Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 669 (AP)

Sode Ramulu v. K. L. V. Prasad

2011-08-23

SANJAY KUMAR

body2011
Judgment : By separate interim orders dated 25.08.2010 passed in Writ Petition No.20867 of 2010, this Court suspended the Circular Memo dated 06.10.2008 of the Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, and directed the respondents in the writ petition to receive forthwith the proportionate bid amount from the petitioner for the period during which he was to operate the first year’s lease and to execute forthwith the lease deed enabling him to quarry sand from Anantharam sand reach, Manuguru Mandal, Khammam District. These orders were communicated by wire to the respondents on the very same day. Alleging disobedience to the said orders, this contempt case was instituted on 30.09.2010. 2. Notice before admission was ordered in the case on 06.10.2010. 3. The lease in favour of the petitioner was admittedly executed only on 14.10.2010 and at that, upon the intervention of the Chief Minister of the State. 4. Originally, Sri K.L.V.Prasad, Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, Khammam District, alone was arraigned for the alleged disobedience. Thereafter, by order dated 18.02.2011 passed in C.A.No.138 of 2011, Smt.Ranjeev R.Acharya, Principal Secretary to the Government, Industries and Commerce Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, and Sri B.R.V.Susheel Kumar, Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, were impleaded eo nomine as respondents 2 and 3 in the contempt case. Pertinent to note, all the three officers were party to the writ petition and consequently, to the orders passed therein. 5. The facts of the case, to the extent relevant to these contempt proceedings, are as under: 6. The petitioner was declared the successful bidder in the auction held on 05.08.2010 for lease of the sand quarrying rights over Anantharam sand reach, Manuguru Mandal, Khammam District. He deposited the requisite 25% of the knocked down amount within the stipulated time fixed under the Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (for brevity, ‘the Rules of 1966’). However, the auction in his favour had to be confirmed by the Zonal Joint Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh. Separate confirmation orders in this regard were issued by the said officer on 12.08.2010. As per Rule 9-I(2) of the Rules of 1966 the bidder, upon receipt of the confirmation order, had to remit the balance amount, as specified, within seven days from the date of the order. Separate confirmation orders in this regard were issued by the said officer on 12.08.2010. As per Rule 9-I(2) of the Rules of 1966 the bidder, upon receipt of the confirmation order, had to remit the balance amount, as specified, within seven days from the date of the order. It is not in dispute that this confirmation order dated 12.08.2010 was served upon the petitioner only on 18.08.2010, the seventh day from the date of the order. The petitioner therefore submitted a representation on the very same day, viz., 18.08.2010, seeking extension of time by seven days from the date of communication of the order dated 12.08.2010 for making the balance payment proportionately for the first year of the lease. 7. Alleging that the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, Khammam District, refused to accept his request, the petitioner approached this Court by way of the subject Writ Petition, W.P.No.20867 of 2010. This Court, by order dated 25.08.2010 in WPMP No.27475 of 2010 filed in the said writ petition suspended the Circular Memo dated 06.10.2008, which required the full bid amount for the first year to be collected, irrespective of the actual period of the first year’s lease, and adjusted against the second year. By a separate order of the same date in WPMP No.26541 of 2010 filed in the writ petition, this Court directed the respondents to receive forthwith the proportionate bid amount for the period during which the petitioner was to operate the first year’s lease and to execute forthwith the lease deed in his favour for quarrying sand from Anantharam sand reach, Manuguru Mandal, Khammam District. 8. The petitioner states that after communicating the above orders by wire to the respondents on the very same day, he made the necessary deposits but the lease deed was not executed, thereby incapacitating him from operating the sand quarry. He therefore seeks necessary punitive action against the respondents under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1971’) for violation of the Court orders. 9. Sri K.L.V.Prasad, Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, initially the sole respondent in this contempt case, filed his counter affidavit dated nil-11-2010, wherein he admitted receipt of the wire orders from this Court on 26.08.2010. He further admitted that the petitioner paid the balance proportionate knocked down amount along with the income tax payable thereon on 26.08.2010. 9. Sri K.L.V.Prasad, Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, initially the sole respondent in this contempt case, filed his counter affidavit dated nil-11-2010, wherein he admitted receipt of the wire orders from this Court on 26.08.2010. He further admitted that the petitioner paid the balance proportionate knocked down amount along with the income tax payable thereon on 26.08.2010. He however stated that the petitioner failed to pay the security deposit and the stamp duty required for execution of the lease deed. He stated that he had addressed letter dated 26.08.2010 to the Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, informing him of the above payments by the petitioner and seeking a clarification in the matter. He stated that the Principal Secretary, Industries and Commerce Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, condoned the delay in execution of the lease deed and permitted the same subject to final orders in the writ petition under Memo dated 11.10.2010. Thereupon, the petitioner is said to have remitted the security deposit along with the stamp duty and the lease deed was executed on 14.10.2010. He stated that there was a slight delay in the implementation of the order of this Court as seven days time was stipulated for payment of the amounts under Rule 9-I