JUDGMENT GIRISH CHANDRA GUPTA, J. 1. THIS appeal is directed against a judgment dated 12th March 1998 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Midnapore, in Sessions Trial No.VI/ June/ 92 by which the accused/husband Ashok Dab was convicted of offences punishable under Sections 498A/304B and 302 IPC and his near relations were all acquitted of the same charges. The appellant-husband also by an order dated 12th March 1998 was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life as also to pay a fine of Rs.2000/-, in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. He was also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years as also to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence punishable under Section 498A. Both the sentences were however directed to run concurrently. The convict has come up in appeal. 2. THE facts and circumstances of the case briefly stated are as follows:- THE appellant Ashok Dab fell in love with his neighbour Sushmita alias Dukhirani. The affair culminated in a social marriage. Within three years of her marriage she died on 16th August 1989 of severe burn injury. A written complaint was promptly lodged alleging continuous cruel treatment since three months after the marriage followed by physical assault and demand for a piece of land. The victim was hospitalised. Dr. K.K. Maity, Surgeon of Ghatal Sub-Divisional Hospital, attended the patient and recorded her dying declaration. Dr. M. Mishra, EMO of Ghatal Sub-Divisional Hospital, had admitted the patient. He also recorded the dying declaration of the patient. The dying declaration was also witnessed by staff nurse Shrimati Kajal Bera (PW 8). The learned trial Court considering the evidence including the dying declaration passed the aforesaid judgment and order. Before adverting to the submissions advanced by Mr. Mitra, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant, it would be proper to notice the evidence in some detail. The fact that the victim died within three years of her marriage is not in dispute. The fact that she died of severe burn injury is also not in dispute. The fact that it was a love marriage is not in dispute. The fact that the parties were neighbours is also not in dispute. The fact that the victim died within three years of her marriage is not in dispute. The fact that she died of severe burn injury is also not in dispute. The fact that it was a love marriage is not in dispute. The fact that the parties were neighbours is also not in dispute. The PW 1, elder brother of the deceased, deposed that happiness between the couple ended within 3-4 months of the marriage. The victim used to be assaulted by the husband and his near relations. In order to put an end to the torture; a reconciliation process was attempted through a salish about which there is evidence adduced by the PW 1, PW 2 the brother and cousin of the victim. PW 7, a hostile witness, admitted during cross-examination by the prosecution with leave of Court that he had been told by the cousin of the victim about the salish. There is evidence adduced by the PWs.1 and 2 that a piece of land for the purpose of constructing a residential house was demanded by the accused through the victim his wife. The brothers of the victim were however reluctant or unable to part with that piece of land. In connection with the aforesaid demand the PW 1 during his cross-examination deposed as follows:- "As we are very poor I told my sister that we are not in a position to give her the bastu she has asked for. My sister felt grieved for that. I cannot say the date, month and year in which my sister wanted bastu to me." 3. PW 2, a cousin of the victim, deposed in that regard during his cross-examination as follows:- "I heard from my sister that she was put to torture as the bastu demanded by her husband was not given." As regards the dying declaration the evidence of Dr. Mishra, EMO of Ghatal Sub-Divisional Hospital, is as follows:- "On 16.8.89 I was posted at Ghatal S.D. Hospital as M.O. On that date I was on duty as E.M.O. at 11.25 a.m. On that date and at that time one Dukhirani Dab, wife of Ashok Dab of village Jotkeshab was admitted into the emergency room. The patient came with extensive burn. After examination of the patient, I got her admitted into the hospital and she was admitted under Dr. P. Poddar. The patient came with extensive burn. After examination of the patient, I got her admitted into the hospital and she was admitted under Dr. P. Poddar. The patient stated to me that her husband poured kerosene oil on her body and threw a burning matchstick on her in the morning. 4. ON examination I found that the patient had extensive burn all over her body. This emergency ticket is in my handwriting and it bears my signature (marked ext.5). This admission form is in my handwriting and it bears my signature (marked ext.6)" The relevant portion of Exbt.5 reads as follows:- "Patient stated that her husband threw kerosene oil and a burning matchstick on her body in the morning. Patient has extensive burns all over the body." The patient was thereafter shifted to the bed. Dr. Maity treated her. He again recorded her statement in presence of Dr. N. Mishra, EMO, S/N Mrs. Kajal Bera, Group D Staff Mrs. Sushma Singh which reads as follows:- "Patient conscious and oriented and she states that the husband of the patient poured kerosene oil on her body at about 9.30 A.M. today and threw burning matchstick on her. The statement recorded by Dr. Maity was marked exbt.4. 