JUDGMENT :- Since in the above bevy of applications, common questions of law and facts are involved, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. (The facts are taken from Criminal Application. No. 1547/2010). 2. Rule. Rule, returnable forthwith. With the consent of learned counsel for respective, the matters are being taken up for final hearing. 3. By this application under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (henceforth referred to as “the Code”), the applicant seeks to quash and set side the order dated 6th July 2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Darwha in Criminal Revision Application No.21/2009 arising out of order dated 19.8.2009 passed by learned Judicial magistrate First Class, Digras in Misc.. Criminal Case No.101/2009. 4. The facts, in brief, are these: that a private complaint under sections 420, 406 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code was filed by non-applicant no. 1 before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Digras. The complainant alleged that he had purchased Plot No. 35 in the field Serial No.126 situated at Siddhivinayak Nagar, Digras, Dist. Yavatmal, for a consideration of Rs. 33,750/under registered sale deed dated 7.2.2001. The seller had assured that the plot was free from any encumbrances, such as, loan, charge, mortgage etc. and that there was no hurdle whatsoever in transfer of the said plot. The complainant alleged that the seller had mortgaged, the Plot with the Central Bank of India, Branch Gorakshan Road, Akola on 30.4.1998; but this fact was suppressed from the complainant with a view to hoodwink the complainant. The Central Bank of India had filed proceedings against the accused in Debts Recovery Tribunal at Nagpur. This fact was also suppressed. Thus, the plot was sold with mala fide intention to deceive the complainant. The complainant was constrained to file a private complaint under section 406 read with sec.420 read further with section 34 IPC. Thus, according to the complainant (non-applicant no.1), the accused (applicant) had suppressed cel1ain material facts regarding the recovery proceedings initiated by Central Bank of India under sec.19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Nagpur, Further, according to the complainant, the accused had challenged the order dated 23.4.2008 passed by the D.R.T. by filing an appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai. The Central Bank of India, Gorakshan Branch, Akola had lodged FIR at Civil Lines Police Station, Akola, against a total of 16 persons (including the applicant and non-applicant no.1). The Bank had complained that despite mortgage of their properties, the accused had sold the property under registered documents without informing the Bank on or about 30th April, 1998. Thus, there was a complaint from the Bank regarding offence of criminal breach of trust, which was reported as Crime No. 742/2008 at Civil Lines Police Station, Akola. The applicant had obtained anticipatory bail in connection with the said crime reported, which was granted by the learned Sessions Judge. 5. The complainant filed a private complaint (without disclosing the earlier facts, according to applicant). The learned Magistrate by order dated 28.7.2009 passed the following order: ORDER: “It be registered as O. Misc. Cri. Case, put up for verification sd/ JMFC 28.7.2009” Later on, on 19.8.2009, the learned Magistrate proceeded to pass the following order: ORDER: “Perused the complaint. It clearly appears that the alleged offences are of serious nature and cognizable offences wherein investigation is necessary. Therefore, I proceed to pass the following order as per section 156 (3) Cr.P.C.: ORDER: The Police Station Officer, Police Station Digras is hereby directed to register the FIR and to investigate the matter Sd/ JMFC Digras 19.8.2009” 6. It is the grievance of the applicant herein that on 19.8.2009 instead of recording the verification of the complainant, the learned Magistrate passed an order under section 156(3) of the Code, thereby directing the Police Officer to register the FIR and to investigate the matter. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance by ordering registration of the case and putting it up for verification on 28.7.2009. Therefore, it was not open for the learned Magistrate to pass an order u/s. 156(3) of the Code, to direct the Police to register the FIR and to investigate the matter. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance by ordering registration of the case and putting it up for verification on 28.7.2009. Therefore, it was not open for the learned Magistrate to pass an order u/s. 156(3) of the Code, to direct the Police to register the FIR and to investigate the matter. It is the second contention of the applicant that the offences are required to be reported to the police when they are cognizable offences u/s 154 (1) of Code; the information ought to be lodged with an Officer incharge of the Police Station, which is required to be reduced into writing, as required u/s 154 (1) of the Code and if there is any refusal on the part of the Officer incharge of the Police Station to record such information under sec.154(1) of the Code, then substance of such information may be sent to the Superintendent of Police concerned under sec. 154 (3) of the Code. The superior Police officer may record his satisfaction regarding disclosure of