JUDGMENT : VEDPAL, J.- This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner/tenant Shri Nizammuddin Khan (since deceased) challenging the judgment and order dated 23.1.1996 (wrongly written in the petition as 22.1.1996) passed by the than IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bahriach in Rent Appeal No. 28 of 1992 : Nizammuddin Khan v. Shivendra Kumar and others as contained in Annexure No.6 of the writ petition upholding the judgment and order dated 10.2.1992 (wrongly written as 10.2.1995 in the petition) passed by the Prescribed Authority/Munsif, Bahriach in P.A. Case No.9 of 1983 : Smt. Saubhagyawati Oevi (since deceased) v. Shri Nizammuddin Khan and others as contained in Annexure No.5 to the writ petition. 2. The relevant facts in brief, for determination of this writ petition are that Smt. Saubhagyawati Devi, landlord of the shop in question had preferred an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') against Shri Nizammuddin Khan for the release of the shop in question on the ground that the same is required after demolition and new construction for setting up her grand son Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal. 3. During the pendency of the said application, Smt. Saubhagyawati Devi died and in her place, Shivendra Kumar, Dhananjaya Kumar and Dhirendra Kumar were substituted as her legal representatives, who also prosecuted the release application on the basis of the need of Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal and adopted the pleadings of Smt. Saubhagyawati Devi of the aforesaid P.A. Case with consequent amendment. 4. The release application was contested by tenant Shri Nizamuddin Khan before the learned prescribed authority. It was stated by Shri Nizamuddin Khan that Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal is the grand-son of Smt. Saubhagyawati Devi and as such he is not a member of her family and release application for the need of a grand-son is not maintainable. 4. The release application was contested by tenant Shri Nizamuddin Khan before the learned prescribed authority. It was stated by Shri Nizamuddin Khan that Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal is the grand-son of Smt. Saubhagyawati Devi and as such he is not a member of her family and release application for the need of a grand-son is not maintainable. It was further stated in the written statement that the need of Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal is neither bona fide nor genuine and the factum of comparative hardship also does not lie in his favour, as Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal has big business of Dal Mill, whole sale business of grains and has also several other shops and he can start business in those shops also and the release application is liable to be dismissed. During the pendency of the proceeding certain facts that some shops were got vacated and certain were constructed were also brought on record as subsequent events. 5. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective claims. The learned prescribed authority held that the need of Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal for the release of the disputed shops is bona fide and genuine and factum of comparative hardship also lies in his favour and accordingly he allowed the release application in favour of Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal and the appellate authority also dismissed the appeal by the impugned" order dated 23.1.1996. Feeling aggrieved with the said order of release of shop passed by learned prescribed authority and confirmed by the appellate authority, the tenant filed this writ petition. 6. During the pendency of this petition tenant Shri Nizamuddin Khan also died and his legal representatives were brought on record who took the stand taken by Shri Nizamuddin Khan. 7. The parties with their consent, were finally heard at length on the merits of the case at this stage and the petition is being disposed of finally. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioners urged that the release application of the shop in question under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, for the need of Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal who is a grand-son of Smt. Saubhagyawati Devi, who died during the pendency of the release application before the learned prescribed authority, was not maintainable. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioners urged that the release application of the shop in question under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, for the need of Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal who is a grand-son of Smt. Saubhagyawati Devi, who died during the pendency of the release application before the learned prescribed authority, was not maintainable. It was further submitted that a grand-son does not come within the definition of the family as is given under section 3 (g) of the Act. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner/tenant relied on Smt. Rahiman v. District Judge, Barabanki and others;1 Harish Tondon v. Additional District Magistrate;2 Mukesh Kumar v. District Judge, Muzaffarnagar and another;3 Shyam Sunder Mishra v. VIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others;4 Om Prakash and others v. The Prescribed Authority and others;5 Babu Ram @ Babu Lal v. Additional District Judge, Rampur and others.6 9. Learned Counsel for the respondent in counter submitted that grand-son falls within the definition of family, as defined under section 3 (g) of the Act and thus a landlord/landlady can seek release of the shop to establish her grand-son in business. He further submitted that under the provision of section 21 (7) of the Act, legal representative are entitled to prosecute the release application after the death of original landlord on the basis of their own need and since Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal was substituted as legal representative of deceased Smt. Saubhagyawati Devi in the application for release, therefore, on this ground also he is entitled to. get the shop released in his favour to establish himself in the business. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties/landlord in support of his contention, has relied on Bhagwan Das v. Surendra Prakash Agarwal;7 Surendra Prakash Goel v. Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Muzzafar Nagar and others;8 Mohammad Ali v. IXth A.D.J., Allahabad and others.9 Shiromani Kant @ Mani Kant and others v. Additional District Judge, Meerut and others.10 10. I have carefully considered the respective submissions made by the parties and perused the relevant case law on the point. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to refer section 3 (g) of the Act, which defines family. I have carefully considered the respective submissions made by the parties and perused the relevant case law on the point. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to refer section 3 (g) of the Act, which defines family. It reads as uryder : “Section 3 (g).-‘family’, in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building, means, his or her – (i) spouse, (ii) male lineal descendants, (iii) such parents, grand-parents and any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of residence in that building." 11. It reveals from the perusal of the above definition that male lineal descendants come within the ambit of family. The plaint meaning of lineal descendant is one who is in the blood stream of the ancestral such as chi1d or grandchild of the remotest degree. There cannot be any other meaning of this word. The terms 'lineal descent' have been defined in Whartoris Law Lenicon, 14th Edn., Second India Reprint, 1994 as; that relationship which subsists between persons descended in a right line, as grandfather, father, son, grandson., 12. Thus term "lineal descendants" is of wide amplitude which includes not only the sons but grandsons also. This Court in cases of Bhagwan Das v. Surendra Prakash Agrawal, Shiromani Kant (@ Mani Kant and others v. Additional District Judge, Meerut and others; Murlidhar v. XIth A.D.J. and others after considering other cases also on the point held that under the provisions of section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, the application for release of the accommodation can be filed on the ground of need of the grandson as well. In case Shiromani Kant (supra), paras 5 to 7 are relevant and important which are reproduced as under: “5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners urged that the release application for the need of grandson cannot be entertained in an application filed by the grandfather under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. He has also Placed reliance upon the decision Smt. Rahiman v. District Judge, Barabanki and others, wherein the Court considering the provisions of Rule 161 (2) (d) held that this Rule is not applicable in respect of grandson. Rule 16 (2) (d) reads as under : . He has also Placed reliance upon the decision Smt. Rahiman v. District Judge, Barabanki and others, wherein the Court considering the provisions of Rule 161 (2) (d) held that this Rule is not applicable in respect of grandson. Rule 16 (2) (d) reads as under : . "Where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building was originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government service, and want to engage in self-employment, his or her need shall be given the consideration." The Court was not considering the definition of 'family" as given under section 3 (g) of the Act which reads as under : 'family', in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building mean, his or her – (1) spouse, (2) male lineal descendants, (3) such parents, grand-parents and any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated dumpher or daughter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female being a legal right or residence in that building; . 6. It includes the male lineal descendants. it is not confined only to the son. The application under section 21 (1) (a) of the At can be filed by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family. 7. In Murlidhar v. XIth Additional District Judge and others, it was held that the application can be filed for release on the ground of the need of the grandson as well. In Prem Chand v. District Judge, Jhansi and others, it was held that the definition of "family" under section 3 (g) of the Act includes spouse, son, parents grandparents, unmarried or widowed or judicially separated daughter, grand-daughter. The landlord can validly file an application for need of his grandson under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. 13. It reveals from the perusal of the above case law that ruling of case Smt. Rahiman (supra) relied on by learned Counsel for the petitioners was also considered by this Court wherein it was held that in that case, Court was not considering the definition of family as given under section 3 (g) of the Act. 13. It reveals from the perusal of the above case law that ruling of case Smt. Rahiman (supra) relied on by learned Counsel for the petitioners was also considered by this Court wherein it was held that in that case, Court was not considering the definition of family as given under section 3 (g) of the Act. Thus, direct authority of this Court is available on the point wherein other cases of this Court were also considered and some of them were also relied. The ruling cited by learned Counsel for the petitioners is not direct on the point in issue and provisions of section 3 (g) of the Act were no analyzed in those cases. Furthermore, the ruling of this Court wherein grandson is held to be a member of family are latter in time. Full Bench of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in case Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore v. R. Maheshwari2 has held as under : "Where there are two judgments rendered by the Benches consisting of equal number of Judges, it is well settled law of precedent that the latter in time would prevail." 14. In view of the above, it is abundantly clear that grandson of a landlord or tenant as the case may be falls within the definition of "family" given in section 3 (g) of the Act and an application for release of accommodation on the ground of need of a grandson is maintainable. 15. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note in this case that during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned prescribed authority, the original landlord Smt. Saubhagyawati Devi had died and Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal alongwith his brother and father was substituted as legal representatives. Section 21 (7) of the Act provides that where during the pendency of an application under Clause (a) of sub-section (1), the landlord dies, his legal representatives shall be entitled to prosecute such application further on the basis of their own need in substitution of the need of the deceased. 