of the Rules of 1966 and the Government alone had the power to condone the delay thereafter under Rule 9-K(2) of the said Rules. He further stated that the delay in the implementation of the order was neither wilful nor wanton, but ended on a belligerent note by stating that he tendered his unconditional apology to the Court in the unlikely event this Court came to the conclusion that the direction dated 25.08.2010 was to be understood to the effect that the petitioner was to be permitted to pay the proportionate lease amount without furnishing the security deposit and stamp duty. 10. The petitioner, in his reply affidavit dated 26.11.2010 filed in response to the above counter, stated that the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, had to furnish to him the details of the stamp duty and other deposits before he could make the payment, but the officer had reported that no letter could be given in this regard as a clarification was sought from the Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. He stated that he had approached the officer a number of times but the details of the security deposit and stamp duty were furnished only after the condonation of delay by the Government under Memo dated 11.10.2010. 11. Thereafter, respondents 2 and 3 were impleaded in this contempt case as they were parties to the orders passed by this Court and were consequently liable to account for the delay in the implementation thereof. 12. Respondents 2 and 3 filed separate counters. 13. Sri B.R.V.Susheel Kumar, Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, respondent 3, filed his counter on 03.03.2011. He relied upon the Rules of 1966 in support of his contention that the petitioner had to pay the amounts due under Rule 9-I within seven days from the date of the confirmation order. Pertinent to note, this was the specific issue raised in the writ petition even at the time of its admission and was therefore within the knowledge of this Court when it passed the interim orders on 25.08.2010. He also referred to the fact that the petitioner did not furnish the security deposit and pay the stamp duty when he remitted the proportionate balance knocked down amount on 26.08.2010. He however did not choose to meet the allegations of the petitioner in his reply to the counter filed by the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, to the effect that, in spite of his requests, the details as to the quantum of the security deposit and the stamp duty were not furnished to him. He referred to the communication dated 26.08.2010 of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, seeking a clarification in the matter, and stated that he, in turn, submitted a report to the Government under letter dated 06.09.2010. He stated that after examination of the matter, a detailed counter was filed in the writ petition on 28.09.2010 along with a vacate stay application. He pointed out that the counter was filed at least 2 days before the filing of this contempt case. He further stated that though orders had been granted by this Court on 25.08.2010, as the petitioner had not submitted an application for seeking condonation of delay, there was no possibility for the Government to consider his case under Rule 9-K(2) of the Rules of 1966. He further stated that though orders had been granted by this Court on 25.08.2010, as the petitioner had not submitted an application for seeking condonation of delay, there was no possibility for the Government to consider his case under Rule 9-K(2) of the Rules of 1966. He then referred to the fact that the petitioner had made representations to the Chief Minister of the State and that the office of the Chief Minister had directed examination of the matter and the circulation of the file; and as the petitioner had also submitted a separate representation to his office on 07.10.2010, proceedings in Memo dated 11.10.2010 were issued by the Government in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 9-K(2) of the Rules of 1966 condoning the delay and permitting the execution of the lease deed in favour of the petitioner. He stated that the orders of this Court were implemented at the very first opportunity and within a period of less than four days from the receipt of a representation from the petitioner on 07.10.2010. He denied the allegation levelled by the petitioner that there was a violation of this Court’s orders. He then launched an attack against the petitioner introducing new facts which are wholly irrelevant for the purpose of this contempt case. He pointed out that orders were issued condoning the delay in less than a week from the submission of a representation by the petitioner on 07.10.2010 and stated that he did not commit wilful and deliberate contempt to the orders of this Court. He pointed out that orders were issued condoning the delay in less than a week from the submission of a representation by the petitioner on 07.10.2010 and stated that he did not commit wilful and deliberate contempt to the orders of this Court. It would however be apposite to extract the language used by the Officer while offering his apology: “19.……… I have always a high respect and regard to this Hon’ble Court and its orders and in the unlikely event that this Hon’ble Court were to conclude that the Government ought to have condoned the delay in payment of the requested amounts by the petitioner even without an application being moved by the petitioner, I hereby sincerely apologize for not having understood the orders of this Hon’ble Court from this perspective.” He then referred to case law in support of his plea that the Act of 1971 is to ensure that orders of the Court were complied with and not to proceed against persons and reiterated that this Court’s orders had been complied with at the earliest possible point of time after duly following the procedure and sought closure of the proceedings. 14. Smt.Ranjeev R.Acharya, Principal Secretary to the Government, Industries and Commerce Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, respondent 2, filed her counter on 16.04.2011, reproducing the contents of the counter filed by respondent 3, including an apology in identical terms. 