I.A.Ansari, J. - With the help of this revision, made under Section 72 of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2009, the petitioner has challenged the order, dated 10.12.2006, passed by the Superintendent of Taxes, Churaibari Check Post, Tripura, seizing certain consignment of goods on the grounds that the said consign­ment was undeclared. 2. The petitioner has, with the help of this revision, also challenged the order, dated 17.12.2007, passed by the Commissioner of Taxes, Tripura, holding that the seized goods were taxable @ 12.5% by virtue of Entry 135 of Schedule H(B) of Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004, (in short, 'the TVAT Act') and since the petitioner had opted for composition, the petitioner shall pay a sum of Rs. 16,125/- as the amount of compensation and directed the Superintendent of Taxes to release the said goods on payment of the composition money. 3. The petitioner's case is, in brief, thus: The petitioner purchased 600 metres offish net fabric at Rs. 16,125/- from Kolkata and booked the said fish net fabric in five consignment to Tripura. In the documents, the consignment of goods was classified as fish net fabric. When the said consignments reached Churaibari check post, Tripura, Suprerintendent of Taxes, respondent No. 3 herein, namely, Superintendent of Taxes, in charge of Churaibari check post, seized the said consignment of goods on the ground that the said consignments were undeclared. The respondent No. 3, namely Superintendent of Taxes, Churaibari check post, assessed the value of the goods at Rs. 43,000/- and, thereupon, handed over the seizure list to the driver of the vehicle. The following reasons were assigned for seizure of the goods by the respondent No.3: "Searched the goods in the vehicle and 5 (five) pkgs of mosquito net (plastic made) seized for causes of undeclaration. The transporter in C. N. wrong information submitted, only Fishnet Fabric. Hence seized the goods seems to have undeclaration & wrong information." 4. The petitioner, thereafter, approached the Commissioner of Taxes with a prayer for releasing of the seized goods. The Commissioner of Taxes, the respondent No.2 herein, however, vide order, dated 17.02.2007, held that the seized goods were mosquito net (plastic made) and, therefore, taxable @ 12.5% under Entry 135 of Schedule II(B) of the TVAT Act. The petitioner, thereafter, approached the Commissioner of Taxes with a prayer for releasing of the seized goods. The Commissioner of Taxes, the respondent No.2 herein, however, vide order, dated 17.02.2007, held that the seized goods were mosquito net (plastic made) and, therefore, taxable @ 12.5% under Entry 135 of Schedule II(B) of the TVAT Act. The Commissioner of Taxes also recorded, in his order, dated 17.02.2007, that the petitioner had opted for composition and ordered the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 16,125/- as composition money and directed the Superintendent of Taxes, the respondent No.3 herein, to release the seized goods on payment of the said composition money. 5. Being aggrieved, the present revision application has been filed challenging the orders, dated 10.12.2006 and 17.12.2007, passed by the Superintendent of Taxes, Churaibari Check Post, Tripura, and the Commissioner of Taxes, Tripura respectively. 6. We have heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel, for the petitioner and Mr. N C. Pal, learned Government Advocate, for the respondents. 7. While considering the present writ petition, it needs to be noted that the TVAT Act came into force with the effect from 27.04.2005. Schedule III attached to the TVAT Act contains a list of exempted goods. Entry 15 of Schedule III of TVAT Act, prior to its amendments, reads as under: "15. Fishnet, Fishnet fabric, fish seeds/ prawn/shrimp seeds" 8. By the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, the aforesaid Entry 15 was replaced by the following: "15. Fishnet, Fishnet fabric, fish seeds/ prawn/shrimp seeds, mosquito net." 9. Thus, with the amendment of Entry 15 of the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007 Mosquito net was also exempted from the payment of tax under the TVAT Act. 10. Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, assailing the orders, dated 10.12.2006 and 17.12.2007, passed by the Superintendent of Taxes, Churaibari check post, Tripura, and the Commissioner of Taxes, Tripura, respectively, submits that the findings of the respondent No.3, the Seizing Authority, that the goods were mosquito net (plastic made) was without any reason or basis. Mr. Deb points out that under the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976, mosquito net (plastic made) was not taxable inasmuch as the said item was not covered by any of the taxable entries. Mr. Mr. Deb points out that under the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976, mosquito net (plastic made) was not taxable inasmuch as the said item was not covered by any of the taxable entries. Mr. Deb also points out the Legislature, while amending the various provisions of the TVAT Act, used the expression "added" or "deleted", but no expression whatsoever was used, while amending the Entry 15 of Schedule III of the TVAT Act. Mr. Deb submits that from a close reading of pre-amended Entry 15 it clearly transpires that amendment of Entry 15 has to read to be an instance of legislation by substitution. He points out that a provsion making exemption substituting thereby a former provision should be liberally construed and should be constructed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission, which the earlier legislation suffered, and the subsequent Statute must, therefore, be held to relate back to the time, when the former statute was enacted. In support of his contention, Mr. Deb places reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Rafiquennessa Vs. lal Bahadur Chetri : AIR 1964 SC 1511 , Shashikalabai Vs. State of Maharshtra, reported in (1998) 5 SCC 332 , Rattan lal Vs. State of Punjab : AIR 1965 SC 444 , Workmen. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. India (P) Ltd. reported in (1973) 1 SCC 813 , Bharat Singh Vs. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre reported in (1986) 2 SCC 614 , Rathi Menon Vs. Union of India, reported in (2007; 3 SCC 714, Allied Motors (P) Ltd. Vs. CIT, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 472 , CIT Vs. Poddar Cement (P) Ltd. reported in (1997) 5 SCC 482 , National Agricultural Corporation Marketing Federation of India Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 23 , Government of India Vs. India Tobacco Association, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 396 , Binani Industries Ltd. Vs. CCT, reported in (2007) 15 SCC 435 , and Vijay Kumar Vs. State of Maharshtra, reported in (2005; 6 SCC 289. 