Judgment :- K.J. SENGUPTA, J. The above appeal is preferred at the instance of the decree-holder being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 12th January, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court while passing judgment upon award under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the said “Act”) by which learned Trial Judge refused to grant interest from the date of the award till the date of passing of the decree. The short fact of the case is that the award passed by the learned Arbitrator was challenged unsuccessfully by the respondent under Section 30(33) of the said Act even right up to Appeal Court. It appears that learned Arbitrator awarded interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of entering upon reference till the date of the passing of the award. The learned Trial Judge while dismissing the application under Section 30(33) of the said Act accepted the said award. However, the Appeal Court modified the rate of interest awarding 6% per annum. Thereafter the learned Trial Judge initially on 20th November, 2008 while passing judgment and decree in terms of the award dated 25th September, 1985 awarded interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the award till the date of full payment to the petitioner meaning thereby it had covered the period from the date of filing of the award for making the same rule of the Court till the date of passing of the decree also. It has to be noted even after decree was passed the payment was not made but principal amount was deposited after the decree was passed. Thereafter the said order was modified subsequently by the impugned judgment and order whereby the period of interest was reduced from the date of passing of the decree till the date of making payment presumably invoking power under Section 29 of the said Act. The sum and substance of the appeal is that the first order was perfectly lawful and justified but by the subsequent order the learned Trial Judge has committed error in law by not awarding interest from the date of filing of the award for making the rule of the Court under Section 17 of the said Act up to the date of the passing of the decree. Mr. Mr. Dhruba Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submits with authorities viz. AIR 1958 Allahabad 692, (1989) 1 SCC page 532, (1992) 1 SCC 508 , (1992) 4 SCC 217 that when the award has been filed under Section 17 it is a proceedings before the Court and it can award interest in addition to what has been granted by the learned Arbitrator from the date of filing of such application for making the award rule of the Court up to the date of passing decree under Section 29 of the said Act. Section 29 does not expressly prohibit to grant of interest for the period during which the proceeding under Section 17 is pending. He has drawn our attention to paragraph 14 of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1989) 1 SCC 532 wherein the Apex Court granted interest taking note of Section 17 for this period. It is contended in this case that it will be grave injustice if the appellant is deprived of his legitimate claim of interest from 1986 while award was pending for passing judgment, because of pendency of the action under Sections 30 and 33. During this long period the petitioner suffered huge loss. Therefore, the Court in its inherent power should have awarded interest for this period. He submits that by virtue of Section 41 clause (a) of the said Act the provision of Civil Procedure Code shall be made applicable to all the proceedings in the Court in relation to Arbitration Act. Indisputably the application for passing judgment upon award is a proceeding. Therefore, Section 34 of the Code would be applicable consequently the Court has power to grant interest pendente lite. In this case from the date of filing of the award till the date of passing of the decree the Court under the said provision can grant interest. He, however, concedes that power of granting interest for the post-decree period is governed by Section 29 of the said Act and Section 34 of the Code can have no application. Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned Senior Advocate while countering the submission says that Section 41 clause (a) of the Arbitration Act has to be read subject to the other provisions of the said Act namely, Section 29. He contends that Section 29 has specifically empowered when the Court can grant interest. Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned Senior Advocate while countering the submission says that Section 41 clause (a) of the Arbitration Act has to be read subject to the other provisions of the said Act namely, Section 29. He contends that Section 29 has specifically empowered when the Court can grant interest. From plain reading of the said section it will appear that Court can grant interest from the date of passing decree till realisation or till such time after passing of the decree. It is true expressly this section does not prohibit to grant interest for pre-decree period namely from the date of filing of the award till the date of passing of the decree, but by judicial pronouncement Section 29 has been interpreted to the effect that it carries negative import, and it shall not be permissible for the Court to award interest for any period prior to the date of passing decree. He submits that when this section has been explained in this manner by the judicial pronouncement, the provisions of Section 34 of the Code cannot be brought into operation. He also submits referring to judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1967 Bom 347 , that the legislative history while bringing section 29 in the statute book does not indicate to empower the Court to grant interest for pre-decree period. In the draft bill originally, after passing award pre-decree period was sought to be included following English Arbitration Law. When the same was placed before the Select Committee this period was curved out intentionally, thereafter corrected bill was presented before the Parliament. Thus from such external aid the intention of the legislature is very clear not to include the period of pre-decree period or granting interest by the Court in the said Act. He further submits that this legal position was subsequently cleared by the following Supreme Court and High Court decisions reported in AIR 1967 Bombay 347, AIR 1967 SC 1032 , (1994) 4 SCC 665 , (1995) 2 SCC 385 , AIR 1997 Bombay 20 and 2006 (3) Arbitration Law Reporter 364. He further submits that this legal position was subsequently cleared by the following Supreme Court and High Court decisions reported in AIR 1967 Bombay 347, AIR 1967 SC 1032 , (1994) 4 SCC 665 , (1995) 2 SCC 385 , AIR 1997 Bombay 20 and 2006 (3) Arbitration Law Reporter 364. