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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 684 (MP)

B. L. Nanda v. State of M. P.

2011-06-28

R.S.JHA

body2011
ORDER R.S. Jha, J. 1. The Petitioner has filed this petition being aggrieved by order dated 15.1.2004 passed by the Regional Controller, Govt. of India, Ministry of Mines, Indian Bureau of Mines, refusing to accept the mining plan submitted by the Petitioner along with his application for grant of mining lease in view of the provisions of Rule 22D(c) of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1960'). 2. The brief facts, leading to the filing of the present petition, are that the Petitioner filed an application for grant of mining lease on 11.3.2003 for extracting limestone in respect of Khasra No. 905, Area 3.92 Hectares of village Bhatia, Tehsil Maihar, District Satna in accordance with the Rules. The State Government, by communication dated 6.10.2003, informed the Petitioner that he should submit the mining plan after due approval from the Central Government as required by Rule 22(4) of the Rules of 1960, within six months so that further proceedings could be taken up for processing the Petitioner's application for grant of mining lease. In view of the aforesaid letter of the State Government, the Petitioner submitted the mining plan to the Respondent No. 3 for approval. However, by the impugned communication dated 15.1.2004 the Respondent No. 3 has refused to grant approval to the mining plan submitted by the Petitioner in view of the provisions of Rule 22 D of the Rules of 1960 which was introduced in the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 during the pendency of the Petitioner's application for grant of mining lease. 3. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner has filed this petition contending that he had filed the application for grant of Mining Lease on 11.3.2003 whereas Rule 22 D(c) of the Rules of 1960, which provides that the minimum area for granting mining lease shall not be less than four Hectares, has been introduced by way of amendment in the Rules with effect from 10.4.2003 and, therefore, the Respondents have wrongly rejected the application filed by the Petitioner. 4. It is stated that Rule 22 D of the Rules of 1960, which was introduced during the pendency of the Petitioner's application, cannot be applied retrospectively and in such circumstances the refusal to grant approval by the impugned order dated 15.1.2004 deserves to be set aside. 4. It is stated that Rule 22 D of the Rules of 1960, which was introduced during the pendency of the Petitioner's application, cannot be applied retrospectively and in such circumstances the refusal to grant approval by the impugned order dated 15.1.2004 deserves to be set aside. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of N.T. Bevin Katti, etc. v. Karnataka Public Service Commission and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 1233 in support of his submissions. 5. The learned Counsel for the Respondent Government of India, per contra, submits that the issue involved in the present petition is squarely covered by the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Brijendra Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India and Ors. 1995 MPLJ 710 , wherein this Court has specifically held that an amendment in the Rules of 1960, which is brought into effect during the pendency of the application seeking mining lease, can be applied to pending applications as there is no vested right to the grant or refusal of a mining lease. It is submitted that the Petitioner's application for grant of Mining Lease has to be and has rightly been decided on the basis of the law applicable on the date of disposal of the application and as on that date i.e. on 15.1.2004, Rule 22 D of the Rules of 1960 was already existing in the statute books, therefore, it has rightly been considered and the Petitioner's request for grant of approval has rightly been rejected. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the provisions of law. From a narration of the facts in the preceding paragraph it is clear that the Petitioner applied for grant of mining lease on 11.3.2003. It is also undisputed that Rule 22 D of the Rules of 1960 was introduced in the statute books with effect from 10.4.2003 and that the Petitioner's application filed under Rule 22(4) of the Rules of 1960 seeking approval of mining plan, which also indicates the area of the mining lease, was rejected by the Respondent authorities by the impugned order dated 15.1.2004. In the circumstances, it is abundantly clear that on the date the Petitioner's application under Rule 22(4) of the Rules of 1960 for approval of mining lease was considered, Rule 22 D of the Rules of 1960 was very much in existence in the statute books and, therefore, the authority was bound to consider the same. 7. As far as the contention of the Petitioner to the effect that the amended provisions of Rule 22 D of the Rules of 1960 could not have been made applicable to the Petitioner's case as he had applied for grant of mining lease on 11.3.2003, i.e., prior to the coming into force of Rule 22 D of the Rules of 1960, is concerned the said issue apparently stands concluded by the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Brijendra Kumar Agarwal (supra), decided by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone AIR 1981 SC 711 , in the following terms in paras 8 and 9: The rules under consideration in the case State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone AIR 1981 SC 711 were Tamilnadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1959. Rule 8C was introduced by notification issued on 2.12.1977. It prescribed the procedure and the forum. Application of the Respondent in the case was pending even before incorporation of Rule 8C. It was contended that the disposal was delayed and the application should be disposed of under the preexisting rule. The Court held as follows: While it is true that such applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable time clothes an application for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions. No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in any one an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. (Emphasis supplied) 9. The decision in M/s. Hind Stone is applicable to the facts of the present case. The Act and the Rules enabled the Petitioners to apply for mining licence. The Act and the Rules prescribed particular procedure for the application and the disposal. The procedure has been altered by subsequent amendment during the pendency of the applications. The Petitioners certainly have a right to file applications before the appropriate authority but they cannot have a right to have the applications disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of making applications; that is because they have no vested right to the grant of a mining lease. Since there is no such vested right, it must follow that all applications pending on the date on which the amendments came into force, should be disposed of under the amended provisions of the law. The amendments, no doubt, introduced certain additional conditions and restrictions which are intended for public good and due regulation of the mining activity in the light of vital concerns with regard to protection of environment and the like. 8. From a perusal of the above it is clear that the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Hind Stone (supra) has clearly held that no person has a vested right to the grant of or refusal of a mining lease and that in the absence of such a right, the application for mining lease has necessarily to be dealt with in accordance with the Rules in force on the date of disposal of the application. Admittedly, the Petitioner's application for grant of mining lease was filed on 11.3.2003 and the same could not be processed any further as the Government of India, by the impugned order dated 15.1.2004, refused to grant approval to the mining plan submitted by the Petitioner under Rule 22(4) of the Rules of 1960 on account of the stipulation contained in Rule 22 D of the Rules of 1960 which was introduced on 10.4.2003. It is, therefore, clear that on the date of disposal of the Petitioner's application under Rule 22(4) of the Rules of 1960, i.e. 15.1.2004, Rule 22D was very much in force and, therefore, no fault can be found with the impugned order of rejection by applying Rule 22D of the Rules of 1960. 9. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Hind Stone (supra) and of this Court in Brijendra Kumar Agarwal (supra) I do not find any merit in the submission and contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. The reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner on the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of N.T. Bevin Katti, etc. (supra) is also misplaced and misconceived as in that case the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of appointment wherein the authorities had been directed to implement the circular of the State Government which itself contained a stipulation to the effect that the said circular would not apply to advertisements that had already been issued and it was in such circumstances that the Supreme Court allowed the petition. Apparently, as the facts of that case were totally different it has no applicability to the present case. 10. The petition, being meritless is, accordingly, dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to the costs. Petition dismissed.