11. Referring to the Corpus Juris Secundum, Mr. Union of India, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 23 , Government of India Vs. India Tobacco Association, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 396 , Binani Industries Ltd. Vs. CCT, reported in (2007) 15 SCC 435 , and Vijay Kumar Vs. State of Maharshtra, reported in (2005; 6 SCC 289. 11. Referring to the Corpus Juris Secundum, Mr. Deb submits that as a general rule, Statutes, relating to remedies and procedural, are given retrospective operation inasmuch as remedial and procedural statute does not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested or contractual rights but relate only to remedies or mode of procedure and the same are, generally, construed to operate restrospectively and apply to pending actions or proceedings, unless such operation or application would adversely effect substantive rights. Mr. Deb also submits that the Superintendent of Taxes, Churaibari Check Post, seized the goods without obtaining any report as contemplated by Section 67 (4) of the TVAT Act. As regards the question as to whether the goods, sought to be seized, were or were not Mosquito net and, hence, the action of the Superintendent of Taxes in seizing the goods on the basis of individual inference, in contrary to the mandate of Section 67(4) of the TVAT Act. Mr. Deb further submits that seizing authority/officer in charge of check post does not himself possess any authority to declare/classify any materials and the same can be done only after causing a verification or enquiry to that effect. Since no enquiry and/ or verification was done by the respondent No. 3 namely, Superintendent of Taxes, Churaibari Check Post, the respondent No.3 ought to have considered the goods as fishery fabric in terms of the Consignment Note/ Credit Note. 12. Assailing the order passed by the Commissioner of Taxes, Tripura, Mr. Deb submits that the respondent No.2 has no jurisdiction to affirm any valuation of goods seized by the respondent No. 3 and, hence, the action of the respondent No. 2 in affirming the valuation made by the respondent No. 3 is illegal and without juridsdiction. Mr. Deb further submits that 'Monofilament Cloth and round nesh knitted fabric' falls under the purview of Additional Duites of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, and, therefore, no tax can be levied on the Fishnet/ Fishnet Fabric under the TVAT Act. 13. Mr. Mr. Deb further submits that 'Monofilament Cloth and round nesh knitted fabric' falls under the purview of Additional Duites of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, and, therefore, no tax can be levied on the Fishnet/ Fishnet Fabric under the TVAT Act. 13. Mr. Deb contends that the order, dated 17.02.2007, passed by the Commissioner of Taxes, Tripura, is in conflict with Section 70 (2) of the TVAT Act inasmuch as Section 70 (2) the TVAT Act makes it clear that no order can be passed by the revisional authority, which is prejudical to the interest of a dealer except upon holding enquiry or upon causing such enquiry to be made and subject to such other provisions as may be embodied, in this regard, in the TVAT Act. 14. It has also been submitted by Mr. Deb that the conclusion of the respondent No.2, the Commissioner of Taxes, that the petitioner had opted for composition, is without following the proper procedure and, therefore, the same is illegal and without jurisdiction. Mr Deb has also assailed the order passed by the Commissioner of Taxes, Tripura, whereby taxable liability has been imposed on the petitioner including penalty to the tune of double the amount of tax. Mr. Deb contends that the liability to pay penalty does not arise merely upon proof of default. An order, imposing penalty, for failure to carry out the statutory obligation, is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding and penalty would not be, ordinarily, imposed unless the party obliged has either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of contumacious or dishonest conduct or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. 15. Mr. Pal, learned Senior Government Advocate, appearing for the State-respondents, supporting the orders, dated 10.12.2006 and 17.12.2007, passed by the Superintendent of Taxes, Churaibari Check Post, Tripura, and the Commissioner of Taxes, Tripura, respectively submits that since the petitioner was carrying mosquito net (plastic made) declaring the same to be fishnet fabric, the Superintendent of Taxes was legally justified in seizing the said goods. He further submits that since the petitioner opted for composition, the Commissioner of Taxes committed no illegality in directing Superintendent of Taxes to release the said goods on payment of the composition money. 16. He further submits that since the petitioner opted for composition, the Commissioner of Taxes committed no illegality in directing Superintendent of Taxes to release the said goods on payment of the composition money. 16. Upon hearing the learned counsel for both the parties, we find that the following questions of law have arisen for adjudication: - (1) Whether the amedment of Entry 15 of the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, amounts to substitution of the original Entry and whether the said amendment shall have restrospective effect? (2) Whether the order of seizure of goods passed by the Superintendent of Taxes, on the ground of wrong information as regard goods had been given by the petitioner and that the goods covered by the consignment shall be treated as undeclared goods, are legally tenable in the face of the provisions of Section 67 (4) of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004? (3) In view of the fact that 'Monofi­lament Cloth and round nesh knitted fabric' falls under the purview of Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, whether it is impermissible to impose tax on the Fishnet/ Fishnet under the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004? (4) Whether the conclusion arrived at by the Commissioner of Taxes that the petitioner had opted for composition, when the petitioner has denied the same and when there is no proof that the petitioner had opted for composition, what is the legal effect of the conclusion of the Commissioner of Taxes that the petitioner had opted for composition? (5) Whether the imposition of penalty, under Section 67 of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act 2004, is automatic or imposition of penalty has to precede an opportunity of showing cause and hearing? Whether the amendment of Entry 15 by the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, amounts to substitution of the original Entry and whether the said amendment shall have retrospective effect? 