Constitution “the service of the Union or of the State” means any service of the Union or of the State or does it mean the judicial service of the Union or of the State? The setting, viz., the chapter dealing with subordinate courts, in which the expression “the service” appears indicates that the service mentioned therein is the service pertaining to Courts. The setting, viz., the chapter dealing with subordinate courts, in which the expression “the service” appears indicates that the service mentioned therein is the service pertaining to Courts. That apart, Article 236(2) defines the expression “judicial service” to mean a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of district Judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of district Judge. If this definition, instead of appearing in Article 236, is placed as a Clause before Article 233(2), there cannot be any dispute that “the service” in Article 233(2) can only mean the judicial service. The circumstance that the definition of “judicial service” finds a place in a subsequent Article does not necessarily lead to a contrary conclusion. The fact that in Article 233(2) the expression “the service” is used whereas in Articles 234 and 235 the expression “judicial service” is found is not decisive of the question whether the expression “the service” in Article 233(2) must be something other than the judicial service, for, the entire chapter is dealing with the judicial service. The definition is exhaustive of the service. Two expressions in the definition bring out the idea that the judicial service consists of hierarchy of judicial officers starting from the lowest and ending with district Judges. The expressions “exclusively” and “intended” emphasise the fact that the judicial service consists only of persons intended to fill up the posts of district Judges and other civil judicial posts and that is the exclusive service of judicial officers. Having defined “judicial service” in exclusive terms, having provided for appointments to that service and having entrusted the control of the said service to the care of the High Court, the makers of the world Constitution not have conferred a blanket power on the Governor to appoint any person from any service as a district Judge.” 27. The above pronouncement is applicable to the case of the petitioner, and makes it clear that the petitioner, who has been appointed in the Revenue Service, cannot be understood to have been in Judicial Service, as per the Constitution Scheme of Chapter VI of the Constitution of India. 28. In S.D.Joshi vs. High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Supra), the questions arising for consideration were:— “1. 28. In S.D.Joshi vs. High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Supra), the questions arising for consideration were:— “1. In the present writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the following simple but questions of some legal significance and consequences arise for consideration: (a) What is the scope of the expression ‘judicial office’ appearing in Article 217(2)(a) of the Constitution? (b) Whether a ‘Family Court’ has the trappings of a Court and the Family Court Judges, being the Presiding Officers of such Courts, on the claimed parity of jurisdiction and functions, would be deemed to be the members of the Higher Judicial Services of the State? (c) If answer to the above question is in affirmative, then whether Family Court Judges are eligible and entitled to be considered for elevation as Judge of the High Court in terms of Article 217 of the Constitution of India?” 29. After discussing various judgments, including the one in Chandra Mohan vs. State of U.P and others (Supra), relied upon by the learned advocate for respondents Nos.2 and 3, and the judgment in Statesman (P) Ltd vs. H.R.Deb (Supra) relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner, the Supreme Court held:— “32. The Bench, while dealing with the case of Labour Law Practitioners’ Association (supra), found that this judgment should not be interpreted narrowly to exclude from judicial services, new hierarchy of Civil Courts being set up which are headed by a Judge who could be considered as a District Judge bearing in mind the extensive definition of the term in Article 236. We have no hesitation in noticing that the judgments of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the cases of Chandra Mohan and H.R. Deb (supra) are binding and they have taken a view that the expression ‘judicial service’ has to be confined to the persons appointed as Judges under the relevant Rules and the provisions contained in Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution. We have already noticed that in the case of Labour Law Practitioners’ Association (Supra), the Court was primarily concerned with ensuring that Labour Court Judges who were performing judicial functions should maintain independence of judiciary and they should be placed under the control of the High Court and the appointments to those offices should be made in conformity with Article 234 of the Constitution. Thus, this judgment can hardly be cited to support the proposition advanced by the petitioners. ‘Judicial service’ as understood in its ‘generic sense’, may impliedly include certain other services for limited purposes but such other services may not be judicial service stricto sensu as contemplated under Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution. 33. In this view of the matter, it is difficult for the Court to hold that the Family Court Judges will form part of the cadre of the Judicial Services under the State of Maharashtra as contemplated under Rule 3 of the Rules of 2008.” (emphasis supplied) 30. The conclusions arrived at by the Apex Court, as quoted hereinabove, lend credence to the view expressed by this Court, that the petitioner, has not been a member of the “Judicial Service” and does not fulfil the eligibility criteria as laid down in Rule 3(c) of the Notaries Rules, 1956, for appointment as Notary. 31. Viewed from all angles, the claim of the petitioner that he is eligible for appointment as Notary as he has been a member of the Judicial Service for at least ten years, must fail, in light of the detailed discussion and reasons stated hereinabove. The petition is devoid of merit. 32. Accordingly, the petition is rejected. The interim relief stands vacated. Rule is discharged. There shall be no orders as to costs. The learned advocate for the petitioner has made a request that the implementation of this judgment be stayed for some time. For reasons expressed in the judgment, the request is declined. P P P P P