JUDGMENT Hon'ble Rakesh Tiwari, J. - Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. Respondent Smt. Anguri Devi wife of Sri Pratap Singh Verma purchased part of the building in question situated 13/10 Anguri Devi market Phul Chauraha, Aligarh vide sale-deed dated 10.12.85. According to the sale-deed the building was 90-100 years old. After purchase of the building, plaintiff-respondent prepared a map for reconstruction of the building which was sanctioned by the Aligarh Development Authority, Aligarh on 11.10.89. An area of 4'x6' has been let out to the petitioner in the year 1991 under the stair case pursuant to agreement dated 17.4.1991 for running a tea stall. 3. The case of the petitioner is that the plaintiff respondent received rent up to August, 2006 and also executed the rent receipts. However, no rent was received by the landlord/ respondent as such the tenant petitioner remitted the rent to him through money order on 8.3.2007 for the period September, 2006 to February,2007; inspite of the fact that rent was tendered to the landlord; that the landlord sent notice dated 10.3.2007 terminating the tenancy of the petitioner allegedly on account of non-payment of rent since 1.9.2006. 4. The landlord filed SCC Suit No. 23 of 2007, Smt. Anguri Devi versus Vijai Kumar. On being noticed the petitioner tenant contested the suit by filing written statement interalia that he was not the defaulter in payment of rent and the entire rent demanded had been sent to the petitioner through money order, which having been refused by the landlord, was deposited under Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on the first date of hearing. Thereafter, the parties a filed documentary evidence and also dduced oral evidence in support of their case. 5. The SCC Suit No. 23 of 2007 was thereafter decreed by the Additional Judge Small Causes Court, Aligarh vide judgment and order dated 23.8.2010. Aggrieved by the order, the petitioner preferred Revision No. 31 of 2010, Vijai Kumar Chainwala versus Smt. Anguri Devi. 6. The orders passed by the Judge Small Causes Court as well as the Revisional Court have been assailed in this writ petition on the ground that the plaintiff has not filed any evidence to show that the building has been demolished and thereafter was reconstructed. 6. The orders passed by the Judge Small Causes Court as well as the Revisional Court have been assailed in this writ petition on the ground that the plaintiff has not filed any evidence to show that the building has been demolished and thereafter was reconstructed. It is stated that neither any assessment order has been filed nor there is any evidence to show as to what new construction has been reported to the authorities and the Court below has committed an illegality in decreeing the suit and lastly that the petitioner was a defaulter in payment of rent. 7. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon clause 3,4 and 7 of the permission letter granted to the petitioner with certain conditions by which he was permitted to raise new constructions. These are:- ^^3- fuekZ.k dh vuqKk izkIr djus ds i'pkr dk;Z dh izxfr ds lEcU/k esa vuqKk izkIr drkZ izkf/kdj.k dks fuekZ.k dh izxfr ds ckjs esa fuEufyf[kr lwpuk nsxk%& d- fuekZ.k izkjEHk djus dh frfFkA [k- Lohd`r uD'ks ds vuqlkj fuekZ.k iw.kZ gks tkus dh frfFk x`g izos'k ds iwoZA 4- ekufp= esa tks Hkkx fxjk;s tkus gsrq fn[kyk;k x;k gS igys mls fxjkdj mlds ckn u;k fuekZ.k fd;k tk;sxkA 7- dksbZ Hkh ubZ cuk;h xbZ @ fQj ls cuk;h xbZ ;k jn~nkscny dh xbZ bekjr ds iw.kZ Hkkx esa ;k fdlh Hkkx esa mDr le; rd jgus dh vkKk ugha gksxh tc rd ,slk djus ds fy;s izkf/kdkjh mifof/k;ksa ds micU/kksa dh iwfrZ djrk gS vkSj ;g jgus ;ksX; gSA** 8. He has then referred to the judgment of Additional Judge Small Causes Court, Aligarh in SCC Suit No. 23 of 2007 impugned in this writ petition wherein issue framed regarding applicability of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in respect of the shop in dispute of the petitioner and issue regarding legality of the notice terminating tenancy of the petitioner have been considered. In respect of first issue regarding applicability of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to impress upon the Court that no evidence or document was before the court below to come to the conclusion that the building in dispute was new construction and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were not applicable. In this regard he has placed reliance upon the following findings of the court below. In this regard he has placed reliance upon the following findings of the court below. ^^i{kdkjksa ds fo}ku vf/koDrk x.k }kjk tks rdZ izLrqr