16. In view of the above, the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for release of the shop in question is not maintainable on the ground of need of a grandson, cannot be accepted and is of no help to the petitioners. 17. 16. In view of the above, the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for release of the shop in question is not maintainable on the ground of need of a grandson, cannot be accepted and is of no help to the petitioners. 17. It was next submitted by the learned Counsel $or the petitioners that Act No. 13 of 1972 is benevolent Legislature in the favour of tenant and its provisions should be construed in favour of the tenant and not in favour of landlord. I do not agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. 18. It is not correct to suggest that the Act is beneficial only to the tenant and thus the Court should lean towards him, for the reasons that the Act provides for maintaining the equilibrium of interest of both the parties. In J. Chatterjee v. Mohinder Kaur Uppal and another, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a balance has to be maintained between the general object of the statute which is to provide protection to the tenant against arbitrary action of the landlord of their eviction and the assistance to be referred to the landlords to recover the possession of the premises let out by them for his occupation if they fulfill the requirements of the statute. 19. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra1, the Hon'ble Apex Court emphasized the need of striking a balance between rival interests so as to be just law, in every social legislation like Rent Control Act. "The law ought not to be unjust to one and give disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society." 20. Leaning towards the tenants, while interpreting the provisions of the Rent Control Act, would render the provisions beneficial to the landlord nugatory and hence such an interpretation is not permissible in law. (Vide Arjun Khan Khaiarwal Makhijani v. Jamanadas C. Tuliani. 21. Even otherwise, legislation only for protecting the interest of one party is not permissible as it may tend to be arbitrary and discriminatory and be violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (Vide Arjun Khan Khaiarwal Makhijani v. Jamanadas C. Tuliani. 21. Even otherwise, legislation only for protecting the interest of one party is not permissible as it may tend to be arbitrary and discriminatory and be violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with this issue, observed as under: "Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic perception and not a short-sighted parochial approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislations is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability. A legislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing shockers on the other section, nor only entails miscarriage of justice but may also result in Constitutional invalidity." 22. In Liaq Ahmed and others v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court strikes a balance between the rights of the landlords and the interest of the tenants. 23. In Ganpat Ram Sharma v. Gayatri Devi, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Act protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. On the other hand, it ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to recover possession on stated contingencies. 24. In Nilesh Nandkumar Shah v. Sikandar Aziz Patel, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the purpose of the rent control legislation is to protect the interest of both the parties and it also protects the tenant from unjust eviction at the hands of greedy or unscrupulous landlord. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Rent Control Act is only to protect a tenant and it does not look after the interest of the landlord. 25. In view of the above, the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners that Act No. 13 of 1972 is benevolent legislature in the favour of tenant only and its provisions should be construed in favour of the tenant and not in favour of landlord, cannot be accepted and is of no help to the petitioners. 26. 25. In view of the above, the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners that Act No. 13 of 1972 is benevolent legislature in the favour of tenant only and its provisions should be construed in favour of the tenant and not in favour of landlord, cannot be accepted and is of no help to the petitioners. 26. It was next submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the learned appellate authority in its judgment at page 71 in para 116, has recorded a finding to this effect that sine the shop in question requires demolition and reconstruction therefore there is no need to look into as to whether the requirement of the shop in question to the• landlord is bona fide and comoparative hardship is in his favour or not, as the right of a tenant to reenter under section 24 (2) of the Act is intact and since the appellate authority has allowed the release application under the provisions of section 21 (1) (b) also, it is, therefore, necessary that specific time should be fixed for reconstruction of the shop and a specific direction should be issued by this Court that the shop in question should be given to the tenant within the time fixed by the Court. 