B.D. Agarwal, J.:- The judgment and order dated 4.5.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge of this court in WP ( C) No. 49 of 2008 is under challenge in this appeal. 2. By this impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge has set aside the order dated 11.7.2007 passed by the appointing author­ity, i.e. General Manager, Network-I, SBI, whereby the delinquent/respondent was dis­missed from service. Being aggrieved with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, the disciplinary/appointing authority has preferred this appeal. 3. We have heard Mr. S.S. Sharma, learned Sr. counsel for the appellants and Mr. SN Meitei, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 4. The disciplinary enquiry was initiated in the year 2005. The respondent herein was suspended from service vide order dated 19.12.2005. Thereafter formal charges were framed on 11.8.2006. The articles of charges relate to the period of 18.8.2005 to 19.12.2005. The allegations and charges are reproduced below: "Statement of imputation of lapses against Shri Lalhmachhu-ana, JMGS-I, when he was posted as Branch Manager of State Bank of India, Tawipui South Branch during the period 18.08.2005 to 19.12.2005. While you were working as Branch Man­ager at our Tawipui South Branch (SAB) during the period 18.08.2005 to 19.12.2005, the follow­ing lapses/irregularities have been observed on your part: Allegation-I It is alleged that while you were posted as Branch Manager at our Tawipui South Branch during the period from 18.08.2005 to 19.12.2005, you were absconding from your duties from 13.12.2005 to 16.12.2005 without any informa­tion either to the Regional Office or to the Branch staff. As a result of your absence the Branch could not function for those days causing a business loss and damage of the image of the Bank to the public. Allegation-II You misappropriated an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees one lache Branch fifty thousand) only from the cash balance of the Branch and there was a shortage of Rs. 1,50,000/- in cash balance from 13.12.2005 to 18.12.2005. Allegation-III You claimed reimbursement for an amount of Rs. 1000/- (Rupees one thousand) only as conveyance bill incurred for going to Lawngtlai Branch with UCP for completion of EOD/SOD for 12.12.2005 whereas the EOD/SOD/was done successfully at the Branch on the day itself by 6.00PM. 1,50,000/- in cash balance from 13.12.2005 to 18.12.2005. Allegation-III You claimed reimbursement for an amount of Rs. 1000/- (Rupees one thousand) only as conveyance bill incurred for going to Lawngtlai Branch with UCP for completion of EOD/SOD for 12.12.2005 whereas the EOD/SOD/was done successfully at the Branch on the day itself by 6.00PM. Allegation-IV You allowed the Branch messenger to oper­ate the cash vault and to take out money in the evening of 12-12-2005 after completion of the EOD for 12-12-2005 and closure of cash. Allegation-V You were drunk during the office hours on 12.12.2005 hampering the day's work and dam­aging the image of the Bank." 5. The charges were denied by the delin­quent in toto by way of submitting his show cause reply. Thereafter, an enquiry officer was appointed and a regular domestic enquiry was conducted. During the enquiry only two wit­nesses were examined by the department, out of the four witnesses proposed to be exam­ined. After the enquiry the report was submitted on 6.2.2007. As per the enquiry re­port only charge No. 1 was partially proved; charge Nos. 4 and 5 proved; whereas charge Nos. 2 and 3 could not be established. However, the disciplinary authority did not com­pletely agree to the enquiry report and took a different view that charge No. 1 and 2 stood proved. The decision of the disciplinary au­thority was communicated to the delinquent without affording any opportunity of hearing before upsetting the enquiry officer's report. On the basis of disciplinary authority's new findings the delinquent was dismissed from service by the appointing authority. 6. The aforesaid order of the appointing authority was challenged by the delinquent in the writ petition. Upon hearing both the sides, the learned Single Judge set aside the order of punishment in the following terms: "21. The respondent authorities are directed to place the writ petitioner in WP (C) No.46 of 2008 in the post earlier held by him immediately preceding the holding of the departmental in­quiry with all consequential benefits such as, pay, arrears etc. The respondent authorities are also directed to reinstate the writ petitioner WP (C) No. 49 of 2008 in the post held immediately preceding the holding of the departmental in­quiry with all consequential benefits including the pay, arrears etc. However, it would be open for the respondent authorities to initiate denovo departmental inquiry against the writ petition­ers, if so advised. No cost." 6.1. However, it would be open for the respondent authorities to initiate denovo departmental inquiry against the writ petition­ers, if so advised. No cost." 6.1. It may be mentioned herein that vide impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge has also decided another writ petition being WP (C) No. 46 of 2008, writing a common judgment, since the issues were almost iden­tical. 7. While deciding the writ petition, the learned Single Judge has rendered definite findings that the domestic enquiry was de-hors to the rules and natural justice inasmuch as the disciplinary authority had taken into con­sideration certain documentary evidence with­out examining the author of such documents. The learned Single Judge has further held that that one of the two witnesses was not pro­duced for cross-examination by the charged officer. Besides this, either the named wit­nesses were examined by the department nor the delinquent was allowed to cross-examine those witnesses, hi this way, in the opinion of the learned Single Judge non production of witnesses caused prejudice to the writ peti­tioner. 8. During the course of hearing Sri Meitei, learned counsel for the respondent further added that even the statement of PW 1 was recorded, keeping the delinquent away from enquiry room. 9. Mr. Sharma, learned Sr. counsel ap­pearing for the appellants submitted that the delinquent was requested to remain outside the enquiry room since the witness was a junior officer and the presence of the delinquent would have influenced the mind of the wit­ness. With regard to non production of PW 2 for cross-examination, the learned counsel submitted that the said witness did not turn up for cross-examination as he was under­going treatment for cancer. 10. Referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde; (2006) 7 SCC 212 , the learned counsel contended that the respond­ent being a bank officer was required to main­tain high standard of honesty and integrity and also that a disciplinary proceeding cannot be equated with the criminal trial. In other words, it was submitted that the standard of proof in the domestic enquiry is that of preponderance of probability and not that of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The learned counsel also cited the judgment of the Apex Court ren­dered in the case of Union of India Vs. In other words, it was submitted that the standard of proof in the domestic enquiry is that of preponderance of probability and not that of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The learned counsel also cited the judgment of the Apex Court ren­dered in the case of Union of India Vs. Y. S. Sadhu, Ex-Inspector; (2008) 12 SCC 30 and contended that the learned Single Judge transgressed the scope of judicial review; while directing the appointing authority to re­instate the delinquent with all monetary ben­efits. 11. Per contra, Mr. Meitei, learned coun­sel appearing for the respondent submitted that the disciplinary action was taken arbi­trarily, whimsically and sans any legally ad­missible evidence and as such the same has been rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge. The learned counsel also submitted that in view of the gross irregularity in the disciplinary proceeding the learned Single Judge has rightly directed to re-instate the writ petitioner with consequential benefits, albeit with a lib­erty to hold de-novo enquiry. 12. It is the settled position of law that unless the judgment of learned Single Judge suffers from patent illegality, the Division Bench ordinarily should not interfere therein, being an in-house appeal. It is also the estab­lished principle of law that if two views are possible, the view taken by the learned Sin­gle Judge should not be interfered with. 13. In the case before us, the learned Sin­gle Judge has recorded definite findings about the non-production of the witnesses for cross-examination and also not allowing the delin­quent to cross-examine the witnesses. Dur­ing the course of argument Sri Sharma, learned Sr. counsel for the appellants admit­ted the fact of non-production of PW 2 and other witnesses for cross-examination and also the fact that the delinquent was kept away from the enquiry during the recording of the statement of the PW 1. Besides this, the disciplinary authority partially overruled the en­quiry officer's report without hearing the delinquent 14. In the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Besides this, the disciplinary authority partially overruled the en­quiry officer's report without hearing the delinquent 14. In the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors.; reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is the mandate of Serv­ice Rule as well as Article 311 (2) of the Con­stitution of India to give reasonable opportu­nity of hearing to the delinquent in the follow­ing words: " Apart from the above, Rule 16(3) has to be considered in the light of the provisions con­tained in Article 311(2) of the Constitution to find out whether it purports to provide reason­able opportunity of hearing to the delinquent. Reasonable opportunity contemplated by Arti­cle 311(2) means "hearing" in accordance with the principles of natural justice under which one of the basic requirements is that all the witnesses in the departmental enquiry shall be examined in the presence of the delinquent who shall be given an opportunity to cross-examine them. Where a statement previously made by a wit­ness, either during the course of preliminary enquiry or investigation, is proposed to be brought on record in the departmental proceed­ings, the law as laid down by this Court is that a copy of that statement should first be sup­plied to the delinquent who should thereafter be given an opportunity to cross-examine that witness." 15. After going through the judgment of the learned Single Judge and other documents of the memo of appeal, we agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that there was manifest injustice with the delinquent and that the departmental enquiry was conducted in a perfunctory manner and in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Hence, we do not find any patent irregularity in the impugned judgment, interfering with the decision of the disciplinary and appointing authority. 16. With regard to the direction of the de-novo departmental enquiry and re-instatement of the writ petitioner with consequential ben­efits, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that this direction amounts to trans­gression of appointing authority's powers and discretion. It is true that the discretion of the disciplinary/appointing authority with regard to the punishment is normally not interfered with by the High Court in the writ proceed­ings. However, in the case before us, the di­rection of re-instatement with all consequen­tial benefits has been given with a rider of de-novo departmental enquiry. It is true that the discretion of the disciplinary/appointing authority with regard to the punishment is normally not interfered with by the High Court in the writ proceed­ings. However, in the case before us, the di­rection of re-instatement with all consequen­tial benefits has been given with a rider of de-novo departmental enquiry. In our opinion, since an opportunity has been given to the appellants to bring the domestic enquiry to its logical conclusion by way of holding a de-novo enquiry the appellants can not be prejudiced by the impugned judgment. However, we would only like to clarify that the direc­tion of de-novo enquiry should mean enquiry from the stage of cross-examination of wit­nesses, examined by the department and ad­ducing additional evidence from both the sides. Since the learned Single Judge has also not given any time frame to initiate the de-novo enquiry, we hereby allow the appellants to initiate the departmental enquiry from the stage indicated herein above within a period of 2 (two) months from to-day, if they so wish. If the enquiry is initiated during this period, the direction of re-instatement with conse­quential benefits shall remain suspended till the enquiry is completed and fresh order is passed by the appointing authority. If the de­partmental enquiry resumes as per the direc­tion of the learned Single Judge within two months from to-day, the same shall be com­pleted in the next four months. 17. With the aforesaid clarifications, the writ appeal stands dismissed. 18. In the backdrop of the facts and cir­cumstances of the case and also taking note of the fact that the respondent had accepted the direction of the learned Single Judge for de-novo enquiry, we do not propose to or­der cost of the proceeding.