cognizable offence and he is under obligation to investigate any offence and direct an investigation to be made by any Police Officer subordinate in accordance with law. 7. Learned Advocate for the applicant in support of the above statement made refer to ruling in Panchabhai Popatbhai Butani Vs. State of Maharashtra : 2010 Cri.L.J. 2723 (Full Bench). Learned Advocate made a specific reference to para no .46 of the said judgment as follows :” 46......................As a normal proposition of law, invocation of the provisions of Section 154 in its entirety should be treated as a condition precedent to invocation of the powers of the Court under section 156 (3), but there can be exceptions where the facts and circumstances of the case justify directly approaching the Court by complainant. If a person is desirous of invoking the judicial process at the very first instance, he can always take recourse to section 200 as contained in Chapter XV of the Code, but if he wishes to invoke the powers of the Court under Section 156(3), normally, he may exhaust the remedy available to him as is provided by the Legislature in terms of Section 154 of the Code. “ It appears that the Full Bench of this Court had answered the question whether in absence of a complaint to the police, a complaint can be made directly before the Magistrate. While answering this question, it is stated that normally a person should invoke the provisions of Section 154 of the Code before he takes recourse to the power to take cognizance under sec.190 of the Code. Under sec. 154(3) at least an intimation to the Police of commission of offence of cognizable offence would be a condition precedent for invocation of powers of the Magistrate u/s 156(3) of the Code. However, the Full Bench made it clear that this dictum of law is not free from exception because there can be cases when noncompliance of the provisions of Section 154(3) would not divest the Magistrate of his jurisdiction in terms of Sec. 156(3) and there can be cases where incidentally and in the facts of the case, however, there is possibility of the evidence of commission of offence being destroyed and/or tampered with; then an applicant could approach the Magistrate u/s 156(3) of the Code directly by way of exception as the Legislature has vested wide discretion in the Magistrate. The second question which was posed is, whether without filing the complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d) and praying only for an action u/s. 156 (3) complaint before the Magistrate was maintainable, which was answered thus: the petition under section 156(3) cannot be strictly construed as a complaint in terms of section 2 (d) of the Code and in the absence of a specific prayer or improperly worded prayer or lack of complete and definite details would not prove fatal to the petition under sec. 156(3) insofar as it states facts constituting ingredients of cognizable offences, such petition would be maintainable before the Magistrate. The legal position is thus already made clear by the Full Bench of this Court in Panchbhai's case (supra). 8. The next question which is raised is as to whether the learned JMFC by passing the order dated 28.7.2009 had taken cognizance of offence by merely ordering for registration of the case and putting it for verification. The learned Advocate for the applicant made a reference to ruling in Nathu vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1996 Cri.L.J. 919 (Rajasthan High Court). The learned Advocate for the applicant made a reference to ruling in Nathu vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1996 Cri.L.J. 919 (Rajasthan High Court). The single Judge of Rajasthan High Court made observations with reference to complaint filed before Judicial Magistrate No.6, Jaipur city. The question was raised as to whether the Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance by passing the following order: “(English Translation) 15.7.1993: Complainant along with his counsel present. Office report perused. The complaint is of jurisdiction of the Court. It may be registered for recording the statement of the complainant. The case be listed on 29.7.1993.” The learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court after making reference u/s 190 of Cr.P.C. observed that power to order investigation u/s 156 (3) is distinct from the power to direct investigation conferred by section 202 of the Code. Both operate in a distinct sphere and at different stages. The first is exercisable at precognizance stage; whereas the second at the postcognizance stage when the Magistrate is seised of the case. With reference to the order dated 15.7.1993 when the learned Magistrate had perused the Office report and recorded that the complaint is of the jurisdiction of his court and then directed it to be registered for recording the statement of the complainant and listed the case on 29.7.1993. It was observed in Paragraph 12 as follows : “12...................In the instant case, I have no doubt in my mind that the Magistrate had taken cognizance on 15.7.1993 when he registered the case after going through the complaint and passed an order to proceed u/s 200, Cr.P.C. to record the statement of the complainant. In that situation, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to forward the complaint exercising powers of subsection (3) of Section 156 Cr.P.C. and the said order is not sustainable in the eye of law. The Rajasthan High Court had, in the result, directed the Magistrate to proceed with the complaint in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. 