Judgment G. B. SHAH, J. ( 1. ) HEARD learned Advocate Mr. Nirad Buch for Nanavati Advocates for the applicant and learned Advocate Mrs. Ketty A. Mehta for Ms. Nisha M. Thakore for the opponent. ( 2. ) ORIGINAL applicant Harishbhai Vishwanath Shukla was original defendant-tenant. Opponent Priyavadan Maganlal Patel is original plaintiff- landlord. 2.1. The original applicant was a tenant of the property in question, situated at Station Road, Sihor for 50 years. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the present Civil Revision Application, original applicant has died on 8-1-2010. Heirs and legal representatives of the original applicant preferred Civil Application No. 7492 of 2010, in which they have stated that if they were permitted to contest the Civil Revision Application No. 176 of 2005. no prejudice would be caused to the opponent and if they will not be permitted, their rights would be adversely affected with regard to the suit property. Vide order dated 19-7-2010, this Court allowed said Civil Application No. 7492 of 2010 and accordingly, the legal heirs were brought on record of Civil Revision Application No. 176 of 2005, as applicant Nos. 1/1 to 1/4. Applicant No. 1/1 is widow and applicant Nos. 1/2 to 1/4 are the sons of original applicant/tenant. 2.2. The opponent/landlord preferred Civil Suit No. 59 of 1986 before learned Civil Judge (J.D.) at Sihor, which was decided in favour of the original applicant/tenant, vide order dated 9-12-1994. 2.3. The opponent/landlord challenged the said judgment and order dated 9-12-1994 by filing Regular Civil Appeal No. 102 of 1994 before the learned District Court at Bhavnagar. The appellate Court had confirmed the decree of the trial Court passed in Civil Suit No. 59 of 1986 by which the trial Court has dismissed the suit. 2.4. The opponent herein/original plaintiff-landlord had preferred Civil Revision Application No. 1148 of 1998 before this Court, challenging the said order dated 9-12-1994. At the time of hearing of the said Civil Revision Application No. 1148 of 1998, the original applicant was unable to appear before this Court and thus the said Civil Revision Application was heard ex-parte and the same came to be decided in favour of the opponent herein and the decree of eviction came to be passed in pursuance of the said order passed in Civil Revision Application No. 1148 of 1998, directing the original applicant herein to vacate the premises. 2.5. The original applicant, therefore, preferred Misc. Civil Application for review and recall of the aforesaid order passed in Civil Revision Application No. 1148 of 1998, in favour of the present opponent. After hearing both the parties, this Court remanded the said matter to the lower Appellate Court, vide order dated 29-9-2004 for reconsideration of the limited issue of acquisition of alternative accommodation by the applicant. 2.6. Specific directions passed by this Court in the above-referred Civil Revision Application No. 1148 of 1998, in paragraph Nos. 29 to 31, read as under : "29. In my view, the appellate Court has not considered the evidence properly and instead of considering the evidence in this revision application, it would be just and proper to send the matter back to the appellate Court for giving appropriate finding, after appreciating the evidence on record. Whether the defendant has domain over the house in question is the question, which is required to be considered by the appellate Court after appreciating evidence on record. The appellate Court after considering the evidence on record, may give specific finding whether it can be said that the new house is purchased from the income of H.U.F. or whether the defendant has played substantial financial role for the purchase of said house or whether the defendant has got control over the new house or whether it can be said that the acquisition of new house is on behalf of the joint family. It is also required to be considered whether the sons of the defendant had got any independent income for purchasing new house. It is also required to be considered whether the loan in question is repaid by the sons of the defendant. Since, I am inclined to send the matter back, it is not necessary to deal with the judgments cited by both the sides as ultimately, it is for the appellate Court to give appropriate finding on the issue of acquisition of alternative accommodation. 30. The appellate Court may re-examine the question so far as it relates to acquisition of alternative accommodation as contemplated under Sec. 13(1)(1) of the Bombay Rent Act and thereafter, the appellate Court may give specific finding as indicated above. 30. The appellate Court may re-examine the question so far as it relates to acquisition of alternative accommodation as contemplated under Sec. 13(1)(1) of the Bombay Rent Act and thereafter, the appellate Court may give specific finding as indicated above. The appellate Court shall consider the entire evidence afresh and so far as observation of this Court is concerned, the same is tentative in nature and the appellate Judge is free to take his own decision without being influenced by the reasoning given by this Court in the present judgment. 