1. Petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of this court in terms of Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter for short as Cr.P.C. for quashment of the order dated 27th of December, 2010 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu titled State v. Ajeet Singh and others, whereby the accused Ajit Singh, Paramjeet Singh and Jatinder Singh have been charge-sheeted for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 148, 149, 302, 201, 120-B of the Ranbir Penal Code, for short as RPC and 4/25 Arms Act. While as accused Ranjodh Singh, Narinder Singh and Azmer Singh have been charge-sheeted under Sections 302/ 120-B of the RPC. 2. Precisely the grounds taken by the writ petitioners are that there is no admissible evidence which can be made basis for forming an opinion to presume that accused are involved in the commission of offences under Section 302 and 120-B of RPC and there is not even an iota of evidence which can be made basis for holding that accused have hatched a conspiracy as is alleged in the instant case and for which the accused have been charge-sheeted. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Ranjodh Singh, in support of his case, made a reference to the statements made by PWs Manmohan Singh and Satinder Paul Singh recorded before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class under Section 164-A of the Cr.P.C, the Photostat copy whereof is annexed with the writ petitions. 4. Mr. B. S. Salathia, also argued that ingredients which constitute conspiracy in terms of Section 120-B of RPC are missing. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner-Narinder Singh also made reference in support of his arguments to the document-phone calls which is part of the material collected by the Investigating Officer during investigation and which is made part of the final report in terms of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C, the Photostat copy whereof is also annexed with his writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for respondents have resisted the petitions on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to presume that accused have hatched conspiracy and are involved in the commission of offences punishable under Section 302 and 120-B of the RPC. In this connection the counsels made reference to the statements recorded by the Investigating Officer during investigation, particularly of Balwinder Singh and Paramjeet Singh read with statements of Manmohan Singh and Satinderpaul Singh, under Section 164-A of the Cr.P.C. 7. In this connection the counsels made reference to the statements recorded by the Investigating Officer during investigation, particularly of Balwinder Singh and Paramjeet Singh read with statements of Manmohan Singh and Satinderpaul Singh, under Section 164-A of the Cr.P.C. 7. Meeting the other contention of the counsel for the petitioner that essential ingredients constituting conspiracy are not made out in terms of Section 120-B RPC, the senior counsel Mr. Sethi argued that as far as direct evidence vis-a-vis conspiracy is concerned there rarely can be a case where evidence is available to that extent, because the conspiracy is actually the meeting of minds and when, where & how such meeting takes place is difficult to be ascertained, however, this is one such rare case where direct evidence is also available and the same is to be determined during trial. He further submitted that for prima-facie purpose there is not only statement of two witnesses whose statements were recorded under Section 164-A of the Cr.P.C, but of other two witnesses also which do disclose the ingredients of conspiracy. 8. It appears that the case came up for consideration before the trial court and learned counsel for the accused Ranjodh Singh and Narinder Singh resisted the framing of charge. 9. In order to keep the record straight, it would be apt to state herein that one of the accused namely Jeet Singh S/o Swarn Singh is absconding and proceedings under Section 512 of the Cr.P.C. have been initiated against him. 10. The trial court after considering the material available before it, came to the prima-facie conclusion, in terms of the mandate of Chapter XXIII, of the Cr.P.C, that there are reasonable grounds to presume that the accused are involved in the commission of offences punishable under Section 302, 120-B of the RPC read with 4/25 of Arms Act and accordingly accused were charge-sheeted for the said offences. Accused Ranjodh Singh and Narinder Singh have been charged for the commission of offences under Section 302 and 120-B of RPC. 11. Accused Ranjodh Singh and Narinder Singh have questioned the same and have sought its quashment so far it relates to them. 12. Accused Ranjodh Singh and Narinder Singh have been charged for the commission of offences under Section 302 and 120-B of RPC. 11. Accused Ranjodh Singh and Narinder Singh have questioned the same and have sought its quashment so far it relates to them. 12. I have gone through the statements of Manmohan Singh, and Satinder Singh whose statements were recorded under section 164-A of the Cr.P.C, the Photostat copy whereof is annexed with the petition, have specifically stated how a meeting was arranged, what was the purpose of such meeting and how a conspiracy was hatched for committing offence. Their statements are also supported by Paramjeet Singh and Balwinder Singh whose statement has been recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. The question is whether the petitioners can avail the remedy in terms of Section 561-A Cr.P.C for quashment of charge. It is apt to reproduce Section 561-A Cr.P.C herein: "561-A Saving of inherent power of High Court Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 13. This remedy can be invoked/ pressed into service or may be exercised in the following circumstances:- (i) To pass orders in order to give effect to an order passed under Cr.P.C; (ii) To prevent abuse of process of Court; (iii) To otherwise secure the ends of justice; and (iii) To prevent mis-carriage of justice. 14. FIR, Police Final Report made in terms of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. read with the statements made by the witnesses aforementioned in terms of section 164-A Cr.P.C and 161 Cr.P.C and the opinion framed by the court do formulate sufficient ground for presuming that there are grounds to frame a charge. 