JUDGEMENT B.P.Verma, J. 1. The appellants of the instant second appeal have filed LA. No. 5183 of 2010, kept at flag-A, on 21.5.2010, under Order 22 Rule 3(1) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short "C.P.C."), praying therein for expunging the name of deceased appellant no. 1 (i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, from the array of the parties in the memo of appeal and for substituting her legal heirs and representatives, whose details have been given in paragraph-2 of the aforesaid interlocutory application. It has been stated that appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, has died during the pendency of the instant second appeal on 7.1.2006, leaving behind her two sons and one daughter, as her legal heirs and representatives, fully detailed in .paragraph-2 of the said interlocutory application. 2. I.A. No. 5180 of 2010, at flag-B, has also been filed on 21.5.2010 on behalf of the appellants under Order XXII Rule 9(2) C.P.C. praying therein for setting aside the abatement of the instant second appear as against deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, due to non-filing of a substitution petition within statutory period of time for expunging her name from the cause title and for substituting her legal heirs and representations, whose details have been given once again in paragraph-2 of the aforesaid interlocutory application. However, the names and addresses of the legal heirs and representatives of deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, are exactly same and common as stated in LA. No. 5180 of 2010 as also in LA. No. 5133 of 2010, referred to above. 3. LA. No. 6153 of 2010. at Flag-K. has been filed on 19.7.2010 on behalf of the appellants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 praying therein for condonation of delay in filing the substitution petition for substituting the legal heirs and representatives of the deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, as also for condonation of delay in filing the petition for setting aside an order of abatement of instant second appeal with respect to deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni. 4. Separate counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 4 in all these interlocutory applications, namely, I. A. Nos. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, as also for condonation of delay in filing the petition for setting aside an order of abatement of instant second appeal with respect to deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni. 4. Separate counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 4 in all these interlocutory applications, namely, I. A. Nos. 5183 of 2010, 5180 of 2010 and 6153 of 2010 and those counter-affidavits have been kept at flag- X, Y and Z, respectively, wherein they have controverted the facts stated on behalf of the appellants and prayer has been made on their behalf that in the facts and circumstances of the case, all these interlocutory applications may be rejected. It has been categorically stated on behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 4 that deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, was none else, but the full sister of appellant no. 2, Lalan Prasad and appellant no. 3, Bachanji and they had full knowledge and information about her death having taken place on 7.1.2006, as they had participated in her "Shradh" ceremony, yet steps were not taken by the appellants for substituting her legal heirs and representatives. It has further been stated in the counter affidavits that the appellants have not shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing substitution petition, after expiry of more than four years and further they have not come with clean hands before this Court, as the appellants have made several wrong and misleading statements in all these interlocutory applications for getting the reliefs prayed for therein. 5. When the counter-affidavits on behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 4 were filed, then some supplementary affidavits have been filed on behalf of the appellants and there they have tried to modify their stand taken in the previous interlocutory applications for getting the reliefs sought for. 6. I have heard the parties at length on different dates. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and respondent nos. 1 to 4 have placed their reliance on some judgments of the Honble Apex Court as also of this Court in support of their contention. I shall deal with those judgments at the later part of this order. 7. Before deciding the issues involved in these interlocutory applications, it would be relevant to mention here that instant second appeal was filed on 7.4.1993. Original appellant no. I shall deal with those judgments at the later part of this order. 7. Before deciding the issues involved in these interlocutory applications, it would be relevant to mention here that instant second appeal was filed on 7.4.1993. Original appellant no. 1, Taraknath, died on 26.4.1993 during the pendency of the instant second appeal leaving behind his two sons and four daughters, as his legal heirs and representatives. It is important to note here that his two sons namely, Lalan Prasad and Bachanji, were already on record as appellant nos. 2 and 3 from the very inception of the instant second appeal. A substitution petition, kept at flag-N, filed on behalf of the appellants for substituting the legal heirs and representatives of original appellant no. 1, Taraknath, was allowed on 16.3.1998 by a Bench of this Court. Name of deceased original appellant no. 1, Taraknath, was directed to be expunged from the cause title and his four daughters including appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, were substituted after noting a fact that his two sons are already on record as appellant nos. 2 and 3. Subsequently instant second appeal was admitted on 20.4.1998 by a Bench of this Court. From the facts narrated above, it is apparent that deceased appellant no. 