31. It is clarified that so far as finding of the appellate Court on other points is concerned, the same stands concluded and only the question of acquisition of alternative accommodation is required to be considered." 2.7. In pursuance of the aforesaid order passed by this Court dated 29-9-2004 in Civil Revision Application No. 1148 of 1998, the lower appellate Court was pleased to proceed with the said appeal, being Regular Civil Appeal No. 102 of 1994, and after hearing both the parties, the learned appellate Court was pleased to allow the said Regular Civil Appeal No. 102 of 1994, vide order dated 21-4-2005. 2.8. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 21-4-2005, passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 102 of 1994 by the learned Joint District Judge, Bhavnagar, the original applicant has filed present Civil Revision Application before this Court under Sec. 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. ( 3. ) LEARNED Advocates for the parties have drawn my attention to the aforesaid Paragraph Nos. 2.2 to 2.8, and jointly submitted that this Court, while remanding the Civil Revision Application, has given direction to the appellate Court to consider the only question of acquisition of alternative accommodation and accordingly, in this Civil Revision Application also, the said limited question of acquisition of alternative accommodation under Sec. 13(1)(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 is required to be dealt with. ( 4. ( 4. ) AS per the case of the opponent/original plaintiff pleaded in the plaint, suitable accommodation of the original applicant/original defendant was made by purchasing one flat at Ahmedabad and one open plot at Sihor and after subsequent events, which were brought on record by way of amendment, that two houses in Sihor were purchased and the said cause of action had arisen during the pendency of the suit. It was not under dispute that the High Court had decided that the Court can pass decree on the subsequent events, if it is proved and accordingly, the learned Advocates for the parties have not pressed the same before the appellate Court. ( 5. ) THE learned Advocate for the applicant/original tenant/defendant has mainly argued that because the residential premises have been acquired by the daughter-in-law or by the son of the applicant/original defendant, they are not covered in the ambit and scope of definition of 'Tenant' under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act and it cannot be said that the applicant/original defendant had acquired alternative accommodation and he has domain over the said properties. ( 6. ) REFERRING to the judgment dated 21-4-2005 passed by the appellate Court at Bhavnagar in Regular Civil Appeal No. 102 of 1994, description of Para 9 talks about one flat at Ahmedabad in the name of daughter-in- law Maltiben, wife of Milankumar, son of the applicant/original defendant. It is alleged by the respondent/original plaintiff that the applicant/original defendant had purchased the same in the name of his daughter-in-law. The evidence at length has been discussed by the appellate Court that the said flat was purchased for Rs. 1,15,000/- in June 1985 and was sold in 1986. After detailed discussion on each point relating to the amount which had expended in purchasing the said flat, the Court below has found that the original applicant/original defendant had given more than 50% of the amount to his son for purchasing the flat at Ahmedabad. ( 7. ) ANOTHER allegation of the opponent/original plaintiff is that the applicant/original defendant had purchased one open plot in Sihor in 1965, being Plot No. 76, and thereafter, the said plot was sold on 5-9-1988 by registered sale deed No. 854. In Paragraph Nos. 10 and 11 of the judgment of the appellate Court, detailed discussion of evidence has been made by the appellate Court. In Paragraph Nos. 10 and 11 of the judgment of the appellate Court, detailed discussion of evidence has been made by the appellate Court. On each and every angle, the evidence has been discussed by the appellate Court and it was found mat the original applicant/original defendant has failed to prove the fact that the plot in Sihor village was purchased from H.U.F. money. Subsequently, the original applicant had sold it. The original applicant/original defendant had tried to show to the Court that it was purchased from H.U.F. money, but on the same evidence forthcoming on the record and well discussed, it appears that the same is not believable. The appellate Court has rightly observed that to defeat the case of the opponent/original plaintiff, the original applicant/original defendant had knowingly and intelligently sold the plot during the pendency of the suit. ( 8. ) THIRD contention of the opponent/original plaintiff was that during the pendency of the suit, the applicant/original defendant had purchased the property adjoining the suit house and the same is alternative accommodation, which is sufficient to accommodate the family of the applicant/original defendant The trial Court had also held that the applicant/original defendant and his family members can reside in the said houses comfortably. Threadbare discussion has been made by the Court below relating to the evidence forthcoming on record. It