17. The question, posed above, makes it imperative for us to decide as to what would be the affect of replacement of Entry 15 of the Schedule II(b) of the TVAT Act by the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007. 18. 17. The question, posed above, makes it imperative for us to decide as to what would be the affect of replacement of Entry 15 of the Schedule II(b) of the TVAT Act by the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007. 18. Amicroscopic examination of various provisions of the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, reveals that the Legislature, by the said Ordinance, has amended various provisions of the TVAT Act by way of insertion as well as substitution and deletion. However, while amending Entry 15 of the Schedule II(B) of the TVAT Act, the Legislature has used no expression, such as, substitution, deletion, addition etc., but has simply replaced Entry 15 by a new Entry. 19. The question, which, therefore, naturally, arises is: Whether replacement of Entry 15 by the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, would amount to substitution of the existing Entry 15? 20. The word 'substitute' would, ordin­arily, mean "to put (one) in place of another" ; or "to replace". In Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., at p. 1281, the word 'substitute' has been defined to mean "to put in the place of another person or thing", or "to exchange". In Collins English Dictionary, the word "substitute" has been defined to mean "to serve or cause to serve in place of another person or thing"; "to replace (an atom or group in a molecule) with (another atom or group)"; or "a person or thing that serves in place of another, such as a player in a game who takes the place of an injured colleague". 21. It is a matter of legislative discretion as to whether, while enacting and amending law, an existing provision shall be deleted or a new provision shall be substituted. If there is both repeal and introduction of another provision in place thereof by a single exercise, the expression 'substituted' is used. Such deletion has the affect of repeal of the existing provision and also makes room for introduction of a new provision. Substitution of one text for the other pre-existing text is one of the known and well-recognized practices employed in legislative drafting. 'Substitution' has to be dustinguished from ' supersession' or a mere repeal of an existing provision. 22. In Koteswar Vittal Kamath Vs. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., (1969) 1 SCC 255 , the Supreme Court held that the process of substitution consists of two steps. 'Substitution' has to be dustinguished from ' supersession' or a mere repeal of an existing provision. 22. In Koteswar Vittal Kamath Vs. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., (1969) 1 SCC 255 , the Supreme Court held that the process of substitution consists of two steps. The first step is that the old rule, it made, seizes to exist, and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. Thus, in Koteswar Vittal Kamath (supra), the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between "supersession" of a rule and "substitution" of a rule by pointing out that the process of substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. 23. With regard to the above, the following passengers from Craies on Statute Law and Sutherland on Statutory Construction is relevant: "When an Act of Parliament is repealed", said Lord Tenterden in Surtees Vs. Ellison, "it must be considered (except as to transactions past and closed) as if it had never existed. That is the general rule." Tindal C. J. stated the exception more widely. He said: "The effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it as completely from the records of Parliament as if it had never been passed; and it must be considered as a law that never existed except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded, whilst it was an existing law." "Since an amendatory act alters, modifies, or adds to a prior statute, all Courts hold that a repealed act cannot be amended, that is, no Court will give effect to a repealed law because the legislature attempted to amend it." 24. In other words, the substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision. As regards repeal of a statute, the law is stated, in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, thus: "The effect of the repeal of a statute where neither a saving clause nor a general saving statute exists to prescribe the governing rule for the effect of the repeal, is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in future and to divest the right to proceed under the statute, which, except as to proceedings past and closed, is considered as if it had never existed." 25. In Zile Singh Vs. In Zile Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 1 the Supreme Court held that mere absence of a provision, expressely giving retrospective operation to the legislation, is not determinative of its prospectively and/or retrospectively. The Supreme Court held as under: "Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the Courts will give it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the Courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention giving the statute retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the statute (ii) the remedy sought to be applied, (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated, (p. 388). The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right." (Emphasis is supplied) 26. From the above observations, made in Zile Singh (supra), it becomes clear that the former state of law is one of the factors to be taken into consideration to determine as to whether any amendment is restrospective or prospective in the sense that it is the duty of the Court to decide as to what was the former state of law, what the Legislature contemplated and what remedy the legislature is sought to apply. The further observations made, in this regard, in Zile Singh (supra), being relevant, are reproduced below: "Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute or to "explain" a former statute, the subsequent statute relates back to the time when the prior Act was passed. The rule, against retrospectively, is inapplicable to such legislations as are explanatory and declatorv in nature." (Emphasis is supplied) 27. One may pause to refer to the decision in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. Vs. The rule, against retrospectively, is inapplicable to such legislations as are explanatory and declatorv in nature." (Emphasis is supplied) 27. One may pause to refer to the decision in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1955 SC 661 , wherein, explain­ing the principle of interpretation of statute, the Supreme Court held as under: "It is a sound rule of consideration of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584, when Heydon case was decided that - '.... for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered- 1 st. What was the common law before the making of the Act. 