Judgment : The two petitioners herein are the wife and husband, who seek a writ of mandamus for declaring the Provisional attachment Orders dated 21-10-2010 as illegal and violative of Article 20 of Constitution of India and further, the action of the 4th respondent in initiating Adjudication under Section 8 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (henceforth referred to as “the PML Act”), as bad in law. 2. It is stated that the 1st petitioner was working, at the material point of time, as Senior Vice President & Global Head of Internal Audit of M/s. Satyam Computer Services Limited (henceforth referred to as ‘the Company’ for brevity). It is stated that the C.B.C.I.D., Hyderabad has registered a case in Crime No.2 of 2009 on 09-01-2009 for offences under Sections 120-B, 406, 420, 467, 471 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, against the then Chairman of the Company, its Directors, Auditors and others. It is further stated that the said complaint has been forwarded to the VI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, on 12-01-2009. It is further submitted that pursuant to a notification dated 16-02-2009, the investigation has been entrusted to C.B.I. and the case was registered as C.C.No.187 of 2009 on the file of the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, and upon transfer to Special Court-cum-XXI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, is numbered as C.C.Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2010. The 1st petitioner is arrayed as Accused – 10 in the said criminal case. It is further averred that the Directorate of Enforcement moved Crl.M.P.No.16 of 2010 in C.C.No.1 of 2010 under Section 57 of the PML Act, for recording the statements of the 1st petitioner and others under the said Act. The said petition was ordered on 23-04-2010 allowing recording of the statements in the presence of the counsel for the accused. It is further stated that challenging the correctness and validity of the said order, the 1st petitioner herein filed Crl.R.C.No.907 of 2010 in this Court and while directing not to record further statements, the said Revision is posted for further consideration and it is still pending in this Court. 3. It is further stated that challenging the correctness and validity of the said order, the 1st petitioner herein filed Crl.R.C.No.907 of 2010 in this Court and while directing not to record further statements, the said Revision is posted for further consideration and it is still pending in this Court. 3. It was further submitted that when Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) has issued a letter on 30-04-2010, freezing the shares held by the petitioners in the Company, pursuant to a communication received by the said Bank from the Directorate of Enforcement, the 1st petitioner filed W.P.No.19564 of 2010 and the said case is still pending. At that stage, the present impugned orders have been passed ordering for provisional attachament of movable and immovable properties of the petitioners. Based upon the said provisional attachment order, the adjudicating authority issued notice on 07-12-2010 calling upon the petitioners to participate in the adjudiciation process. Hence, this Writ Petition. 4. Heard Sri Venkateswara Rao Gudapati, learned counsel for the writ petitioners and Sri Rajeev Avasthi, learned special counsel for the respondents appearing on behalf of Sri Ponnam Ashok Goud, learned Assistant Solicitor General. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Venkateswara Rao would contend that under the Schedule to the PML Act, offences under Sections 120-B and 420 IPC are not included at the time when the said offences are alleged to have been committed by the 1st petitioner herein and hence, the question of proceeding against the petitioners under the provisions of the PML Act, would not arise. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the crime is registered against the 1st petitioner herein on 09-01-2009 under Section 420 IPC. As on that date, the said offence under Section 420 IPC is not forming part of the Schedule appended to the PML Act and hence, the question of registering a case under the PML Act against the 1st petitioner, would not arise. As on that date, the said offence under Section 420 IPC is not forming part of the Schedule appended to the PML Act and hence, the question of registering a case under the PML Act against the 1st petitioner, would not arise. The learned counsel would further submit that the CBI has filed its charge sheet against the 1st petitioner (arraying him as A-10) on 22-11-2009 and the charge sheet clearly mentioned that the 1st petitioner herein has been charged for the offence said to have been committed by him under Section 120-B r/w Section 420 IPC only and that an amendment of the Schedule appended to the PML Act has been brought into force on 01-06-2009 incorporating offences of Sections 120-B and 420 IPC therein. Therefore, as on the date when the C.B.C.I.D. registered the crime on 09-01-2009, offences under Sections 120-B and 420 IPC not having been included in the Schedule appended to the PML Act, the amendment brought on 01-06-2009 incorporating those offences would amount to an ex post law and hence, the petitioners cannot be charged under the PML Act at all. The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance, in support of his contentions, upon judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AIR 1953 SC 394 and G.P.NAYYAR v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) (1979) 2 SCC 593 as well as the judgment of a learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court rendered in ABDUL HALEEM v. STATE, OPPOSITE PARTY 1962(2) CRI. L.J. 414and another judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court rendered in PAREED LUBBA MUHAMMED LUBBA v. K.K. NEELAMBARAN, EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THODUPUZHA PANCHAYAT AIR 1967 KERALA155. 