fd;k x;k gS mlds vkyksd esa i=koyh ds voyksdu ls ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd oknh us vius okn i= esa fuekZ.k lu~ 1990 esa iwjk gksuk vkSj ml ij ,DV uEcj 13@1972 ds izko/kku ykxw u gksus dk mYys[k fd;k x;k gS rFkk izfroknh us vius tokc nkos esa ;g dgk gS fd ,xzhesUV esa bl vk'k; dk dksbZ mYys[k ugha gSA blfy;s okn ds le; bl rF; dks ugha dg ldrk vkSj ,sls dFku fcoa/ku ds fl)kUr o ifjR;kx ls ckf/kr gS rFkk fookfnr nqdku dks iqjkuk fufeZr gksuk dgk x;k gSA bl ekeys esa i{kdkjksa ds e/; tks ,xzhesUV izfroknh }kjk izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ds voyksdu ls ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd fnukad 17-4-91 dks jlhn fy[kh xbZ vkSj izfroknh us vius tokc nkos esa Hkh tks vxLr 2007 esa izLrqr fd;k x;k 16&17 o"kZ iwoZ nqdku fdjk;s ds fy;s mYysf[kr fd;k gSA bl ekeys esa oknh dh rjQ ls izLrqr lwph 81x ls lR;izfrfyfi uD'kk 82x] o 83 x Hkou fuekZ.k Lohd`fr i=] vyhx<+ fodkl izkf/kdj.k ds voyksdu ls Li"V gksrk gS fd Hkou fuekZ.k dh Lohd`fr fnukad 11-10-89 dks gqbZ gS vkSj oknh ds cSukek dh Nk;kizfr fyfi tks izfroknh }kjk nkf[ky dh xbZ gS ds i`"B uEcj 6 ds voyksdu ls ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd nqdkus fodz; lEifRr ds Q'kZ dPps iDds rFkk iVko eksVh ds rFkk yxHkx 90&100 o"kZ iqjkuk fy[kk gSA bl laca/k esa oknh dh rjQ ls ;g rdZ izLrqr fd;k x;k gS fd iqjkus fuekZ.k ds LFkku ij u;k fuekZ.k fd;k x;k gS] tks fd izfroknh dh lk{; ls lkfcr gSA mDr vkyksd esa izfroknh lk{kh Mh0MCyw0&1 dh ftjg ds voyksdu ls ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd bl lk{kh us viuh ftjg esa ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd esjh fdjk;snkjh okyh txg esa nhokjks ij IykLVj gks jgk gSA nhokjs lhesUV o bZVksa dh gSA Q'kZ lhesUVsM iDdk gS rFkk ;g Hkh dgk gS fd Hkwry dh nqdkuksa dk iVko ysaVj dk gSA bl izdkj ;g izfroknh dh lk{; ls ;g Li"V gS fd cSukek esa ftl izdkj dk fuekZ.k n'kkZ;k x;k gS ml izdkj dk fuekZ.k bl le; ugha gSA** 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon paragraph 6 of the judgment rendered in Om Prakash Gupta versus Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, and the connected petitions reported in AIR 1982 SC-1230 (2) wherein it has been noted and held that- "6. As a second limb tot he first argument, it is contended that the building will be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th of June, 1967 and not on the date of the first assessment, and that if this be so, the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court on 23rd of March, 1976. In order to appreciate this argument it will be expedient to refer to Explanation 1 to sub-section (2) of Section 2 which has already been extracted. Explanation 1 provides that the building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authorities having jurisdiction, and in case of a building subject to assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied........ for the first time. A perusal of Explanation I makes it abundantly clear that the date of occupation would be taken to be the date of completion of the construction only when there is no report or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment thereof. If there is an assessment, as in the present case it is, it will be the date of the first assessment which will be deemed to be date of completion of the construction, and in that view of the matter the building had not become more than ten year's old on the date when when the revision came to be decided by the High Court , and therefore, there was no question of giving the benefit of Section 39 of the Act to the appellant." 10. He has also relied upon paragraph 18 the judgment rendered in J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. and others versus M.R. Murali and another, AIR 2002 SC-1061 wherein it has been held that documents referable to some other litigation between the parties cannot be taken into consideration unless tendered in evidence and brought on record consistently with procedural law governing trial of civil cases. Paragraph 18 of the judgment is as under:- "18. What amounts to denial of title, and whether such denial to bonafide or not are the questions to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case. As a general rule the vulnerability of denial of title by the tenant shall shall be tested by reference to rule of estoppel contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act which estoppes the tenant from denying the title of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy and the estoppel continues to operate so long as the tenant does not surrender possession over the tenancy premises to the landlord who unducted him in