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall supress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to supress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico." 28. From the judicial pronouncements cited above, it becomes transparent that when a provision is substituted, then, the existing provision stands repealed and new pro vision stands brought into existence in its place and the said act consists of repeal as well as substitution. The effect of repeal of a provision is that the said provision stands oblirated from the statute book as if the provision never existed and the new provision comes into existence in its place as if the new provision was the one, which existed from the beginning. By the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amend­ment) Ordinance, 2007, Entry 15 has been replaced by new Entry 15. This implies that earlier Entry 15 has been deleted and in its place, new Entry 15 has been substituted and thereby the new Entry 15 shall have the effect from the date, Entry 15 has had been in operation. 29. By the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amend­ment) Ordinance, 2007, Entry 15 has been replaced by new Entry 15. This implies that earlier Entry 15 has been deleted and in its place, new Entry 15 has been substituted and thereby the new Entry 15 shall have the effect from the date, Entry 15 has had been in operation. 29. It is also worth noting that under the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976, mosquito net stood always exempted from payment of sales tax. On coming into force of the TVAT Act, Entry 15, though exempted fishnet, fishnet fabric, fish seeds, prawn, slirimp seeds, it did not include therein mosquito net. By the amendment made by the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, the said Entry 15 has been replaced by the new Entry 15, whereby the existing items fishnet, fishnet fabric, fish seeds/prawn/shrimp seeds have been kept intact and only mosquito net has been added to the said Entry. If the intention of legislature would have been to exempt mosquito net prospectively, the Legislature could have amended Entry 15 by insertion of item "mosquito net." However, instead of doing so, what the Legislature did is that it replaced Entry 15, in its entirety, by the new Entry 15, whereby mosquito net has been added to the Entry of exempted goods. By the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, when the Legislature has amended various entries by way of insertion, deletion and substitution, the act of replace­ment of Entry 15 clearly throws light on the intention of Legislature and, while doing so, the Legislature included mosquito net amongst the exempted goods. Though the word "replacement" has been used instead of "substitution", yet the said act of replacement is nothing, but an act of substitution of the existing Entry 15 by a new Entry 15. As held by the Supreme Court, in Zile Singh (supra), while examining the retrospectively of a legislature act, the past history has also to be taken into consideration and if the past history of Entry 15 is taken into consideration, it is more than evident that this act of legislation in replacing Entry 15 is by way of remedial measure inasmuch as there was an obvious omission, earlier on the part of the Legislature, in not exempting mosquito net under the TVAT Act, which stood exempted under the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976. It is this mischief of not including mosquito net within the exempted goods that the earlier Entry 15 of the TVAT Act stands replaced by a new Entry 15 under the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, having thereby the affect of repealing the earlier Entry and substituting, in its place, the present Entry 15. 30. We may pause here to take note of the observations, made in Allied Motors (P) Ltd. Vs. CIT, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 472 , at para 13, which read as under: "Therefore, in the well-known words of Judge Learned Hand, one cannot make a fortress out of the dictionary; and should remember that statutes have some purpose and object to accomplish whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. In the case of R. B. Jodha Mai Kuthiala Vs. CIT this Court said that one should apply the rule of reasonable interpretation. A proviso which is inserted to remedy unintended consequences and to make the provision workable, a proviso which supplies an obvious omission in the section and is required to be read in to the section to give the section a reasonable interpretation, requires to be treated as retrospective in opearation so that a reasonable interpretation can be given to the section as a whole." 31. From the above observations, made in Allied Motors (P) Ltd. (supra), it becomes clear that it is the duty of the Court to determine the legislative intent and purpose and the present one is a case, which, undoubtedly, invites this Court to determine the legislative intent. This Court, therefore, must give to the amended Entry 15 a purposive interpretation. 32. In Corpus Juris Secundum, while dealing with the subject with remedial statutes, it has been stated as under: "While general rule that statutes are construed as prospective only applied to remedial statutes, remedial or procedure statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy vested or contractual right but relate only to remedies or modes of prcedure are generally held to operate retrospectively and to apply to pending actions or proceedings, unless such operation or application would adversely effect substantive rights." 33. What surfaces from the above discussion is that by the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, the existing Entry 15 has been, in fact, substituted by new Entry 15 and the same shall be retrospective effect from the date, when existing Entry 15 was brought into force and thereby the item mosquito net shall be treated as exempted from payment of VAT from the dated the TVAT Act had come into force. With the conclusion, so reached, that mosquito net shall be exempted from the date the TVAT Act had come into force, the present writ petition deserves to be allowed on this score itself; but since a number of other legal issues have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we deem it appropriate to examine other legal issues, which have been raised in the present writ petition. In view of the provisions of Section 67 (4) of the TVAT Act, whether the order of seizure of goods passed by the Superintendent of Taxes on the ground that the goods were undeclared and/or wrong information as regards goods, was given by the petitioner, is legally tenable? 