6. Per contra, Sri Rajeev Avasthi, learned special counsel, would submit that the PML Act has been enacted by the Parliament, as part of international treaty obligation, not only to prevent money laundering, but also to provide for confiscation of property derived from or involved in money laundering and for incidental matter connected thereto. The learned special counsel would submit that the PML Act is a special piece of Legislation that has been made to recognise some of the illegal activities as offences of money laundering and punishment thereof has been provided for. The learned special counsel would submit that the PML Act is a special piece of Legislation that has been made to recognise some of the illegal activities as offences of money laundering and punishment thereof has been provided for. Further, the Statute has also contemplated for attachment and confiscation of the properties, which have a connection with the proceeds of crimes. It is further contended by the learned special counsel that a comprahensive procedure for attachment, adjudication and confiscation has been provided for in the Statute. Further, against the adjudicatory process undertaken by the Primary Tribunal, an Appellate Tribunal has been constituted providing for Appeals thereto. It is further contended that any person, who is aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, has been provided with further Appeal to the High Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal on any questions of law or fact arising out of such an order. Therefore, very efficacious remedies have been provided for under the Statute and hence, the Writ Petition is mis-conceived. 7. Before I proceed any further, it would be apt to remind oneself that at this stage of the matter, it would be wholly inappropriate to examine the tenability or otherwise of the proceedings initiated under Section 5 of the PML Act. The only question that can be examined is whether the 1st petitioner can be proceeded under Section 5 of the PML Act, for an offence alleged to have been committed by him prior to 01-06-2009, the date on which the Schedule appended to the PML Act has been amended. 8. The objects and reasons for enacting the PML Act, have been clearly spelt out. It is pointed out that the Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action, annexed to the resolution S-17/2, was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its seventeenth special session on the 23rd February, 1990. Further, the Political Declaration adopted by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly held between 8th to 10th June, 1998, calls upon the Member States to adopt national money-laundering legislation and programme. 9. Further, the Political Declaration adopted by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly held between 8th to 10th June, 1998, calls upon the Member States to adopt national money-laundering legislation and programme. 9. As a part of this commitment, this enactment has been made by the Parliament, providing for a completely self-contained code of procedure for recognizing and penalizing the offence of money-laundering and also to tackle the proceeds of crime if they eventually percolate into various financial streams of the country, thus, impacting fiscal and economic agendas set forth by the State for its governance. It would be further appropriate to notice that the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), an inter-governmental body was established by the G-7 Summit that was held in Paris in 1989 and it was assigned with the task of setting standards and promotion of policies to combat the issues relating to money-laundering and terrorist funding, during 1990 drew up forty recommendations - as initiatives to fight the malice of money-laundering and terrorist funding – important amongst them are: .criminalise money laundering and enable authorities to confiscate the proceeds of money laundering .implement customer due diligence (e.g. identity verification), record keeping and suspicious transaction reporting requirements for financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions .establish a financial intelligence unit to receive and disseminate suspicious transaction reports, and .cooperate internationally in investigating and prosecuting money laundering. These recommendations have been updated regularly and periodically. Of late, India has been facing, on a regular periodicity, terrorist attacks. Hence, it needs to arm itself with an appropriate toolkit for a rigorous law enforcement to track and tackle the funding behind such attacks. These efforts led to this enactment. 