15. Detailed arguments were advanced by Smt.N.Shoba, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for Industries and Commerce representing the respondents. Records were also produced for the perusal of the Court. 16. The pleadings in the writ petition clearly demonstrate that the issue of the alleged delay on the part of the petitioner in making payments within seven days from the date of confirmation of the grant of lease was specifically raised and was therefore well within the knowledge of this Court. However, this Court, being of the opinion that the authorities’ interpretation of this Rule was incorrect, granted interim orders dated 25.08.2010 requiring the respondent authorities to forthwith receive the proportionate bid amount and to execute forthwith the lease deed in favour of the petitioner. Once this Court passed such orders requiring compliance forthwith, it was for the authorities to act in accordance therewith. Once this Court passed such orders requiring compliance forthwith, it was for the authorities to act in accordance therewith. Falling back upon their own interpretation of the Rule, which was itself the subject matter of the lis, as a defence for not complying with the orders cannot be countenanced. All the more so, when resorted to by those in the higher echelons of governance. The specific use of the word ‘forthwith’ on two occasions in the order ought to have indicated to the respondent authorities that immediate action was required on their part to comply. 17. Though a separate defence is taken that the petitioner failed to furnish the security deposit and pay the stamp duty required for executing the lease deed, the specific averment of the petitioner that the details thereof were not furnished to him in spite of his repeated requests, is left unrebutted though respondents 2 and 3 filed their counters thereafter. Their self-serving plea that the delay in this regard had to be condoned by the Government alone under the Rules of 1966 is equally unworthy of consideration as this Court had directed forthwith execution of the lease deed, being well aware of the said Rule. There is no indication in the records that, being seized of the matter pursuant to this Court’s order, the respondents ever called upon the petitioner to seek condonation of delay, if any, or pay specified amounts towards the security deposit and the stamp duty. Under the weight of a court order requiring their immediate action, that would be the least expected of the respondents. 18. In any event, if the respondent authorities were of the opinion that the orders were incapable of implementation owing to their own version and understanding of the Rules, they should have approached this Court for clarification or sought a review or in the alternative, sought appellate intervention. On the other hand, it is the statement of the Principal Secretary to the Government, Industries and Commerce Department, that a counter was filed in the writ petition along with a vacate stay application on 28.09.2010, more than a month later, but before the filing of the contempt case. This is hardly the response that this Court would expect from an officer of the rank of a Principal Secretary to the Government, when faced with a direction which required her to take action ‘forthwith’. 19. This is hardly the response that this Court would expect from an officer of the rank of a Principal Secretary to the Government, when faced with a direction which required her to take action ‘forthwith’. 19. The records reflect that the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, upon being apprised of this Court’s order immediately addressed a letter on 26.08.2010 to his superior, the Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, respondent 3, seeking a clarification in the matter. The response of the Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, in his report dated 06.09.2010, available in the records, was directed only at filing a counter affidavit in the writ petition and no mention is made therein with regard to the requirement of complying with the Court orders. The records further reflect that in spite of the Chief Minister’s Office intervening in the matter upon the petitioner’s representation dated 21.09.2010 and requesting that the matter be got examined and to circulate the file for orders, the respondents paid no heed to the necessity of complying with the Court orders and circulated the file to the Chief Minister with the recommendation that the outcome of the writ petition be awaited and that action be taken thereafter. Thereupon, the Chief Minister, by endorsement dated 08.10.2010, directed implementation of the Court orders duly reserving the right to contest the same. It was only upon this unequivocal directive that the Principal Secretary to the Government, Industries and Commerce Department, respondent 2, swung into action and issued Memo dated 11.10.2010 condoning the delay in the execution of the lease under Rule 9-K(2) of the Rules of 1966. 20. This response on the part of the authorities to a direction of this Court requiring compliance forthwith is hardly satisfactory. Whether this apparent disregard is also contumacious is the issue. 21. The word ‘forthwith’ in its ordinary signification would mean ‘immediately’ but in judicial parlance it would be more elastic in its import and would mean ‘as soon as by reasonable exertion, confined to the object, it may be accomplished’ [Anderson v. Goff, 1 Am. St. Rep.34]. 22. Whether this apparent disregard is also contumacious is the issue. 21. The word ‘forthwith’ in its ordinary signification would mean ‘immediately’ but in judicial parlance it would be more elastic in its import and would mean ‘as soon as by reasonable exertion, confined to the object, it may be accomplished’ [Anderson v. Goff, 1 Am. St. Rep.34]. 22. A Constitution Bench in KESHAV NILKANTH JOGLEKAR v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, GREATER BOMBAY AIR 1957 SC 28 held that an act which is to be done ‘forthwith’ must be held to have been so done, when it is done with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay. However, when an act is done after an interval of time and there is no explanation forthcoming for the delay it cannot be held to have been done ‘forthwith’. Therefore, an act to be done ‘forthwith’ means that it should be performed with reasonable speed and expedition and that any delay in the matter should be satisfactorily explained. 