5. THE staff nurse Shrimati Kajal Bera was examined as PW 8. She deposed that she had attended the patient. She did not have any independent recollection but it appeared from the bed-head ticket that the patient had told that her husband had poured kerosene on the person of the patient and torched it with a matchstick. At home, before the patient was shifted to the hospital, it was deposed by PW 1 the elder brother of the victim, that the victim had told him that she had been burnt by the inmates of her matrimonial home. This fact has also been indicated by the PW 1 in the written complaint promptly lodged. 6. THE dying declaration of the victim finds corroboration from the following pieces of evidence:- a) THE accused-husband was noticed escaping from the place of occurrence by the PW 2. As a matter of fact all the accused persons escaped after the incident. This fact has also been indicated by the PW 1 in the written complaint promptly lodged. 6. THE dying declaration of the victim finds corroboration from the following pieces of evidence:- a) THE accused-husband was noticed escaping from the place of occurrence by the PW 2. As a matter of fact all the accused persons escaped after the incident. b) PW 2 was suggested during his cross-examination by the defence as follows:- "Not a fact that we told the villagers that Sumitra had been burnt to death by Ashok." c) PW 6, a neighbour, deposed that there used to be quarrel between the couple. d) From the place of occurrence some burnt matchsticks and burnt human hair amongst others were seized by the police vide seizure lists dated 16th August 1989 which were collectively marked exbt.2. e) THE Autopsy Surgeon Dr. Dutta conducted the postmortem examination. He deposed that he found extensive burn all over the body including the hair. 6 f) THE investigating officer prepared a sketch map of the place of occurrence. In his sketch map the place of occurrence has been shown as the room of the appellant Ashok Dab. g) THE appellant during his examination under Section 313 CrPC did not offer any explanation whatsoever. It is in this backdrop that the submissions advanced by Mr. Mitra have to be considered. His entire endeavour was to assail the dying declaration. He contended that the PW 1 Dr. Maity deposed that one Nirapada Roy accompanied the patient. The said Nirapada Roy has not been examined. 7. THE investigating officer (PW 13) went to the hospital at about 1.30 PM but did not enquire about any dying declaration from any of the doctors. The patient died at 3.30 P.M. He submitted that this is rather an unusual situation. He contended that the alleged dying declarations have become doubtful because the bed-head tickets were collected by the investigating officer after four months of the incident. He hinted at subsequent manufacturing of the dying declarations including the bedhead ticket. He also questioned the veracity of exbt.4 on the ground that the signature of the doctor was in different ink. This submission, it can straightaway be pointed out, is based on misconception. Dr. K.K. Maity recorded the statement of the victim in exbt.4 which appears to have been counter-signed by Dr. Mishra in different ink. He also questioned the veracity of exbt.4 on the ground that the signature of the doctor was in different ink. This submission, it can straightaway be pointed out, is based on misconception. Dr. K.K. Maity recorded the statement of the victim in exbt.4 which appears to have been counter-signed by Dr. Mishra in different ink. A comparison between exbt.4 and exbt.5 would make this point clear. Why was Nirapada not examined is not clear. But this omission does not appear to be a very important matter. Two respectable doctors of government hospital having no interest in the matter recorded the statement of the victim separately. The substance of the statements recorded by Dr. Maity and Dr. Mishra incorporated in exbts.4 and 5 is same. When two persons signed one document they may have used their respective pen and the ink could be different. The staff nurse in whose presence one of the statements was recorded has also been examined and she has also supported it. The mere fact that she did not have any independent recollection after five or more years from the date of the incident is not an unusual thing. We are as such unable to view the evidence adduced by these disinterested witnesses with any amount of suspicion. 