JUDGMENT : S. K. SETH, J. 1. Fifteen persons were sent up for trial for causing death of Babusingh in the night intervening 13th and 14th September, 1992 near the village Kalma in Dewas District. Learned trial Court acquitted eight accused persons and convicted above appellants under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment and imposed on each fine of ` 3,000/- with default stipulation. trial Court also found them guilty of offence punishable under section 148 and also sentenced them to three years' R.I. with the direction that sentences shall run concurrently. Hence they have appealed to this Court. 2. During the pendency of above appeal, one of the appellants namely Harisingh (appellant No. 2) expired. His name, therefore, was struck off as the appeal qua him stood abated. 3. In short, prosecution story as unfolded before the trial Court was that at about midnight of night intervening 13th and 14th September, 1992 Babusingh was returning to village Kalma on a Motor-cycle with Gattu and Vasu as pillion riders. On account of previous enmity, accused persons conspired to form an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing murder of Babusingh and in furtherance of the said common object ambushed and killed Babusingh (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased') by causing injuries with sharp edged deadly weapons. As a result, he died a homicidal death. 4. Incident was seen by pillion riders Gattu and Vasu. They somehow managed to escape from the assailant and immediately reported whole incident to Motisingh father of the deceased residing in village Kalma. Motisingh, along with his other son Anarsingh; Gattu; and Vasu started for the spot in a tractor-trolley. On their way to the scene crime, they met Mansingh (P.W.5) who also told Motisingh about the murderous assault made by accused persons. Mansingh followed Motisingh to the spot where they found Babusingh lying dead in a pool of blood. Dehati Nalishi Ex.P.I was recorded by the S.H.O. Police Station Tonk-khurd at the instance of Motisingh. This set the investigation rolling. After taking usual steps, the investigation was over and appellants along with acquitted accused were proceeded against to stand trial under sections 302; 148; and 120-B of the Penal Code. An alternative charge under section 302 read with section 149 was also framed against them. 5. This set the investigation rolling. After taking usual steps, the investigation was over and appellants along with acquitted accused were proceeded against to stand trial under sections 302; 148; and 120-B of the Penal Code. An alternative charge under section 302 read with section 149 was also framed against them. 5. At trial, accused persons denied the charges and claimed that they were falsely implicated. Two of the acquitted accused, viz. Shobhagsingh and Ishwarsingh examined Kumud Kishore Joshi (D.W.1) and Rakesh Pandey (D.W.2) on the point of their alibi. No other defense evidence was let in by other accused persons. Since the trial Court found that. Shobhagsingh and Ishwarsingh were not involved in any offence, therefore, trial Court did not discuss evidence of these two defence witnesses. Nor is it necessary for us to do. 6. Deceased died a homicidal death, is not seriously disputed. Dr. P. P. Choubey (since deceased) had conducted the autopsy. He found 22 wounds, mostly incised wounds all over the body including vital parts like head, neck, etc. caused by hard and sharp edged weapons. According to Late Dr. Choubey, injury Nos. 2 and 4 were dangerous to life. The mode of death was shock due to injury to brain, multiple fractures and hemorrhagic. The autopsy report prepared by Choubey (Ex.P-27) is duly proved by Dr. R. C. Khajvaniya (P.W.19) who is well acquainted with hand writing of Dr. Choubey. Even according to Dr. Khanvaniya (P W.19), the injuries found on the dead body, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In view of the medical evidence, in our opinion, trial Court rightly held that the wounds described in the post mortem report were intended to cause death because of which deceased died a homicidal death. 7. Besides the medical evidence, (P.W.1)-Motisingh, father of the deceased proved Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P-1) recorded at the spot soon after the incident by Dilip Singh (P.W.20), S.H.O. Police Station, Tonk-khurd. Based upon it, formal FIR (Ex.P-24) was recorded at the Police Station by Bansh Gopal (P.W.17), Head Constable. Except Mansingh (P.W.5) and Gattu (P.W.8) other witnesses turned hostile and they were cross-examined with reference to their previous case-dairy statements recorded during investigation by the I.O. Learned trial Judge, on consideration of evidence, found that the charge of criminal conspiracy under section 120-B was not proved. Except Mansingh (P.W.5) and Gattu (P.W.8) other witnesses turned hostile and they were cross-examined with reference to their previous case-dairy statements recorded during investigation by the I.O. Learned trial Judge, on consideration of evidence, found that the charge of criminal conspiracy under section 120-B was not proved. All the accused persons, including appellants were, therefore, acquitted of this charge, which is not challenged by the prosecution; hence we are no longer concerned with it. 8. It is common ground that there