10. Chapter-II of the PML Act defined the offence of money laundering and provided the punishment therefor in Sections 3 and 4 incorporated in the said Chapter. Section 3 declares that, whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting it as untainted property, shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. Section 3 declares that, whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting it as untainted property, shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. Section 4 declares that whoever commits the offence of money-laundering shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine, which may extend to five lakh rupees. From the definition of ‘offence of money-laundering’ contained in Section 3 of the PML Act, it becomes clear that, whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or becomes a party or gets involved in any process or activity or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting it as untainted property, shall be guilty of the offence of money-laundering. The two crucial expressions used in the said Section 3, which are relevant for our inquiry are “proceeds of crime” and “property”. These two expressions have been defined under Section 2(u) and 2(v) of the PML Act, as under: “(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property; (v) “property” means any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located.” Since the definition of “proceeds of crime” in turn used the expression “scheduled offence”, it would also be appropriate to notice as to how the said expression has been defined in Section 2(y): “(y) “scheduled offence” means- (i)the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or (ii)the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is thirty lakh rupees or more;” From a conjoint reading of the expressions “proceeds of crime” and “scheduled offence” as defined, the offence must be one that should find a mention either under Part A or Part B of the Schedule appended to the PML Act. Para 1 of Part A of the Schedule listed out the offences under the Indian Penal Code. Para 1 of Part A of the Schedule listed out the offences under the Indian Penal Code. It is not in dispute that by the Prevention of Money-Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No.21 of 2009), amongst other things, para 1 of Part A of the Schedule has been amended introducing the offence under Section 120-B : criminal conspiracy, and offence under Section 420 : cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, therein. It is further not in dispute that the amending Act No.21 of 2009 has been brought into force with effect from 01-06-2009. Therefore, it coes not pose any difficulty that post 01-06-2009, any property derived or obtained, by any person, as a result of criminal activity, relating to offences punishable under Sections 120-B and 420 IPC, can be dealt with under the PML Act. 11. It will be appropriate at this stage to notice that Chapter-III of the PML Act dealt with the process of attachment, adjudication and confiscation of the proceeds of the crime. 12. As was noticed supra, the PML Act is not only intended to create and provide for prohibitive measures, but also intended to put in place regulatory mechanism, so as to arrest the impact of ‘proceeds of crime’ denting, in any manner, the fiscal and economic agenda of the State. If I may say so, the Act has provided for two distinct and separate branches of action. Chapter-II dealt with the conduct, which constitutes the offence and provided for the appropriate punishment therefor, while Chapter-III dealt with the regulatory aspects of the ‘proceeds of the crime’, enabling them to be subjected to attachment and adjudication and leading to their ultimate confiscation to the State. Therefore, if Chapter-II can be characterized as dealing with the criminal facets of the conduct, the provisions in Chapter-III are essentially intended to deal with the aspects to deny certain persons from deriving benefits either knowingly or unknowingly, arising from the ‘proceeds of crime’. But, for the provisions contained in Chapter-III, the proceeds of crime could not have been dealt with at the initial stages itself. These two aspects are completely distinct and separate. Chapter-III, therefore, had to deal first with the immediate action that is required to be taken in the matter by ordering for provisional attachment, and then, seeking the process of adjudication, which might lead to ultimate confiscation of such proceeds. These two aspects are completely distinct and separate. Chapter-III, therefore, had to deal first with the immediate action that is required to be taken in the matter by ordering for provisional attachment, and then, seeking the process of adjudication, which might lead to ultimate confiscation of such proceeds. Otherwise, the proceeds of the crime continue to impact the financial streams of the society. 