Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.—This Appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 7th October 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 13046 of 2010, whereby the learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition, confirming the order dated 17th July 2010 passed by the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, Ahmedabad, arising from the order of the Collector, Bharuch dated 4th December, 2008. 2. Facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this Appeal can be summarised as under:— 1. The appellant herein purchased a parcel of agricultural land bearing Block No. 565 situated at village Shuklatirth, Taluka and District Bharuch jointly with one Shri Babubhai Keshram Morya by way of a registered sale deed on 8th June 1993 after payment of premium and permission from the Deputy Collector, Bharuch. 2. It appears that an entry bearing No. 5650 was mutated in the record of rights in the village form Nos. 6 and 7/12 on 23rd June 1993. The appellant and the co-owner Babubhai are cultivating the said land and are in possession of the said land. One another entry was also mutated in the record of rights in the names of the appellant and the co-owner Babubhai. 3. It appears that a resident of the same village, having no right, title or interest in the said land, preferred an application addressed to Respondent No. 2 Collector stating that the appellant herein and the co-owner Babubhai are not the agriculturists and could not have purchased the agricultural land without a valid permission of the authorities and the same is in breach of Section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the Tenancy Act’). It is also alleged against the appellant herein that he is not a resident of Gujarat but he hails from Uttar Pradesh and is an agricultural labourer. It is also the case of the respondents against the appellant herein that even if a person is an agriculturist in another State, such person cannot buy agricultural land within the State of Gujarat without a valid permission and the transaction would be hit by Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. 4. It is also the case of the respondents against the appellant herein that even if a person is an agriculturist in another State, such person cannot buy agricultural land within the State of Gujarat without a valid permission and the transaction would be hit by Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. 4. It appears that the transaction of 1993 and the entries mutated in the record of rights way back in the year 1993 came to be taken up in suo motu revision after a period of almost about 15 years by the Deputy Collector, Bharuch vide notice dated 10th October 2007. The Collector, Bharuch ordered that proceedings under Section 84-C must be initiated against the appellant in so far as land bearing Block No. 565 is concerned. Pursuant to the order dated 4th December 2008 passed by the Collector, Bharuch, Respondent No. 3, Mamlatdar, Bharuch initiated proceedings under Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act. It also deserves to be noted that Entry No. 5650 mutated in the record of rights also came to be cancelled along with Entry No. 5597 mutated on 1st December 1992. 5. It appears that the action of the Collector and the Mamlatdar and the orders passed by them came to be challenged before the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department by filing Revision Application No. 3 of 2009, which also came to be rejected vide order dated 9th July 2010. 6. It is at that stage that the appellant herein preferred Special Civil Application No. 13046 of 2010 and challenged the orders passed by the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department and the Collector, Bharuch. 7. The learned Single Judge took the view that merely because the appellant is engaged in agricultural work, he cannot be termed as an “agriculturist” as defined under the Tenancy Act. The learned Single Judge also took the view that originally the transaction is from an agricultural land to non-agricultural land and, therefore, it is illegal and can be taken up in suo motu review at any point of time. The learned Single Judge, therefore, rejected the petition and refused to grant any relief to the appellant. The appellant is, therefore, here before us in Appeal. 3. We have heard learned advocate Ms. Sonal D. Vyas appearing for the appellant and learned AGP Mrs. Krina Calla appearing for Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 4. The learned Single Judge, therefore, rejected the petition and refused to grant any relief to the appellant. The appellant is, therefore, here before us in Appeal. 3. We have heard learned advocate Ms. Sonal D. Vyas appearing for the appellant and learned AGP Mrs. Krina Calla appearing for Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 4. The controversy is in a very narrow compass and the position of law applicable in the present case is also now no longer res integra. 5. For the first time, in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Patel Raghav Natha and others, reported in (1969) X GLR 992, the Supreme Court held that powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (for short, ‘the Code’) have to be exercised within reasonable time and what would be a reasonable time would depend upon the facts of each case and the nature of the impugned order. The Supreme Court in the case of Raghav Natha (Supra) was constrained with the exercise of revisional powers under Section 211 of the Code. Section 211 of the Code prescribes no period of limitation for exercise of powers thereunder. The concept of reasonable time qua Section 211 of the Code has been applied to the powers exercised by the authorities, inter alia, under Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act in several rulings of the Apex Court as well as this High Court in various matters. 