23. In BIDYA DEB BARMA v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, TRIPURA AIR 1969 SC 323 , another Constitution Bench held that a particular thing to be done ‘forthwith’ should be understood as allowing a reasonable time for doing it. 24. In GOPAL MONDAL v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AIR 1975 SC 1807 , the Supreme Court affirmed that ‘forthwith’ means as soon as possible; without any delay and in the event there is some delay which is reasonably explained then there is no violation. 25. In SALIM v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL (1975) 3 SCR 394 , the Supreme Court reiterated on the touchstone of the earlier decisions that ‘forthwith’ does not connote a precise time and should be understood to mean without avoidable or unreasonable 26. The case on hand however reflects that there were no exertions whatsoever by respondents 2 and 3 to comply with the Court orders. Let alone tendering an explanation for the delay in compliance, these respondents adopted an adamant stand that the rules must be implemented without exception as unilaterally understood by them thereby negating the orders of this Court which, according to them, were not in keeping with such interpretation. 27. It is also to be noted that this Court had merely directed the respondents to forthwith receive the amounts and execute the lease deed. 27. It is also to be noted that this Court had merely directed the respondents to forthwith receive the amounts and execute the lease deed. The main grievance that the respondents seem to have had with this direction was as to the quantum of the amounts to be paid as per schedule prior to such execution and the condonation of delay in that regard. Needless to state, the receipt of the amounts and the execution of the lease deed with reasonable despatch would not have had an irreversible or irreparable adverse effect upon the State. The petitioner could have been called upon even thereafter to pay such amounts as were found due by this Court upon further adjudication in the matter. So far as the issue of condonation of delay is concerned, the delay as perceived by the respondents was a result of their own interpretation of the Rule which was already sub judice in the writ petition. This aspect was palpably within the knowledge of the Court when it passed orders on 25.08.2010. 28. What is particularly worrisome in this case is that dereliction in the face of court orders is attributed to those occupying responsible and high positions of power and governance, members of the permanent executive, respondents 2 and 3. 29. Bimal Jalan, well-known Economist and former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, states that division of the administrative structure between the ‘political part’ and the ‘non-political civil service part’ is to ensure that while all policy decisions effecting the public are made by politicians, implementation of these policies is carried out by an independent non-political civil service. This separation of ‘policy making function’ from the ‘implementation function’ is an essential feature of the Constitution and is expected to provide equality of treatment to all citizens irrespective of political or party affiliations. The bureaucracy is supposed to ensure that programmes are implemented according to the laws in force and in line with approved administrative procedures. While implementing the programmes set by the Cabinet and the Ministers, bureaucrats are enjoined to act without fear or favour. The Future of India – Politics, Economics and Governance by Bimal Jalan. 30. The bureaucracy is supposed to ensure that programmes are implemented according to the laws in force and in line with approved administrative procedures. While implementing the programmes set by the Cabinet and the Ministers, bureaucrats are enjoined to act without fear or favour. The Future of India – Politics, Economics and Governance by Bimal Jalan. 30. Thus, the permanent executive, the bureaucracy at various levels in the administrative hierarchy, is expected to operate in a balanced manner and act in an advisory role to supplement the functioning of the political executive, with due regard to the constitutional mandate resting upon it to uphold the rule of law. The case on hand presents a peculiar reversal of roles where the political executive, the Chief Minister of the State, had to step in to remind the permanent executive of its responsibility and duty to abide by orders of the Court for upholding the rule of law!! 31. A member of the permanent executive is enjoined to comply with the orders of the Court passed in exercise of judicial review. The Court would expect that the authorities would discharge their duties expeditiously as enjoined under the rules and as per the directions. If they do not discharge the duty, necessarily they would be required to give explanation to the Court as to the circumstances in which they could not comply with the direction issued by the Court or if there was any unavoidable delay, they should seek further time for compliance [STATE OF BIHAR v. SUBHASH SINGH (1997) 4 SCC 430 ]. 32. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents submitted that the delay in the execution of the lease deed was purely owing to administrative reasons. However, the records do not support this plea. There is nothing in the records to indicate that even a semblance of an effort or attempt was made by respondents 2 and 3 to comply with the directions of this Court till the intervention by the Chief Minister on 08.10.2010. The learned Government Pleader stated that the orders of this Court were found to be in conflict with the Rules and therefore, steps were taken to file a vacate stay application in the writ petition immediately. However, as pointed out by Smt.N.Shoba, learned counsel, the said vacate stay application was filed well over a month after the passing of the orders by this Court on 25.08.2010. However, as pointed out by Smt.N.Shoba, learned counsel, the said vacate stay application was filed well over a month after the passing of the orders by this Court on 25.08.2010. No attempt was made by the respondents in the meanwhile to comply with the orders and no effort was made thereafter to have the vacate stay application heard. It was not even listed for hearing by the time arguments concluded in this contempt case! In any event, the respondents ought to have at least approached this Court for extension of time if they were unable to comply with this Court’s directions which required immediate implementation. 