possession. The tenant is not estopped from denying the title of the landlord if it comes to an end subsequent to the creation of the tenancy nor is he estopped from questioning the derivative title of a transferee of his landlord. However, the rule of estoppel contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act is not exhaustive. To operate against the tenant as providing a ground for eviction under Section 10 of the Act a mere denial of the title of the landlord is not enough, such denial has to be not bonafide. Not bonafide would mean absence of good faith or non genuineness of the tenant's plea. If denial of title by the tenant is an outcome of good faith or honesty or sincerty , and is intended only to project the facts without any intention of causing any harm to the landlord it may not be not bonafide. Therefore, to answer the question whether an assertion of dental of landlords title by the tenant was bonafide or not, all the surrounding circumstances under which the assertion was made shall have to be seen. The counter highlights the factum and contents of notice by the Municipal Corporation served on the tenant, reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment and the reaction of tenants to the threat coupled with temptation held out by Corporation. The counter highlights the factum and contents of notice by the Municipal Corporation served on the tenant, reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment and the reaction of tenants to the threat coupled with temptation held out by Corporation. This notice by Municipal Corporation states that tenants having informed the Municipal Corporation that they were in possession of the premises that they had agreed to pay to the Corporation the lease amount which was presumably in arrears on account of non payment of their landlords ( i.e. the respondents), that the Municipal Corporation threatened the tenancy premises being subjected to public auction if the arrears of rent were not cleared. This notice is by reference to letter dated 26.3.1993 sent by the tenants to the Municipal Corporation which is not available on record. The landlords on whom lay the burden of proving availability of the ground of eviction took no steps for the production of this letter. The contents of the letter would have provided vital evidence relating to the nature and manner of denial of title by the tenants and the bonafides of denial could have been inferred. The High Court in its judgment has made a reference to a " a series of attempts to deprive the landlords of their lawful rights" by tenants. The High Court appears to have taken into consideration some other documents referable to some other litigation between the parties which documents, in our opinion, could not have been taken into consideration unless tendered in evidence and brought on record consistently with procedural law governing trial of civil cases. There is yet another error committed by the High Court. So far as the additional counter and contents of the notice by Municipal Corporation to the tenants are concerned we do not think that a case of denial of title is made out. In any case it cannot be considered to be 'not' bonafide. The tenants have stated that the ultimate owners of the property were the Municipal Corporation and they had agreed their willingness to pay rent to the Municipal Corporation under threat of eviction solely for the purpose of protecting their own possession over the premises. In any case it cannot be considered to be 'not' bonafide. The tenants have stated that the ultimate owners of the property were the Municipal Corporation and they had agreed their willingness to pay rent to the Municipal Corporation under threat of eviction solely for the purpose of protecting their own possession over the premises. They have neither disowned the title of their own landlords at the inception of the tenancy nor have set up any title in themselves nor attorned in favour of the Municipal Corporation by voluntarily entering into direct tenancy the Municipal Corporation by passing their own landlords. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that no case of eviction on the ground of "tenants" denial of landlords' title "not bona fide" is made out." 