9. Learned Advocate for the non-applicant/Respondent No.1 argued with reference to the ruling in Sureshchand Jain Vs. The Rajasthan High Court had, in the result, directed the Magistrate to proceed with the complaint in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. 9. Learned Advocate for the non-applicant/Respondent No.1 argued with reference to the ruling in Sureshchand Jain Vs. State of M.P. and another: 2001(2) SCC 628 to argue with reference to paragraph 11 of the said ruling that the Magistrate who had not taken cognizance of the offences upon the complaint filed before him is not under obligation to examine the complainant on oath and the witnesses present at the time of filing of the complaint as one cannot read the provisions of sec.190 of the Code to mean that once the complaint is filed the Magistrate is bound to take cognizance of the offence if the facts stated in the complaint disclose commission of any offence. It is not possible to construe the word “may’ in sec.190 so as to mean “must”. The reason is obvious. The complaint which disclose cognizable offence may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint u/s 156(3) to the Police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted. On the other hand there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. 10. Reference is further made to the ruling in Narayandas Sarda and othersvs. State of Maharashtra and another : 2008 ALLMR (Cri.) 2737 delivered by the Division Bench of this Court 9to which I am a member). With reference to the order of the JMFC Court no.1 Nagpur dated 25.7.2008 in that case, when the learned Magistrate had perused the complaint and documents and heard learned Advocate for the complainant when learned Magistrate having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case had observed that the complaint required detailed investigation by police machinery; to take cognizance of the offence directed it to be sent to Ganeshpeth Police Station for investigation while concerned police were ordered to file/submit report accordingly. With reference to the aforesaid order and after making reference to the rulings on the subject, it was observed by the Division Bench that the learned Magistrate did not proceed to take cognizance of the offence in as much as he only perused the complaint and documents and heard the complainant and did not examine the complainant on oath. With reference to the aforesaid order and after making reference to the rulings on the subject, it was observed by the Division Bench that the learned Magistrate did not proceed to take cognizance of the offence in as much as he only perused the complaint and documents and heard the complainant and did not examine the complainant on oath. Under these circumstances, it was concluded that order u/s 156(3) of the Code cannot be said to be illegal. Reference is also made to the ruling in T. T. Anthony Vs. State of Kerala and others: AIR 2001 SC 263. The ruling is also referred to in the impugned judgment and order of learned Sessions Judge who decided to dismiss Cri.Rev.No.21/2009.According to the learned Advocate for the applicant there cannot be a second FIR in respect of same cognizable offence, the same incident or occurrence. Considering the grievance of the non-applicant no.1 as also grievance of the complainant in Cr.No.742/2008, in respect of the alleged crime it is specifically observed that it was not second FIR. It is also brought to my notice that the earlier FIR was by the Central Bank of India in which the applicant as well as non-applicant no.1 figured as accused while the present complaint is filed by non-applicant no.1 which cannot be considered as second FIR. 11. Section 156(3) of the Code operates at precognizance stage of the complaint which clarify that any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance of offence u/s 190 may order investigation into any cognizable case. The investigation into a case of cognizable offence is domain of the police. Sec. 156(3) empowers the Magistrate to order a police enquiry in any case where the Magistrate has not issued process at once. Once the Magistrate has acted under Chapter XV then he cannot go backwards at precognizance stage so as to order the investigation of an offence by the police. On receiving the complaint, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind to the allegations made in the complaint. The Magistrate has discretion either at once to take cognizance or he may order police to register the offence and investigate. On receiving the complaint, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind to the allegations made in the complaint. The Magistrate has discretion either at once to take cognizance or he may order police to register the offence and investigate. If the Magistrate decides to enquire himself he may record substance of statement made by the complainant and witnesses present, if any, with a view to issue process against the accused or if there is no sufficient ground to proceed further, he may dismiss the complaint. Thus, the power to direct investigation by police u/s 156(3) is to be exercised before taking cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint. Once the Magistrate has taken cognizance