33. Section 2(b) of the Act of 1971 defines ‘civil contempt’ as under: “2(b)"civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;” 34. To qualify as a ‘civil contempt’ under the above provision, the disobedience must be wilful [INDIAN AIRPORTS EMPLOYEES' UNION v. RANJAN CHATTERJEE (1999) 2 SCC 537 ].Disobedience of Court orders strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which our system of governance is based. However, as such disobedience must be wilful, it would exclude casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order [KAPILDEO PRASAD SAH v. STATE OF BIHAR (1999) 7 SCC 569 ]. 35. If from the circumstances of a particular case, the Court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but the same is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the Court may not punish such contemner [NIAZ MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA (1994) 6 SCC 332 ]. However, as pointed out by a learned Judge of this Court in I.B.SUGUNA DEVI v. C.B.S.VENKATA RAMANA 2008 (6) ALD 259 ,relying upon HEATONS TRANSPORT (ST HELENS) LTD. v. TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION1972 (3) All ER 101, it would not be necessary to show that the disobedience was contumacious in the sense that there was a direct intention to disobey the order to qualify the same as ‘wilful’. Effective administration of justice would require some penalty for disobedience to the order of the Court if such disobedience is more than casual, accidental or unintentional. 36. Effective administration of justice would require some penalty for disobedience to the order of the Court if such disobedience is more than casual, accidental or unintentional. 36. The learned Government Pleader relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in MOHD. IQBAL KHANDAYv. ABDUL MAJID RATHER (1994) 4 SCC 34 in support of his plea that the order was incapable of implementation as it was conflicting with the Rules and therefore, no contempt would arise. However, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in MOHD. IQBAL KHANDAY(supra)itself,the law of contempt is based on sound public policy for punishing any conduct which shakes the public confidence in the administration of justiceand once, the order is passed, right or wrong, it cannot be gainsaid that the order ought to be obeyed. If a party is aggrieved by the order, he should take prompt steps to invoke appellate proceedings and cannot ignore the order and plead about the difficulties of implementation at the time contempt proceedings are initiated. 37. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party concerned to approach the higher court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher court. Rightness or wrongness of the order cannot be urged in contempt proceedings. Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance with which was alleged [UNION OF INDIA v. SUBEDAR DEVASSY PV (2006) 1 SCC 613 ]. 38. The learned Government Pleader also relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in THREE CHEERS ENTERTAINMENT PRIVATE LIMITED v. CESC LIMITED(2008) 16 SCC 592 that the Court in its endeavour to see that its orders are complied with is not entitled to embark upon a roving enquiry. This Court has no intention of doing so. The order dated 25.08.2010 required forthwith execution of a lease deed, which was admittedly not done. This Court has no intention of doing so. The order dated 25.08.2010 required forthwith execution of a lease deed, which was admittedly not done. It is therefore for the respondents to explain and justify on what basis they did not comply with this Court’s direction. As pointed out in PRODIP KUMAR BISWAS (DR.) v. SUBRATA DAS (2004) 4 SCC 573 , referred to in THREE CHEERS ENTERTAINMENT PRIVATE LIMITED(supra), contempt jurisdiction has to be exercised by this Court when the act complained of adversely affects the majesty of law or dignity of the Court. 39. In ADVOCATE GENERAL, STATE OF BIHAR v. M.P. KHAIR INDUSTRIES (1980) 3 SCC 311 ,the Supreme Court held thus: “The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult or injury as the expression “Contempt of Court” may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. “It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage.” Per Frankfurter, J. in Offutt v. U.S., (1954) 345 US 11 “The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope.” Per Judge Curtis-Raleigh quoted in Jennison v. Baker, (1972) 1 All ER 997, 1006.” 40. If an order passed by this Court directing its implementation forthwith evokes no response from the authorities and at that, from officers of the ranks of a Principal Secretary to the Government and the head of the State’s Mining Department, it is a cause for serious concern and this Court would necessarily have to see whether such failure falls foul of the rule of law and offends the dignity of this Court. 41. It is the further contention of the learned Government Pleader that the order passed by this Court was capable of dual interpretation. 41. It is the further contention of the learned Government Pleader that the order passed by this Court was capable of dual interpretation. However, no such plea was taken by any of the respondents in their counters and it is not explained even at this stage as to how the order lends itself to two meanings. Nor was it the case of the respondents that there was any error in their understanding of the said order. Reliance placed by the learned Government Pleader on ANIL KUMAR SHAHI (2) v. PROF. RAM SEVAK YADAV (2008) 14 SCC 115is therefore misplaced. That was a case involving an error of judgment on the part of the authorities in understanding the order and the Supreme Court held that there was no wilful disobedience if best efforts were made to comply with the order. 42. The case on hand stands on a different footing altogether as no efforts whatsoever were made by respondents 2 and 3 to implement the Court orders. It is not their case that they failed to understand the import or the substance of the order. 