Hon'ble VYAS, J.—In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing order dated 21.2.2011, Annex. 7 which is passed upon application filed under Section 148, CPC and prayed that application filed under Section 148, CPC may be allowed and written-statement may be ordered to be taken on record. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that although suit was filed against the defendant-petitioner in the year 2001, service of summons issued to him was effected upon him and his counsel appeared on 25.9.2001 and filed power on behalf of the defendant-petitioner. But, thereafter, time and again, for other reasons, the matter remained pending, therefore, due to said reason written-statement was not filed within the time limit prescribed; but, in the interest of justice, now, written-statement filed by the defendant petitioner may be ordered to be taken on record. 3. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention towards judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu vs. Union of India, reported in 2005(2) WLC (SC) Civil 242, in which, it has been held by the Apex Court that Provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 are directory in nature and not mandatory, therefore, prayer of the petitioner may be accepted and Trial Court may be directed to take the written statement on record. 4. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, I have perused the order impugned. Learned Trial Court rejected the application on the ground that after amendment in the year 2002 in the Code of Civil Procedure, reply was to be filed within 30 days from the date of service and, further, reply was to be accepted after recording reasons within 90 days. But, after service on 25.9.2001, no reply has been filed and, now, at this belated stage, an application was filed for taking written statement on record on 14.7.2008. 5. It is true that an amendment was made in the Code of Civil Procedure in the year 2002 and following amendment was made under Order 8 Rule 1, CPC., "1. Written statement.-The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence. 5. It is true that an amendment was made in the Code of Civil Procedure in the year 2002 and following amendment was made under Order 8 Rule 1, CPC., "1. Written statement.-The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence. Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons." Upon perusal of the above provision, it is obvious that after amendment, defendant is required to file written-statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons and, further, it is provided that where the defendant fails to file written-statement within the said period of 30 days he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day as may be specified by the Court for the reasons to be recorded in writing but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons. 6. Further, as per Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, written-statement can be accepted by the Trial Court while enlarging the time but, in that provision also, it is specifically provided that where the period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing of any act, prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period (not exceeding 30 days in total) even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. 7. It is true that Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Salem Advocates Bar Association (supra), held that provision of Order 8 Rule 1, CPC is directory and not mandatory; but, at the same time, it is observed that provision of Order 8 Rule 1, CPC is directory but the Court has wide powers to make such orders in relation to suits as it thinks fit. Further, it is held that time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases and while extending time it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time limit of 90 days, therefore, discretion of the Court to extend time may not be so frequent and routine exercise so as to nullify the period fixed by the Order 8 Rule 1. Para 21 and 22 of the said judgment run as under: "21. The use of the word `shall' in Order VIII Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. We have to ascertain the object which is required to be served by this provision and its design and contest in which it is enacted. The use of the word `shall' is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules or procedure are handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice. 22. In construing this provision, support can also be had from Order VIII Rule 10 which provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this provision, the Court has been given the discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other order in relation to suit as it thinks fit. In the context of the provision, despite use of the word `shall', the Court has been given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce the judgment against the defendant even if written statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit. In the context of the provision, despite use of the word `shall', the Court has been given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce the judgment against the defendant even if written statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision of Order VIII Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious construction is required to be applied. The effect would be that under Rule 10 of Order VIII, the Court its discretion would have power to allow the defendant to file written statement even after expiry of period of 90 days provided in Order VIII Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order VIII Rule 10 that after expiry of ninety days, further time cannot be granted. The Court has wide power to `make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit'. Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order VIII Rule 1 providing for upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to time written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time limit of 90 days. The discretion of the Court to extend the time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed by Order VIII Rule 1." 8. I have applied my mind towards the facts of the present case, so also, considered the judgment of the apex Court in Salem Advocates Bar Association's case (supra). In my opinion, although the apex Court has held that Order 8 Rule 1, C.P.C. is directory in nature; but, at the same time, the Supreme Court has in clear words held that the discretion of the Court to extend time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed in Order 8 Rule 1. In this light, I have examined the facts of the present case. In the present case, admittedly, written-statement has been filed after eight years and no justification is on record for such exorbitant delay. In this light, I have examined the facts of the present case. In the present case, admittedly, written-statement has been filed after eight years and no justification is on record for such exorbitant delay. Therefore, in my opinion, even if it is held by the apex Court that order 8 Rule 1, CPC is directory in nature discretion has been given to Court to apply mind towards facts of each case and, facts of the present case speak aloud that order passed by the Trial Court rejecting the prayer of the petition-defendant for taking the written-statement on record after eight years does not require any interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In this view of the matter, no case is made out for interference. Hence, this writ petition is hereby dismissed.