8. MR. Mitra submitted that the Autopsy Surgeon deposed that the victim could be unconscious. That is a mere presumption which cannot outweigh the value of the evidence of eyewitnesses who in this case were two qualified independent doctors. Dr. Maity and Dr. Mishra examined the patient and recorded her statement. Dr. Dutta the Autopsy Surgeon has merely given an opinion on the basis of what he found during his postmortem examination We are supported in our view by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Smt Lichhamadevi vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1988 SC 1785 wherein Their Lordships accepted the evidence of attending physician although he had not recorded the statement of the victim yet Their Lordships held that there was no reason to disbelieve the doctor. The views to be precise expressed by Their Lordships in paragraph 9 of the judgment which are as follows:- "It was Lalit Kishore who took Pushpa to the hospital and got her admitted. Dr. Goel who received Pushpa and admitted her in the emergency ward has testified that neighbours brought Pushpa and no relative accompanied her. The views to be precise expressed by Their Lordships in paragraph 9 of the judgment which are as follows:- "It was Lalit Kishore who took Pushpa to the hospital and got her admitted. Dr. Goel who received Pushpa and admitted her in the emergency ward has testified that neighbours brought Pushpa and no relative accompanied her. He has stated that Pushpa was in a serious condition. He has deposed that upon his questioning, Pushpa told him that her mother-in-law had burnt her. It is true that Dr. Goel has not recorded this statement in the medical register but that is no ground to disbelieve him. Dr. Goel is a disinterested person. The High Court has accepted his version and we have no reason to reject it. Dr. Goel himself has treated the victim. Therefore, there was no question of finding out from the Doctor whether Pushpa was in a position to give her statement or not. Moreover, the statement before the Doctor was not recorded as a dying-declaration. It was a communication by the patient to the Doctor who treated. He is a Government Doctor on duty in the hospital at that time. Nothing has been elicited from his cross examination that he was interested in or enemically disposed towards the appellant. 9. THE judgments cited by Mr. Mitra are not of any assistance to the appellant for the simple reason that in each of the cases cited by him the dying declaration was suspicious. The first judgment cited by Mr. Mitra is in the case of RamilaBen vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 1575. In that case Their Lordships were of the view, for the reasons discussed in the judgment, that the dying declaration had failed to inspire confidence. 10. THE second judgment cited by Mr. Mitra was in the case of Panchdeo Singh vs. State of Bihar reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 211. In that case the alleged dying declaration did not contain any signature of the doctor and other attending staffs which made the dying declaration a seriously suspect document. The third judgment cited by Mr. Mitra was in the case of Sk. Rafiq vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2008(2) SCC (Cri) 720. In that case the dying declaration was recorded by the Assistant Sub-Inspector of police. The third judgment cited by Mr. Mitra was in the case of Sk. Rafiq vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2008(2) SCC (Cri) 720. In that case the dying declaration was recorded by the Assistant Sub-Inspector of police. He during his cross-examination was unable to offer any explanation as to why did he not send for an Executive Magistrate to record the dying declaration and why did he not take the doctor into confidence before recording the alleged dying declaration. There was no satisfactory evidence in that case to show that the patient was conscious. It is in those circumstance that the dying declaration was disbelieved. The fourth judgment cited by Mr. Mitra in this connection was in the case of Chacko vs. State of Kerala reported in 2003 SCC (Cri) 246. Their Lordships in that case disbelieved the alleged dying declaration allegedly made by the deceased, an old man, aged about 70 years, who had suffered 80% burn injury and the dying declaration appeared to be a very detailed one. The alleged dying declaration was recorded after 8/9 hours from the time he contacted the burns. The doctor was not taken into confidence. There was no knowing as to what was the physical condition of the patient when he allegedly made the dying declaration. The alleged dying declaration was not even signed by the doctor. It is in these circumstances that the dying declaration was disbelieved. 11. THE fifth judgment cited by him in this regard is in the case of P. Rosamma and Ors. vs. State of AP reported 1999(7) SCC 695 . In this case the dying declaration had been recorded by a learned Magistrate which contained at the end an endorsement by a doctor indicating that the patient was conscious but there was no indication to show whether the patient was in a fit mind to make the statement. The doctor in that case did not take the responsibility as to the contents of the dying declaration. The document was therefore disbelieved. 12. THE sixth judgment cited by Mr. Mitra in this regard was in the case of Jagga Singh vs. reported in AIR 1995 SC 135 . The dying declaration in that case was not signed by the doctor. It was indicated in the dying declaration that the victim had been raped as regards which there was no evidence. 