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and having considered the judgment and order impugned herein we think the point which has fallen for our consideration is as follows:- Whether the Court has power to grant interest under Section 29 while passing decree under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 from the date of filing of the award till the date of passing decree even applying the provision of Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code by virtue of Section 41 clause (a) of the said Act or not? As we have noted earlier the Division Bench of this Court while disposing of the appeal filed against the order of the learned Trial Judge rejecting the application for setting aside the award, modified the award to the extent of the rate of interest. The Division Bench by its judgment allowed interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum instead of 9 per cent per annum as awarded by the learned Arbitrator. Before we proceed further it is necessary to examine the scope of Section 17 of the said Act under which the award is made rule of the Court. The Division Bench by its judgment allowed interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum instead of 9 per cent per annum as awarded by the learned Arbitrator. Before we proceed further it is necessary to examine the scope of Section 17 of the said Act under which the award is made rule of the Court. Section 17 reads as follows:- “Section 17- Judgment in terms of award: Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award.” On careful reading of the said section it would appear that in exercise of the power under the said section the Court has only jurisdiction to accept the award which has reached its finality and thereafter will pass decree and it is manifest in the said section that the Court does not decide anything else, rather accepts decided matter and put a seal thereon to make the same enforceable. The award reaches finality as mentioned in the said section when the challenge under Section 30(33) of the said Act fails and/or came to an end by modification of the said award. Thus, in this case the award has become final after the Division Bench disposed of the appeal with little modification so far as the rate of interest is concerned. Hence the scope of preferring appeal in this matter is not to be found as the decree impugned here is not in excess of or inconsistent with the award. On that ground the appeal is not maintainable. However, when the argument has been advanced on the point of law we feel it expedient to examine the same. Hence the scope of preferring appeal in this matter is not to be found as the decree impugned here is not in excess of or inconsistent with the award. On that ground the appeal is not maintainable. However, when the argument has been advanced on the point of law we feel it expedient to examine the same. The question is whether by virtue of Section 41 clause (a) of the said Act the provision of Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code can be applied for awarding interest from the date of filing of the award till the date of the passing of the decree. Section 41 clause (a) is required to be examined carefully. Thus we set out the same. “Section 41- Powers of the Court Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made there under – (a) provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 shall apply to all proceedings before the Court, and to all appeals under this Act…………” It is clear from plain reading that provision of the Code will be applicable subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act. In this case the power of the Court with regard to the grant of interest for pre-decree period after award being passed is the issue. On extensive study of all the sections of the said Act we think that only Section 29 of the said Act deals with the power conferred upon the Court for granting interest. The said Section reads as follows:- “Section 29 Interest on awards – Where and in so far as award is for the payment of money the Court may in the decree order interest, from the date of the decree at such rate as the Court deems reasonable, to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree.” Thus the Court is empowered to grant interest only from the date of decree while passing the decree in acceptance of the award. In other words, Court has power expressly under this section to grant interest from the post-decree period. However this provision is silent about the power of the Court to grant interest for pre-decree period after the award is passed. In other words, Court has power expressly under this section to grant interest from the post-decree period. However this provision is silent about the power of the Court to grant interest for pre-decree period after the award is passed. How far this Section 29 is to be applied came for consideration before the Courts on number of occasion as could be found from number of authorities cited at the bar. In case of Srikantia and Company v. Union of India reported in AIR 1967 Bombay 347 learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court after tracing the legislative history and decisions of the Patna High Court, Madras High Court came to conclusion that entire Arbitration Act 1940 is an exhaustive one and while interpreting Section 29 learned Single Judge opined, as follows:- “In my view, these decisions and particularly the decisions of the Patna High Court and the Madras High Court clearly indicate the corollary which follows upon an Act being regarded as exhaustive viz. – that it carries with it a negative import that only such Acts are mentioned in the Act are permissible to be done and acts or things not mentioned therein are not permissible to be done. In my view, Section 29 of the Act also is exhaustive of the whole law upon the subject of “interest on awards” and since the said section enables the Court to award interest on the principal sum adjudged by an award from the date of the decree onwards, it must be held that it carries with it the negative import that it shall not be permissible to the Court to award interest on the principal sum adjudged by an award for any period prior to the date of the passing of the decree.” The above judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court has been taken note of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India v. Jain Association and another reported in (1994) 4 SCC 665 and the same was approved by the Supreme Court with a clear pronouncement on this subject which is as follows:- “………….Section 29 of the Act empowers the Court, that where the award is for payment of money, to grant reasonable rate of interest on the principal amount adjudged