JUDGMENT 1. - This is a writ petition filed by the non-applicant of Original Applicant no. 256 of 2005 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order dated 24.3.2010 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short called The Tribunal) in the aforementioned O.A. 2. By impugned order, the Tribunal allowed the Original Application of the applicant (respondent herein) in part and while setting aside of the penalty order passed against the respondent remanded the case to disciplinary authority for imposition of fresh but lesser penalty as indicated by the Tribunal in the impugned order. It is this order, which is impugned by the Railways in this writ petition. 3. So the question arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether Tribunal was justified in partly allowing the original application and was further justified in interfering in quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority on the respondent ? 4. Facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. 5. The respondent herein is a retired employee of the railway. He joined the services on 15.4.64 and retired on 31.5.2003. On 15.2.2001, he was served with a charge sheet that contained the following charges : "1. He refused to issue the tickets for MTJ despite many requests from the decoy passenger and issued the tickets for SGNR instead of MTJ. 2. Rs. 279/-, were recovered from a register which was got deposited in Govt. cash vide MR No. 787818, dated 19.10.2000. Thus it is clear that this amount was earned by him illegally for his personal gain. 3. He adopted a non-cooperation attitude as much as he refused to prepare the cash details of Rs. 279/- which were recovered from the register in the presence of SS/RSNR. 4. He was also found responsible for creating artificial shortage of Rs. 16/- in his Govt. cash." 6. Out of the four charges, first three were held fully proved whereas the fourth one was partly proved to the extent that shortage of Re. 1/- was proved in Government cash by the Inquiry Officer after due participation of the respondent in the inquiry proceedings. 7. In the light of aforementioned findings, the disciplinary authority chose to impose the penalty of "reduction to a lower time scale of pay of Rs. 5500-9000 till retirement with cumulative effect" as prescribed in the Rules for such proved misconduct. 7. In the light of aforementioned findings, the disciplinary authority chose to impose the penalty of "reduction to a lower time scale of pay of Rs. 5500-9000 till retirement with cumulative effect" as prescribed in the Rules for such proved misconduct. The respondent unsuccessfully challenged this penalty in departmental appeal and then carried the matter to the Tribunal in Original Application out of which this writ petition arises. The Tribunal upheld the inquiry proceedings including findings recorded against all the four charges. In other words, in the opinion of the Tribunal, all the charges set out above were rightly held proved before the Inquiry Officer and thus no fault could be noticed while holding them as proved. However, the Tribunal felt that looking to the gravity of the charges, the penalty imposed on the respondent appears to be excessive in nature and hence the Tribunal first opined that what should have been the lesser penalty, which should have been imposed on the respondent for such charges and then remitted the case to the disciplinary authority for imposition of such penalty in place of the original one. 8. This is what was held by the Tribunal in its concluding paras 13 and 14 : "13. We have looked at the gravity of the charges and also the past conduct of the applicant. The charges no. (i) and (iv) are of a less serious nature to warrant a major punishment. Charge no. (ii) and (iii) rest on weak foundation. The fact remains that the applicant did not over charge the decoy passenger. There is also nothing to indicate any past misconduct proved against the applicant or any penalty imposed. Looked at from all such angles, the penalty of reduction to a lower pay scale with cumulative effect is a harsh punishment and disproportionate to the charges proved. At best the applicant could have been imposed the penalty of stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect or if no increment was due till the date of his retirement, a reduction to the next stage in the existing pay scale without cumulative effect could have been justified. 14. For the reasons stated above, the O.A. is partly allowed. The penalty order dated 04.09.2002, 23.09.2002 and 24.09.2002 are hereby quashed and set aside. 14. For the reasons stated above, the O.A. is partly allowed. The penalty order dated 04.09.2002, 23.09.2002 and 24.09.2002 are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are at liberty to reconsider the quantum of punishment afresh by taking into account the observations made in this order and pass fresh penalty orders if they wish to. In the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs." 9. It is this order, which is impugned by the Railways in this writ petition. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the writ petition and while setting aside of the impugned order, dismiss the original application filed by the respondent herein (applicant before O.A.) 11. As rightly argued by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner (Railways), once the Tribunal upheld the inquiry proceedings and held the charges as proved, then it should not have interfered in the quantum of penalty for more than one reason. First once the charges are proved then it is the sole discretion of the employer to decide as to what should be the quantum of punishment that should be imposed on the delinquent employee. Second, the only thing in such case to be seen is whether penalty prescribed for such charge i.e. if the charge is of minor nature then penalties that are prescribed for minor misconduct in the rules should be inflicted and if the charge is major then the penalty prescribed for the major misconduct should be inflicted. If there are more than one penalty prescribed then any one out of those prescribed can be imposed that being in the discretion of the disciplinary authority. It is only in extreme cases where the court feels that punishment given is extremely harsh and disproportionate to the charge levelled against the delinquent, then case for interference in such imposition can be considered by exercising discretion by giving cogent reasons in support thereof but not in every cases. In other words, only because the court feels that instead of A punishment, B punishment could have been imposed by the disciplinary authority, then such exercise of discretion cannot be said to be judicial one. The last word in such matters normally is that of disciplinary authority subject to its judicial scrutiny within the limited area. 12. In other words, only because the court feels that instead of A punishment, B punishment could have been imposed by the disciplinary authority, then such exercise of discretion cannot be said to be judicial one. The last word in such matters normally is that of disciplinary authority subject to its judicial scrutiny within the limited area. 12. Coming to the facts of the case, in our opinion, this was not a case where, the Tribunal should have interfered with in quantum of penalty. In other words, the applicant (respondent herein) was not on facts able to make out any case for interference in the impugned penalty order. The reason was that the charges that stood proved were of major in nature and hence the penalty imposed on the respondent was commensurate with the charges. It was not nor it could be said to be in any way harsh one. In fact looking to the gravity of charges, the respondent could as well have been dismissed but instead, the authority concern chose not to take a extreme step of imposing punishment of dismissal and instead chose to impose lesser punishment mentioned supra. There was thus no scope to have interfered in quantum of punishment by the Tribunal. That apart, the Tribunal committed yet another error when it virtually directed while remitting the case to disciplinary authority to impose a particular penalty. In our opinion, this was not the function of the Tribunal to give direction to the disciplinary authority to impose a particular punishment for a particular charge on the delinquent employee but it should have been left to the discretion of the authority to decide as to which punishment, they would consider it proper to impose on the delinquent employee for the proved misconduct out of those prescribed other than the one which was initially imposed and was set aside by the Tribunal on the ground of it being excessive. Such direction itself was bad in law and amounted to issuance of mandamus that was not legally permissible. It is apart from the fact that in the facts of this case, no case for remand was made out. 13. Such direction itself was bad in law and amounted to issuance of mandamus that was not legally permissible. It is apart from the fact that in the facts of this case, no case for remand was made out. 13. In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot concur with the reasoning and the conclusion of the Tribunal when it allowed the application and set aside the penalty order and then remitted the case to the disciplinary authority for imposition of lesser penalty than what was imposed. The order impugned thus deserves to be set aside. 14. As a result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order is set aside. As a consequence thereof, the original application out of which this writ petition arise is dismissed.Writ Petition Allowed - Original Application Dismissed. *******