12. THE sixth judgment cited by Mr. Mitra in this regard was in the case of Jagga Singh vs. reported in AIR 1995 SC 135 . The dying declaration in that case was not signed by the doctor. It was indicated in the dying declaration that the victim had been raped as regards which there was no evidence. The doctor who had allegedly declared the victim fit to make a dying declaration did not endorse the same and therefore Their Lordships were unable to place any reliance upon that kind of a document. Lastly Mr. Mitra relied upon a judgment in the case of State of Assam vs. Mafizuddin Ahmed reported in AIR 1983 SC 274 wherein the alleged dying declaration belatedly made was disbelieved for the following reasons:- "In the instant case, the occurrence took place on the 10th of April, 1973. The deceased was alive up to 18th of April, 1973. She did not disclose earlier to anyone. She met in the hospital that her husband sprinkled kerosene oil and set her on fire. She met so many people after the occurrence- she met the village people who appeared on the scene just after the occurrence and who took her to hospital. She did not disclose the story to the doctor or the nurse attending on her. There is no evidence of the doctor on the record that she was not in a position to speak or that she had become unconscious between 10th of April and 18th of April. It is only when her uncle met her on the 18th of April that she made an oral dying declaration to him and later to the Magistrate who recorded her statement. This throws doubt on the dying declaration made by Jaygun Bibi and this circumstance weighed with the High Court in discarding the dying declaration of the deceased. The High Court discarded the dying declaration on yet another ground that the name of the husband of the deceased given in the dying declaration was Mohsin Ali not Mafizuddin Ahmed and, therefore, the identity of the lady Jaygun Bibi was itself doubtful. Dr. Ramananda Das, Registrar of the Surgical Unit No.1 of the Gauhati Medical College Hospital, P.W.6 in whose presence the statement was recorded, has not stated that the declarant was Jaygun Bibi. Dr. Ramananda Das, Registrar of the Surgical Unit No.1 of the Gauhati Medical College Hospital, P.W.6 in whose presence the statement was recorded, has not stated that the declarant was Jaygun Bibi. He has simply stated that the Magistrate recorded the statement of a patient of his unit who received burn injuries. Further, the Magistrate, Shri A.C. Bhuyan, who recorded the dying declaration of the Jaygun Bibi stated that the daroga and a constable were present nearby when the statement was recorded. Coupled with these is the absence of the thumb impression of the deceased on the declaration. 13. THE cumulative effect of all the circumstances which weighed with the High Court is that they cast doubt about the truthfulness of the dying declaration. It is not outside the realm of probability that her statement may have been inspired by her uncle and, therefore, it will not be safe to base the conviction of respondent on such a dying declaration." 14. ONLY other judgment relied on by Mr. Mitra was in the case of MP Shaw vs. State of Gujarat reported AIR 1983 SC wherein Their Lordships opined that the evidence of a doctor has to be appreciated like the evidence of any other witness and that there is no irrebuttable presumption that a doctor is always a witness of truth. The views expressed in this judgment do not have any application to the case in hand. The law as regards value of a dying declaration laid down in the case of State of Assam vs. Mofizuddin (supra) is as follows:- "Thus, the law is now well settled that there can be conviction on the basis of dying declaration and it is not at all necessary to have a corroboration provided the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is a truthful dying declaration and not vitiated in any other manner." We have before us unblemished testimony of two eminent doctors of a government hospital as regards whose impartiality nothing was suggested which might lead us to view them with any amount of suspicion. The dying declaration and the truth thereof has found corroboration from the facts and circumstances including conduct of the appellant discussed above. We therefore are of the view that the judgment and order under challenge are impeccable and there is no scope for any interference. This appeal in the result fails and is dismissed. 15. The dying declaration and the truth thereof has found corroboration from the facts and circumstances including conduct of the appellant discussed above. We therefore are of the view that the judgment and order under challenge are impeccable and there is no scope for any interference. This appeal in the result fails and is dismissed. 15. THE appellant is directed to surrender forthwith to serve out the sentence. In the event the appellant does not surrender the learned trial Court shall take coercive measures and shall also issue appropriate jail warrant. Lower Court Records with a copy of this judgment be sent down to the concerned learned trial Court forthwith by the criminal section for information and necessary action in accordance with law. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, be delivered to the learned Advocate for the parties, if applied for, upon compliance of all formalities.