ORDER 1. The Order of the Court was delivered by KRISHN KUMAR LAHOTI, J. :-By this order, a question raised in both petitions in respect of entertainability of the petitions before this main seat is being decided. For convenience, facts are taken from W.P. No. 1008/10. 2. Petitioner Rashtra Bharti Shiksha Mahavidyalay, Ujjain is a private unaided institution which is imparting education and training of B.Ed. Course at Ujjain. The petitioner has sought following reliefs: (i) This Hon'ble Court be further pleased to set aside the impugned orders dated 1.4.09 and 13.8.2009 passed by respondent NCTE and direct the respondent no. 1 NCTE for conducting fresh physical inspection of the petitioner institution within time bound period for the purposes of ascertaining whether the petitioner institution meets the norms and standards as on date and entitled to run the institution. (ii) This Hon'ble Court be further pleased to direct the respondent authorities for initiating counseling process for admission of students to the petitioner institution for the session 2009-10. (iii) This Hon'ble Court be further pleased to direct the respondents for permitting the petitioner institution for participating in the counseling process for admission to the B.Ed course of the academic session 2008-09 which has commenced from 18/01/2010. Any other and further relief, as may be deemed fit may be granted to the petitioner. The case of the petitioner is that for grant of recognition, respondents have not inspected the premises of the petitioner college and passed an order Annexure P/1 by which order passed by the WRC for refusal of recognition was affirmed with prospective effect. 3. It is not in dispute that the petitioner institution is situated at Ujjain. The students are studying at Ujjain. The recognition is granted for the institution which is situated at Ujjain. Ujjain district is within territorial jurisdiction of Indore Bench of this Court as per Presidential notification. A preliminary objection has been raised by the respondents that such petition lies at Indore Bench of this Court and this petition may not be entertained at main seat. Per contra, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that under Article 226(1) of the Constitution of India, the main seat is having jurisdiction for the entire State of Madhya Pradesh and this seat has jurisdiction to hear and decide this matter. Reliance is placed by Shri Siddharth Gupta to the Apex Court judgments in Lt. Con. Khajoor Singh Vs. Per contra, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that under Article 226(1) of the Constitution of India, the main seat is having jurisdiction for the entire State of Madhya Pradesh and this seat has jurisdiction to hear and decide this matter. Reliance is placed by Shri Siddharth Gupta to the Apex Court judgments in Lt. Con. Khajoor Singh Vs. The Union of India & another 1961 Vol. 2 SCR 828, Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association Vs. Union of India & others (2001) 2 SCC 294 , Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India & another (2004) 6 SCC 254 , Manju Varma (DR.) Vs. State of MP. & others (2005) 1 SCC 73 U.R Rashtriya Chini Milladhikar Parishad, Luchnow Vs. State of U.P. and others (1995) 4 SCC 738 and submitted that this petition may be heard at the main seat of the High Court. 4. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, factual position is that the petitioner institution is situated at Ujjain and is seeking a recognition from the National Council for Teacher Education. Initially, the respondent No. 2 refused to grant recognition. However, vide order Annexure P/1, respondent No. 1 affirmed the aforesaid refusal with prospective effect. 5. The Presidential notification in respect of the jurisdiction of Gwalior and Indore Benches of this Court reads as under:- In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956), I, Zakir Hussain, President of India and the Chief Justice of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, hereby establish a permanent bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior and further direct that such Judges of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh being not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice may from time to time nominate, shall sit at Gwalior in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts of Gwalior, Shivpuri, Datia, Guna, Vidhisha (Bhilsa), Bhind and Morena: Provided that the Chief Justice may, for special reasons, order that any case or class of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Jabalpur. New Delhi November 18, 1968 Zakir Hussain President In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956), I, Zakir Hussain, President of India and the Chief Justice of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, hereby establish a permanent bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore and further direct that such Judges of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh being not less than four in number, as the Chief Justice may from time to time nominate, shall sit at Indore in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts of Indore, Ujjain, Dewas, Dhar, Jhabua, Ratlam, Mandsaur, West Nimar (khargone), Shajapur and Rajgarh: Provided that the Chief Justice may, for special reasons, order that any case or class of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Jabalpur. New Delhi November 18, 1968 Zakir Hussain President 6. A Single Bench of this Court considering similar controversy in Bhupendra Singh Alawa held thus:- 4. The Apex Court in Rajas than High Court Advocates' Association Vs Union of India and others (2001) SCC 294 has laid down that jurisdiction of Jodhpur Main Seat and Jaipur Bench depends upon the districts from where the cases arise. 