43. T.N.GODAVARMAN THIRUMULPAD v. ASHOK KHOT (2006) 5 SCC 1 is also of no avail to the respondents. The Supreme Court pointed out therein that respect should always be shown to the Court and that, if any party is aggrieved by the order which in its opinion is wrong or against rules or implementation is neither practicable nor feasible, it should approach the court. In the present case, no effective steps were taken by the respondents in this regard. They cannot therefore rely upon this decision to protect themselves. 44. In so far as the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, respondent 1, is concerned, upon receiving the wire orders from this Court he immediately addressed a letter on 26.08.2010 seeking a clarification from his superior, the Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, respondent 3. He thereafter awaited orders from his superior and took steps after the condonation of delay by the Government under its Memo dated 11.10.2010, being bound by the administrative hierarchy. The inaction on the part of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology cannot therefore be said to be wilful or deliberate. No doubt, a defence that a superior’s permission was awaited for complying with Court orders generally cannot be accepted in contempt proceedings. The inaction on the part of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology cannot therefore be said to be wilful or deliberate. No doubt, a defence that a superior’s permission was awaited for complying with Court orders generally cannot be accepted in contempt proceedings. However, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, at least reacted to the Court orders immediately. To that extent, he stands absolved of being charged with wilful disobedience. His apology however verges on challenging this Court and reflects an inclination to bristle, unbecoming of an officer duty-bound to implement Court orders. 45. However, the disregard shown by his superiors, the Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, and the Principal Secretary to the Government, Industries and Commerce Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, respondents 3 and 2 respectively, stands on a worse footing. Upon receiving the communication dated 26.08.2010 from the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kothagudem, the Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh, did not even address himself to the necessity of complying with the Court orders but merely concentrated on advising the Government as to the filing of a counter affidavit in the writ petition. This is evident from his report dated 06.09.2010. In turn, the Principal Secretary of the Government, Industries and Commerce Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, adopted the same stand and in fact, recommended to the Chief Minister of the State that final orders be awaited in the writ petition and that action be taken thereafter. This is what she had to say in her counter: “19.I further submit that after 25.8.2010 being the date on which this Hon’ble Court had been pleased to grant the orders, the violation of which is presently being alleged, the Rule position was examined and it was decided that a detailed counter affidavit shall be filed, with a petition to vacate the interim orders granted in favour of the petitioner. Accordingly, a petition to vacate the interim directions had been filed on behalf of the respondents on 28.9.2010, itself, which is at least 2 days prior to the above contempt petition being filed. Accordingly, a petition to vacate the interim directions had been filed on behalf of the respondents on 28.9.2010, itself, which is at least 2 days prior to the above contempt petition being filed. It has been only endeavour of the Government to ensure that the petitioner pays the amounts rightfully due to the Government and on account of this fact that it was clarified by the Government in exercise the powers under 9-K(3), vide Memo No.4919/SPIU & SAND/2008-2 dated:13.6.2008 that the successful bidders shall pay the amount payable for one year at the time of executing the lease deed and that any unutilized amount shall be adjusted, while collecting the second year lease amount. In view of the same, steps were taken on behalf of all the respondents in this petition to bring the rule position to the notice of this Hon’ble Court and seeking the orders to be vacated. The fact that the petitioner had not filed a petition for condonation of delay and not paid Security Deposit and Stamp Duty was also one of the reasons that orders could not be implemented immediately. However, as stated above, on account of the fact that the petitioner had made a representation on 21.9.2010 to the Chief Minister, which was received by the 2nd respondent herein on 1.10.2010 and further representation, dated: 6.10.2010 addressed to the 2nd respondent that was received on 7.10.2010, notwithstanding the fact that the petitions were filed to vacate the interim orders were pending before the Hon’ble Court, immediate steps were taken for the purpose of implementing the orders of this Hon’ble Court after following due procedure.” 46. Viewed thus, the utter and complete failure on the part of respondents 2 and 3 to take any steps for compliance with this Court’s directions with reasonable despatch cannot be said to be disobedience of a casual, accidental or unintentional nature. They did not even take any fruitful steps as required by law, if aggrieved by the orders. Their defences to the effect that the petitioner failed to seek condonation of delay and that he had not paid the requisite amounts are only attempts to clutch at straws for not reacting positively to the Court’s orders. As stated supra, though seized of the matter they did not even choose to address the petitioner if they felt that any steps were required on his part for implementing this Court’s orders. As stated supra, though seized of the matter they did not even choose to address the petitioner if they felt that any steps were required on his part for implementing this Court’s orders. Relevant to note, the records reflect that in respect of Purushotapatnam sand reach, Bhadrachalam Mandal, for which the auction of sand quarry rights was