34. Section 67 of the TVAT Act relates to the establishment of check post for inspection of goods on transport. The portion of Section 67, relevant to the present context, is quoted below: "Section 67: Establishment of check posts for inspection of goods in transport- (1) The Government may with a view to prevent or check avoidance or evasion of tax, by notification in the official gazette, direct the establishment of the check post or barrier at such places as may be specified in notification and every officer who exercises powers and discharges his duties at such check post by way of inspection of documents produced and goods being moved, shall be in charge. (2) The driver or person in charge of vehicle or carrier of goods in movement shall:- (a) Carry with him the records of the goods including challan, bills of sale or dispatch memos and prescribed declaration forms duly filled in and signed by the consignee or transporter of goods carried; (b) Stop the vehicle or carrier at every check post set under sub-section (1) or at any other place by an officer authorized by the Commissioner in this behalf; (c) Produce all the documents including the prescribed forms relating to goods before the officer-in-charge of the check post or authorized officer; (d) Give all the information in his possession relating to goods; (e) Allow the inspection of the goods for search of the vehicle by the officer in charge of check post of any authorized officer. (3) Where any goods are in movement within the territory of the State of Tripura, an officer, empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may stop the vehicle or the carrier or the person carrying such goods, for inspection, at any place within his jurisdiction and provisions of sub-section (2) shall mutatis mutandis apply. (4) Where any goods in movement are without documents, or are not supported by documents as referred to in sub-section (2). (4) Where any goods in movement are without documents, or are not supported by documents as referred to in sub-section (2). or documents produced appeared to be false or forged, the officer in charge of the check post or officer empowered under sub-section (3), may- (a) Direct the driver or person in charge of a vehicle or carrier or of the goods not to part with the goods in any manner including by transporting or rebooking, till a verification is done or an enquiry is made, which shall not take more than seven days; (b) Seize the goods for reasons to be recorded in writing and shall give receipt of the goods to the person from whose possession or control they are seized; (5) The officer in charge of check post or officer empowered under sub-section (3), after having giving the person in charge of a goods a reasonable opportunity of being heard and having held such enquiry as he may deem fit, shall impose, for pssession or movement of goods, whether seized or not, in violation of the provisions of Clause (a) of sub-section (2) or for submission offalse or forged documents in addtion to tax leviable a penalty equal to double the amount of tax, or rupees one thousand, whichever is higher. (Emphasis is supplied) 35. From a plain reading of sub-section (4) Section 67 of the TVAT Act it is clear that the authority shall have the power to seize the goods, when any goods in movement are without documents or are not supported by documents as referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 67 of the TVAT Act or that the documents produced appear to be false or forged. 36. The first pre-condition for the seizure of the goods is not applicable to the present case inasmuch as it was not the case of the sizing authority that the goods in movements are without documents or are not supported by the documents referred to in sub-section (2). The goods were seized on the ground that the goods were undeclared inasmuch as the transporters gave wrong information that the consignments contained fishnet fabric, whereas the said consignment contained mosquito net (plastic made). 37. From the reason recorded by the seizing authority, it nowhere appears that the seizing authority came to a conclusion that the documents produced were false or forged. 37. From the reason recorded by the seizing authority, it nowhere appears that the seizing authority came to a conclusion that the documents produced were false or forged. The only ground on which the seizure was made was that the documents contained wrong information. Furnishing of any wrong or incorrect information, in a document, cannot be equated with the documents being false or forged. In the present case, the documents were neither forged not false, but simply the information, which was furnished in the said documents, was, according to the seizure authority, found to be wrong or incorrect. 38. Black's Law Dictionary defines the terms 'false' to mean, when it is done, or made, with knowledge, actual or constructive, that it is the untrue or illegal, or is said to be done falsely, when the meaing is that the party is in fault for its error. The word 'false statement' has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary to mean statement knowingly false, or made recklessly without honest belief in its truth, and with a purpose to mislead or deceive. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term 'forge' to mean fabricate, construct or prepare one thing in imitation of another thing, with the intention of substituting the false for the genuine, or otherwise deceiving and defrauding by the use of the spurious article. 39. In the present case, the documents, which were produced, were neither false not forged by the seizing athority felt that incorrect information had been given in the documents inasmuch as according to him, the goods transported were mosquito net (Plastic made) and not fishnet net fabric. Even assuming that the information, furnished in the documents, was false, the same will not make the doucument, itself, to be forged or false. The seizing authority has, nowhere, recorded its conclusion or satisfaction that wrong information was furnished in the documents knowing it to be untrue with mala fide intention. Similarly, furnishing of wrong or incorrect information withnout knowing it to be untrue cannot be termed as a false information and the same cannot make the documents false or forged. The seizing authority has, nowhere, recorded its conclusion or satisfaction that wrong information was furnished in the documents knowing it to be untrue with mala fide intention. Similarly, furnishing of wrong or incorrect information withnout knowing it to be untrue cannot be termed as a false information and the same cannot make the documents false or forged. Since sub-section (4) of Section 67 of TVAT Act empowers the authority concerned to seize the goods, when the goods are not supported by the documents referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 67 of the TVAT Act or the documents produced appears to be false or forged, the seizing authority, respondent No. 3, acted ex-facie beyond its jurisdiction in seizing the consignment of petitioners on the ground offurnishing of wrong or incorrect information in the documents. The seizing authority is not empowered to seize the goods on such a ground and, hence, the order of seizure of the goods passed by the respondent No.3 is wholly illegal, without jurisdiction and beyond the scope of the power conferred on him by sub-section (4) of Section 67 of the TVAT Act. 40. Coupled with the above, what is also important to note is that without any reasonable opportunity of hearing having been given to the person in charge of or without holding any enquiry, the seizing authority does not derive jurisdiction to levy tax and/or penalty. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that any opportunity of showing cause or hearing was accorded or any enquiry was held by the seizing authority before seizure was made. Viewed from this angle too, seizure was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. 41. In order to determine as to whether giving of incorrect information, in a document, can be a ground for seizure of goods by treating such a document as false or forged document, we may however, look at some of the provisions of Assam Value Tax Act, 2003 (in short, 'the Act of 2003'). Section 85 of the Act of 2003 deals with offences and penalties. Section 85 (1) (h) of the Act of 2003 makes submission of false return of turnoever of furnishing of false statement punishable. Similarly, Section 85 (1) (n) makes knowingly furnishing of incorrect information an offence. Section 85 of the Act of 2003 deals with offences and penalties. Section 85 (1) (h) of the Act of 2003 makes submission of false return of turnoever of furnishing of false statement punishable. Similarly, Section 85 (1) (n) makes knowingly furnishing of incorrect information an offence. This apart, Section 85 (1) (z) makes import into, or export from, the State of Assam any goods showing incorrect or fictitious names or addresses of consignors or consignees or incorrect details about goods or incorrect particulars and vouchers, bills or receipts, documents accompanying the goods, while such goods are in transit, to be an offence. The relavant part of Section 85 reads as under: "85: offences are prosecutions:-(1) *** *** *** *** *** *** (h) submits a false return of turnover under this Act or furnishes a false statement; or *** *** *** *** *** *** (n) knowingly prepares or produces incorrect account, registers or documents, or knowingly furnishes incorrect information; or *** *** *** *** *** *** (z) makes import into or export from the State any goods showing incorrect or fictitious names or addresses or consigners or consignee or incorrect details about the goods or incorrect particulars in vouchers, way bills or goods receipt of documents accompanying the goods while such goods are in transit. Shall, without prejudice to his liabilities under any other law for the time being in force and in addition to recovery of tax or any other dues payable by him under this Act, on conviction be punishable with simple imprisonment for a period which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and shall be liable to pay a fine of an amount not less than the tax or other amount due and not exceeding fifty thousand rupees." 42. Though legislation of one State cannot be interpreted on the basis of the legislation on the same subject of another State, yet such a legislation may throw light in interpreting the corresponding provisions of another State. 43. Apatient examination of the provisions of the Act of 2003 would reveal that Section 85 (1) (h) makes submission of false return to be an offence. At the same time, Section 85 (1) (n) makes even furnishing of incorrect information too an offence. 43. Apatient examination of the provisions of the Act of 2003 would reveal that Section 85 (1) (h) makes submission of false return to be an offence. At the same time, Section 85 (1) (n) makes even furnishing of incorrect information too an offence. In the same manner, import into, or export from, the State of Assam any goods showing incorrect or fictitious names or addresses of consignors or consignees or incorrect details about goods or incorrect particulars and vouchers, bills or receipts, documents accompanying the goods, while such goods are in transit, has been made an offence under Section 85(1) (z). 44. Thus, furnishing of incorrect information is also an offence under the Act of 2003; whereas under the TVAT Act, furnishing of incorrect information does not form a ground for seizure of goods under Section 67 (4) of the TVAT Act. Whether in view of the fact that 'Monofilament Cloth and round nesh knitted fabric' falls under the purview of Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, no tax can be levied on the Fishnet/Fishnet Fabric under the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004? 45. The submission, made on behalf of the petitioner, that Monofilament Cloth and round nesh knitted fabric being taxable under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1957), no tax can be levied in fish net and fish net fabric under TVAT Act is liable to be rejected, beacuse the proviso to Clause (1) of the Second Schedule of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) At, 1957, (in short, the Act of 1957'), makes it clear that if any tax is levied and collected, in any State, under any law of the State, on the sale and purchase of any item, which is taxable under the Act of 1957, no amount, which is due to the State, under the proviso to Clause (1) of the Second Schedule to the Act of 1957, will be payable to concerned State unless the Central Government, by specific order or otherwise, so directs. Even assuming that the State of Tripura is getting its share of Cental Excise duty levied and collected under the Act of 1957 in resect of the item in question, levy and realization of VAT on the said item does not ipso facto make levy and collection bad in law insasmuch as the only consequence, in such a situation, as contemplated under the Act of 1957, shall not be payable. 46. In view of the above, the effect of the levy and collection of Central Excise duty, under the Act of 1957, on any particular item and receipt by the State of its share of Central Excise duty under the Act of 1957 would not have the effect of invalidating the levy and collection of tax on sale and purchase of the said goods under the Act of 1957. 