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2011 DIGILAW 69 (GUJ)

Gujarat Janvadi Karmachari Union v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation

2011-02-04

JAYANT PATEL

body2011
Judgment Jayant Patel, J.—The petitioner, by this petition, has prayed for the relief, inter alia, to quash and set aside the order dated 15.3.2004 passed by the Respondent No. 1 at Annexure-G, whereby the representation of the petitioner has been rejected and the consequential prayer is made by the petitioner to issue appropriate directions to the respondents to grant benefits of General Provident Fund (GPF) Scheme to the Central Workshop employees of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC). 2. Heard Mr. Upadyay, Learned Counsel for the petitioner. 3. It may be recorded that this Court, when considered the matter for the first time on 9.4.2004, passed the following order:— “The present petition is preferred by the petitioner challenging the order, dated 15.3.04 passed by the Respondent No. 1 (Annexure “G”) whereby the representation of the petitioner has been dismissed. 2. Heard Mr. Upadhyay for the petitioner. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the Commissioner has ordered for shifting of Employees’ Provident Fund to General Provident Fund scheme to certain class of employees and the same is not ordered to the petitioner and therefore this petition. 3. Having considered the above, it is required to be noted that earlier the petitioner had preferred SCA No. 4861/02 before this court and the said petition was disposed of by this court directing the petitioner to make representation before the Commissioner and the Commissioner was directed to decide the same. Accordingly, the petitioner made representation on 9.7.03. The Corporation has examined the same and found that after 1998 shifting from EPF scheme to GPF is not permissible. The reasons are mentioned while passing the order annexure G, dated 15.3.04. It cannot be said that the decision of the Commissioner upon the representation is arbitrary or illegal. However, whether the scheme should be made applicable or should be applied or not is essentially a policy decision because change or shifting in the scheme may ensue additional financial burden upon the corporation. So far as extension of benefit to certain class of employees and not extending the same to the petitioner is concerned, the petitioner has given the names but they are not those who have entered the service along with petitioner or thereafter. It appears that they are the persons who have joined the service prior to the petitioner. So far as extension of benefit to certain class of employees and not extending the same to the petitioner is concerned, the petitioner has given the names but they are not those who have entered the service along with petitioner or thereafter. It appears that they are the persons who have joined the service prior to the petitioner. If the classification is made on the basis of rational criterion it can not be said that there is any discrimination made by the corporation. 4. Under the circumstances, I find that no case is made out for interference and hence petition is rejected.” 4. Thereafter, vide order dated 1.7.2010 in Civil Application No. 2611 of 2010 with LPA No. 1376 of 2004, following order was passed:— “The case comes up for taking certain documents on record. The documents pertain to the custody of the respondents only. Therefore, their production is not opposed. They are permitted to be produced. In view of the production of the documents, the whole texture of the case will get changed because before learned Single Judge the documents were not produced and therefore the order impugned came to be passed. In light of these documents a fresh view is required to be taken. In that view of the matter, we consider it appropriate that the order of learned Single Judge be set aside and the matter be remanded to learned Single Judge. Learned Single Judge will permit the petitioner to refer to the documents before this Court. Rule is made absolute. The appeal also stands disposed of.” 5. Under these circumstances, the matter is once again placed for hearing after restoration of the Special Civil Application for consideration on merits. 6. The Learned Counsel relied upon the additional documents, which were shown to the Division bench at the time when the LPA was heard and he submitted that such documents are produced from page Nos.66 to 103 together with the affidavit filed in the present Special Civil Application by Mr. Ramesh Ramcharan Upadhyay dated 19.7.2010. The Learned Counsel contended that in respect of 25 employees of the Corporation the correspondence was addressed by the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation to the Regional Director, Provident Fund Commission for shifting of the Scheme. Ramesh Ramcharan Upadhyay dated 19.7.2010. The Learned Counsel contended that in respect of 25 employees of the Corporation the correspondence was addressed by the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation to the Regional Director, Provident Fund Commission for shifting of the Scheme. However, he is not aware about the decision taken by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner as to whether shifting from EPF Scheme to GPF Scheme was permitted or not. The contention is that if the Corporation has, in respect of certain employees, moved the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner for shifting of the Provident Fund Scheme, the same treatment is required to be given in respect of the members of the petitioner Union and if such is not given, it would result into discretionary treatment and, therefore, the matter deserves consideration. 