27. In counter, learned Counsel for the respondents/landlord submitted that the application for release of the shop was moved on the' ground that shop in question is bona fide required after demolition and new construction by landlord for occupation of Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal to establish his business as per provisions of section 21 (1) (a) of the Act and the application was never moved for release of shop under the provisions of section 21 (1) (b) of the Act and as such the finding contrary to the pleadings of the parties is of no avail to the petitioners and is redundant particularly when there is a specific finding of both the authority below that case of release of the shop in question under the provisions of section 21 (1) (a) of the Act is made out on the basis of bona fide requirement of the landlord Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal. He further submitted that one paragraph of the judgment of the learned Appellate Court cannot be read in violation and as such if a finding contrary to the pleadings of the parties was recorded incidentally by the learned Appellate Court while considering the argument made by the tenant, the petitioners can get no benefit of it. 28. I have carefully considered the respective submissions made by the parties. It reveals from the perusal of the record that application for release of the shop was moved on the ground that shop in question is bona fide required after demolition and new construction by landlord for occupation of Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal to establish his business of general merchandise. There is specific mention of section 21 (1) (a) of the Act in paragraph 14 the application as under: "That the present application being in one under section 21 (1) (a) a sum of Rs. 10/- is being paid as Court-fee." 29. There is a distinction between an application under section 21 (1) and section 21 (1) (b) of the Act. In an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act release is sought on the ground that it is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, while in an application under section 21 (1) (b) of the Act release is sought on the ground that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for the purposes of demolition and new construction. In the later case there remains no element of need of landlord for the accommodation. In the present case the application for release of the shop was moved on the ground that shop in question is bona fide required after demolition and new construction by landlord for occupation of Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal to establish his business. Thus the application was clearly under the provisions of section 21 (1) (a) of the Act and in no way it could have been treated otherwise, merely because shop also requires demolition and new construction before its occupation by Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal. Thus the application was clearly under the provisions of section 21 (1) (a) of the Act and in no way it could have been treated otherwise, merely because shop also requires demolition and new construction before its occupation by Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal. The land lord in his application for release of the shop has clear y stated that the shop in question is needed to Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal to establish him in\the business of general merchandise while respondents in their written statement have denied this fact. Need of the shop to the landlord was the main controversy between the parties and the pleadings were also to this effect that both the parties have adduced their evidences in support of their pleadings before the learned prescribed authority. It was nowhere stated or admitted by the landlord that shop is not required for the occupation of Shri Dhananjaya Kumar and they only want it to be demolished and reconstructed. Thus the finding of the learned Appellate Court treating application under section 21 (1) (b) of the Act was also beyond the pleadings of the parties and is redundant and the petitioners can get no benefit of its particularly when there is specific finding of both the authorities below that case of release of shop in question is made out on the basis of bona fide requirement of landlord Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal and the factum of hardship is also in favour of the landlord. 30. It is settled law that a judgment of a Court is not a statute and cannot be read like the statute. It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or sentence from the judgment, divorced from context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete judgment. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court. A decision of the Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered. It is not permissible to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration to support the contentions. A decision of the Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered. It is not permissible to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration to support the contentions. The Court is bound to decide an application on the points raised therein and should not take a case which has not been put forward by any of the parties. There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that the Court or Tribunal is not permitted to decide a case going out of pleadings of the parties nor the evidence led on a non-existing plea is permitted to be taken into consideration. As has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases of J. Jermons v. Aliammal and others; the Insurance Corporation of India and others v. Jyotish Chandra Biswas; Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal and Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan and others. 31. In view of the above, the said finding recorded by the Appellate Court is redundant and the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in this behalf, as stated above, cannot be accepted and the petitioners can get no benefit of it. 32. The next submission of the learned Counsel of the petitioners is that it has not been established that need by Shri Dhananjay Kumar Agarwal is bona fide and he will suffer hardship if shop in question is not released in his favour. It was further submitted that Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal had an oil mill, business of grains merchant and had several shops but he did not do any business in any of the shop which were vacated by other tenants and subsequent events were not taken into consideration by the authorities below. It was further submitted that Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal had an oil mill, business of grains merchant and had several shops but he did not do any business in any of the shop which were vacated by other tenants and subsequent events were not taken into consideration by the authorities below. It was further submitted that while assessing the factum of bona fide need and comparative hardship, the relevant factors as detailed in Rule 16 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules have not been kept in view and as such the findings recorded by prescribed authority as well as by appellate authority that Shri Dhananjay Kumar Agarwal bona fide require the shop in question and comparative hardship is in his favour, are not in accordance with the evidence on record and are perverse, and as such the impugned orders cannot be sustained and are liable to set aside. 