47. Because of what have been indicated above, it clearly follows that collection of VAT, under the TVAT Act, on the ground, indicated above, is not tenable in law. Whether the conclusion, arrived at by the Commissioner of Taxes, that the petitioner had opted for composition, when the petitioner has denied the same and when there is no proof that the petitioner had opted for composition, is legally tanable? 48. The two questions, which are inseparably linked, need to be examined in the light of Section 80 of TVAT Act, which deals with the compounding of offences. Inseparable with the two questions aforementioned would also be the question as to what is the nature, scope and/or ambit of the power or duties of the authority concerned. The question, however, which is most important of all, in this regard, is: who has to invoke the provisions of the Section 80? Whether it is the tax prayer, who has to opt for composition or whether the officer's assertion that the offender has opted for composition is enough and whether expressing of the desire by the alleged offender to opt for composition is enough to vest the authority concerned with the power to determine the maximum amount, which, according to the officer, might be payable as composition money and to enforce payment thereof. 49. 49. Before we proceed to examine the above questions, it would be expedient to refer Section 80 of the TVAT Act, which provides for compounding of offences, Section 80 reads as under: "Section 80: Compounding of offences: (1) The Commissioner may, either before or after the institution of proceedings of any offence punishable under Section 74 or under any rules made under this Act, accept from any person charged with such offence by way of composition of the offence under sub-sections (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), or Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) of sub-section (9) or sub-section (10) of Section 75 in addition to the tax leviable, a sum of money not exceeding one thousand rupees or double the amount of tax leviable whichever is greater. (2) On payment of such sum as may be determined by the Commissioner under sub­section (1), no further proceeding shall be taken against the accused person in respect of the same offence and any proceeding, if already taken, shall stand abated." 50. From a bare reading of Section 80 of the TVAT Act, it is clear that Section 80 is an enabling Section by virtue whereof, Commissioner may accept certain sum, specified therein, by way of composition. The composition money is in addition to the tax leviable. The maximum amount of composition money has been fixed at Rs. 1,000/- or double the amount to tax leviable, whichever is greater. From a careful reading of sub-section (2) of Section 80 of the TVAT Act, it also becomes clear that composition is not completed either with the offer made by a dealer to compound or acceptance thereof by the authority concerned. All these can be termed as steps towards composition of an offence. The offer to pay a certain amount, by way of composition money, has to come from the person, who has committed or alleged to have committed an offence. It is the offender, who has to specify the amount, which he is willing to pay by way of composition. It is at this stage that the authority comes into picture, because the authority concerned has to decide whether to accept the offer or not to accept. It is the offender, who has to specify the amount, which he is willing to pay by way of composition. It is at this stage that the authority comes into picture, because the authority concerned has to decide whether to accept the offer or not to accept. If the authority concerned decides not to accept the offer of the person concerned, on the ground that the amount offered is low, it may itself point out the amount that it is willing or prepared to accept and to that extent there is scope for negotiation between the authority concerned and the person charged with the offence. 51. If such negotiation fails, as indicated above, there will be no composition. If the person concerned agrees to pay the enhanced amount suggested by the authority, he shall revise his offer by agreeing to pay such enhanced amount. Thereupon, it shall be for the authority to accept it. It is only on payment of the composition amount as agreed to that the composition shall be completed and then only as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 80, no further proceeding can be taken against the person compounding the same offence. It is only final act of payment that completes the process and it is at such a stage that one can say that offence is compounded. If the payment is not made, the entire exercise to compound the offence will fail and the proceeding, initiated against the person concerned, for the alleged commission of the offence shall continue and the authority concerned shall be free to proceed with the same. 52. It will not be correct to say that the composition, like an ordinary contract, is complete the moment there is an offer to compound by the person concerned and acceptance thereof by the authority. There cannot be any offer without specifying the amount, which the person concerned is willing to pay by way of composition money. Nor does the mere fact that a person has made an offer to compound vest, in the authority, the power to determine the maximum amount of compensation money that may be payable under Section 80 and enforce payment thereof. Determination of amount of composition by a concerned authority can be treated only as a suggestion to the dealer of the amount that may be acceptable to the authority. Determination of amount of composition by a concerned authority can be treated only as a suggestion to the dealer of the amount that may be acceptable to the authority. It is for the dealer to consider the same and make an offer. If no offer is made, what the authority can do is to forget all about the talks of composition and proceed with action under the law for the alleged commission of the offence. 53. From the facts of the present case, it appears that the Commissioner of Taxes has observed in his impugned order that the petitioner had opted for composition of the offence and, in consequence thereof, directed for payment of the composition money. The petitioner, in the present writ petition, has denied that he ever opted for composition of the offence. 