13. Before analysing the provisions contained in Section 5 included under Chapter-III of the PML Act, it will be approriate to notice the definition assigned to the word “attachment” under Section 2(1)(d), which is to the following effect: “(d) “attachment” means prohibition of transfer,conversion, disposition or movement of property by an order issued under Chapter-III;” Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 authorises the Director, appointed in terms of Sub-Section (1) of Section 49 of the said Act by the Central Government, if he has reason to believe, on the basis of material in his possession that; (a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; (b) such person has been charged of having committed a scheduled offence; and (c) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter; by order in writing, to provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one fifty days from the date of the order. However, the following conditions are required to be satisfied before a provisional attachment order is passed by the Director or any other Officer authorised by him occupying a rank not below that of a Deputy Director; (1) There should be adequate material before such Officer, which makes him believe that if the attachment of the proceeds of crime are not ordered, it might result in frustration of the confiscation. (2) A person must be in possession of the proceeds of crime; (3) Such person must have been charged of having committed one or the other of the scheduled offences under this Act; (4) Such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed or transferred or dealt with in any manner, which may result in frustrating any proceedings of their ultimate confiscation. 14. In the instant case, with effect from 01-06-2009 Sections 120-B and 420 IPC have been incorporated in para 1 of Part A of the Schedule. 14. In the instant case, with effect from 01-06-2009 Sections 120-B and 420 IPC have been incorporated in para 1 of Part A of the Schedule. Therefore, the proceeds of such crime are capable of being dealt with under Section 5, provided, of course, such person, who is in possession of the proceeds of crime, should have also been charged of having committed the said offence under Sections 120-B and 420 IPC after 01-06-2009. As was already noticed, a charge was laid against the 1st petitioner by the C.B.C.I.D., in C.C.No.187 of 2009 on the file of the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, alleging him to have committed offences punishable under Section 120-B r/w Section 420 IPC, on 22-11-2009. Therefore, after 22-11-2009, the proceeds of crime punishable under Sections 120-B and 420 IPC, in the hands of the 1st petitioner herein, are capable of being subjected to action under Section 5 of the PML Act. As was already noticed, the provisional attachment order has been passed only on 21-10-2010, which is long subsequent to 22-11-2009. 15. Sri Rajeev Avasthi, learned special counsel, has pointedly drawn my attention to the findings recorded by the Division Bench of this Court speaking through Justice Goda Raghuram in B. RAMA RAJU AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, REP. BY ITS SECRETARY (REVENUE), NEW DEKLHI AND OTHERS 2011 (3) ALT 443 (D.B.), wherein the learned Judges have held as under: “……………… In our considered view, the provisions of the Act which clearly and unambiguously enable initiation of proceedings for attachment and eventual confiscation of property in possession of a person not accused of having committed an offence under Section 3 as well, do not violate the provisions of the Constitution including Articles 14, 21 and 300-A and are operative proprio vigore. While the offence of money-laundering comprises various degrees of association and activity with knowledge and information connected with the proceeds of crime and projection of the same as untainted property; for the purposes of attachment and confiscation (imposition of civil and economic and not penal sanctions) neither mens rea nor knowledge that a property has a lineage of criminality is either constitutionally necessary or statutorily enjoined. Proceeds of crime [as defined in Section 2 (u)] is property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property. “Property” is defined in Section 2 (v) to include property of every description corporeal, incorporeal, movable, immovable, tangible, and intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to or interest in such property or assets wherever located. The matrix of the relevant provisions of the Act compel the inference that the legislation subsumes that property which satisfies the definition of “proceeds of crime”, prima facie is considered as property whose transfer [defined in Section 2(za)] is subject to verification to consider whether the transfer is a stratagem of a money laundering operation and is part of a layering transaction. As the provisions of the Act target malfeasants charged of an offence under Section 3 and the proceeds of crime in the possession of a person so charged and any other person as well, the legislative intent is manifest that attachment and confiscation constitute a critical and clearly intended and specifically enacted strategy to combat the evil of money-laundering. A person though not accused/charged of an offence under Section 3, when in possession of any proceeds of crime, from the provisions of the Act it is clear, has but a defeasible and not a clear title thereto.” Dealing with the same question, which was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners herein, this is what has been said by the Division Bench in the aforementioned Judgment: “ …………………. On analysis of the provisions of Section 5, 8, 17 and 18, it is clear that provisions of the Second Amendment Act have carefully ironed out the creases and the latent rucks in the texture of the provisions of the Act relating to attachment, adjudication and confiscation in Chapter-III. Attachment or confiscation of proceeds of crime in the possession of a person who is not accused or charged of an offence under Section 3 is thus not an incorporation