Judgment :- 1. In this writ petition, petitioner has challenged the order dated 30/10/2010 passed by the Prl. Civil Judge & J.M.F.C., Mangalore, in Election Petition No.1/2010, which is produced at Annexure ‘A’ and he has also challenged the order dated 5/5/2010 passed by the Tahsildar – Respondent No.3, which is produced at Annexure ‘E’. 2. According to the petitioner, she is a member of the Bhovi community, a Scheduled Caste , by birth and was married to Sri Narayan Naik, a member of Scheduled Tribe on 7/3/1993 at Kateel as per the customary rights of the community; that she has been recognized as a member of her husband’s caste and accepted by the public as a member of the Naik Community. She filed her nomination as a candidate of Ward No.2 of Mogaru Village, which is reserved for Scheduled Tribe women, on 23/4/2010, to be elected a member of Ganjimutt Gram Panchayat. At the time of filing her nomination, she had attached a Caste Certificate issued by the Tahsildar, certifying that she belonged to Scheduled Tribe. On scrutiny, the same was accepted and she contested for the said election as per Section 17 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 1993 (hereinafter, referred to as the ‘Rules’). The election was conducted on 12/5/2010 and the petitioner was declared elected on 15/5/2010. The said election was challenged by respondent No.1 initially, seeking rejection of the nomination on the basis that she did not belong to she Schedule Tribe and thereafter, the election petition was filed before the Prl. Civil Judge, Mangalore, in Election Petition No. 1/2010 under Section 19 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (hereinafter, referred to as the ‘Act’), by contending that as on the date of the election, the returned candidate was not qualified or in other words, was disqualified. The said ground raised in the Election Petition was under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act. The Election Petition was posted for trial. During the course of trial, the first respondent examined herself as P.W.1 and produced 10 documents, which were marked as Exs.P.1 to P.10 while the petitioner herein examined herself as R.W.1 and another witness was examined as R.W.2. The said ground raised in the Election Petition was under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act. The Election Petition was posted for trial. During the course of trial, the first respondent examined herself as P.W.1 and produced 10 documents, which were marked as Exs.P.1 to P.10 while the petitioner herein examined herself as R.W.1 and another witness was examined as R.W.2. On the basis of the said evidence, the trial Court held that first respondent herein had made out a case under Section 19 and 20 of the Act and while allowing the election petition, declared that the petitioner herein was disqualified to act as member of Ward No.2 of Mogaru village, Ganjimutt Grama Panchayat, Mangalore. It was also declared that respondent No.1 was duly elected and consequently, directions were issued that the first respondent was to act as the member of Ward No.2. The said order has been challenged in this writ petition. 3. I have heard the learned counsel Sri.Taranath Poojary for petitioner, learned counsel Ms. Jayana Kothari for respondent No.1 and the learned G.P. For respondents 2 and 3. 4. According to the petitioner, the trial Court was not right in holding that as on the date of the election, the petitioner was disqualified to contest the election for the post of member of Gram Panchayat and thereby, allowing the election petition. He has drawn my attention to various judgments of the Apex Court and also of the Division Bench of this Court to contend that a lady acquires the caste of her husband by marriage and that the said proposition was squarely applicable to the facts of the present case and it is on that premise that the Tahsildar had issued a caste certificate to the petitioner herein stating that she belonged or Scheduled Tribe and since the post in question were reserved for Scheduled Tribe woman, she was rightly entitled to contest for the said post. He submitted that although the petitioner was by birth belonging to Scheduled Caste but my marriage had acquired the caste of her husband and his proposition has been supported by various decisions of the Apex Court and under the circumstances, the trial Court has not appreciated the decisions of the Apex Court in their proper perspective. The decisions which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner shall be adverted to. 5. The decisions which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner shall be adverted to. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 supporting the order of the trial Court submitted that what has to be seen for the purpose of reservation under the Constitution is as to what is the caste of a person at the time of birth and after marriage a woman cannot rely on her change in her caste so as to avail the benefits of reservation. She conceded that though the husband’s community may recognized a woman to belong to the husband’s caste, after her marriage that would not be sufficient for claiming benefits under the Constitutional provisions for the purpose of seeking reservation with regard to either employment or education or for that matter to contest in elections. She has also adverted to certain decisions to contend that what is crucial in the context of certain benefits under the Constitution is caste by birth of not by marriage. 