was enmity between accused persons, especially Sobhagsingh (acquitted accused) and deceased because of political factionalism. Motisingh (P.W.1) stated that Sobhagsingh (brother of appellant Bhagwansingh @ Bhaggu), had threatened to see that Babusingh was killed. This is said to be the motive for assaulting deceased by accused persons. Motisingh received the information immediately after the incident from Gattu (P.W.8) and Vasu (not examined) that Sobhagsingh and his associates armed with deadly weapons mounted the attack. Gattu and Vasu were travelling as pillion riders with the deceased on the Motor Cycle. Motisingh proceeded to the spot and on his way he met Mansingh (P.W.5) who also told him of the attack by Shobharam, Thakursingh, Harishing, Gulabsingh etc. He found the dead body near the house of appellant Peersingh. He further stated that at his instance Dehati Nalishi Ex. P. 1 was recorded by the Dilip Singh (P.W.20) at the spot. After going through deposition of Motisingh, we find no reason, to discard his evidence. An attempt was made during hearing that Dehati Nalishi was inadmissible in evidence therefore the whole edifice of prosecution case collapses because of the so called delay in recording of the FIR Ex.P. 24. 9. We are not impressed with the argument. Ex.P.24 is the formal registration of the FIR at the Police station based upon the Dehati Nalishi. trial Court rightly repelled this contention and we are in agreement with the finding in this regard. The principal object of the first information report is to disclose commission of a cognizable offence and set the criminal law in motion so as to bring to book the guilty. It is not necessary to set down on paper all known facts and circumstances about the incident. The principal object of the first information report is to disclose commission of a cognizable offence and set the criminal law in motion so as to bring to book the guilty. It is not necessary to set down on paper all known facts and circumstances about the incident. It does not constitute substantive evidence; it can be used as a previous statement for the purpose of corroboration or contradiction of its maker under section 157 or 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. It can by no means be utilized for contradicting or discrediting other witnesses. 10. From the prosecution point of view, the other material witnesses are Mansingh (P.W. 5) and Gattu (P.W.8). They were examined as eye-witnesses. Both have supported the prosecution story in their depositions made before the Court. Trial Court, however, did not attach any importance to the testimony of Gattu (P.W. 8) for the reason that culprits were unknown to him and no test identification parade was held to establish presence of accused persons at the time of attack said to have been seen by this witness. His evidence was thus discarded, however, the conviction of appellants rests only on the basis of evidence of other eye-witness Mansingh (P.W.5). 11. According to Mansingh (P.W.5) he is resident of village Kalma and accused persons were known to him. He stated that on the fateful night, he was returning home when he saw accused persons armed with deadly weapons ambushing deceased Babusingh near the house of appellant Peersingh. There was sufficient light. He frankly admitted that he did not rush to the rescue of the deceased and went near the deceased after the attacker dispersed from the scene. Looking to the number of attackers, perhaps he thought discretion was better part of valor therefore, his conduct does not seem inappropriate or unnatural. He proved presence of Shobharam, Bhagwansingh @ Baggu, Harisingh, Gulabsingh, Thakursingh, Gajrajsingh and Peersingh armed with deadly weapons-sword, Dharia (a sharp cutting weapon) attacking deceased. This witness remained consistent without breaking down in cross-examination . 12. The evidence of Mansingh (P.W.5) is critised by the learned counsel for appellants on the ground that he was interested witness because of his relationship with Motisingh (P.W.1). It is argued that in absence of corroborative evidence, the conviction of appellants is unsustainable on the sole testimony of this witness. We find no substance in this submission. 13. 12. The evidence of Mansingh (P.W.5) is critised by the learned counsel for appellants on the ground that he was interested witness because of his relationship with Motisingh (P.W.1). It is argued that in absence of corroborative evidence, the conviction of appellants is unsustainable on the sole testimony of this witness. We find no substance in this submission. 13. After going through the entire statement, we do not find that the evidence of this witness is unreliable, as has been sought to be made out. On the other hand, this witness, being the most important witness from the point of view of the prosecution, was put to a severe test in his cross-examination. He has frankly made admissions in his cross-examination, which throw a very lurid light on the past life of the deceased. The witness further admitted that deceased Babusingh was an accused in the criminal case relating to murder of Shankersingh-father of appellant Peersingh. If the witness was inclined to tell falsehoods or at least to conceal deceased's past, he could have taken shelter behind failing memory or want of information not an uncommon characteristic of prevaricating witnesses. His evidence, read as a whole, rings quite true, and we have no hesitation in acting upon it and we cannot, therefore, brush aside the testimony of Mansingh (P.W.5). 