1(1), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, has been already on record since 16.3.1998 and she died on 7.1.2006, leaving behind her two sons and one daughter as her legal heirs and representatives, but none of her legal heirs are on record of the instant second appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that though they had knowledge and information about the death of deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, but the appellants are not very educated persons and were not knowing about the implication and consequences for non-substitution of deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, and, therefore, they could not file a substitution petition within the period of limitation. When appellant no. 3, Bachanji, came to Patna on 16.4.2010 and disclosed the fact to his lawyer about the death of deceased appellant no.1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, having taken place on 7.1.2006, then on legal advice I.A. No. 5183 of 2010 as also I.A. No. 5180 of 2010 were filed on 21.5.2010. When appellant no. 3, Bachanji, came to Patna on 16.4.2010 and disclosed the fact to his lawyer about the death of deceased appellant no.1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, having taken place on 7.1.2006, then on legal advice I.A. No. 5183 of 2010 as also I.A. No. 5180 of 2010 were filed on 21.5.2010. Therefore, it has been submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, all these Interlocutory applications are fit to be allowed by this Court. 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 4 has vehemently opposed.the prayer made on behalf of the appellants and according to him the appellants having full knowledge and information about the death of deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, and, her legal heirs and representatives being necessary party in the instant second appeal, were legally obliged to take steps for their substitution. It has been contended on behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 4 that statements made in paragraph-3 of I.A. Nos. 5180 of 2010 and 5183 of 2010 that the appellants are illiterate persons and they were not knowing the implication and consequences due to non-substitution of the legal heirs of deceased Chandmuni, are factually incorrect. According to him, the appellants are literate persons and know the reading and writing, and, therefore, their claim that they are illiterate is patently false and misleading statements. It has also been contended that the appellants are very careless and negligent in prosecuting the instant second appeal. 10. It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the appellants have not taken a plea that they were not having knowledge and information about the death of deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, who was none else, but the own sister of appellant nos. 2 and 3, who are parties in the present second appeal right from the day of its filing. It is contended that appellant nos. 2 to 4 were the parties in the lower appellate court also, therefore, their plea that they had no knowledge about implication of non-substitution is not at all believable. 11. It is highlighted by the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 4 that the instant second appeal has been preferred against a preliminary decree in a partition suit allotting 8 annas share to the plaintiffs-respondent nos. 11. It is highlighted by the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 4 that the instant second appeal has been preferred against a preliminary decree in a partition suit allotting 8 annas share to the plaintiffs-respondent nos. 1 to 4 herein in the ancestral landed property in survey plot nos. 2292 and 1444. On the basis of the aforesaid judgment of the learned lower appellate court, final decree was prepared in Title Suit No. 136 of 1987 on 22.6.1998, against which the appellants herein filed Title Appeal No. 82 of 1998, which was finally dismissed by learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Buxar by a judgment and order dated 20.11.2000. Against the said judgment and order dated 20.11.2000, the appellants herein wrongly filed initially separate S.A. No, 447 of 2000 before this Court, which was subsequently converted into C.R. No. 1812 of 2003. The said C.R. No. 1812 of 2003 was finally dismissed on contest by a Bench of this Court on 1.12.2004. The appellants herein, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, preferred S.L.P.(Civil) No. 5818 of 2005 before the Honble Supreme Court, which has also been finally dismissed by a three Judge Bench of the Honble Supreme Court on 13.1.2010. The order passed by learned Single Judge in C.R. No. 1812 of 2003 has been brought on record as Annexure-A and order passed in aforesaid S.L.P. (Civil) No. 5818 of 2005 has been brought on record as Annexure-B to the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 4. By referring to these facts it is submitted that it is not at all believable that the persons, who are parties right from title appeal and have contested the matter upto the Honble Supreme Court, had no knowledge about the implication and consequences due to non- substitution of the legal heirs and representatives of deceased appellant no. 1 (i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi. 12. It is also contended that there is an inordinate delay in filing the substitution petition and petition for setting aside order of abatement. According to learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4 no cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for condonation of such a delay. According to him, admittedly, death of deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, took place on 7.1.2006. According to learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4 no cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for condonation of such a delay. According to him, admittedly, death of deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, took place on 7.1.2006. The substitution petition was filed on 21.5.2010 and if the statutory period of 90 days is excluded, then in that case also, there is a delay of four years, one month and fourteen days in filing the substitution petition. On the basis of these submissions, a prayer has been made that all these Interlocutory applications may be rejected and judicial notice may be taken that second appeal, having abated due to non-substitution of legal heirs and representatives of deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, has become incompetent. 