6. Learned G.P. supporting the order of the trial Court submitted that under Rule 243-T, election to Panchayat is based on population and therefore, reservation is made on the basis of proportion of population with regard to entire population of the ward and that the reservation is determination on the basis of birth and not by marriage. In the instant case, it was only Scheduled Tribe woman who was entitled to contest to the said post which was reserved for such a person and therefore, what is relevant is caste by birth and not by marriage and that on the day of the said election, the petitioner was not a Scheduled Tribe and therefore, was not entitled to contest the same. It was also submitted by the counsel for respondents that the caste certificate which had been obtained by the petitioner stating that she belonged to Scheduled Tribe may be valid for some purpose but not for the purpose of seeking reservation or benefits under the Constitution. It is therefore submitted that the order of the trial Court does not call for any interference and hence, the writ petition has to be dismissed. 7. Having heard the counsel on both sides, the only point that arises for my consideration is as to whether the first respondent was entitled to contest for Grama Panchayat Election in question. It is therefore submitted that the order of the trial Court does not call for any interference and hence, the writ petition has to be dismissed. 7. Having heard the counsel on both sides, the only point that arises for my consideration is as to whether the first respondent was entitled to contest for Grama Panchayat Election in question. In other words, whether she was disqualified on the date of Grama Panchayat Election and therefore, her election has to be set aside. 8. From the material on record, what is seen is that the petitioner by birth belongs to Scheduled Caste and thereafter, on her marriage on 7/9/1993, she might have been recognized as belonging to the husband’s family and therefore, belongs to Scheduled Tribe community. But what has to be seen in the instant case is as to whether the petitioner was entitled to be certified as belonging to Scheduled Tribe and therefore, was entitled to contest for the post. In order to answer the said question, which is necessary is to understand the position of law from the various decisions of the Apex Court and also refer to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, which has been relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner. 8A. In the case of Valsamma Paul (MRS) – vs – Cochin University And Others [ (1996) 3 SCC 545 ], the facts were that: Two posts of lecturers in Law Department of Cochin University were notified of recruitment, one of which was reserved for Latin Catholics (Backward class Fishermen). The appellant, a Syrian Catholic (a Forward Class), having married a Latin Catholic, had applied for selection as a reserved candidate. The University selected her on that basis and accordingly appointed her against the reserved post. Her appointment was questioned by one Rani George by filing a writ petition. Viz., OP No. 9450 of 1991 praying for a direction to the University to appoint her in place of the appellant to the said post. The Apex Court stated that the question is one of constitutional importance to harmonize the personal law of the citizens and the constitutional goal, viz., to accord equal opportunity to the disadvantaged social segments, envisaged in Articles 16(4) and 15(4) of the Constitution. The Apex Court stated that the question is one of constitutional importance to harmonize the personal law of the citizens and the constitutional goal, viz., to accord equal opportunity to the disadvantaged social segments, envisaged in Articles 16(4) and 15(4) of the Constitution. In the said case the Apex Court reiterated the proposition that the husband and wife are one under law and on marriage the wife becomes an integral part of wife’s marital home entitled to equal status of husband as a member of the family and thereby becomes a member of the caste of the husband. 9. It was however held that with regard to claim for reservation, on the basis of voluntary mobility to reserved class through inter-caste/inter-religion marriage or adoption by a lady belonging to a non-reserved class marrying a SC,ST or OBC citizen or a person belonging to non-reserved class being transplanted by adoption or any other voluntary act to a family belonging to such reserved class, would not ipso facto entitle the lady/adept to claim reservation under Article 15(4) or 16(4) of the Constitution as the case may be in view of the advantageous start in life availed by her/him. 10. In the said decision, it was held that caste became the result of birth and not of volition. It was a result of birth and has become a bane for individual drive, thrive and improvement of excellence, a Fundamental Duty under Article 51-A(j). It was observed that the practice untouchability, which had grown for centuries, denuded social and economic status and cultural life of the Dalits and the programmes evolved under Articles 14, 15(2), 15(4) and 16(4) aimed to bring Dalits into national mainstream by providing equalitarian facilities and opportunities. They are designated as “Scheduled Caste” by definition under Article 366(24) and “Scheduled Tribes” under Article 366(25) read with Articles 341 and 342 respectively. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the recognition of the appellant in the said case as a member of the Latin Catholics would not be relevant for the purposed of her entitlement meant for backward caste, as she had an advantageous start in life as she was born as a Syrian Christian and after completion of her education and becoming major, she is not entitled to the facility of reservation given to the Latin Catholics, a Backward Class. The Apex court which holding so observed as follows: “A Candidate who had the advantageous start in life being born in Forward Caste and had march of advantageous life but is transplanted in Backward Caste by adoption or marriage or conversion, does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation either under Article 15(4) or 16(4), as the case may be Acquisition of the status of Scheduled Caste etc., by voluntary mobility into these categories would play fraud on the Constitution, and would frustrate the benign constitutional policy under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution.” 11. In case of Meera Kanwaria – vs – Sunita And Others reported in [ (2006) 1 SCC 344 ], the respondent was a Rajput by caste had married a member of a Scheduled Caste. The marriage was performed as per Vedic Hindu rites. She obtained a certificate as belonging to Scheduled Caste by birth but the same was later found to be incorrect and was, therefore, cancelled. She contested the election as a Municipal Councilor which was reserved for a Scheduled Caste woman candidate. The appellant therein, was also a candidate for that seat. Having secured more votes than the votes secured by the appellant therein, the respondent was declared elected. In an election petition filed by a third party, a finding was given that the Scheduled Caste certificate obtained by the respondent was incorrect and observing that Scheduled Caste status could not be acquired merely by marriage with a SC person, the District Judge set aside the election of the respondent. However, the High Court held that as the respondent was accepted by her husband’s family and “biradari”, the judgment of the District Judge was not sustainable. Before the Apex Court, a reference was made to a decision in the case of Sobha Hymavathi Devi’s case and it was held that the High Court’s decision was not sustainable and in that context, the Apex Court held that as follows: “It is one thing to say that a lady belonging to a forward caste has been accepted by the community to which her husband belongs; but is another thing to say that her marriage has been accepted only by her husband’s family. The question as regards change of caste in view of her marriage although may be relevant in relation to Hindus, but when the question of change of caste is referable to the category belonging to a special class of citizens who require protective discrimination and affirmative action, a different rule will apply. The burden of proof thereof indisputably would be on the person who affirms the same.” It was further held that: “A person who is a high-caste Hindu and not subjected to any social or educational backwardness in his life, by reason of marriage alone cannot ipso facto become a member of the Scheduled Caste or the Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of any strict proof he cannot be allowed too defeat the very provisions made by the Stat for reserving certain seats for disadvantaged people.” The Apex Court opined as follows: “We see no reason why the principle relating to reservation under Articles 15(4) and 16 (4) laid down by this Court should not be extended to the constitutional reservation of a seat for a Scheduled Tribe in the House of the People or under Article 332 in the Legislative Assembly. The said reservations also constitutional reservations intending to benefit the really underprivileged and not those who come to the class by way of marriage.” 12. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the High Court in the said case has committed a manifest error in coming to the conclusion that for the purposes of reservation under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution, on the one hand, and Articles 330 and 332, on the other, are different. Though in the said decision a reference is made or Sobha Hymavathi Devi’s case, it will be adverted to a little later. 13. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to an earlier decision in the case of Kailash Sonkar –vs – Maya Devi 1984 (2) SCC 1991. The facts in the said case were that respondent therein was born of converted Christian parents and was baptised according to Christian rites and educated in various schools or institutions where she was known as a Christian. There was however no evidence to show that her parents had been Christians from generation to generation. The respondent was reconverted to Hinduism and married to a member of a scheduled caste (Katia) and also performed the Shudhikaran ceremony. There was however no evidence to show that her parents had been Christians from generation to generation. The respondent was reconverted to Hinduism and married to a member of a scheduled caste (Katia) and also performed the Shudhikaran ceremony. It appears from the evidence that she was accepted and also welcomed by the important members, including the President and Vice- President, of the community. About 3-4 years after her reconversion to Hinduism she filed her nomination as a candidate for election of MLA from the reserved constituency and was declared elected. The appellant therein questioned her election on ground that she being a Christian by birth could not be treated as a member of the scheduled caste and therefore her election from the reserved constituency was invalid. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and said that the present case fulfills the conditions required for being reconverted to Hinduism from Christianity in order to revive the original caste and therefore, she fulfills the Constitutional requirements under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950 and therefore, she was declared elected. In the said case, it was stated that when a person is converted to Christianity or some other religion, the original caste remains under eclipse and as soon as during his/her lifetime the person is reconverted to the original religion the eclipse disappears and the caste automatically revives. 14. It was also stated that a caste to which Hindu Belongs is essentially determined by birth and therefore, no opinion was expressed as to whether the community to which the lady was married to had recognized her in the community as belonging to the community of the husband. From this decision, what becomes clear is that the caste of a person is determined by birth and not by marriage. 15. In Sobha Hymavathi Devi – vs – Setti Gangadhara Swamy and Others ( AIR 2005 SC 800 ), the question was whether a woman belonging to a forward caste marrying a member of Scheduled Tribe could claim a right to contest the seat reserved for Scheduled Tribe merely by virtue of her marriage. In the said case also, it was held that Article 332 of the Constitution speaks of reservation of seats for Scheduled Tribes in Legislative Assemblies. In the said case also, it was held that Article 332 of the Constitution speaks of reservation of seats for Scheduled Tribes in Legislative Assemblies. The object is clearly to give representation in the legislature to Scheduled Tribe candidates, considered to be deserving of such special protection and not to these who claim to have acquired such status by marriage. The Apex Court observed as follows; “The principle relating to reservation under Arts. 15(4) and 16(4) laid down by Supreme Court should be extended to the constitutional reservation of a seat for a Scheduled Tribe in the house of the People or under Art. 332 in the Legislative Assembly. The said reservations are also constitutional reservations intending to benefit the really under privileged and not those who come to the class by way of marriage. Whether it be a reservation under Arts. 15(4) or 330 and 332, the said reservation would benefit only those who belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and not those who claim to acquire the status by marriage, like the appellant in this case. The appellant could not claim the right to contest a seat reserved for a Scheduled Tribe in terms of Art. 332 of the Constitution of India merely by virtue of her marriage to a person belonging to a Scheduled Tribe.” 16. Therefore, from his decision also it becomes clear that a person acquires his caste status by birth and not by marriage and though these decisions are in the context of a forward caste member marrying a person belonging to backward class and seeking reservation, nevertheless, the golden thread that runs through these decisions is that as far as a Hindu is concerned, caste is determined by birth and not by marriage and by marriage, the husband’s caste may be recognised for customary social or other purposes, but for claiming reservation under the Constitution and other such Constitutional benefits, the caste at the time of birth has to be taken into consideration. 17. In Meera Kanwaria’s case, supra, there is a reference made to the case of Sandhya Takur – vs – Vimla Devi Kushwah reported in [ (2005) 2 SCC 731 ], wherein it has been held as follows: “2. 17. In Meera Kanwaria’s case, supra, there is a reference made to the case of Sandhya Takur – vs – Vimla Devi Kushwah reported in [ (2005) 2 SCC 731 ], wherein it has been held as follows: “2. In the light of the decision in Valsamma Paul.V. Cochin University and our decision rendered today in Sobha Hymavathi Devi V. Setti gangadhara Swamy which was heard along with this appeal. It must be held that the appellant, who by birth did not belong to a backward class or community would not be entitled t contest a sear reserved for a backward class or community merely on the basis of her marriage to a male of that community.” 