held on 05.08.2010, the same day as the auction for Anantharam sand reach, Manuguru Mandal, the successful bidder, in the first instance, paid a proportionate amount as was done by the petitioner. However, as he surrendered to the Government’s demand and paid the entire amount thereafter, the delay in execution of the lease deed was condoned on 20.08.2010 and the lease deed was executed on the very same day. No ‘administrative delay’ intervened in this case for the respondents to take necessary action. The reluctance on the part of respondents 2 and 3 to apply similar despatch to the case on hand was demonstrably due to their indifference to this Court’s orders and their obdurate adherence to their own stand. This pestiferous disregard and carelessness on the part of members of the permanent executive and at that, those in the higher echelons of governance, is condemnable. Trite to state, negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience [KAPILDEO PRASAD SAH(supra)]. 47. The disobedience by respondents 2 and 3 is therefore held to be more than merely casual and unintentional and accordingly fulfills the requirements of ‘civil contempt’ as defined in the Act of 1971. 48. It is relevant to note that though respondents 2 and 3 offered separate apologies in their individual counters, the tone and tenor of the same are in identical terms. An underlying note of sarcasm and arrogance is manifest in the language used clearly indicating that the apology is neither a product of compunction nor of genuine regret. Further, their counters do not seek to explain the delay in implementation of the Court orders but on the other hand, an attempt is made to justify the non-implementation. As pointed out in HOSHIAR SINGH v. GURBACHAN SINGH AIR 1962 SC 1089 in a matter relating to contempt of Court, there cannot be both justification and apology. 49. Further, their counters do not seek to explain the delay in implementation of the Court orders but on the other hand, an attempt is made to justify the non-implementation. As pointed out in HOSHIAR SINGH v. GURBACHAN SINGH AIR 1962 SC 1089 in a matter relating to contempt of Court, there cannot be both justification and apology. 49. InM.Y.SHAREEF v. HON’BLE JUDGES OF THE NAGPUR HIGH COURT AIR 1955 SC 19 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court pointed out that there cannot be both justification and an apology as the two things are incompatible. The Court observed that an apology was not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea, but it is intended to be the evidence of real contriteness. 50. The aggressive and unabashed tone adopted by the officers in stating that they apologized in the ‘unlikely event’ that this Court concluded that the order had to be complied with without the petitioner taking requisite steps, clearly demonstrates their confrontationist attitude. It is indeed unfortunate that such a stance should be forthcoming from no less than a Principal Secretary to the Government and an officer of the rank of the Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh. 51. The Supreme Court in BIGYAN KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AIR 1988 SC 1025 had occasion to express serious concern and disapproval of the growing conduct of parties and public officers, in particular, of ignoring the directions of the Courts and the multiplying instances of confrontation. The observations in this regard are extracted hereunder: “7. ……… The court, including the apex one, is a part of the State and is a built-in mechanism of the Constitution to administer justice in accordance with law. For discharging that duty, the court has got to adopt an attitude of critical assessment of situations connected with litigation brought before it for adjudication. The manner of functioning of the court in accord with the Rule of Law has to be dispassionate, objective and analytical. The judges who preside over these courts do not act with a sense of superiority; nor do they look down upon others in the community. The manner of functioning of the court in accord with the Rule of Law has to be dispassionate, objective and analytical. The judges who preside over these courts do not act with a sense of superiority; nor do they look down upon others in the community. In order that the system may efficiently work and the purpose for which the courts are established is duly served, it is necessary that everyone within the framework of the Rule of Law must accept the system, render due obedience to orders made and in the event of failure of compliance, the rod of justice must descend down to punish.” 52. This Court can only echo the sentiments expressed supra. Reference may also be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in E.T. SUNUP v. C.A.N.S.S. EMPLOYEES ASSN (2004) 8 SCC 683 . “16. It has become a tendency with the government officers to somehow or the other circumvent the orders of court and try to take recourse to one justification or other. This shows complete lack of grace in accepting the orders of the Court. This tendency of undermining the Court’s order cannot be countenanced. This Court time and again has emphasised that in a democracy the role of the court cannot be subservient to administrative fiat. The executive and legislature have to work within the constitutional framework and the judiciary has been given the role of watchdog to keep the legislature and executive within check. …… 18.……… But if the Court’s orders are flouted like this, then people will lose faith in the courts. Therefore, it is necessary to deal with such type of violation of the Court’s order with strong hands and to convey to the authorities that the courts are not going to take things lightly.” 