13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has placed reliance on the following judgments: (A) Jagamath Singh V/s. Srimati Singhashan Kuer and Others; reported in 1984 PUR 217 (Full Bench). (B) Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and Others v/s. Gobardhan Sao and Others; reported in (2002)3 SCC 195 . 0 Perumon Bhagwathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village V/s. Bharvavi Amma (Dead) By LRs and Others; reported in (2008)8 SCC 321 . 14 Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 to 4 has placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) Katari Suryanarayana & Ors. V/s. Koppisetti Subba Rao &, Ors.; reported in AIR 2009 SC 2907 =2009 AIR SC Weekly 4640. (ii) Balwant Singh (Dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Others; reported in (2010)8 SCC 685 . 15. The issues before the Full Bench of our own High Court in the case of Jagarnath Singh V/s. Srimati Singhashan Kuer and Others (supra) were quite different from that of the issues involved in the present proceeding. The issues before the Full Bench was that if some of the heirs of the deceased person are already on record and the rest of them are not substituted, then whether the proceeding becomes defective and it abates or whethe by application of the principles of representation by the heirs on record, the proceeding does not abate? The issues raised at the outset in paragraph no. The issues raised at the outset in paragraph no. 1 was answered by the Full Bench in paragraph-17 of the judgment holding therein that when one or more heirs of the deceased defendant or respondent are on record, then the estate is fully represented in the suit or the appeal, as the case may be, and in that circumstances, the suit or appeal shall not abate for not bringing on record the other left out legal heirs. The aforesaid proposition laid by the Full Bench has been qualified by certain exceptions indicated there in paragraph-17 itself. However, the ratio laid down there by the Full Bench is not applicable in the facts of the present case. 16. The Apex Court in the case of Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and Others V/s. Gobardhan Sao and Others (supra) has held that sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or Order 22 Rule 9 C.P.C. or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction, so as to advance substantial justice, when no negligence or inaction or want of bone fides is imputable to the party concerned. I am tempted to quote the relevant portion of paragraph 12 of the aforesaid judgment, which is reproduced hereinbelow: "12. ...In a particular case whether " explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be pendant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown arid reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner..........."{emphasis added) 17. In the case of Perumon Bhagwathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village V/s. Bharvavi Amma (Dead) By LRs and Others (supra), though issues were identical, but facts were quite distinguishable. In the case of Perumon Bhagwathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village V/s. Bharvavi Amma (Dead) By LRs and Others (supra), though issues were identical, but facts were quite distinguishable. In that case one of the respondents in the second appeal had died and steps for substitution of his legal heirs and representatives were not taken within time before the High Court of Kerala. Subsequently three petitions namely, a petition for substitution, a petition for setting aside abatement and a petition for condonation of delay, was filed after about 394 days. The prayer for substitution of legal representatives of deceased respondent as also for setting aside order of abatement and condonation of delay for filing such petition was rejected by the High Court of Kerala. The Honble Apex Court, after considering several previous judgments, has laid down the law in paragraphs 13 and 19 of its judgment, which are reproduced hereinbelow: "13. The principles applicable in considering applications for setting aside abatement may thus be summarized as follows: (i) The words "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant. (ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement. (iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. (iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyers lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigants lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in refilling the appeal after rectification of defects. (v) Want of "diligence" or "inaction" can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years and appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal." X X X X "19. Thus it can safely be concluded that if the following three conditions exist, the courts will usually condone the delay, and set aside the abatement (even though the period of delay is considerable and a valuable right might have accrued to the opposite partyLRs of the deceasedon account of the abatement): (i) The respondent had died during the period when the appeal had been pending without any hearing dates being fixed; (ii) Neither the counsel for the deceased respondent nor the legal representatives of the deceased respondent had reported the death of the respondent to the court and the court has not given notice of such death to the appellant. (iii) The appellant avers that he was unaware of the death of the respondent and there is no material to doubt or contradict his claim." (Emphasis supplied) 18. In the case of Katari