14. His testimony is consistent with the contents of Dehati Nalishi recorded at spot without any avoidable delay. It cannot therefore, be said that his statement in Court, is an afterthought, or the result of tutoring by other interested persons. His story of the attack on the victim is also consistent with the medical evidence as deposed to by Dr. Khajvaniya Medical Officer (P.W.19). It is not necessary to set out in detail the incised gaping wounds on the person of the deceased, which are all set out in extenso in the post-mortem report Ex.P-27. 15. It has been further argued on behalf of the appellants that it is not safe to convict the appellants on the testimony of a single witness. It has not even been claimed by counsel for the appellants that this is a rule of law. He has only put it on the ground of prudence that, ordinarily, the Court should not, in a case involving a charge of murder, convict an accused person upon the testimony of a single witness. It has not even been claimed by counsel for the appellants that this is a rule of law. He has only put it on the ground of prudence that, ordinarily, the Court should not, in a case involving a charge of murder, convict an accused person upon the testimony of a single witness. In a murder case, the Court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, has categorically laid it down that "no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact." The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after the consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted." 16. Our Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the Court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well established rule of law that the Court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. 17. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely : (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 18. 17. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely : (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 18. In the first category of proof, the Court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the Court equally has no difficulty in coming to a conclusion. It is in the third category of cases that the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The Court naturally has to weigh carefully such testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The Law Reports contain many precedents where the Court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. 19. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the Court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. 20. In other words, a witness is normally considered to be reliable and independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often sure guarantee of truth. We have therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of Mansingh (P.W.5), which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution. 21. On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established : (1) As a general rule, a Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character. (2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, Courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character. (3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion and in the light of unblemished testimony of Mansingh (P.W.5), we are unable to agree with the learned Counsel for appellants for reasons already discussed above that the testimony of eye-witness Mansingh (P.W.5) requires corroboration and is not sufficient to rest conviction of appellants. 23. From the material available on record, we are quite satisfied that appellants were members of the unlawful assembly within the meaning of section 141 of the Penal Code, sharing common object to cause murder of the deceased and were armed with deadly weapons used for commission of the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 23. From the material available on record, we are quite satisfied that appellants were members of the unlawful assembly within the meaning of section 141 of the Penal Code, sharing common object to cause murder of the deceased and were armed with deadly weapons used for commission of the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction of all appellant under sections 148, 302/149, being more than five in number, is, therefore, proper and no case is made out calling for any interference by this Court in this appeal. 24. In the result, we find no merit and substance in this appeal and as such it deserves to be dismissed. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court is hereby affirmed. Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 25. The appellants No. 1-Gajrajsingh, No. 3-Bhagwansingh @ Bhaggu, No. 4-Peersingh and No. 6-Shobharam are on bail. Their bail bonds are hereby cancelled and they are directed to surrender forthwith before the trial Court for undergoing the remaining part of sentence, failing which, trial Court shall take suitable action as per law under intimation to this Court. 26. Office is directed to send a copy of this judgment along with record of the trial Court forthwith. 27. Order accordingly.