Judgment : 1. State filed this revision impugning the order dated 07.06.2002 of the learned Additional Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad in Crl.M.P.No.399 of 2000 in C.C.No.6 of 2000. The respondents 1 to 3 were A.1 to A.3 before the Special Judge in C.C.No.6 of 2000. They are the i) Secretary, Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society Limited, ii) Supervisor, District Cooperative Central Bank Limited and iii) Junior Officer, District Cooperative Central Bank Limited. The accused allegedly committed the offence punishable under Section 2 (c)(ix) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘P.C. Act’, for short). Holding that the employees of cooperative societies constituted under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 are not public servants within the meaning of the P.C. Act, the learned trial Judge discharged A.1 to A.3. The co-accused, who is A.4, also was discharged. However, the present revision is confined to A.1 to A.3 only. 2. It is the contention of the learned Standing Counsel for A.C.B. (petitioner) that the members of the cooperative societies are, indeed, public servants, as observed by the Supreme Court in Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. etc. v. P. Venku Reddy (2002 (2) ALD (Crl.) 750 (SC)) and that the trial Court, therefore, was not justified in discharging A.1 to A.3 on the ground that P.C. Act would not apply to them. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents/accused contended that the trial Court discharged the accused on the basis of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in P. Venku Reddy v. Govt. of A.P. (Writ Appeal No.1163 of 2001), dated 26.09.2001 and that there was no error on the face of the order of the learned trial Judge to interfere with the same. 3. There appears to be a change of legal view regarding the definition of public servant, as referred to in the P.C. Act, with reference to its application to the members of the cooperative societies. As already pointed out, a Division Bench of this Court took the view on 26.09.2001 in P. Venku Reddy (W.A.No.1163 of 2001) that an employee of the cooperative society per se is not a public servant within the meaning of Section 2 (c) (ix) of the P.C. Act. The impugned order was passed by the learned Special Judge on 07.06.2002. As already pointed out, a Division Bench of this Court took the view on 26.09.2001 in P. Venku Reddy (W.A.No.1163 of 2001) that an employee of the cooperative society per se is not a public servant within the meaning of Section 2 (c) (ix) of the P.C. Act. The impugned order was passed by the learned Special Judge on 07.06.2002. In the appeal from the decision of the High Court, the Supreme Court in P. Venku Reddy (supra) that the employees of cooperative societies are indeed public servants. In other words, the respondents/A.1 to A.3 are public servants within the meaning of the P.C. Act, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court. The question is whether the order of the learned Special Judge is liable to be set aside, as suffering from error of the application of law. 4. Thelearned counsel for the respondents-accused referred to three dates. The Division Bench of this Court disposed of Writ Appeal No.1163 of 2001 on 26.09.2001. The learned Special Judge disposed of Crl.M.P.No.399 of 2001 on 07.06.2002. The Crl. Appeal No.997 of 2002 arising from W.A.No.1163 of 2001 was disposed of by the Supreme Court on 03.09.2002. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Special Judge applied the legal position as it stood on the date of the order and that the legal position as on that date was that the employees of the cooperative societies were not public servants within the meaning of the P.C. Act. My attention was drawn to Chapter-XXX of Cr.P.C. and Section 399 Cr.P.C. in particular. The learned counsel for the accused submitted that the High Court can interfere with the order of the Special Judge if the order suffers from illegality, irregularity or error in any proceedings and that as the law stood on the date of the order was followed by the learned Special Judge, the impugned order did not suffer from any irregularity or illegality or error. It, therefore, is suggested that it is not a case where the High Court can interfere with by exercising its revisional powers. 5. I may make it clear that there is no change of law by the enactment. No new provision was incorporated in between 26.09.2001 and 03.09.2002. It, therefore, is suggested that it is not a case where the High Court can interfere with by exercising its revisional powers. 5. I may make it clear that there is no change of law by the enactment. No new provision was incorporated in between 26.09.2001 and 03.09.2002. A Division Bench of this Court took the view on 26.09.2001 that the employees of cooperative societies were not public servants within the meaning of the P.C. Act. In the criminal appeal arising therefrom, the Supreme Court held on 03.09.2002 that the members of the cooperative societies are, indeed, public servants. The question of the wrong application of the law by the trial Court or committing any irregularity or illegality by the trial Court in passing the impugned order did not arise. However, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the order of discharge passed by the learned Special Judge has become erroneous. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents-accused inter alia contended that the judgments of the Courts are prospective in operation. I am afraid that this contention is not correct. Any judgment of the Court and particularly, any judgment of a Court of records is retrospective in operation. Way back in 1967, Subba Rao C.J. observed in Golaknath v. Union of India ( AIR 1967 SC 1643 ) that it is only the Supreme Court, which has powers to prospectively overrule an enactment or a legal position. The decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel is liable to be read with retrospective operation. However, in the present case, reading the decision of the Supreme Court with retrospective operation is not necessary. The Supreme Court merely clarified that the employees of cooperative societies are public servants within the meaning of P.C. Act. The Supreme Court did not lay down any new law. It did not even expand the meaning of public servant. It merely gave clarity to the grey area pointing out that the employees of cooperative societies are public servants. The question of the decision of the Supreme Court being prospective or retrospective would be a mere academic exercise in the present case. As on today, the position is that the employees of cooperative societies are public servants within the meaning of the P.C. Act. In that view of the matter, the decision of the learned Special Judge is erroneous. The question of the decision of the Supreme Court being prospective or retrospective would be a mere academic exercise in the present case. As on today, the position is that the employees of cooperative societies are public servants within the meaning of the P.C. Act. In that view of the matter, the decision of the learned Special Judge is erroneous. The question still open for consideration is whether the order of the learned Special Judge is liable to be set aside. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents-accused contended that whenever the Supreme Court takes a different view, if it is to be applied to already disposed of cases, it would be impossible to reopen every case on the strength of the clarification issued by the Supreme Court. I am afraid that equities have no place in criminal law. In the present case, the question is very simple viz., whether A.1 to A.3 are public servants or otherwise within the meaning of the P.C. Act. The Special Court held that they were not public servants and consequently, discharged them. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, considered that the employees of cooperative societies are public servants within the meaning of the P.C. Act. The decision of the learned Special Judge, consequently, suffers from erroneous application of law and is consequently liable to be set aside. It may be pointed out that the only ground on which the learned trial Judge discharged the accused was that the accused were employees of the cooperative societies and were not public servants within the meaning of the P.C. Act. Consequently, the order of the Special Court is liable to be set aside. 8. I, however, do not wish to pass orders straightaway issuing direction to the learned Additional Special Judge SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad. I consider that the ends of justice would be met if the impugned order is set aside and the case is remitted to the trial Court for fresh consideration. 9. Forthe reasons set out, Crl.M.P.No.399 of 2000 in C.C.No.6 of 2000 passed by the Additional Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad is set aside. The case is remitted to the Additional Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad for fresh consideration and disposal, according to law, after due notice to both sides. The revision is disposed of accordingly.