15. The inadmissibility of evidence, if at all there is any, and the defence which is yet to be determined, cannot be looked into at this stage. Thus by no stretch of imagination it can be said and held that petitioners have carved out a case which falls within the contours of Section 561-A Cr.P.C. 16. 15. The inadmissibility of evidence, if at all there is any, and the defence which is yet to be determined, cannot be looked into at this stage. Thus by no stretch of imagination it can be said and held that petitioners have carved out a case which falls within the contours of Section 561-A Cr.P.C. 16. Apex Court in the cases reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 , AIR 1964 SC 01; AIR 1972 SC 484 ; AIR 1974 SC 1146 ; AIR 1977 SC 1489 ; AIR 1977 SC 2229 ; AIR 1980 SC 326 ; AIR 1989 SC 01; AIR 1990 SC 494 ; AIR 1991 SC 1260 ; AIR 1992 SC 604 ; AIR 1992 SC 892; AIR 1996 SC 309 ; AIR 1996 SC 2983 ; AIR 1999 SC 3596 ; AIR 1999 SC 1044 ; AIR 1999 SC 1216 ; AIR 2002 SC 671 ; AIR 2004 SC 3967 ; AIR 2005 SC 3212 ; SLJ 2005 (1) 118; 2008 AIR SCW 1003; 2008 AIR SCW 1993; 2008 AIR SCW 1998; 2008 AIR SCW 4614; 2008 AIR SCW 7680; 2008 AIR SCW 2778; AIR 2010 SC 201 has discussed the scope of Section 561-A Cr.P.C. corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C. of Central Code. 17. Apex Court has also held that power is to be exercised cautiously, carefully and sparingly and Court has not to function as a Court of Appeal or revision. It has also laid down the parameters and guidelines in cases titled as K.L.E Society & Ors. v. Siddalingesh reported in 2008 AIR SCW 1993; A.P. v. Bajjoori Kanthaiah reported as 2008 AIR SCW 7860 and Reshma Bano v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2008 AIR SCW 1998. 18. Apex Court in AIR 2004 SC 3967 , AIR 1972 SC 484 , AIR 1974 SC 1446, AIR 1977 SC 2229 , AIR 1989 SC 01, has laid down the same principle. It is apt to reproduce para 10, 13, 14, 15, 17 & 19 out of the judgment titled as Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka, reported in 2008 AIR SCW 1003 herein. "10 In a catena of decisions this Court has deprecated the interference by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code in a routine manner. of Karnataka, reported in 2008 AIR SCW 1003 herein. "10 In a catena of decisions this Court has deprecated the interference by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code in a routine manner. It has been consistently held that the power under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in rarest of rare cases. Exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not the rule but it is an exception. The exception is applied only when it is brought to the notice of the Court that grave miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is allowed to proceed where the accused would be haraassed unnecessarily if the trial is allowed to linger when prima facie it appears to Court that the trial would likely to be ended in acquittal. In other words, the inherent power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked by the High Court either to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, 13. In State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha (1980) 1 SCC 554 this Court pointed out at SCC p. 574: "The High Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction committed a grave error by making observations on seriously disputed questions of facts taking its cue from affidavits which in such a situation would hardly provide any reliable material. In our opinion the High Court was clearly in error in giving the direction virtually amounting to a mandamus to close the case before the investigation is complete. We say no more." 19. In Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad (1972) 1 SCC 452 this Court at SCC p. 455 pointed out: "In exercising jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court can quash proceedings if there is no legal evidence or if there is any impediment to the institution or continuance of proceedings but the High Court does not ordinarily inquire as to whether the evidence is reliable or not. Where again, investigation into the circumstances of an alleged cognizable offence is carried on under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not interfere with such investigation because it would then be the impeding investigation and jurisdiction of statutory authorities to exercise power in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code." 20. In Jehan Sinqh v. Delhi Administration (1974) 4 SCC 522 the application filed by the accused under Section 561-A of the old Code for quashing the investigation was dismissed as being premature and incompetent on the finding that prima facie, the allegations in the FIR, if assumed to be correct, constitute a cognizable offence. 21. In State of Bihar v. Murad All Khan (1988) 4 SCC 655 this Court held that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and has given the working that in exercising that jurisdiction, the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. 22. We may observe here that despite this Court consistently held in catena of decisions that inherent power of the High Court should not be exercised according to whims and caprice and it has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, we often come across the High Court exercising the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a routine manner at its whims and caprice setting at naught the cognizance taken and the FIR lodged at the threshold Committing grave miscarriage of justice. While it is true that so long as the inherent power of Section 482 is in the Statute Book, exercise of such power is not impermissible but it must be noted that such power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, the sole aim of which is to secure the ends of justice. The power under Section 482 is not intended to scuttle justice at the threshold." 23. This court only has to, ascertain whether the allegation made in the FIR read with the final report in terms of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C do or do not disclose the commission of offence? 24. The power under Section 482 is not intended to scuttle justice at the threshold." 