53. This Court cannot therefore take kindly to the recalcitrant attitude and approach of respondents 2 and 3 when faced with Court orders requiring compliance forthwith. Their so-called apologies, far from being evidence of contrition and remorse, are full of bluster and challenge. A mere ‘sincere apology’ casually offered to this Court falls abysmally short of the requirements to purge these respondents of their guilt. Further, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in L.D. JAIKWAL v. STATE OF U.P. (1984) 3 SCC 405 . Their so-called apologies, far from being evidence of contrition and remorse, are full of bluster and challenge. A mere ‘sincere apology’ casually offered to this Court falls abysmally short of the requirements to purge these respondents of their guilt. Further, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in L.D. JAIKWAL v. STATE OF U.P. (1984) 3 SCC 405 . “We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the “slap-say sorry-and forget” school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying “sorry” does not make the slapper poorer. Nor does the cheek which has taken the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical word being uttered ………” The apologies are accordingly rejected at their face value as mere means of the last resort adopted by respondents 2 and 3 to escape the consequences to their acts of wilful disobedience. 54. Section 12(3) of the Act of 1971 provides that where a person is found guilty of civil contempt, the Court, if it considers that a fine would not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. Section 13(a) provides that no Court should impose a sentence under the Act of 1971 for a contempt of Court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. 55. It is no doubt true that the Court would normally be inclined to adopt a lenient view if its order/direction has been complied with subsequently, though after receipt of notice in the contempt case. However, as pointed out in PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI v. PATEL CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI(2008) 14 SCC 561, an element of public policy exists in punishing civil contempt as administration of justice would otherwise be undermined if the Court’s orders are disregarded with impunity; for proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with its orders, the Court would not hesitate to wield the potent weapon of contempt. 56. While awarding sentence on a contemner, the Court does so to uphold the majesty of the law and to ensure that the unflinching faith of people in Courts remains intact. 56. While awarding sentence on a contemner, the Court does so to uphold the majesty of the law and to ensure that the unflinching faith of people in Courts remains intact. If the guilty are let off, and their sentence remitted on grounds of mercy, people would lose faith in the administration of justice. The Court is duty-bound to award proper punishment to uphold the rule of law, however high the person may be [J.VASUDEVAN v. T.R.DHANANJAYA1996 (1) ALD (Crl.) 727 (SC) = (1995) 6 SCC 249 ]. 57. The observations of a learned Division Bench of this Court in B.KRISHNA REDDY v. PUSHPA SUBRAHMANYAM 2011 (1) ALD (Crl.) 504 (AP), relying on DEBABRATA BANDHOPADHYAYA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AIR 1969 SC 189 , are apposite: “29.In contempt proceedings the court is both the accuser and the judge of the accusation. It should act with circumspection making allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct, not explainable otherwise, arises that the contemner must be punished. Punishment under the Law of Contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one’s duty and in defiance of authority. ………” 58. In the present case, though the respondents executed the lease deed in favour of the petitioner shortly after receiving notice in this contempt case and upon the intervention of the Chief Minister, what is shocking is that this delay in execution was in the face of a direction which required such execution ‘forthwith’ and the respondents did not even deem it appropriate to explain the reasons as to why they could not comply with the said direction with reasonable despatch. This glaring and egregious imperviousness of respondents 2 and 3 to the Court’s directive which required them to act without avoidable delay undoubtedly tends to interfere with the due course of justice. If such disregard were to be viewed lightly notwithstanding the specific direction to act ‘forthwith’, this Court’s orders would be reduced to mere empty letters and an utter mockery. 59. Tolerance of law Courts there is but not without limits and only upto a point and not beyond [ANIL RATAN SARKAR v. HIRAK GHOSH (2002) 4 SCC 21 ]. 60. For the reasons stated above, respondent 1 is held not guilty of committing wilful disobedience to the orders of this Court. 59. Tolerance of law Courts there is but not without limits and only upto a point and not beyond [ANIL RATAN SARKAR v. HIRAK GHOSH (2002) 4 SCC 21 ]. 60. For the reasons stated above, respondent 1 is held not guilty of committing wilful disobedience to the orders of this Court. He would however be well advised to exercise care and caution in future and more particularly, in the language he uses while addressing the Court. Respondents 2 and 3 are found to have committed wilful disobedience to the orders of this Court and are consequently held in ‘civil contempt’ warranting suitable punishment under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This Court is conscious that the Principal Secretary to the Government, Industries and Commerce Department, respondent 2, is a woman. However, holding a lofty and responsible position in the administrative hierarchy of the permanent executive, she is expected to abide by the constitutional mandate of upholding the rule of law and once she failed to do so, she must necessarily face the consequences and no lenity can be shown to her merely on the ground of her sex. Respondents 2 and 3 are accordingly sentenced to individually undergo detention in civil prison for a period of fifteen (15) days and shall each pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-(Rupees two thousand). They shall be entitled to subsistence allowance at the rate of Rs.750/- (Rupees seven hundred and fifty) per day in accordance with Rule 32(1) of the Contempt of Court Rules, 1980 framed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh under the Act of 1971 during the period of their detention which shall be borne by the State. 61. The Contempt Case is ordered accordingly. 62. After pronouncement of the order, the learned Government Pleader for Industries and Commerce sought suspension of the order so as to enable his clients to avail appellate remedies. The order shall accordingly remain suspended for a period of one (1) month from today.