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the finding of the court below on issue no.1 which reads thus:- ^^tgkWa rd izfroknh ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dk ;g rdZ gS fd uD'kk ikl gksuk ;k uD'kk izLrqr gksuk /kkjk 2 ¼2½ esa dksbZ mYys[k ugha gSA bl ifjizs{; esa eSaus /kkjk 2 ¼2½ ,DV uEcj 13@ 1972 dk lE;d voyksdu fd;kA ftlds Li"Vhdj.k 1 esa bl vk'k; dk izko/kku gS fd construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect,and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied ( not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time. "mDr ds ifjizs{; esa ;g Li"V gS fd ;fn fuekZ.k fnukad 26-4-1985 vFkok mlds ckn iwjk gksrk gS rks ,slh fLFkfr esa fuekZ.k iwjk gksus ds pkyhl o"kZ rd ,DV ds izko/kku ykxw ugaha gksrs gS rFkk Li"Vhdj.k 1 ftldk mYys[k mij rFkk ,lsleSUV ugha gS rks ogkWa ij okLrfod :i esa tc fuekZ.k ij dCtk izkIr fd;k x;k gS rc iwjk gksuk ekuk tk;sxkA ,slh fLFkfr esa mijksDr lejr dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq;s ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd bl ekeys esa uD'kk Lohd`r lu~ 1989 esa gqbZ gS vFkkZr uD'kk Lohd`fr gksus ls iwoZ fuekZ.k gksus dk dksbZ vkSfpR; ugha gksrk gS rFkk izfroknh us nqdku dks fdjk;s ij lu~ 1991 esa gksuk Lohdkj fd;k gS vkSj iwoZ ds cSukesa esa ftl izdkj dk fuekZ.k Fks] mlls fHkUu fuekz.k gksuk izfroknh us viuh ftjg esa Lohdkj fd;k gSA ftldk mYys[k mij fd;k tk pqdk gSA mijksDr ds vfrfjDr cSuke 13@9 uEcj uxj ikfydk esa ntZ gksus dk mYys[k cSukek ds ist uEcj 5 ij gS rFkk ekStwnk okn lEifRr edku uEcj 13@10 gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa i=koyh ij miyC/k izi=ksa o lk{; o fof/k O;oLFkk rFkk /kkjk 2 ¼2½ ds Li"Vhdj.k ds voyksdu ls ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd fookfnr nqdku uofufeZr nqdku gS vkSj bl ij ,DV uEcj 13 @ 1972 ds izko/kku ykxw ugha gksrs gSaA rn~uqlkj ;g fopkj.k fcUnq fuLrkfjr fd;k tkrk gSA** 12. As regards notice is concerned, it is stated that the court below has committed an error in law in holding that since the notice was sent by the landlord at the correct address by registered post with AD,hence the service cannot be deemed to be sufficient unless and until the service is proved not to have been made. 13. It is lastly submitted that the receipts filed by the landlord in the court below regarding deposit of house tax, water tax, drainage and interest etc. by Smt. Anguri Devi on 22.5.2006 do not show that it is receipts of tax and not assessment. 14. Before recording the conclusion on facts the rulings cited by the petitioner may be considered. 15. As regards paragraph 18 of the judgment rendered in J.J. Pvt. Ltd. and others versus M.R. Murali and another relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, suffice it to say that the aforesaid paragraph has been given in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 15. As regards paragraph 18 of the judgment rendered in J.J. Pvt. Ltd. and others versus M.R. Murali and another relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, suffice it to say that the aforesaid paragraph has been given in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. It is in the background that where this judgment was referred in the background that title of the landlord had been denied by the tenant. The Apex Court in that case was considering the question as to whether such denial is bonafide or not, are questions to be determined not in circumstances of each case. In the instant case, the Court has not relied upon any documents filed by the parties which may require proof but has relied upon a judgment of the court itself which was between the present landlord and another tenant in the same building. Therein also the question of applicability of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was under consideration of the same Court. A judgment does not require that it is to be proved before reliance can be placed upon it by the Court. The natural question would be as to who would prove the judgment? The court below therefore, has not committed any illegality by relying upon its own judgment wherein it has been held that the building in question was a new construction and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 would not apply. The natural question would be as to who would prove the judgment? The court below therefore, has not committed any illegality by relying upon its own judgment wherein it has been held that the building in question was a new construction and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 would not apply. In this regard the findings of the appellate court are thus:- ^^1- izfroknh ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dk rdZ gS fd Mh-Mh-jke iz'uxr nqdku esa fnukad 15-10-89 ls fdjk;snkj gS rFkk fdjk;sdh pkj jlhnsa nkf[ky dh x;h gSA Hkou Lokeh dk ;g dguk fd iz'uxr Hkou o"kZ 1990 esa uofufeZr gqvk xyr crk;k gSA Hkou Lokeh }kjk uxj fuxe vyhx<+ esa Hkou fuekZ.k gsrq Lohd`r izkIr djus ds fy, izLrqr fd;s x;s uD'ks esa Hkou ds izFke ry ij igys ls fLFkr LVksj ,oa Vsfjl ds LFkku ij dsoy LVksj cukus