23. This court only has to, ascertain whether the allegation made in the FIR read with the final report in terms of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C do or do not disclose the commission of offence? 24. As discussed hereinabove, I am of the considered view that there are grounds to presume that this is a case for trial and if any defence is projected that has to be determined during trial and would be subject to proof, therefore, this cannot be a ground for quashing the proceedings. 25. This court in a case titled Mian Abdul Qayoom v. State and others reported as 2011 (1) JKJ (500) HC has made detailed discussion when and how remedy under section 561-A Cr.P.C. can be availed. 26. In Cr. Appeal No. 1660-1662 of 2011 titled Santosh Kumari v. State and others and the Apex Court quashed the order passed by this court in terms of Section 561-A of the Cr.P.C and upheld that order passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Kathua. 27. Having glance of the above discussion, I am of the considered view that petitioners have failed to carve out a case which warrant interference in terms of mandate of Section 561-A Cr.P.C, therefore, both the petitions warrant to be dismissed and are dismissed as such. 28. Now coming to bail petitions, admittedly as discussed hereinabove, both the accused are involved in heinous and serious offence and the punishment prescribed is death and life, are not entitled to bail as a matter of right and have not carved out a case for grant of bail on merits. 29. It needs to be emphasized herein that Apex court in a latest judgment which too relates to J&K State has held that no bail can be granted in heinous offence more so when the accused are allegedly involved in commission of offences punishable under Section 302 of the RPC. it is apt to reproduce Para 13 herein: "13..............The fact that accused are involved in commission of a heinous crime like murder which entails death or life imprisonment as punishment should have been taken into consideration before releasing the accused on interim bail. it is apt to reproduce Para 13 herein: "13..............The fact that accused are involved in commission of a heinous crime like murder which entails death or life imprisonment as punishment should have been taken into consideration before releasing the accused on interim bail. The trial court after having considered the gravity of the offence and the apprehension on the part of the prosecution that the accused would tamper with the evidence in the event of their release on bail had rightly refused to enlarge the accused on bail. The High Court while granting the relief of bail to the accused has completely ignored and over looked the aforementioned relevant factors which weigh heavily against the accused. Moreover, the complaint filed by Vijinder Singh that he and Kuljit Singh, who is one of the witnesses in the present case, were physically assaulted and threatened in the Court premises will have to be given its due weight. The FIR registered on August 13, 2010 is pending necessary investigation wherein the statement of Vijinder Singh who is son of the appellant was recorded on August 20, 2010 under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code. The contents of the FIR would indicate that the accused eight themselves or through their relatives would try to tamper the evidence which is going to be led by the prosecution in the case." 30. Trial court had passed a detailed order whereby bail petition of Ranjodh Singh was rejected, the order is reasoned one and no interference is warranted. 31. The ground projected by the accused Ranjodh Singh for seeking bail is based on his health condition. The health ground is available to the accused only when the State under whose custody the accused is, fails to provide the necessary facilities to the accused. But in the instant case, the accused-Ranjodh Singh was taken to Sheri Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences Srinagar, for short as SKIMS, at the expense of the State and even the post operative management was also borne by the State. He has been taken by air to Srinagar for obtaining the medical advise/ opinion and on this count the State has not only paid the Air Fare of the accused but of those officials also under whose custody and security he was. Therefore, the question of State being negligent in taking care of the health of the accused during custody does not arise. 32. Therefore, the question of State being negligent in taking care of the health of the accused during custody does not arise. 32. Apex Court in case reported as AIR 2002 SC Page 2435 titled as State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atique Ahmad has held it improper to release the accused on bail on medical grounds ignoring the fact that State Govt. had made arrangements for his treatment in Medical College Hospital. 33. In this regard report submitted by Dr. Altaf Umer Ramzan, Additional Professor & head Deptt. of Neurosurgery, SKIMS needs a look:- "In compliance with the Court order dated 28th Oct, 2011 in case of Ranjodh Singh State BA No. 92/2011. I have examined the patient Ranjodh Singh who presently has backache and spasm of back muscles. His Post Operative recovery has not been up to expectation as the Post Operative rest and back care which was needed, he could not receive and even had a fall around 12 days back. Patient needs to be in hospital (Police Hospital) bed and needs to avoid bending, lifting, weight, twisting his back. He further needs physical therapy to relieve his back spasm avoid unhygienic/ crowded area." 34. The medical advice tendered by the doctor makes it imperative to keep the accused- Ranjodh Singh hospitalized for the time being. 35. In the given circumstances respondents are commanded to shift the accused Ranjodh Singh in the Police Hospital at Jammu for the period as would suffice the medical advice and thereafter be shifted back to Central Jail in terms of the orders of trial court. 36. Both the petitions under Section 561-A Cr.P.C and bail application of Narinder Singh are dismissed while as the bail petition of Ranjodh Singh is disposed of as indicated above. 37. Judgment announced today the 2nd day December, 2011 in terms of Rule 138(3) of Jammu and Kashmir High Court Rules, 1999.