17. The expression 'cause of action' has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact comprises in 'cause of action.' It has to be left to be determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact comprises in 'cause of action.' It has to be left to be determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises. The Chief Justice of the High Court has not been conferred with the legislative competence to define cause of action or to declare where it would be deemed to have arisen so as to lay down artificial or deeming test for determining territorial jurisdiction over an individual case or class of cases. The permanent Bench at Jaipur has been established by the Presidential Order issued under subsection (2) of S. 51 of the Act. The territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench at Jaipur is to be exercised in respect of the cases arising in the specified districts. Whether the case arises from one of the specified districts or not so as to determine the jurisdictional competence to hear by reference to territory bifurcated between the principal seat and the bench seat, shall be an issue to be decided in an individual case by the Judge or Judges hearing the matter if a question may arise in that regard. The impugned explanation appended to the order of the Chief Justice dated 23rd December, 1976 runs counter to the Presidential order and in a sense it is an inroad into the jurisdiction of the Judges hearing a particular case or cases, pre-empting a decision to be given in the facts of individual case whether it can be said to have arisen in the territory of a particular district. The High Court is right in taking the view which it has done. 18. It was submitted at the end by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Division Bench of the High Court in its impugned order has observed that the permanent Bench at Jaipur shall have "exclusive jurisdiction" to hear the cases arising out of the 11 specified districts and the High Court at Jodhpur shall not have jurisdiction to hear those cases which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench. He submitted that the use of word "exclusive" pre-fixed to 'jurisdiction' is uncalled for. We find no substance in this contention as well. He submitted that the use of word "exclusive" pre-fixed to 'jurisdiction' is uncalled for. We find no substance in this contention as well. The purpose of the Presidential order is to carve out and define territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat at Jodhpur and the permanent Bench seat at Jaipur. The cases are to be heard accordingly unless the Chief Justice may exercise in his discretion the power vested in him by the proviso to para 2 of the Presidential order. Clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 226 of the Constitution provide how territorial jurisdiction shall be exercised by any High Court. Although the said clauses do not deal with principal seat or permanent Bench of any High Court but in our opinion, there is no reason why the principle underlying there under cannot be applied to the functioning of the bifurcated territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat and permanent Bench seat of any High Court. In case of a dispute arising whether an individual case or cases should be filed and heard at Jodhpur or Jaipur, the same has to be found out by applying the test - from which district the case arises, that is, in which district the cause of action can be said to have arisen and then exercising the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, Thus, it is clear that territory from where the cases arise if fells within the territory of districts tailing within Indore and Gwalior Benches, cases are to be heard at Indore and Gwalior Benches. The submission raised that capital is at Bhopal and an order has been issued from Bhopal, thus, this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition and can give the relief apart from Indore Bench cannot be accepted as that would defeat the intendment and very purpose of creation of Benches at Indore and Gwalior as most of the business of the Government is transacted at Bhopal, that would not mean with respect to incumbents who were posted at Indore and Gwalior bench territory, cases have to be heard at Jabalpur, that will have the taking away of jurisdiction of respective Benches and would mean usurpation of jurisdiction by the main seat. Propriety also requires that the cases arising out of districts which are in Indore Bench are heard at Indore Bench and which are of Gwalior Bench are heard at Gwalior Bench, otherwise there is likelihood of filing of repeated petitions in Benches as well as in the Main Seat and there is no counter check to ensure that petitions have in fact been filed or not at the respective benches. There have been occasions when it was found by this Court in Transport Matters covering the routes that petitions were filed at the Benches as well as at the Principal Seat creating confusion. 5. The Apex Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India and others (2004) 6 SCC 254 has laid down that even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, in appropriate cases the Court may refuse to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum convenience. The Apex Court has laid down thus:- 10. Keeping in view the expressions used is clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. 30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum convenience. (See Bhagar Singh Bagga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhany, AIR 1941 Cal 670; Mandal Jalal v. Madanlal, (1945) 49 CWN 357; Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. M/s. Jharia Talkies and Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. (1997) CWN 122; S. S. Jain and Co. and another v. Union of India and others (1994) CHN 445; Mis. New Horizon Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1994 Delhi 126). 6. Thus, I am of the opinion that cases arising out of the districts assigned to Indore and Gwalior Benches cannot be heard at Jabalpur merely because the order in relation to those employees posted therein has been issued from Bhopal. Writ petition is dismissed. 7. New Horizon Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1994 Delhi 126). 6. Thus, I am of the opinion that cases arising out of the districts assigned to Indore and Gwalior Benches cannot be heard at Jabalpur merely because the order in relation to those employees posted therein has been issued from Bhopal. Writ petition is dismissed. 7. The controversy involved in this case is identical to the case of Bhupendra Singh Alawa in which case, an order was passed from Bhopal but the cause of action arose at Rajgarh where the petitioner was posted. Considering aforesaid, learned judge in Bhupendra Singh Alawa. held that the petition is not maintainable at Jabalpur merely on the ground that the order in relation to the employee posted at Rajgarh was issued from Bhopal. 8. Now the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner may be seen. So far as Lt. Con Khajoor Singh is concerned, aforesaid was decided prior to amendment in Article 226 of the Constitution of India and after amendment in Article 226, position has changed substantially. 