was argued that when Milankumar, son of the original applicant/original defendant, had no knowledge about the amount which had been transacted after purchasing the new house, it is proved that the original applicant/original defendant was domain in his family and the Court should presume the same as per Sec. 106 of the Evidence Act. After detailed discussion of the evidence, the appellate Court has observed and found in Paragraph 16 of the order dated 21-4-2005, which reads as under : "......Here in the case on hand there is no evidence that Milankumar has maintained any separate accounts and he has purchased the new house from his own independent income. After detailed discussion of the evidence, the appellate Court has observed and found in Paragraph 16 of the order dated 21-4-2005, which reads as under : "......Here in the case on hand there is no evidence that Milankumar has maintained any separate accounts and he has purchased the new house from his own independent income. He had all opportunities to bring the real evidence and had also the possible and available evidence to prove this fact and for that it is established from the fact that the new house is also purchased by the family of the defendant and the defendant was domain in the family, and hence, if the house purchased by the family then it is a alternative accommodation to the defendant and for that the defendant is responsible to vacate it as per Sec. 13(1)(1) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947..." 8.1. I have carefully gone through the judgment dated 21-4-2005 passed by the Second Joint District Judge at Bhavnagar in Regular Civil Appeal No. 102 of 1994 in light of the evidence forthcoming on the record. The learned Advocate for the applicant has mainly emphasized Paragraphs 10, 12 and 15 and nothing substantial has been pointed out, which would help the present applicant. From the said judgment, the learned Advocate for the applicant has failed to show that the applicant/original defendant had no control over the family and he was not domain over the newly purchased property at Sihor. On the contrary, it has come in the cross-examination of Milankumar (son of the original applicant/original defendant) that his brother Atul is residing at Bhavnagar and he had purchased the house in Bhavnagar City and the same was purchased by his father, i.e. the original applicant/original defendant. There appears no infirmity or illegality in the well discussed and painstaking judgment delivered by the learned Second Joint District Judge at Bhavnagar in Regular Civil Appeal No. 102 of 1994 dated 21 4-2005 and I find myself in complete agreement with the same. ( 9. ) THE conduct of the original applicant/original defendant and the present applicant Nos. 1/2 to 1/4 is such which gives signal to the society that, henceforth landlord will think twice before the property is given on rent j to tenants. ( 9. ) THE conduct of the original applicant/original defendant and the present applicant Nos. 1/2 to 1/4 is such which gives signal to the society that, henceforth landlord will think twice before the property is given on rent j to tenants. If paragraph No. 15, on page 14 of the judgment dated 21-4- 2005 of the appellate Court, is perused, it appears that in the deposition of Milankumar, recorded at Exh. 196, he has stated that he has purchased the house before five years (on the date of deposition) and prior to that, he was residing in the joint family. Son of the original applicant/original defendant Milankumar has also stated that the house nearby the suit property was purchased in the name of his own as well as his brother Atul. He has then deposed that there is no right of the defendant in this new house. If this was the deposition, then how, after the death of the original applicant/ original defendant, said Milankumar, present applicant No. 1/2, and rest of the applicant Nos. 1/3 and 1/4 in Civil Application No. 7492 of 2010 filed under Order XXII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for bringing the heirs of the applicant/original defendant, stated that permission sought for by the applicant Nos. 1/1 to 1/4 if rejected, would adversely affect their rights to the suit property. THE learned Advocate for the applicant Nos. 1/1 to 1/4 has fairly admitted that after the death of the applicant/original defendant, legal heirs of deceased applicant/original defendant had not claimed tenancy rights over the suit property with the present opponent/original plaintiff. On a query raised by the Court, the learned Advocate for the applicant has fairly admitted that the age of the present applicant No. 1/1 Sushilaben H. Shukla is approximately 80 to 85 years and she is residing along with her son. Under the above-referred circumstances, there appears no substance and merits in the present Civil Revision Application and being devoid of any merits, the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith. ( 10. ) CONSIDERING the above referred conduct of the original applicant as well as present applicants, present applicant Nos. 1/2 to 1/4 are directed to pay cost of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only) to the present opponent/original plaintiff landlord. Application dismissed.