18. Learned counsel for petitioner has however also relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of B.A. Kagali and Another – vs. – The Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, Bangalore and Others reported in 2005 (3) KCCR 2005 (DB) wherein, the respondent married a person from Coorg belonging to Kuruba Community to which caste she herself belonged and later she became a permanent resident of Coorg thereafter having family of her own and claimed t have acquired status of a Scheduled Tribe. In the said case the respondent’s caste certificate had been cancelled by the caste certification committee without hearing ht respondent and the said orders was quashed by the Learned Single Judge. In the circumstances, the Division Bench held that she was entitled to claim reservation as a Scheduled Tribe on the premise that upon marriage the wife acquires the caste of her husband. 19. It is necessary to note that before that Division Bench, none of the judgments of Apex Court which have been elucidated above have been brought to its notice. The fact remains that the respondent in the said decision belonged to Kuruba caste by birth. After her marriage she settled down in coorg, where Kuruba Community is recognised as a Scheduled Tribe. The fact remains that the respondent in the said decision belonged to Kuruba caste by birth. After her marriage she settled down in coorg, where Kuruba Community is recognised as a Scheduled Tribe. Under the circumstances, the Division Bench held that by virtue of her marriage to a person resident in Coorg who belonged to Kuruba Community which is recognized as a Scheduled Tribe and by virtue of the respondent permanently settling down in coorg, she was entitled to a Scheduled Tribe status as by birth she was in any case belonging to Kuruba caste and on her migration to Coorg consequent to her marriage was entitled to a Scheduled Tribe status. The facts of the aforesaid case are quite different from the facts of the present case. In the present case petitioner belongs to Scheduled Caste by birth and after her marriage her husband’s caste being Scheduled Tribe, she claims to belong to Scheduled Tribe caste. Under the circumstances, it was held that she was not entitled to take part in election to the seat reserved for Scheduled Tribe. What has to be reiterated is that the proposition of law which has been canvassed in this case, that a person by birth can belong to one caste but by marriage acquires the caste of her husband cannot be accepted for the purpose of seeking benefits under the Constitution. It has been elucidated and reiterated by the Apex Court in various judgments that the caste of a person is determined by birth and not by marriage. The same applies to the facts of the present case also. 20. In the instant case, it is also necessary to observe that the petitioner belonged to a Scheduled Caste by birth. Therefore, it is not a case where a person who belongs to a forward caste sought to contest the election which was reserved for a Scheduled Tribe category. Although the petitioner belong to a scheduled Caste, it is necessary to note that the seat was reserved for a Scheduled Tribe candidate and under the circumstances, it is only a Scheduled Tribe candidate by birth who could have contested for the said seat. Although the petitioner belong to a scheduled Caste, it is necessary to note that the seat was reserved for a Scheduled Tribe candidate and under the circumstances, it is only a Scheduled Tribe candidate by birth who could have contested for the said seat. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the caste certificate which was issued to her stating that she belong to Scheduled Tribe could not have been relied upon by the petitioner in support of her status as a Scheduled Tribe and the same would have been useful to her social purpose only. But for seeking reservation of a seat for the purpose of election in the instant case or for any benefit under the Constitution, a person could claim such reservation only if she is a Scheduled Tribe by birth as in the present case, the said seat was reserved for scheduled tribe women. Thought petitioner belong to another depressed Class, that by itself would not give her the benefit of reservation as a scheduled tribe upon her marriage since reservation of post has to be strictly followed in terms of the particular caste for which it is made and the said caste is determined by birth. Therefore, the trial Court was right in holding that as on the date of the election, the petitioner did not belong to Scheduled Tribe category and therefore, she was disqualified to contest the election in the said reserved category. First respondent has therefore been successful in making out a case under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act. The order of the trial Court is in accordance with law and the same does not call for any interference in this writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.