by examining the complainant and witnesses present, if any, then he cannot revert back at precognizance stage so as to order investigation u/s. 156(3) Code; but at postcognizance stage, he has power to direct investigation by police u/s 202 of the Code. These two powers operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first under section 156(3) is exercisable at the precognizance stage and the second power under sec.202 of the Code is exercisable at the postcognizance stage when the Magistrate has already taken cognizance of the offence. The term ‘taking cognizance” is not defined in the Code but it means taking cognizance of an offence. Once the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence by conscious application of mind; it is his duty to find out who the offenders really are. Thus, the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind to the averments in the complaint so as to take cognizance of offences. The Magistrate is required to satisfy himself prima facie as to whether there is sufficient ground for to proceed further to issue process or not. Merely because the Magistrate has perused the complaint, it cannot be said that he has taken cognizance of offences because the term “taking cognizance” means judicial action contemplated under the Code by application of judicial mind with a view to proceed further under Chapter XV of the code. Merely because the Magistrate has perused the complaint, it cannot be said that he has taken cognizance of offences because the term “taking cognizance” means judicial action contemplated under the Code by application of judicial mind with a view to proceed further under Chapter XV of the code. Thus, the question as to whether the Magistrate had taken cognizance of offences or not is a question of fact to be determined in each case: In a given case when the Magistrate has applied his mind only for ordering investigation u/s.156 (3) of the Code, then it cannot be said that he has taken cognizance of an offence. The Magistrate may apply his mind merely with a view to order investigation by police at precognizance stage. The order u/s 156(3) of the Code is in the nature of administrative order directing the police to exercise their powers to investigate cognizable offence, if any, the accused at such pre cognizance stage has no right to object registration of FIR as against him nor the accused can claim right of hearing at the stage of preregistration of FIR. In other words, the accused cannot be allowed to thwart investigation at its threshold. Thus, the term “taking cognizance” would indicate judicial application of mind to facts stated in the complaint with a view to take further action i.e. to proceed u/s 200 and subsequent sections in Chapter XV of the Code to find out whether there is sufficient ground to proceed further to issue process. Hence, the stage of taking cognizance of offences indicate a stage when Magistrate has applied his conscious judicious mind to the contents of the complaint for to satisfy himself regarding commission of offences. 12. In the present case, by order dated 28.7.2009, the learned JMFC merely directed registration of Misc. Criminal case and to put it up for verification. By passing this order, it does not indicate as to whether the learned JMFC had applied his judicious mind to the contents of the complaint to satisfy himself regarding commission of offences mentioned in the complaint. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offences in this case by passing order on 28.7.2009, particularly when the Magistrate had perused the complaint on 19.8.2009 to note that alleged offences are of serious nature and cognizable offences wherein investigation is necessary. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offences in this case by passing order on 28.7.2009, particularly when the Magistrate had perused the complaint on 19.8.2009 to note that alleged offences are of serious nature and cognizable offences wherein investigation is necessary. Thus, the learned Magistrate was justified in passing the order u/s 156 (3) Code so as to direct the Police Station Officer of Digras Police Station to register the FIR and to investigate into the matter. The case was, therefore, still at the precognizance stage as no any action was taken to record substance of the statements of complainant and witnesses present ( if any) as contemplated under Chapter XV in view of Section 200 of the Code and subsequent sections. It is, therefore, concluded that merely because the Magistrate ordered registration of the case and to put it up for veritication one cannot jump to say that the Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence by judicial application of mind to the contents of the complaint. The impugned orders did not spell out intention of the learned Magistrate to proceed under Chapter XV of the Code so as to examine the complaint and his witnesses present, if any, in the case, while he passed merely a preliminary order for to register the case as a Miscellaneous Criminal Case. 13. Learned APP also supported the impugned orders on the ground that the order dated 19.8.2009 for direction to investigate u/s156(3) of the Code being preliminary at precognizance stage and did not warrant any interference. 14. For the above reasons, the applications being devoid of merit, stand dismissed. Rule discharged in all the applications. Applications dismissed.