Suryanarayana & Ors. V/s. Koppisetti Subba Rao (supra) almost similar issues were involved there. (iii) The appellant avers that he was unaware of the death of the respondent and there is no material to doubt or contradict his claim." (Emphasis supplied) 18. In the case of Katari Suryanarayana & Ors. V/s. Koppisetti Subba Rao (supra) almost similar issues were involved there. There was a huge delay in bringing legal heirs and representatives of the deceased respondent nos. 2 and 3 on record in second appeal. Prayers for substitution of legal heirs and representatives of deceased respondents, for setting aside order of abatement and for condonation of delay were rejected by the High Court of Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. A plea was taken on behalf of the appellants therein that they were not aware of the consequences of the death of the respondents and on that ground, besides others, it was submitted that the orders passed by the High Court were not sustainable. The Honble Apex Court, after noticing the previous judgments, has refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and consequently the appeal was dismissed. Paragraphs 12-13 would be relevant for the purposes of disposal of the present second appeal and are reproduced hereinbelow: "12-13.It is not in dispute that the appellants were neighbours. They were co-sharers. The respective dates of death of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, thus, were known to them. It is difficult to conceive that the petitioners were not in touch with their learned Advocates from 1999 to December 2006. If not every week, they are expected to contact their lawyers once in a year. Ignorance of legal consequence without something more would, in our opinion, be not sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Appellants are literates. They have been fighting their cases for a long time. The High Court in its impugned judgment has categorically arrived at a finding that no sufficient cause has been shown for the purpose of condonation of delay in bringing on record the names of the heirs or legal representatives of the deceased respondent Nos. 2 and 3.........." (High-lighting is of mine) 19 In the case of Balwant Singh V/s. Jagdish Singh (supra) exactly similar and identical issues were involved before the Honble Apex Court. 2 and 3.........." (High-lighting is of mine) 19 In the case of Balwant Singh V/s. Jagdish Singh (supra) exactly similar and identical issues were involved before the Honble Apex Court. During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, despite death, steps were not taken for bringing on record the legal heirs and representatives of deceased appellant for a considerable period of time. Steps for substitution and for setting aside abatement were taken after a delay of 778 days. The Honble Supreme Court, noticed the facts that one of the applicants before it had appeared as witness in the trial court and was fully aware about the proceeding, still steps were not taken for substitution within reasonable time. It was further noticed that the applicants had not approached the Supreme Court with clean hands, and they made certain wrong and false statements for condonation of delay. The applicants were found to be callous and careless in pursuing the appeal. In the circumstances, it was held that sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 778 days has not shown. Therefore, the application for substitution and for setting aside abatement were rejected, resultantly appeal was treated to have abated and was finally dismissed. Paragraphs-26, 32, 33, 34 and 35 of the judgment are illuminating on the issues involved and are reproduced hereinbelow. "26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." X X X X "32. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." X X X X "32. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly. 33. Furthermore, it is also a well- settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to the provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the provision of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. 34.- Liberal construction of the expression "sufficient cause" is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the court should condone the delay: equally there would be cases where the court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect "sufficient cause" as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edn., 1997). 35. The expression "sufficient cause" implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edn., 1997). 35. The expression "sufficient cause" implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word "sufficient" means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. (Emphasis added) 20. After having noticed the principles laid down by the Apex Court on the issues involved in the present proceeding, I wish to revert to the facts of the present case for its final disposal. Admittedly, deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, was brought on record on 16.3.1998. She died on 7.1.2006 leaving behind her heirs and legal representatives as indicated earlier. The appellants have admitted in their pleadings that they had knowledge and information about death of deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi. I.A. No. 5183 of 2010 seeking substitution of her legal representatives and I.A. No. 5180 of 2010 praying therein for setting aside the order of abatement have been filed on 21.5.2010, i.e., after delay of more than four years and to say exactly after delay of 150.4 days. The only plea taken by the appellants for condonation of delay in filing the substitution petition and petition for setting aside the order of abatement is that they were not knowing the consequences and implication for not filing such petitions within the statutory period of time. It is also admitted case of the parties that after preparation of final decree on 22.6.1998 in Title Suit No. 136 of 1987, the appellants preferred a title appeal, which was dismissed by learned lower appellate court, against which C.R. No. 1812 of 2003 was finally preferred by the appellants, which too on contest was dismissed on 1.12.2004 by a Bench of this Court. The appellants herein took the matter to the Apex Court by preferring S.L.P.