JUDGMENT Ravi Malimath , J.—This appeal is by the assessee being aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal holding that the order of CIT (Appeals) is rectifiable under Section 154 of the Act and thereby dismissed the appeal. The appellant company is engaged in financial services. It filed its return of income for the assessment year 2005-06 on 26.10 2005 declaring nil income. However, the book profits under Section 115JB were shown at Rs.10,51,09,653/-. 2. The intimation under Section 143(1) was issued. Credit for pre-paid taxes was given at Rs.7,33,31,887/-. The assessee, however, filed an application for rectification seeking for credit to the extent of Rs.11,90,97,725. But, the Assessing Officer gave credit only to the extent of Rs.11,33,31,887/- and levied interest of Rs.7,93,203/- under Section 234C of the Act. The assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT (Appeals) against the order of the Assessing Officer, wherein the appeal was allowed by holding that there is no question of levy of interest under Section 234C levied on computation of book profits under Section 115JB and accordingly, interest of Rs.7,93,203/- levied by the Assessing Officer on the assessee was deleted. Aggrieved by the same, the revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal, wherein the Tribunal dismissed the same on the ground that the permission of the COD was not obtained. Subsequently, the revenue preferred an application under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) stating that the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Jindal Thermal Power Company Limited (Formerly Jindal Tracteble Power Co. Ltd.) Vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Union of India (UOI) r/by its Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, (2006) 286 ITR 182 KAR was not taken into consideration while allowing the assessee's appeal. The Appellate Authority entertained the application under Section 154 and rectified the order by levying interest under Section 234C of the Act. Aggrieved by the same, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by the impugned order dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present appeal by the assessee. 3. It is contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that once the appeal by the revenue has been dismissed on the ground of non-obtaining of the COD permission, the revenue could not have sought for rectification of the earlier order passed. The Tribunal by the impugned order dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present appeal by the assessee. 3. It is contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that once the appeal by the revenue has been dismissed on the ground of non-obtaining of the COD permission, the revenue could not have sought for rectification of the earlier order passed. That the revenue had no authority in law to make an application for rectification when the earlier proceedings stood concluded. 4. The Tribunal while passing the impugned order held that the revenue's earlier appeal was dismissed not on merits but only on the ground of not obtaining COD permission. Hence that by itself cannot bind the revenue from filing an application under Section 154 of the IT Act for rectification of a mistake, which is apparent on the face of the record. It was further noted on the facts that the order of the jurisdictional High Court was already available on 31.03.2008 and therefore, the non-consideration of the same is a mistake apparent on the face of the record. 5. We are in complete agreement with the finding recorded by the Tribunal the provision of seeking rectification is very much available to the revenue notwithstanding the earlier rejection of the appeal, which was not on merits. The consideration of the application for rectification of a mistake is very much available in view of the non-consideration of the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court as on the date of the passing of the order. Accordingly, we do not find any error committed by the Tribunal that calls for any interference nor any substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal being devoid of merits is dismissed.