54. As already observed earlier, the authority has no power to impose composition as it is the option given to the person charged with an offence under the TVAT Act. It is not a power vested in the officer to impose composition money like penalty. The Commissioner has simply been given the power or authority to accept the offer of such a person to compound the offence. This power or authority vested in Commissioner, however, is not an arbitrary or naked power, but it is his duty to exercise the same as and when facts and circumstances of the case so demand. A Division Bench of this Court, in Kinkar Deb Vs. State of Tripura, reported in (1991) 80 STC 458 , dealing with the provision of the composition of offence under Section 32 of Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976, held as under: "An officer cannot refuse to accept composition, nor he can insist on payment of maximum amount of composition money without due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. He is expected to apply his mind to the facts of the case in a judicious manner and to arrive at a conclusion as to wehether to accept the offer made by the person concerned or. if it is on the lower side, to suggest him a higher amount, which, if offered, might be accepted. Refusal to exercise this power or arbitrary exercise thereof will amount to violation of the mandate of the law." (Emphasis is added) 55. Tn Kinkar Deb (supra), Dr. if it is on the lower side, to suggest him a higher amount, which, if offered, might be accepted. Refusal to exercise this power or arbitrary exercise thereof will amount to violation of the mandate of the law." (Emphasis is added) 55. Tn Kinkar Deb (supra), Dr. B. P. Saraf, J, (as his Lordship, then, was) speaking for the Court, held that the authority have no power to impose maximum compounding fee on a person, who has expressed his desire to compound the offence and to realize the said amount so determined by coercive means. They have simply been given the power to accept an offer to compound an offence by the alleged offender. 56. From the facts of present case, it appears that Commissioner of Taxes was not justified in directing the Superintendent of Taxes to release the goods on payment of the composition money. By doing so, Commissioner of Taxes has closed the revisional proceeding even before the composition process as complete. There is nothing in the impugned order that the petitioner had offered to pay the sum, which has been ordered to be paid by him as composition money. The Commissioner of Taxes, in exercising the power under Section 80 of the TVAT Act, cannot direct a dealer to make payment of composition money even assuming that the dealer had opted for compounding of the offence inasmuch as it is only on the payment of composition money, as per sub-section (2) of Section 80 of the TVAT Act, that the compounding of the offence can be said to be complete. 57. In the present case, as the petitioner has denied the fact that he had opted for composition and there us no proof or evidence to show that the petitioner had ever opted for the compounding of offence, the question of determination of composition money by the Commissioner of Taxes did not arise at all. Even after determination of composition money, till the amount is paid by the dealer, the compounding of offence cannot come to an end and the Commissioner of Taxes, in such circumstances, issue direction to release the goods on payment of composition money. When the composition money was not paid by the petitioner, it was incumbent, on the part of the Commissioner of Taxes, to decide the issues raised in the revision application on merit. When the composition money was not paid by the petitioner, it was incumbent, on the part of the Commissioner of Taxes, to decide the issues raised in the revision application on merit. Since the Commissioner of Taxes has not done so, the said order passed by the Commissioner of Taxes cannot withstand the scrutiny of law and is, therefore, liable to be set aside and quashed. Whether the imposition of penalty under Section 67 of the TVAT Act is automatic or whether any hearing has to be given before imposition of such penalty? 58. Imposition of penalty under sub­section (5) of Section 67 of the TVAT Act is, certainly, not automatic inasmuch as the officer, before imposing penalty, has to give opportunity of hearing to the person on whom penalty is sought to be imposed and has to make an enquiry as to whether possession or movement of the goods was in violation of the provisions of Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 67 of the TVAT Act or the person, in charge of the goods, submitted false or forged documents. 59. From a plain reading of Section 67, it becomes abundantly clear that the imposition of penalty is not a routine affair. Penalty can be imposed only when the authority is satisfied, upon making necessary enquiry, that possession or movement of goods was in violation of provision of Clause (a) of sub­section (2) of Section 67 of the TVAT Act or that the person, in charge of the goods, submitted false or forged documents. Thus, upon giving opportunity to the person proceeded against and upon due hearing, penalty can and needs to be imposed and not otherwise. Having given the opportunity of hearing, the authority concerned shall take into account all relevant circumstances and eschew from consideration every irrelevant circumstance, and, then, determine as to whether the person, proceeded against, needs to be saddled with the liability of payment of penalty for possession or movement of goods in violation of provision of Clause (a) of sub­section (2) of Section 67 of the TVAT Act or for the submission of false or forged documemts. The authority concerned must, thus, take a decision, in the matter of imposition of penalty, objectively upon considering all relevant factors. 60. In the present case, the officer-in-Charge of check post has not taken any decision so far as the imposition of penalty is concerned. The authority concerned must, thus, take a decision, in the matter of imposition of penalty, objectively upon considering all relevant factors. 60. In the present case, the officer-in-Charge of check post has not taken any decision so far as the imposition of penalty is concerned. Against the order of seizure of the goods, when the revision application was filed before the Commissioner of Taxes, the Commissioner of Taxes directed release of the goods on payment of composition money with penalty, which is wholly in contravention of Section 80 of the TVAT Act. 61. Because of the fact that we have already held above that mosquito net (plastic net) stands, in the light of amendment of Entry 15 by the Tripura Value Added Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, exempted from payment of tax, the question of seizure of the goods on the ground that the goods was mosquito net or the goods were undeclared did not arise at all. 62. In the result and for reasons discussed above, the impugned orders, dated 10.12.2006 and 17.12.2007, passed by the Superintendent of Taxes, Churaibari Check Post, Tripura, and the Commissioner of Taxes, Tripura, respectively are hereby set aside and quashed. The respondents are directed to release the seized goods forthwoth. 63. With the above observations and directions, this revision shall stand disposed of . 64. No order as to costs.