Satish Chandra, J.— By way of this Special Appeal, the appellant (The District Basic Education Officer, District Lucknow) has assailed the judgment and order dated 4th May, 2007 passed by the learned Single Judge. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that opposite party Nos. 1 to 5 were working on consolidated salary of Rs. 750 per month and were not appointed by following the procedure established by law nor they did they work against sanctioned posts. For the first time, vide order dated 30.11.1995, their services were regularized w.e.f. 24.8.1995 in the pay-scale of Rs. 750-12-870-14-940 and from the date of their regularization, the opposite party Nos. 1 to 5 on attaining the age of superannuation retired on 31.3.1999, 31.1.2000, 9.9.1996, 30.9.1998 and 31.1.1998 respectively. The said opposite parties on the date of superannuation were not having "ten years" of regular service as employees of Basic Shiksha Parishad, U.P. which is a condition precedent for grant of pensionary benefits and as such none of the opposite party Nos. 1 to 5 is legally entitled to get pensionary benefits. Learned counsel further submits that against non-payment of pensionary benefits, the opposite parties filed Writ Petition (S/S) 4127 of 2001 wherein the following interim order was passed: "Three weeks' time is allowed to the learned Standing Counsel either to pay pensionary benefits to the petitioner in accordance with law or show cause." In pursuance of the said interim order, the representations of opposite party Nos. 1 to 5 were considered by the then Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Lucknow, and an order dated 26.9.2001 was passed mentioning therein that since opposite party Nos. 1 to 5 (petitioners of writ petition No. (S/S) 4127 of 2001) do not complete ten years regular service, therefore, they are not legally entitled to get pension. To substantiate legal proposition, the appellant also filed a counter affidavit in the said writ petition. Learned counsel further submitted that subsequently on 4.5.2007, an ex-parte order was passed without hearing the appellant and also without considering the facts and legal position stated in the counter affidavit and,thus, being aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. On the other hand, learned counsel for the private opposite parties submits that initially, opposite party Nos. On the other hand, learned counsel for the private opposite parties submits that initially, opposite party Nos. 1 to 5 were not appointed on consolidated salary but on a regular pay scale and thus, they were made entitled to draw their dearness allowance as per the letter dated 13.9.1972. He further submits that opposite party Nos. 1 to 5 retired from service on different dates from the post of class IV (peon) employees after completing about 45 years, 42 years, 26 years, 35 years and 26 years of service respectively under the control and supervision of the appellant. During the course of their services, they were getting increments and dearness allowance. They were full time regular employees of Deputy Inspector of Schools, Lucknow, therefore, they are entitled for all the pensionary benefits. Moreover, funds and group insurance have already been paid to the opposite party Nos. 1 to 5. Besides,other similarly placed employees in other districts are said to be getting pensionary benefits. Thus, he tried to justify the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. We have heard counsel for the parties and gone through the materials available on record. The sole basis of present appeal is that opposite party Nos. 1 to 5 do not possess "ten years" of regular service,so they are not entitled to get pension. However, in our view, the aforesaid ground stands obliterated after the amendment of Fundamental Rule 56 by U.P. Act No.24 of 1975 which also allows retirement of a temporary employees, and provides in clause (e) that a retiring person is entitled for pension and other retiral benefits, if any. Thus, the pensionary benefit shall be available to every government servant who retires or is required or allowed to retire under this Rule. Moreover, payment of pension is not dependent on pleasure of the employer but it creates a right in the favour of a Government servant, subject to statutory Rules, if any, because they are enacted in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Articles 309 and Article 148 (5) of the Constitution. Pension is not an ex-gratia payment but it is a payment for the past service rendered by an employee. Further, it is a social welfare measure rendering socio-economic justice to an employee. Pension is not an ex-gratia payment but it is a payment for the past service rendered by an employee. Further, it is a social welfare measure rendering socio-economic justice to an employee. It must also be noticed that the quantum of pension is a certain percentage correlated to the average emoluments drawn by an employee as per liberalized pension scheme. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of D.S. Nakara and others V. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 observed that: "In the course of transformation of society from feudal to welfare and as socialistic thinking acquired respectability, State obligation to provide security in old age, an escape from undeserved want was recognised and as a first step pension was treated not only as a reward for past service but with a view to helping the employee to avoid destitution in old age. The quid pro quo was that when the employee was physically and mentally alert, he rendered unto the master the best, expecting him to look after him in the fall of life. A retirement system therefore exists solely for the purpose of providing benefits. In most of the plans of retirement benefits, every one who qualifies for normal retirement receives the same amount." In the instant case, it appears that opposite party Nos. 1 to 5 were confirmed vide order dated 30.11.1995 w.e.f. 24.8.1995 i.e. before the retirement. The earlier services rendered by the private opposite parties thus cannot be ignored, even if temporary, for the reason that there was continuity in service. It also cannot be ignored on the basis of vague and unsubstantiated plea sought to be raised by the appellant. The statutory right of the opposite parties flowing from their long service career, cannot be brushed aside lightly and the same have to be counted as qualifying service period for grant of retiral benefits. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any substance in the special appeal to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. This appeal, therefore, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. Hence, it is dismissed. _