33. In support of his contention that subsequent events should be taken into account, learned Counsel for the petitioner/tenant has relied upon the case of; Kedar Nath Agarwal (dead) and another v. Dhanraji Devi (dead) and another; Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram; Mahabir Prasad v. Vlth Additional District Judge, Gounda and others; Durga Prasad Mahavir Prasad v. District Judge, Ghazipur and others; Smt. Sarojrani and others v. Xth Additional District Judge, Lucknow and others; Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad; Atma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar Singh ; Smt. Kalyani Bala Halder v. 1st Additional District Judge, Varanasi and another ; Sri Narain and another v. Vth Additional District fudge, Agra and others; ; Badri Prasad and others v. Munna Lal and others; Savani Transport (P) Ltd. v. L. Rajamanikkam. Learned Counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention that while assessing bona fide need and comparative hardships, provisions of Rule 16 should be taken into account relief on Natthu v.Amar Nath Agarwal and others, Raghav Ram Gupta v. IInd Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others; Bishan Chand v. Vth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and another. 34. Learned Counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention that while assessing bona fide need and comparative hardships, provisions of Rule 16 should be taken into account relief on Natthu v.Amar Nath Agarwal and others, Raghav Ram Gupta v. IInd Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others; Bishan Chand v. Vth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and another. 34. Learned Counsel for the respondents in counter submitted that subsequent events put forward by tenants were taken into consideration by the authorities below and while discussing evidence of parties on assessment of bona fide need of landlords and comparative hardships between the parties, provisions of Rule 16 were taken into consideration and in the factual position and circumstances of the present case, the ruling cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners have not application. He further submitted that Shri Dhananjay Kumar Agarwal had no independent business of his own and the facts that he has a share in his parental mill and also lands support to his father and brother in their business are not sufficient to hold that he has no need of the shop in question. On the point of bona fide need, learned Counsel for the landlord submitted that Shri Dhananjay Kumar Agarwal belong to a business class and want to settle himself in business which is not possible until and unless he has a shop for an independent business and thus release of the shop was not a mere desire for him but was a pressing need and his need was bona fide. He further submitted that the shops which falls in his share after family settlement was not vacant and as such could have not been occupied by the respondent Shri Dhananjay Kumar Agarwal without its release in accordance with the law as they were subject to allotment and this was the reason that even tenant did not apply for allotment of the shop which had come in the share of Shri Dhananjay Kumar Agarwal. He further submitted that this Court in writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot re-appreciate the findings of facts recorded by the authorities below as an Appellate Court and there is no perversity and illegality in the finding recorded by learned "prescribed authority as well as by learned appellate authority. He further submitted that this Court in writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot re-appreciate the findings of facts recorded by the authorities below as an Appellate Court and there is no perversity and illegality in the finding recorded by learned "prescribed authority as well as by learned appellate authority. The finding of bona fide need and comparative hardship recorded by the authorities below in favour of petitioners is based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record and there is no perversity and illegality in the said findings. He further submitted that it is the choice of landlord which shop is best suitable to him for his business and the tenant cannot dictate that landlord may run in his business in a particular shop. It was also submitted that the tenant Shri Nizamuddin Khan had also four shops and he instead of shifting his business in those shops settled down his sons therein and also changed the nature of his business in the shop in questions as previously he was dealing in thread, buttons and needless and thereafter he started business of nuts and bolts in the shop in question and his old business of buttons, needle and thread is being carried out by his sons thus no goodwill is attached to the later business of the nut and bolts. He further submitted that during the pendency of the writ, the tenant Shri Nizamuddin Khan, had died and his wife and sons have been brought on record as L.Rs. and thus the question of need of shop to the original tenant is no longer subsists and his sons own their independent business. It was further submitted that there is nothing on record that tenant had ever made a search of alternative accommodation during the pendency of these proceedings and as such he cannot say that hardship is in favour of tenant and in the favour of landlord. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties/landlord in support of his contention, has relied upon the cases of Mohammad Ali v. IXth A.D.J., Allahabad and others; Lalita Ram Nath (Dead) through LRs. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties/landlord in support of his contention, has relied upon the cases of Mohammad Ali v. IXth A.D.J., Allahabad and others; Lalita Ram Nath (Dead) through LRs. v. Vth Additional District Judge, Etawah and another; Satish Chandra and others v. Som Nath Anand and others; Mahendra Singh Verma v. Kaushalya Devi and another; Munna Lal V, IInd Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court, Jalaun and others; Mahendra Singh Verma v. Kaushalya Devi and another; Jagdish Saran v. Prashant Kumar Dublish; Rajendra Prakash Garg v. Bal Kishore. Agprwal; Kanahaiya Lal Agarwal v. District Judge, Ballia, Gulab Chand through L.Rs' v. District Judge, Lalitpur and others; Ashis Kumar and another v. Prescribed Authority and another; Haider Ali and others v. IXth Additional District Judge, Lucknow and others; Abdul Aziz and others v. Vth Addl. District Judge, Agra and others; Satya Prakash Kaushik (Dr.) v. Sri Sobin Jain; Zaheer Ahmad v. Imtiaz Hussain and another. 35. I have carefully considered the respective submissions made by the parties keeping in view the rulings cited by both the parties. It reveals. from the perusa1 of rulings cited by learned Counsel for the petitioners that subsequent events if they have bearing on issue between the parties and may affect the result of the case, should be taken into consideration and while disposing release application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, provisions of Rule 16 Should be taken into account. It is therefore to be seen whether it was done. by the authorities below or not. 36. In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties it is necessary to go through the provisions of Rule 16 which reads as under: "16. It is therefore to be seen whether it was done. by the authorities below or not. 36. In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties it is necessary to go through the provisions of Rule 16 which reads as under: "16. Application for release on the ground of personal requirement.-(1) In considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the prescribed authority shall, also have regard to such factors as the following : (a) where the landlord already has adequate and reasonably suitable accommodation having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his means and social status, his claim for additional requirements shall be construed strictly; (b) where a residential building was let all t at a time when the sons of the landlord were minors and subsequently one or more of them has married, the additional requirement of accommodation for the landlord's sons shall be given due consideration; (c) where the tenant has, apart from the building under tenancy other adequate accommodation, whether owned by him or held as tenant of any public premises, having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his social status, the landlord's claim for additional requirements shall be construed liberally; (d) where the tenant's needs would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's needs would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building; (e) where there are a number of tenants separately occupying a block of tenements and the landlord desires their eviction on ground of his personal need the prescribed authority shall, consider whether suitable alternative accommodation is likely to be available to such tenants; (j) where the landlord offers to the tenant alternative accommodation reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family the landlord's claim for release of the building under tenancy shall be construed liberally; (g) where the landlord was engaged in any employment in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building is situate and was in occupation of other accommodation by reason of such employment or where the landlord is the wife or minor son or unmarried daughter of a person who was engaged in any profession, trade, calling or employment away from the city, municipality, notified area or town area within which the building is situate and was living with such person, and by reason of the cessation of such engagement, the landh5rd needs the building for occupation by himself for residential purposes, such need shall ordinarily be deemed sufficient. (2) While considering an application for release under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 21 in respect of a building let out of purposes of any business, the prescribed authority shall also have regard 0 such facts as the following : (a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less the justification for al owing the application; (b) where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application; (c) the greater the existing business of the landlord's own, apart from the business proposed to be set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the application, and even if an application is allowed in such a case, the prescribed authority may on the application of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has available with him other accommodation (whether subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed business but may serve the purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall left out that accommodation to the tenant on' a fair rent to be fixed by the prescribed authority; (d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building was originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government service, and wants to engage in self-employment, his or her need shall be given due consideration. (3) Where the tenant being servant of Government or of any local authority or any public sector corporation does not contest the application, then a reasonable opportunity of 'being heard shall be given to the District Magistrate, who shall have the right to oppose the application." 37. The parameters relating to Rule 16 of the Rules have been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sushila v. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda and others, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 10 and 11 observed as under: "10. The parameters relating to Rule 16 of the Rules have been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sushila v. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda and others, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 10 and 11 observed as under: "10. A bare perusal of Rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 makes it clear that the rule only prescribes certain factors which have also to be taken into account while considering the application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide need. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 quoted earlier relates to the cases of eviction from an accommodation for business use. Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) provides, greater the period of tenancy less the justification for allowing the application; whereas according to Clause (b) in case the tenant has a suitable accommodation available to him to shift his business, greater the justification to allow the application. Availability of another suitable accommodation to the tenant, waters down the weight attached to the longer period of tenancy as a factor to be considered as provided under Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. Yet another factor which may in some cases be relevant under Clause (c) is where the existing business of the landlord is quite huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed business to be set up, there would be lesser justification to allow the application. The idea behind Clause (c) is apparent i.e., where the landlord runs a huge business eviction may not be resorted to for expansion or diversification of the business by uprooting a tenant having a small business for a very long period of time. In such a situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater hardship to the tenant. 11. In the case in hand we find that even though the period of tenancy of the respondent is no doubt long but availability of another shop to him where he can very well shift his business as found by the prescribed authority, neutralises the factor of length of tenancy in the accommodation in dispute. We further find that the landlady has no other shop where she can establish her son who is married and unemployed. We further find that the landlady has no other shop where she can establish her son who is married and unemployed. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the business of father of Prem Prakash is so huge or that it is a very flourishing business so as to attract application of Clause (c) of Rule 16 (2). As observed earlier it is clear that length of period of tenancy as provided under Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 is only one of the factors to be taken into account in context with other facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be a sole criterion or deciding factor to order or not the eviction of the tenant. Considering the facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into service on behalf of the respondent, we find that according to the guidelines provided therein balance tilts in favour of the unemployed son of the landlady whose need is certainly bona fide and has also been so accepted by the respondent before us." 38. In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Mac/unary and Co. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is the choice of the landlord to choose the place for the business which is most suitable for him. He has complete freedom in the matter. 39. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the need of the landlord is to be seen on the date of application for release. 40. In Prativa Devi (Smt,) v. T.V. Krishnan Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the landlord is the best Judge of his requirement and Courts have no concern to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he should live. 41. In the present case it reveals from the perusal of the record that in the instant case the learned prescribed authority discussed the evidence of both the parties at length and after analyzing the evidence of the parties, he reached to the conclusion that the need of landlord of the shop in question is bona fide and genuine and factum of comparative hardships also lies in his favour. In his judgment, he has also taken into account the accommodation which was alleged to be in the ownership of the landlord and held that no vacant accommodation is available to the landlord for his business. In his judgment, he has also taken into account the accommodation which was alleged to be in the ownership of the landlord and held that no vacant accommodation is available to the landlord for his business. He also considered that the need of landlord is genuine and bona fide and the factum of comparative hardships also lies in favour of the landlord as Shri Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal has no independent business. These findings are based on evidence on record. 42. The judgment passed by the learned prescribed authority was challenged by the tenant before the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court also considered all the relevant facts including subsequent events which had occurred during the pendency of the proceedings before him and reached to the conclusion that the shop in question is genuinely required to Shri Dhanajaya Kumar Agarwal to establish him in the business and the fact that he is looking after the business of H.U.F. is not sufficient to deprive him from establishing his independent business. The learned appellate authority has held that need of Dhananjay Kumar is bona fide and factum of comparative hardship also is in his favour. Learned appellate authority also considered that tenant has also got shops, wherein he has established his sons and they are doing business of buttons, needles and threads which was previously done by Shri Nizammuddin Khan in shop in question. These findings are based on evidence on record. 43. In view of the above, it is clear that subsequent events were taken into consideration by the authorities below and provisions of Rule 16 were also kept in view while assessing the need of the landlord and comparative hardships between the parties. In view of this factual position, the rulings cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners cited above, is of no help to the petitioners. 44. Regarding re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh and others1 held as under: "Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was examined and to record a finding in that behalf. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a Court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a First Appellate Court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained." 45. In the case of Lalit Pop v. Canera Bank and others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not to akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority." 