JUDGMENT Mr. L.N. Mittal, J (Oral): - CM No.2074-C of 2011 For reasons mentioned in the application which is accompanied by affidavit, delay of 178 days in filing the appeal is condoned. Main Appeal. Defendant-Gurvinder Singh alias Angrej Singh, who was successful in the trial Court, but has been unsuccessful in the lower appellate Court, has filed the instant second appeal. 2. Respondents-plaintiffs-Ginder Singh etc., who are husband, four minor daughters and a minor son of Kamal Kaur filed suit against defendant-appellant for recovery of Rs.4,00,000/- as damages for murder of Kamal Kaur allegedly committed by the defendant-appellant on 14.09.1992. 3. Defendant broadly denied the plaint allegations and raised various pleas including the plea that the suit is time barred. Later on, defendant was proceeded ex parte in the trial Court when none appeared for him. 4. Learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Patiala vide judgment and decree dated 01.11.2004 dismissed the suit as time barred. However, first appeal preferred by the plaintiffs has been allowed on behalf of minor plaintiffs No.2 to 6 by learned District Judge, Patiala vide judgment and decree dated 08.05.2010 and thereby the suit has been decreed for their share of the compensation i.e for Rs.1,60,000/- whereas suit qua plaintiff No.1 has been dismissed as time barred regarding his share of Rs.32,000/- in the total compensation amount of Rs.1,92,000/- assessed by the said Court. Feeling aggrieved, defendant has preferred the instant second appeal 5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the case file. 6. Defendant stands convicted by Sessions Court for committing murder of Kamal Kaur. His appeal against his conviction and sentence also stands dismissed by this Court. In view of conviction of the defendant and also in view of ex parte, unrebutted evidence of plaintiff led in the instant suit, it has been rightly found that the defendant committed murder of Kamal Kaur, who was wife of plaintiff No.1 and mother of minor plaintiff Nos.2 to 6. Consequently, the defendant is liable to pay compensation to the plaintiffs. The compensation amount has been assessed at Rs.1,92,000/- which cannot be said to be excessive by any standards. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, vehemently contended that the suit is barred by limitation. The occurrence took place on 14.09.1992 whereas the suit was instituted on 05.08.1996. Consequently, the defendant is liable to pay compensation to the plaintiffs. The compensation amount has been assessed at Rs.1,92,000/- which cannot be said to be excessive by any standards. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, vehemently contended that the suit is barred by limitation. The occurrence took place on 14.09.1992 whereas the suit was instituted on 05.08.1996. Suit qua plaintiff No.1 has been held to be barred by limitation by both the Courts below. However, plaintiffs Nos.2 to 6 were minors at the time of filing of the suit. Consequently, in view of Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963, suit on behalf of plaintiff Nos.2 to 6 cannot be said to be barred by limitation as rightly held by the lower appellate Court. Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act lays down that whether a person entitled to institute a suit is a minor at the time from which the prescribed period of limitation is to be reckoned, he may institute the suit within the same period of limitation even after he has ceased to be minor. Consequently, plaintiffs No.2 to 6 could institute the suit within the prescribed period of limitation even after attaining the age of majority. However, the suit was filed on their behalf while they were still minors. Consequently, the suit on their behalf cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that plaintiff Nos.2 to 6 could have filed the suit after attaining the age of majority within the prescribed limitation period computed from the date of attaining the age of majority, but since they have filed the suit while they were still minors, prescribed period of limitation commenced from the date of cause of action. The contention cannot be accepted. Such an interpretation of Section 6 (1) of the Limitation Act would lead to absurdity. It would mean that a minor can institute the suit on attaining majority, within limitation period commencing on attainment of majority by him, but the suit filed by him while he is still minor would be treated as time barred if not filed within limitation period computed from the date of accrual of cause of action. It would mean that a minor can institute the suit on attaining majority, within limitation period commencing on attainment of majority by him, but the suit filed by him while he is still minor would be treated as time barred if not filed within limitation period computed from the date of accrual of cause of action. If suit filed by plaintiff Nos.2 to 6 would have been within limitation if instituted after attaining the age of majority, the suit filed by them while they are still minors cannot be said to be barred by limitation. 8. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no infirmity in the finding of the lower appellate Court that the suit on behalf of plaintiff Nos.2 to 6 cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Consequently, there is no merit in the instant second appeal. No question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for determination in the instant second appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed in limine. -----------0.K.B.0------------