and confirmed in the decree, only from the date of the decree. Section 34 CPC empowers the Court, where there is a decree for payment of money to grant interest pendente lite and future, till the date of the realisation. Since Section 29 of the Act enables the Court to grant interest on the principal amount adjudged in the award and confirmed in the decree only from the date of the decree, it carries a negative import with it that the Court has no power to grant interest of pendente lite.” The Supreme Court judgment has also taken note of the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Ram Singh v. Ram Singh reported in AIR 1985 Rajasthan 148 which also held on the same line as it has been held by the Bombay High Court. This judgment of Rajasthan High Court was approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Again a Division Bench of Bombay High Court in case of Arjandas Narain Das Adnani v. Narisingdas Naraindas Adnani reported in AIR 1997 Bombay 20 while following the said decision of Supreme Court Jain Associates and also the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court and Rajasthan High Court has referred to above in paragraph 7 ultimately held as follows:- “Since Section 29 of the Act enables Court to grant interest on the principle amount adjudged in the award and confirmed in the decree only from the date of the decree, it carries a negative import with it that the Court has no power to grant interest pendente lite……….” The Supreme Court in case of Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P). Ltd. reported in (1989) 1 SCC 532 held Arbitrator has power to award interest for the period from the date of the award till the date of the decree not the Court. We are of the view that the Division Bench of Bombay High Court on the above referred decision has not examined the Supreme Court’s observation in paragraph 14 which has dealt with reference to Section 29 of the Arbitration Act 1940 and also Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure while doing so, Supreme Court has modified the rate of interest. In this paragraph the Supreme Court was of the view interest should be allowed for the pre-decree period on the principle that this Court can, once proceedings under Section 15 to 17 are initiated, grant interest pending litigation before it i.e., from the date of the award from the date of the decree. If this judgment of Supreme Court is read with the judgment of the same Court in case of Jain Associates (supra) apparently the ratio decided in both the cases is inconsistent with each other. Mr. Pradip Ghosh while referring to Sections 15, 16 and 17 submits that when a proceeding is initiated for making the award rule of the Court by virtue of the said judgment as in case of Gujarat Water Supply Sewerage Board, interest should be awarded. In this situation question is which of the two decisions should be followed? We find that later Supreme Court decision considering earlier decisions of the several High Courts have decided the issue. It appears from earlier decision of the Supreme Court in case of Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board reported in (1989) 1 SCC 532 dealt upon jurisdiction of the Court under Sections 30, 33 of the 1940 Act and not for passing a decree under Section 17. We therefore prefer to accept the ratio decided in the Jain Associates case (supra). When Section 29 has been interpreted by the judicial pronouncement in the manner stated above, the provision of the Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code for granting interest from the date of filing of the award till the date of the passing of the decree cannot be applied since it is inconsistent with scope and purport of the said Section 29 as explained by the Supreme Court. Section 41 clause (a) of the said Act, clearly provides that Code of Civil Procedure has to be applied subject to the provision of the said Act. Hence Section 34 for this purpose cannot be applied by virtue of Section 41 clause (a) of the said Act. There is another reason as to why the said Section 34 will not be applicable for awarding interest for the period from the date of the filing of the award till date of passing of the decree and the same is discussed later. There is another reason as to why the said Section 34 will not be applicable for awarding interest for the period from the date of the filing of the award till date of passing of the decree and the same is discussed later. We, therefore, appropriately quote Section 34 of the Code as follows:- “Section 34:- “where and in so far as decree for payment of money, the Court may in the decree, therefore interest at such rate as Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principle sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of the decree…….” In our view Section 34 will apply in a case when the Court itself adjudged the principal amount payable to the plaintiff and it can be granted only when there is an adjudication and working out of the principle amount by the Court. When the decree is passed under Section 17 of the said Act the Court does not adjudicate nor adjudge any principal amount. Court merely accepts the award which has adjudged the principal amount by the learned Arbitrator. Actually the function of the Court under Section 17 of the said Act is almost mechanical and this section does not partake the character of the proceedings for which any adjudication is required. The real adjudication as to the legality and validity of the award is made under the proceedings under Sections 30 and 33 of the said Act. In such application both the parties may demand variation of the principal amount awarded and the amount of interest as to its rate and period. The argument of Mr. Dhruba Ghosh that it is no fault of the decree-holder but it is the failure of the Court for not passing the decree for a long time because of the pendency of the proceedings under Sections 30, 33 therefore interest should be awarded, howsoever emotional and thought-provoking, is not tenable in law. Court is helpless in this situation as the Court does not possess any power to grant interest from the date of filing of the award till the date of passing of the decree. This complaint should have been made by his client in the proceedings under Section 30, 33 itself asking for suitable measure by way of interest or cost. Hence we do not find any reason to interfere with the decree passed by the learned Trial Judge. This complaint should have been made by his client in the proceedings under Section 30, 33 itself asking for suitable measure by way of interest or cost. Hence we do not find any reason to interfere with the decree passed by the learned Trial Judge. Thus the appeal fails on the merit also. I agree.