6. It is by now well-settled by catena of decisions that powers under Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act will have to be exercised within reasonable time. In the present case, as it is evident from the record that the transaction of 1993 was taken up in suo motu review for the first time in the year 2007 i.e. almost after a period of 15 years. Further, in the present case, the alleged breach is that of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. Any transaction in contravention of Section 63 or 64 of the Tenancy Act is made ‘invalid’ and not ‘void’. This becomes clear from the language of Section 63 and the provisions contained in Section 64(8) thereof. Further, in the present case, the alleged breach is that of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. Any transaction in contravention of Section 63 or 64 of the Tenancy Act is made ‘invalid’ and not ‘void’. This becomes clear from the language of Section 63 and the provisions contained in Section 64(8) thereof. What is the basic difference between the two terms ‘invalid’ and ‘void’ has been very well explained by this Court in the case of Mavjibhai Dharsibhai and others vs. State of Gujarat and others, reported in 1994 (2) GLR 1168 , wherein the learned Single Judge held in Paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 as under :— “12. Ordinarily, I would have accepted the aforesaid submission canvassed by Shri D.N. Patel for the contesting respondents to the effect that there is practically no difference between the two terms ‘invalid’ and ‘void’ in the light of the aforesaid ruling of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Mohammad Ibrahim Khan Ikramkhan (Supra). The scheme of the Act, however, makes a clear distinction between void transactions on the one hand and invalid transactions on the other. It is not open to me to say that the Legislature did not understand the distinction between the two terms ‘void’ and ‘invalid’. In fact, as transpiring from the various provisions of the Act, the Legislature was fully aware of the distinction between the two aforesaid terms. In Section 17(5) of the Act it has been provided, “Any sale of a site held in contravention of this section (that is, Section.17 thereof) shall be null and void.” As against this, Section 64(8) has provided “any sale made in contravention of this section (that is, Section. 64 thereof) shall be invalid.” The language of Section. 63 thereof also makes it clear that the transaction in contravention thereof would be invalid and not void. 13. The material provision, however, occurs in Section 83A of the Act. It reads : “(1) No person shall acquire land by transfer where such transfer or acquisition is invalid under any of the provisions of this Act. 63 thereof also makes it clear that the transaction in contravention thereof would be invalid and not void. 13. The material provision, however, occurs in Section 83A of the Act. It reads : “(1) No person shall acquire land by transfer where such transfer or acquisition is invalid under any of the provisions of this Act. (2) Any person who acquires land in contravention of Sub-section (1) shall, in the event of the transfer or acquisition being decided or declared invalid, be liable to suffer, the consequences under Section 84 or 84-C as the case may be.” It becomes clear from the language of the aforesaid statutory provision that any invalid transaction will have to be decided or declared invalid. It would thus mean that an invalid transaction per se may be invalid but it will not be invalid unless it is decided or declared to be so. It has to be invalidated. It thus becomes clear that an invalid transaction is made equivalent to a voidable transaction and not a void transaction. It is a trite principle of law to say that a voidable transaction remains valid till it is avoided, annulled or invalidated. Even at the cost of repetition, I reiterate that the language of Section. 83A of the Act has likened an invalid transaction to a voidable transaction. 14. In order to annul, avoid or invalidate a voidable transaction, powers for the purpose will have to be exercised within reasonable time. The aforesaid rulings of this Court in the case of Govindbhai Somabhai Nai (Supra) and in the case of Koli Nagjibhai Varjan (Supra) will not be applicable in the instant case as they were dealing with void transactions and not voidable transactions.” 7. We may also refer to a recent decision of the Division Bench in the case of Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar vs. State of Gujarat and others, reported in 2011(2) GLR 1676 , wherein the Division Bench has held that, even if an order is void, it requires to be so declared by a competent forum and it is not permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. The Division Bench, in Paragraphs 22.2, has observed as under :— “22.2 We may also refer to a recent decision in the case between Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group, ( 2011 (3) SCC 363 ), the Apex Court, has, with regard to void order, observed in paragraph No. 16 that:— “16. It is a settled legal proposition that even if an order is void, it requires to be so declared by a competent forum and it is not permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. In Sate of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth Naduvil, Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla vs. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd., M. Meenakshi vs. Metadin Agarwal and Sneh Gupta vs. Devi Sarup, this Court held that whether an order is valid or void, cannot be determined by the parties. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. While referring to the earlier decisions in the case State of Punjab (Supra) as well as in the case of Sultan Sadik vs. Sanjay Raj Sabba, (2004 [2] SCC 377) the Apex Court has observed:— “19.Thus, from the above it emerges that even if the order / notification is void / voidable, the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said order / notification is not binding upon it. It has to approach the court for seeking such declaration. The order may be hypothetically a nullity and even if its invalidity is challenged before the court in a given circumstance, the court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds including the standing of the petitioner or on the ground of delay or on the doctrine waiver or any other legal reason. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person” 8. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person” 8. Under the circumstances, upon considering the overall facts of the present case and in light of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the fact that at the time of the transaction the appellant was an agricultural labourer and he purchased the land for agricultural use jointly with one another person way back in the year 1993 and since then he has maintained the status of the land and put the land to agricultural use, the decision to compulsorily evict the appellant after lapse of almost 15 years deserves to be set-aside. Therefore, in view of the facts of the present case and having regard to the aspects noted above, we are inclined to set-aside the impugned orders passed by the revenue authorities. 9. The Appeal is allowed and the order dated 17th July 2010 passed by the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, Ahmedabad in Revision Application No. 3 of 2009 and the order dated 4th December 2008 passed by the Collector, Bharuch in R.T.S. Revision Application No. 4 of 2008 are set-aside. Since the orders of the authorities are set-aside, the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge would not survive. There shall be no order as to cost. P P P P P