Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 65 (MP)

Harshita Harshlata W/o Liladhar v. State of M. P.

2011-01-17

N.K.GUPTA

body2011
ORDER N.K. Gupta, J. 1. Shri Pramod Thakre, counsel for the Applicant. Smt. Sushila Paliwal, Public Prosecutor for the State/Respondent. Shri Sushil Tiwari, counsel for the objector. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The Applicant has an apprehension of her arrest in the Crime No. 237/2010 registered at Police Station Athaner, District Betul for offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. Learned Counsel for the Applicant submits that Applicant No. 1 is the married sister of husband of the deceased. Deceased, wife of the brother of the Applicant No. 1 has allegedly committed suicide. She was a teacher and therefore, an earning member of the family. Applicant is living away from Athaner and therefore, there is no role of the Applicant in the life of the deceased or her husband. 4. Learned Counsel for the Applicant further submits that the deceased gave one dying declaration before Inspector of the concerned police station in the presence of Block Medical Officer, in which she has stated that due to an accident, she was burnt. Again she had given a dying declaration at Nagpur before the Executive Magistrate, in which she had stated that some quarrel took place with the mother-in-law of the deceased and the mother-in-law of the deceased said that when she was taking bigger steps without her consultation, then why she was consulting for a small thing and therefore, under provocation deceased had committed suicide. Two days after this second dying declaration, one relative of the deceased, who was in police had prepared one more dying declaration inclusive of allegations of dowry demand etc. Actually the deceased was a working woman and she was earning. Therefore, the deceased did not say anything about the dowry demand in her first two dying declarations. It is alleged that due to control of the parents-in-laws, she did not have any talking terms with her parental relatives and therefore, such relatives had no knowledge of relations between the deceased and the Applicant. However, one of the relatives of the deceased, who is in police has prepared dying declaration by his own but at the time of third dying declaration the deceased was in coma. This dying declaration was prepared on computer, which was not possible to be prepared by the deceased. However, one of the relatives of the deceased, who is in police has prepared dying declaration by his own but at the time of third dying declaration the deceased was in coma. This dying declaration was prepared on computer, which was not possible to be prepared by the deceased. Police has not registered the case for offence punishable under Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, whereas no offence under Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code is made out. The Applicant is a reputed citizen of the locality who has no criminal past alleged against her. She is living at Betul. She has a small child and there is nobody except the Applicant to look after the child. Under these circumstances, she prays for anticipatory bail. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor for the State opposes the application. 6. Learned Counsel for the objector submits that offence is grave and therefore, on the basis of ratio laid in the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Samundra Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1987 SC 737 this Court cannot give any anticipatory bail in such cases. 7. After considering the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, it would be proper to refer the following dictum laid by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Sidharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. Criminal Appeal No. 2271/2010 decided on 2-12-2010: 121. No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula can be provided for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. We are clearly of the view that no attempt should be made to provide rigid and inflexible guidelines in this respect because all circumstances and situations of future cannot be clearly visualized for the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. In consonance with the legislative intention the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail should necessarily depend on facts and circumstances of each case. As aptly observed in the Constitution Bench decision in Sibbia's case (supra) that the High Court or the Court of Sessions to exercise their jurisdiction under Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure by a wise and careful use of their discretion which by their long training and experience they are ideally suited to do. In any event, this is the legislative mandate which we are bound to respect and honour. 8. In any event, this is the legislative mandate which we are bound to respect and honour. 8. Present view of Hon'ble the Apex Court is very much clear in the case of Sidhram Satlingappa Mhetre (supra) and therefore, no straitjacket formula can be fixed for not granting of anticipatory bail. Therefore, dictum laid in the case of Samundra Singh (supra) cannot be followed. In the present case, there is no allegation against the Applicant of dowry demand in first two dying declarations, whereas third dying declaration appears to be prepared by some relative of the deceased, who is in police, which does not bear any medical certificate etc. and which is prepared by computer print. Since the deceased was a working woman and there is nothing alleged about the dowry demand in the first two dying declarations, police cannot be permitted to make harassment to the Applicant. Provisions of Section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure are to be applied by balancing between the rights of the Applicant and investigation of the police. In the present case, most of the investigation is over Police has not to seize anything from the Applicant. Witnesses inclusive of parents and relatives of the deceased may be examined by the police and therefore, if the Applicant is enlarged on anticipatory-bail, there will be no adverse effect on the investigation. 9. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and keeping in view the submissions made by learned Counsel for the Applicants and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that this is a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail to the Applicant. Consequently this application of Applicant under Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure is hereby allowed. 10. It is directed that in the event of arrest, present Applicant Harshita ' Harshlata, shall be released on bail on her furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) with a solvent surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of Arresting Authority. 11. The Applicant shall make herself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required. She shall further abide by the other conditions enumerated in Sub-section (2) of Section 438 of Criminal Procedure Code. 12. 35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) with a solvent surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of Arresting Authority. 11. The Applicant shall make herself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required. She shall further abide by the other conditions enumerated in Sub-section (2) of Section 438 of Criminal Procedure Code. 12. This order shall remain in force for a period of 30 days and in the meanwhile, if the Applicant so desires, may move an application for regular bail before the competent Court. Certified Copy as per rules.