for the first time by the provisions of the Second Amendment Act, 2009. Attachment or confiscation of proceeds of crime in the possession of a person who is not accused or charged of an offence under Section 3 is thus not an incorporation for the first time by the provisions of the Second Amendment Act, 2009. The contention on behalf of the petitioners that the second proviso to Section 5(1) of the Act, applies only to property acquired/possessed prior to enforcement of this provision or if interpreted as being retrospective, the provision itself must be invalidated for arbitrary retrospective operation is therefore without substance or force. The above contention does not merit acceptance even otherwise. Article 20 of the Constitution enacts an injunction only in respect of ex post facto laws resulting in conviction for offences or imposition of penalties greater than which might have been inflicted under the law enforceable at the time of commission of the offence. No provision of the Constitution has been brought to our notice which prohibits a legislative measure which targets for attachment and confiscation proceeds of crime. On the text and authority of our Constitution while it may perhaps gainfully be contended that conviction for the offence of money-laundering cannot be recorded if the said offence is committed prior to the enforcement of Section 3 of the Act, such a contention cannot be advanced to target proceedings for attachment and confiscation, as these fall outside the pale of the prohibitions of the Constitution, in particular Article 20(1). xxxx……xxxx……xxxx……xxxx…. xxxx……xxxx……xxxx……xxxx…. The observations in Amratlal Prajivandas (supra) are apposite in this context. The definition of “illegally acquired properties” in Section 3(1)(c) of SAFEMA were challenged on the ground of over-breadth and, therefore as arbitrary. Negativing this contention the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed (per B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J): …Even apart from the protection of Article 31(B), we see no substance in the submission that the definition is arbitrary or discriminatory nor do we see any reason for reading down the said definition to confine it to the violation of the acts referred to in Section 2(2)(a) of SAFEMA. We can take note of the fact that persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange manipulations do not keep regular and proper accounts with respect to such activity or its income or of the assets acquired therefrom. If such person indulges in other illegal activity, the position would be no different. We can take note of the fact that persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange manipulations do not keep regular and proper accounts with respect to such activity or its income or of the assets acquired therefrom. If such person indulges in other illegal activity, the position would be no different. The violation of foreign exchange laws and laws relating to export and import necessarily involves violation of tax laws. Indeed, it is a well-known fact that over the last few decades, smuggling, foreign exchange violations, tax evasion, drugs and crime have all got mixed-up. Evasion of taxes is integral to such activity. It would be difficult for any authority to say, in the absence of any accounts or other relevant material that among the properties acquired by a smuggler, which of them or which portions of them are attributable to smuggling and foreign exchange violations and which properties or which portions thereof are attributable to violation of other laws (which the Parliament has the power to make). It is probably for this reason that the burden of proving that the properties specified in the show cause notice are not illegally acquired properties is placed upon the person concerned. May be this is a case where a dangerous disease required a radical treatment. Bitter medicine is not bad medicine. In law it is not possible to say that the definition is arbitrary or is couched in unreasonably wide terms. Further, in view of clear and unambiguous language employed in clause (c) of Section 3, it is not possible or permissible to resort to the device of reading down. The said device is usually resorted to save a provision from being declared unconstitutional, incompetent and ultra vires. We are, therefore, of the opinion that neither the constitutional validity of the said definition can be questioned nor is there any warrant for reading down the clear and unambiguous words in the clause. So far as justification of such a provision is concerned, there is enough and more. After all, all these illegally acquired properties are earned and acquired in ways illegal and corrupt – at the cost of the people and the State. The State is deprived of its legitimate revenue to that extent. These properties must justly go back where they belong – to the State. What we are saying is nothing new or heretical. After all, all these illegally acquired properties are earned and acquired in ways illegal and corrupt – at the cost of the people and the State. The State is deprived of its legitimate revenue to that extent. These properties must justly go back where they belong – to the State. What we are saying is nothing new or heretical. Witness the facts and ratio of a recent decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General for Hong Kong v. Reid (1993 (3) W.L.R. 1143). The Respondent, Reid, was a crown-prosecutor in Hong Kong. He took bribes as an inducement to suppress certain criminal prosecutions and with those monies, acquired properties in New Zealand, two of which were held in the name of himself and his wife and the third in the name of his solicitor. He was found guilty of the offence of bribetaking and sentenced by a criminal court. The administration of Hong Kong claimed that the said properties in New Zealand were held by the owners thereof as constructive trustees for the Crown and must be made over to the Crown. The Privy Council upheld this claim over-ruling the New Zealand Court of Appeals. Lord Templeman, delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee, based his conclusion on the simple ground that any benefit obtained by a fiduciary through a breach of duty belongs in equity to the beneficiary. It is held that a gift accepted by a person in a fiduciary position as an incentive for his breach of duty constituted a bribe and, although in law it belonged to the fiduciary, in equity be not only became a debtor for the amount of the bribe to the person to whom the duty was owed but he also held the bribe and any property acquired therewith on constructive trust for that person. It is held further that if the value of the property representing the bribe depreciated the fiduciary had to pay to the injured person the difference between that value and the initial amount of the bribe, and if the property increased in value the fiduciary was not entitled to retain the excess since equity would not allow him to make any profit from his breach of duty. Accordingly, it is held that to the extent that they represented bribes received by the first respondent, the New Zealand properties were held in trust for the Crown, and the Crown had an equitable interest therein. The learned Law Lord observed further that if the theory of constructive trust is not applied and properties interdicted when available, the properties “can be sold and the proceeds whisked away to some Shangri La which hides bribes and other corrupt moneys in numbered bank accounts” – to which we are tempted to add : one can understand the immorality of the Bankers who maintained numbered accounts but it is difficult to understand the amorality of the Governments and their laws which sanction such practices – in effect encouraging them. The ratio of this decision applies equally where a person acquires properties by violating the law and at the expense of and to the detriment of the State and its revenues where an enactment provides for such a course, even if the fiduciary relationship referred to in Reid is not present. It may be seen that the concept employed in Reid was a common law concept, whereas here is a case of an express statutory provision providing for such forfeiture. May we say in conclusion that “the interests of society are paramount to individual interests and the two must be brought into just and harmonious relation. A mere property career is not the final destiny of mankind, if progress is to be the law of the future as it has been of the past” (Lewis Henry Morgan: Ancient Society). From the scheme of the Act and its several provisions, in particular the provisions of Sections 8 and 22 to 24, it is clear that the legislature considered it appropriate to inhere different shades of presumptions and thus corollary burdens, on persons in the ownership, control or possession of property believed to be proceeds of crime, depending on whether the person is accused of a scheduled offense or not, necessitating such person to dislodge the presumption by probative evidence or material.” 16. In view of the erudite enunciation of the principles by the learned Division Bench, to my mind, the action initiated under Section 5 of the PML Act against the 1st petitioner herein cannot be faulted on any score. 17. In view of the erudite enunciation of the principles by the learned Division Bench, to my mind, the action initiated under Section 5 of the PML Act against the 1st petitioner herein cannot be faulted on any score. 17. That takes us to the next question as to whether the petitioners herein can be subjected to action under PML Act, at all. The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the Judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH’s case cited (1 supra). It is only appropriate to notice as to how the issue has been answered by the Supreme Court: “ 8. Article 20 (1) of the Constitution is as follows: "No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence." This Article, in its broad import has been enacted to prohibit conviction and sentences under 'ex post facto' laws. The principle underlying such prohibition has been very elaborately discussed and pointed out in the very learned judgment of Justice Willes in the well known case of 'Phillips v. Eyre', (1870) 6 QB 1 at pp. 23 and 25 (D), and also by the Supreme Court of U. S. A. in -'Calder v. Bull' (1798) 3 Dallas 386: 1 Law Ed 648 at p. 649 (E). In the English case it is explained that 'ex post facto' laws are laws which voided and punished what had been lawful when done. There can be no doubt as to the paramount importance of the principle that such 'ex post facto' laws, which retrospectively create offences and punish them are bad as being highly inequitable and unjust. In the English system of jurisprudence repugnance of