46. The decisions referred to above clearly highlighted the parameters of the Court's power regarding re-appreciation of evidence. The jurisdiction of the Courts in such a matter is very limited. The order can be setaside if it is based on extraneous grounds or there are no grounds at all for passing it or the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion. The Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. Neither the question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the authority can be raised/examined nor the question of re-appreciating the evidence to examine the correctness of the order under challenge. If there are sufficient grounds for passing an order, then even if one of them is found to be correct and on its basis the order impugned can be passed, there is no occasion for the Court to interfere. If there are sufficient grounds for passing an order, then even if one of them is found to be correct and on its basis the order impugned can be passed, there is no occasion for the Court to interfere. The jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is permissible against the decision making process and not against the decision itself. The bona fide personal need and factum of comparative hardship are questions of fact and should not be normally interfered with. In the present case, there are materials and evidence in support of the said finding recorded by the authorities below and as such the findings recorded by the authorities below in this regard, cannot be said to be perverse. 47. The petitioners in this writ petition have filed additional evidence in the form of affidavit stating that it carne to their knowledge during the pendency of the writ petition hence evidence should be taken into account as subsequent events. Counter and rejoinder affidavits were also exchanged between the parties in this writ petition. The evidence filed by the parties were taken on record. It reveals from the perusal of the evidence filed by the parties that it mainly relates to the alleged construction in Shravasti Hotel. It has been stated by the petitioners that the landlords have made four shops over the 1st Floor of Shravasti Hotel and these shops may also be used by the landlord for their business. In counter it has been stated by landlords that the alleged construction are not shop but is a hall of hotel which has no independent way and in this new construction, the only approach is inside the hotel. It is clear from the perusal of the photographs submitted by the petitioners in this writ petition that there is no independent way to the alleged shop and the way of approach to the aforesaid accommodation is from the inside of hotel. Thus, this accommodation cannot be used for general merchandise business. Thus the evidence adduced in this writ petition regarding subsequent events is also of no help to the petitioners and the need of the landlord cannot be said to have been vanished on this ground. 48. Thus, this accommodation cannot be used for general merchandise business. Thus the evidence adduced in this writ petition regarding subsequent events is also of no help to the petitioners and the need of the landlord cannot be said to have been vanished on this ground. 48. Admittedly, the original tenant Shri Nizammuddin Khan has expired during the pendency of this writ petition and his L.Rs. have been brought .on record. It has come on record that two sons of the original tenant have their own business. This Court in Haider Ali and others v. IXth Additional Distrkt Judge, Lucknow and others in para 8 has held that if original tenant dies and his sons are having other accommodation in their possession and doing their business in their own accommodation, their objection against release application shall not be entertained. 49. It reveals from the perusal of the judgment of the authorities below that they have not awarded two years' rent to the tenant under the IInd proviso to section 21 (1) of the Act. It ought to have been awarded and may be awarded by this Court. Admittedly, the rent of the tenanted was Rs. 12/-. per month. Thus the amount of compensation to be paid comes to Rs. 288/- Therefore two years rent determined at the rate of rent of Rs. 12/ - per month i.e. Rs. 288/will be paid as compensation by the respondents to the petitioners within one month from the date of this order. 50. In view of above, there is no scope in this petition for any interference in the concurrent findings recorded by the authorities below regarding bona fide need of shop in question to Dhananjaya Kumar Agarwal and comparative hardships in his favour. 51. In view of what has been stated above, the writ petition is accordingly dismissed with aforesaid modification. 52. The petitioners-tenants are granted three months time to vacate the shop in question provided that: 1. Within one month from today petitioners-tenants file an undertaking before-the prescribed authority to the effect that on or before the expiry of aforesaid period of three months they will willingly vacate and handover possession of the shop in question to the landlord-respondent. 2. For this period of three months, which has been granted to the tenants-petitioners to vacate, they are required to pay Rs. 3,000/- (at the rate of Rs. 2. For this period of three months, which has been granted to the tenants-petitioners to vacate, they are required to pay Rs. 3,000/- (at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month) as rent/damages for use and occupation. This amount shall also be deposited within one month before the prescribed authority and shall immediately be paid to the landlords-respondents. In case of default in compliance of any of these conditions, tenants-petitioners shall be evicted through process of Court after one month and tenants-petitioners shall be liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month since after one month till the date of actual vacation. 53. Similarly, if after filing the aforesaid undertaking and depositing Rs. 3,000/-, the accommodation in dispute is not vacated on the expiry of three months the damages for use and occupation shall be payable at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month since after six months till actual vacation. 54. It is needless to add that this direction is in addition to the right of the landlord to file contempt petition for violation of undertaking and execution application under relevant provisions of the Act. 55. No order as to costs. Petition Dismissed.