(Civil) No. 5818 of 2005 and that has also been finally rejected on 13.1.2010. Thus, the appellants having contested the matter right from lower court to the Apex Court for such a long time, therefore, the plea taken on their behalf that they were not aware about the consequences and implication of non-filing of substitution petition for deceased appellant no. 1(i), Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi, is not at all believable. No prudent person can accept such a palpably false plea taken by the appellants. Not only that, before filing instant interlocutory applications on 21.5.2010, appellant no. 3 filed a petition on 1.4.2010 in Execution Case No. 3 of 1998 levied by the decree holders-respondent nos. 1 to 4 in the Court of learned Sub-Judge-3, Buxar and there it was stated that judgment- debtor no. 1 Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi has died on 7.1.2006, leaving behind her legal heirs and representatives, but steps for substitution has not been taken by the decree holders and therefore, legal consequence should follow in the aforesaid execution case. 21. I have already noticed earlier that when counter-affidavits were filed on behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 4, then the appellants filed some supplementary affidavits retracting from their previous stand and from certain facts stated in the interlocutory applications about the date of coming to Patna and taking steps for filing instant interlocutory applications. All these facts noted above, go to show that appellants herein are not only careless, but they are callous in their approach in pursuing the instant second appeal. They have not only taken false plea for condonation of delay, but they have deliberately stated some wrong and misleading facts in the present interlocutory applications. Apparently, the appellants have not come with clean hands. The reliefs sought for on behalf of the appellants are completely in teeth of ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Katari Suryanarayana V/s. Koppisetti Subba Rao (supra) and Balwant Singh V/s. Jagdish Singh (supra). This Court further finds that equity is also not in favour of the appellants. Now final decree has admittedly been prepared, and that has not been interfered with even by the Supreme Court. 22. This Court further finds that equity is also not in favour of the appellants. Now final decree has admittedly been prepared, and that has not been interfered with even by the Supreme Court. 22. Though the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu V/s. Gobardha.r Sao (supra), Perumon Bhagwathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village V/s. Bharvavi Amma (supra) and Balwant Singh V/s. Jagdish Singh (supra) are by and large similar and identical, but even if there are some conflicts on certain issues, then in that case principles laid down in the case of Balwant Singh V/s. Jagdish Singh (supra) will have to be followed. All the aforesaid three judgments have been handed down by the Apex Court by a Bench of two Judges. A question arose before the Karnataka High Court that if there are some conflicts in the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, by two different Benches of equal number, then which should be followed by the High Court. The matter was finally referred to a Full Bench of five Judges in the case of Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi V/s. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. & Ors.; reported in AIR 1980 Karnataka 92 and the Full Bench answered that in the case of conflict of opinion of equal member of the Judges, the. later of the two decisions should be followed by the High Court. I cannot do better than to quote the opinion of the aforesaid Full Bench recorded in paragraph-12 in the aforesaid case of Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi V/s. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. (supra) and the same is quoted hereinbelow: "12.-In view of the majority opinion, the answer to the question referred to this Full Bench, is as follows: "If two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and one of them is by a larger Bench while the other is by a smaller Bench, the decision of the larger Bench, whether it is earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by High Courts and other Courts. However, if both such Benches of the Supreme Court consist of equal number of Judges, the later of the two decisions should be followed by High Courts and other courts." 23. However, if both such Benches of the Supreme Court consist of equal number of Judges, the later of the two decisions should be followed by High Courts and other courts." 23. In the facts and circumstances set forth above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the issues involved in the case at hand are fully covered by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Katari Suryanarayana V/s. Koppisetti Subba Rao (supra) as also in the case of Balwant Singh V/s. Jagdish Singh (supra). 24. For the reasons recorded above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellants have completely failed to show the sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the substitution petition vide I.A. No. 5183 of 2010 for substituting the legal heirs of deceased appellant no.1(i), Chandmuni Devi as also for filing a petition for setting aside the order of abatement vide I.A. No. 5180 of 2010, belatedly after expiry of more than four years. 25. In the result, I.A. No. 6153 of 2010, at flag-K, for condonation of delay is hereby rejected. Consequently I.A. No. 5183 of 2010 and I.A. No. 5180 of 2010 also stand rejected. The instant second appeal stands abated with respect to deceased appellant no.1(i), namely, Chandmuni @ Chandmuni Devi. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.