such laws to universal notions of fairness and justice is treated as a ground 'not' for invalidating the law itself but as compelling a beneficent construction thereof where the language of the statute by any means permits it. In the American system, however, such 'ex post facto' laws are themselves rendered invalid by virtue of Art. 1 Ss. 9 and 10 of its Constitution. In the American system, however, such 'ex post facto' laws are themselves rendered invalid by virtue of Art. 1 Ss. 9 and 10 of its Constitution. It is contended by the learned Attorney-General that Art. 20 of the Constitution was meant to bring about nothing more than the invalidity of such 'ex post facto' laws in the post-Constitution period but that the validity of the pre-Constitution laws in this behalf was not intended to be affected in any way. The case in - 'Keshavan Madhavan Menon v. State of Bombay', AIR 1951 SC 128 (F), has been relied on to show that the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution have no retrospective operation, and that the invalidity of laws brought about by Art. 13 (1) of the Constitution relates only to the future operation of the pre-Constitution laws which are in violation of the fundamental rights. On this footing it was argued that even on the assumption of the convictions in this case being in respect of new offences created by Ordinance No. 48 of 1949 after the commission of the offences charged, the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 20 is not attracted thereto so as to invalidate such convictions. This contention, however, cannot be upheld. On a careful consideration of the respective Articles, one is struck by the marked difference in language used in the Indian and American Constitutions. Sections 9 (3) and 10 of Art. 1 of the American Constitution merely say that "No 'ex post facto' law shall be 'passed' . . . . .. . . " and "No State shall "pass ex post facto' law . . ... . . . . .. . . .." But in Art. 20 of the Indian Constitution the language used is in much wider terms, and what is prohibited is the conviction of a person or his subjection to a penalty under 'ex post facto' laws. The prohibition under the Article is not confined to the passing or the validity of the law, but extends to the conviction or the sentence and is based on its character as an 'ex post facto' law. The fullest effect must therefore be given to the actual words used in the Article. Nor does such a construction of Art 20 result in giving retrospective operation to the fundamental rights thereby recognised. The fullest effect must therefore be given to the actual words used in the Article. Nor does such a construction of Art 20 result in giving retrospective operation to the fundamental rights thereby recognised. All that it amounts to is that the future operation of the fundamental right declared in Art. 20 may also in certain cases result from acts and situations which had their commencement in the Pre-Constitution period In - 'The Queen v. St. Mary Whitechapel', (1848) 116 ER 811 at p. 814 (G), Lord Denman C. J. pointed out that a statute which in its direct operation is prospective cannot properly be called a retrospective statute because 'a part' of the requisite for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. The general principle, therefore, that the fundamental rights have no retrospective operation is not in any way affected by giving the fullest effect to the wording of Art. 20. This Article must accordingly be taken to prohibit all convictions or subjections to penalty after the Constitution in respect of 'ex post facto' laws whether the same was a post Constitution law or pre-Constitution law. That such is the intendment of the wording used in Art. 20 (1) is confirmed by the similar wording used in Arts. 20 (2) and 20 (3). Under Art. 20 (2)1 for instance, it cannot be reasonably urged that the prohibition of double jeopardy applies only when 'both' the occasions therefor arise after the Constitution. Similarly, under Art. 20 (3) it cannot be suggested that a person accused before the Constitution can be compelled to be a witness against himself, if after the Constitution the case is pending. 9. In this context it is necessary to notice that what is prohibited under Art. 20 is only conviction or sentence under an 'ex post facto' law and not the trial thereof. Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a Court different from that which had competence at the time cannot 'ipso facto' be held to be unconstitutional. A person accused of the commission of an offence has no fundamental right to trial by a particular Court or by a particular procedure, except in so far as any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may be involved. 10. A person accused of the commission of an offence has no fundamental right to trial by a particular Court or by a particular procedure, except in so far as any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may be involved. 