7. Prima facie the contention appears to be attractive but upon close scrutiny it appears that the document upon which the reliance has been placed by the Learned Counsel from page 94 onwards up to 103, they are all of the period 1991 and further those employees were also prior to the said period. As such in absence of the sanction granted by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner for shifting of the PF Scheme from EPF to GPF, the contention cannot be examined on the mere premise that such is permissible as prayed in the petition. Even if the matter is to be considered on the aspects of differential treatment, then also it is obligatory on the part of the petitioner to prove that the employees in question in the petition are similarly situated with those, who were considered for shifting of the Scheme by the Municipal Corporation at the relevant point of time. 8. Upon the query put by the Court, the Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, at the initial stage, during the course of submission, had declared that the employees in question are early 1996 appointees, whereas during the course of dictation of the order, the Learned Counsel altered the statement and stated that some members are also appointed in the years 1983 to 1989. As such the statement is as vague as anything, without putting material on record and such type of argument, without any support of authenticated evidence cannot be considered. As such the statement is as vague as anything, without putting material on record and such type of argument, without any support of authenticated evidence cannot be considered. Further, if the correspondence upon which the reliance placed is considered, it appears that they were relating to certain employees, who demanded for shifting of the scheme and the same came to be considered on 25.1.1991. If the employees, who are appointees of 1996 onwards are to be considered, they cannot be said to be similarly situated. Therefore, the alleged ground of discrimination would not be available at all. Further, even if it is considered that some of the employees were of 1983 to 1989 onwards, no material is produced on record to show that those employees, whose grievance is sought to be canvassed, at any point of time, during that period of 1991, made any application for shifting of the Scheme. If the employee concerned at the relevant point of time had not applied for shifting of the PF scheme and thereafter has allowed themselves to be as Members of EPF Scheme for a long time i.e. roughly for about 14 years, if considered from the filing of the petitioner and by now if considered, would be about 20 years, it cannot be said that they are similarly situated. If the employees concerned are not similarly situated, the ground of discrimination can be said as of non-existence premise. 9. Apart from the above, it deserves to be recorded that as observed earlier, if the classification is based on rational criteria, it cannot be said that there is any discrimination by the Corporation on the ground as sought to be canvassed, as observed, vide order dated 9.4.2004. 10. Mr. Upadyay, Learned Counsel had attempted to contend that as per the circular of the Corporation those employees, who have joined service after 1983 were compulsorily to join GPF and not EPF Scheme and, therefore, the contention is that if any mistake has been committed by the Corporation, the same is required to be rectified. 11. It appears that it is not a policy, which was not known to the petitioners. 11. It appears that it is not a policy, which was not known to the petitioners. Even if such policy exists, however, the petitioners, by their own volition, have become members of EPF and has continued for a long period, thereafter the members of the petitioner Union cannot be heard to say that now another Scheme of GPF is more beneficial, they should be allowed to shift the Scheme. No right cannot be allowed on the ground as sought to be canvassed, more particularly on account of the conduct with open hands throughout by the members of the petitioner Union. 12. The additional aspects in the present case is that the petitioners themselves have allowed being Members of EPF Scheme and deduction from the salary has been made as if the members of EPF Scheme all throughout and once a person is admitted as Member of EPF Scheme, no right is said to have vested in him for shifting of the PF Scheme and more particularly because, at a late stage, one finds another GPF Scheme is to endure better benefits. Once the party has altered his position, he cannot be heard to shifting of the scheme as of right as sought to be canvassed. 13. In view of the aforesaid, the petition is meritless and hence, dismissed. P P P P P