dk ekufp= fn;k x;k gSA vr% Hkou Lokeh }kjk izLrqr uD'kk ,oa Lohd`fr iz'uxr Hkou ls fHkUurk fy;s gq, gSA oknh ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dk rdZ gS fd izfroknh fdjk;snkj }kjk izLrqr jlhnsa xyr gSa rFkk ih0MCyw0 1 izrki flag oekZ ls fnukad 13-05-2008 dks izfrijh{kk iw.kZ gksus ds mijkUr fnukad 16-07-08 dks izfroknh us xyr :i esa dfFkr jlhnsa nkf[ky dh x;h gS rFkk fu;ekuqlkj izekf.kr ugha gSA Hkou Lokeh us iz'uxr Hkou dz; djus ds mijkUr izFke ry ij fLFkr fookfnr nqdku lfgr Hkou ds uofuekZ.k gsrq vko';d Qhl fnukad 25-04-89 dks tek dj ekufp= izLrqr fd;k x;k Fkk rFkk uxj fuxe vyhx<+ }kjk fnukad 11-10-89 dks Hkou fuekZ.k ds fy, Lohd`fr iznku fd;s tkus ij o"kZ 1990 esa iz'uxr Hkou dk uo fuekZ.k fd;k x;k Fkk rFkk Hkou] uxj fuxe vyhx<+ }kjk fu/kkZfjr xzg dj fu/kkZj.k ds v/khu gSA uofuekZ.k mijkUr uxj fuxe vyhx<+ }kjk fnukad 01-04-2006 ls izHkkoh Hkou dk okf"kZd ewY;kadu :i;s 912@& ds LFkku ij :i;s 6780@& djrs gq, xzg dj 85-85 iS0 ls o<+k dj :i;s 847 fd;k x;k FkkA ,DV 13 lu~ 1972 dh /kkjk 2 mi/kkjk 2 ds Li"Vhdj.k ds vuqlkj fu/kkZj.k dh izFke frfFk fnukad 01-04-2006 ls bl Hkou dk fuekZ.k iw.kZ ekuk tk;sxkA** 16. It appears from the judgment that the court below has considered the provisions of Section 2(2) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and has come to the conclusion that since the building is a new construction having been constructed after 26.4.1985 , therefore, the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 would not be applicable for a period of 40 years. The court below has also considered the fact that map was sanctioned in the year 1989 and the petitioner has admitted the fact that he had taken the shop on rent in the year 1991. The court below based its finding that it is a new construction as it is made after sanction of the map and is different from the old construction. The court below has also noted the fact that earlier this building was numbered as house no. 13/9 in the Nagar Palika record but after part purchase and reconstruction it has been renumbered as 13/10 and as such in view of explanation to Section 2(2) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 the building would fall within the ambit of a new construction as provided in the aforesaid provision. 17. The case law of Om Prakash Gupta versus Dig Vienjdendrapal Gupta (supra) along with other connected cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner show that the argument before the court below was that the building will be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation. In the instant case, admittedly the petitioner has occupied the building in the year 1991 pursuant to agreement dated 17.4.1991. As regards Explanation 1 is concerned, it provides that construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect,and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time. 18. 18. As regards Section 2(2) and the Explanation thereto is concerned, it provides only the procedure for determination of date of the building for the purpose of assessment to tax. It is not in dispute that tax has been deposited by the petitioner and the question of payment of tax is not an issue in this writ petition. 19. The question of service of notice may now also be considered. Notices sent by registered post AD in law is deemed to be served until and unless it is proved otherwise as such the courts below have not committed any illegality in presuming service of notice by registered post upon the tenant. As regards the deposit of tax receipts is concerned, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the house tax and water tax etc. receipts show that the building has been completed and this argument supports the factum of agreement entered into between the landlord and the tenant dated 17.4.1991 by which the possession of the shop in dispute had been taken by the tenant. 20. It is apparent from the record that the part of the house sold out by the respondent was an old as it is also stated in the sale-deed that the house in dispute is 90-100 years old. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had submitted a sanctioned map and that the floor of the house at the time of sanction of map was not made. The Court below has recorded a categorical finding of fact that in the evidence it has been admitted by the tenant himself that floor has been constructed and wall of the house has been plastered. It would suffice to say that new construction has been made. 21. For all the reasons stated above I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the orders impugned. 22. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed. No order ass to costs.