10. In this contention our attention has been drawn to the fact that the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance 48 of 1949 though enacted on 11-9-1949, i.e. after the alleged offences were committed, was in terms made retrospective by S. 2 of the said Ordinance which says that the Act "shall be deemed to have been in force in Vindhya Pradesh from the 9th day of August 1948", a date long prior to the date of the commission of the offences. It was accordingly suggested that since such a law at the time when it was passed was a valid law and since this law had the effect of bringing this Ordinance into force from 9-8-1949 it cannot be said that the convictions are not in respect of 'a law in force" at the time when the offences were committed. This, however, would be to import a somewhat technical meaning into the phrase "law in force" as used in Art. 20. "Law in force" referred to therein must be taken to relate not to a law "deemed" to be in force and thus brought into force but the law factually in operation at the time or what may be called the then existing law. Otherwise, it is clear that the whole purpose of Art. 20 would be completely defeated in its application even to 'ex post facto', laws passed after the Constitution. Every such 'ex post facto' law can be made retrospective, as it must be, if it is to regulate acts committed before the actual passing of the Act, and it can well be urged that by such retrospective operation it becomes the law in force at the time of the commencement of the Act. It is obvious that such a construction which nullifies Art. 20 cannot possibly be adopted. It is obvious that such a construction which nullifies Art. 20 cannot possibly be adopted. It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the phrase "law in force" as used in Art. 20 must be understood in its natural sense as being the law in fact in existence and in operation at the time of the commission of the offence as distinct from the law "deemed" to have become operative by virtue of the power of legislature to pass retrospective laws. It follows that if the appellants are able to substantiate their contention that the acts charged as offence in this case have become such only by virtue of Ordinance No. 48 of 1949 which has admittedly been passed subsequent to the commission thereof, then they would be entitled to the benefit of Art. 20 of the Constitution and to have their convictions set aside. ………..” (Emphasis is generated now) The principle enunciated in this Judgment has subsequently been reiterated in G.P.NAYYAR’s case cited (2 supra) and followed by Allahabad and Kerala High Courts cited (3 and 4 supra), the Judgments of which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 19. From the abovementioned Judgment, the principle that can be deduced is that, Article 20 prohibits only conviction or sentence under an “ex post facto” law and not the trial thereof and such trial cannot “ipso facto” be held to be unconstitutional. In view of this undisputed principle, the resistance offered by the petitioners to the impugned orders, is totally misconceived and unacceptable. The present one is not the stage for securing protection under Article 20 of our Constitution. 20. That takes us to the question as to whether the impugned orders of provisional attachment passed by the Enforcement Director ceases to have any effect after expiry of the 150 days time-period provided under Sub-section(1) of Section 5 of the PML Act. Sub-Section (3) of Section 5 makes it clear that every order of attachment made under Sub-Section (1) shall cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in that sub-section or on the date of order, made under Sub-Section (2) of Section 8 by the adjudicating authority, whichever is earlier. 21. Sub-Section (3) of Section 5 makes it clear that every order of attachment made under Sub-Section (1) shall cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in that sub-section or on the date of order, made under Sub-Section (2) of Section 8 by the adjudicating authority, whichever is earlier. 21. In the instant case, the notice issued by the adjudicating authority under Sub-Section (1) of Section 8 has also been stayed on 10-11-2010 along with the provisional orders of attachment passed by the Enforcement Director under Sub-Section (1) of Section 5. Undoubtedly, the period of 150 days, reckoned from 21-10-2010 has already expired. It is appropriate to notice that this Court passed an order on 10-11-2010 granting interim stay as prayed for by the petitioners. Therefore, by virtue of the operation of the order passed by this Court on 10-11-2010, the further process of the adjudicating authority for determining the lis under Sub-Section (2), has been stalled. In such circumstances, can the order of this Court passed on 10-11-2011 be construed as causing prejudice to the respondents? 22. The answer in this regard is not hard to seek. The principle is rested upon a public policy enunciated in the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit”. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense and also affords safe and certain guide for the administration of law. By virtue of the intervention of a Court, which intended to examine the veracity of the claim made in the case, no party can be construed to have been prejudiced by the delay that occasioned in testing the question by the Court. Since, the order that was passed by this Court on 10-11-2010, is likely to cause prejudice to the respondents, it is only appropriate for this Court to declare that the time between 10-11-2010 up to today, shall be excluded from reckoning for purposes of Sub-Section (3) of Section5 of the PML Act. 23. For the above reasons, I do not see any merit in this writ petition and hence, it is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.