9. In U.P. Rashtriya Chini Milladhikari Parishad, the Apex Court considering the question held thus:- 12. We are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court fell into patent error in holding that the interpretation placed by this Court on Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order had ceased to be operative after the incorporation of the explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court in Nasiruddin's case did not rely on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In fact this Court did not even notice any of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench of the High Court took shelter behind the Explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure without any jurisdiction. It created an argument when none existed. We have no hesitation in holding that the reasoning of the High Court in not following the law laid down by this Court in Nasiruddin's case was wholly perverse. 14. While reaching the above conclusion this Court kept in view the plain language of Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order. No provision of the Code of Civil Procedure was noticed, referred to or taken into consideration directly or indirectly. The territorial jurisdiction of a Court and the "cause of action" are interlinked. 14. While reaching the above conclusion this Court kept in view the plain language of Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order. No provision of the Code of Civil Procedure was noticed, referred to or taken into consideration directly or indirectly. The territorial jurisdiction of a Court and the "cause of action" are interlinked. To decide the question of territorial jurisdiction it is necessary to find out the place where the "cause of action" arose. We, with respect, reiterate that the law down by a Four- Judge Bench of this Court in Nasiruddin's case ( AIR 1976 SC 331 ) holds good even today despite the incorporation of an Explanation to Section 141 to the Code of Civil procedure. 15. There is no dispute that the Amalgamation Order is a special law which must prevail over the general law. This Court interpreted the relevant expression in clause 14 and did not take any support from any general law. The discussion by the Division Bench of the High Court by evolving the so called theory of "exercise of jurisdiction revolving on the place of sitting" as compared to the theory of "cause of action" is wholly misconceived and has no legal basis whatsoever. This part of the High Court judgment is mentioned to be rejected. 16. Mr. Satish Chandra, learned senior advocate appearing for the appellant has contended that even on the reasoning of the Division Bench judgment itself the conclusions reached by the Bench are erroneous. We see force in the contention. The Division Bench of the High Court relying upon the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Ram Rakh Vyas v. Union of India, AIR 1977 Rajasthan 243 (the judgement delivered by A.P. Sen, J. as the learned Judge then was), came to the conclusion that the words "arising in" the context, mean "pertaining to the districts of or "arising from." It is not disputed that in the present case the order/notification and the advertisement were issued by the State Government at Lucknow. Without there being an order/notification by the Government there could be no cause of action at all. The petitioner got aggrieved only from the order/notification which "arose" from Lucknow. Without there being an order/notification by the Government there could be no cause of action at all. The petitioner got aggrieved only from the order/notification which "arose" from Lucknow. The grievance of the petitioner "arose" at Lucknow which is within the Oudh area and as such on the plain reading of the relevant provisions of Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, the Bench at Lucknow had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 10. In Manju Varma (DR.) (supra), the Apex Court considering the controversy held thus:- 19. In ordering the transfer of the case under the 1948 Amalgamation Order, the Chief Justice was determining the plea of the respondent and the objection of the appellant to the transfer of the appellant's writ petition. He could not allow the plea without hearing the affected party and without determining on objective criteria and upon investigation whether the case was (a) transferable, and (b) should be transferred. His decision would affect the right of the appellant to choose her "forum conveniens". He was, therefore, acting as an adjudicating body empowered by the Constitution to discharge judicial functions. We would accordingly hold that the Chief Justice while exercising jurisdiction under para 14 of the 1948 Order, acts as a judicial authority with all the attributes of a court and his order is, therefore, amenable to correction under Article 136. The preliminary objection of the respondent is therefore rejected. 20. Coming to the merits - the appellant's writ petition had been filed on 12-11-1998 (WP No. 1678 of 1998) and related to the seniority list of the Readers in Obstetrics and Gynaecology in the State medical colleges. The appellant sought for promotion from the date her juniors, Dr. Sandhya Aggarwal and Dr. Gauri Ganguli, were given promotion. Dr. Gauri Ganguli was added as Respondent 6 to the appellant's writ petition in 1999. Hearing of the writ petition was concluded and judgment was reserved by a Bench of two Judges in December 1999. Subsequently, the matter was released because of the personal embarrassment faced by one of the Judges who had heard the matter. It was again heard by another Bench inconclusively because one of the Judges was transferred. During this period, pleadings were complete. The matter then appeared in the list of two learned Judges on 10-7-2001. An application was filed for adjournment by Respondent 6. The application was rejected by a reasoned order. It was again heard by another Bench inconclusively because one of the Judges was transferred. During this period, pleadings were complete. The matter then appeared in the list of two learned Judges on 10-7-2001. An application was filed for adjournment by Respondent 6. The application was rejected by a reasoned order. The order records that while the appellant's petition had been taken up for hearing several months back and arguments had commenced, the matter had been adjourned on several occasions to accommodate Respondent 6 and her counsel. It was noted that Respondent 6 had filed a writ petition on 4-7-2001 in connection with her appointment to the post of Reader in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology and obtained an interim order without imp leading the present appellant as a party. It was also noted that the hearing of the appellant's writ petition had been fixed with the consent of the parties. After further discussion, the Court was of the view that the application for adjournment was a device to get the case adjourned so that Respondent 6 could get an appointment order issued in her favor in her writ petition. Having rejected Respondent 6's application for adjournment, the matter was directed to be proceeded with. It was then that Respondent 6 filed the application for transfer of the appellant's writ application from Lucknow to Allahabad. When the appellant's writ application was taken up for hearing on 25-7-2001 an order was passed by the Division Bench to the following effect: Supplementary counter-affidavit on behalf of Respondent 6 filed today be placed on record. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the opposite parties. Arguments concluded. Judgment is reserved. 21. Six months later on 23-1-2002 the Chief Justice of the High Court allowed Respondent 6's application for transfer. Before considering the reasons given by the Chief Justice for allowing the transfer it is necessary to delineate the ambit of his power under para 14 of the Order. The first proviso of para 14 which confers the power of transfer on the Chief Justice allows the Chief Justice to provide that in respect of such cases, namely, those which arise in areas in Oudh, shall be heard at Allahabad. The first proviso of para 14 which confers the power of transfer on the Chief Justice allows the Chief Justice to provide that in respect of such cases, namely, those which arise in areas in Oudh, shall be heard at Allahabad. The proviso assumes first, that the case or class of cases to be transferred by the Chief Justice from Lucknow to Allahabad are those which the Lucknow Bench would otherwise have the jurisdiction to entertain; and second that the power of transfer must be exercised for the purpose of having the matter heard at Allahabad. If the matter has already been heard, then the Chief Justice would not have power to transfer the case from Lucknow to Allahabad. 11. Recently the Apex Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) considering the controversy held thus:- 27. When an order, however, is passed by a Court or Tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority. 28. Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. The Union of India and another ( (1961) 2 SCR 828 ) whereupon the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant placed strong reliance was rendered at a point of time when clause (2) of Art. 226 had not been inserted. In that case the Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, properly construed, depends not on the residence or location of the person affected by the order but of the person or authority passing the order and the place where the order has effect. In that case the Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, properly construed, depends not on the residence or location of the person affected by the order but of the person or authority passing the order and the place where the order has effect. In the latter sense, namely, the office of the authority who is to implement the order would attract the territorial jurisdiction of the Court was considered having regard to Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure as Art. 226 of the Constitution thence stood stating: ...The concept of cause of action cannot in our opinion be introduced in Art. 226, for by doing so we shall be doing away with the express provision contained therein which requires that the person or authority to whom the writ is to be issued should be resident in or located within the territories over which the High Court has jurisdiction. It is true that this may result in some inconvenience to person residing far away from New Delhi who are aggrieved by some order of the Government of India as such, and that may be a reason for making a suitable constitutional amendment in Art. 226. But the argument of inconvenience, in our opinion, cannot affect the plain language of Art. 226, nor can the concept of the place of cause of action be introduced into it for that would do away with the two limitations on the powers of the High Court contained in it. 29. In view of clause (2) of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India now if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh (supra) has, thus, no application. Forum Conveniens 30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. (See Bhagar Singh Bagga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhany, AIR 1941 Cal 670; Mandal Jalal v. Madanlal, (1945) 49 CWN 357; Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. M/ s. Jharia Talkies and Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. (1997) CWN 122; S. S. Jain and Co. and another v. Union of India and others (1994) CHN 445; M/s. New Horizon Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1994 Delhi 126). 12. The Apex Court held that where whole or in part cause of action arose or mere fraction of cause of action accrues within jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. But the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merits. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. 13 It is not in dispute that the petitioner institution is situated at Ujjain and as per Presidential Notification, the case has arisen from the revenue district of Ujjain which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Indore Bench of this Court. In view of the settled position of law, if the petitioner was inclining to file this petition at main seat, it ought to have sought a specific permission from Hon'ble the Chief Justice and until and unless such permission is granted, this petition which is arising from Ujjain district, cannot be entertained at main seat. 14 In W.P. No. 13647/10, petitioner Sendhwa Physical Education Institute is situated at Sendhwa, District Badwani (erstwhile West Nimar, Khargone), (wrongly mentioned in the cause title as in district Bhopal), which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Indore Bench as per Presidential notification dated 18.11.1968 (supra) 15. In view of aforesaid, these petitions at this stage are not entertained and are dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to approach Indore Bench of this Court for ventilation of the grievance as raised in the petitions. No order as to costs.