JUDGMENT M. L. TAHALIYANI, J. (1) This writ petition impugns the judgment and order dated 6th Apri 1, 2010 passed by learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Yavatmal in Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 2007. Before we proceed further it is necessary to be noted here that said criminal appeal was once decided by the same Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge on 7th June, 2008. Respondent No. 1 Authorized Officer/ Assistant Conservator of Forest, being aggrieved by the said order, had filed writ petition in this Court being Writ Petition No.491 of2008. This Court (Coram : A.P. Lavande and P.B. Varale, JJ) by order dated 10th December, 2009 directed fresh hearing of the appeal. Operative part of the order of this Court runs as under : "12. In the result, therefore, the impugned judgment and order dated 7.6.2008 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Yavatmal in Criminal Appeal No. 13/2007 is quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to the Additional Sessions Judge, Yavatmal for fresh decision in the light of the observations made above. The Appellate Court shall decide the appeal afresh in the light of the above observations, after considering the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in relation to Sections 61 (A) and 61(B) of the Act. Since the matter pertains to the confiscation of the vehicle and the articles found in the vehicle which were seized in September, 2006 the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Yavatmal shall dispose of the appeal expeditiously and in any case within a period of three months from the date of appearance of the parties. 13. The parties shall appear before the Additional Sessions Judge, Yavatmal on 8.1.2010 at 11 a.m., and no separate notices shall be given to the parties. 14. Rule is made partly absolute in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs." (2) In view of the directions issued by this Court the matter was heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and impugned order came to be passed on 6th April, 2010. The impugned order of the learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge runs as under : "The appeal is allowed. The order dated 2912007, passed by the Respondent no.1 in P.C.R. No.60/11 dt. 2892006 as regards confiscation of the vehicle No.MH 15/ G4931 belonging to the appellant is hereby set aside. The impugned order of the learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge runs as under : "The appeal is allowed. The order dated 2912007, passed by the Respondent no.1 in P.C.R. No.60/11 dt. 2892006 as regards confiscation of the vehicle No.MH 15/ G4931 belonging to the appellant is hereby set aside. The seized vehicle No.MH 15/ G4931 be returned to the appellant on his suprutnama of Rs.5,00,000/(Five lakhs) which would stand cancelled on failure to challenge this order by the Respondent nos. 1 to 3 by way of writ, appeal, revision etc. Suprutnama before Respondent No. 1. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Pronounced in open Court." Before we proceed to examine the validity of the said order, it will be apt to state the facts of the case in brief which led to seizure of motor vehicle (Matador) No.MH 15/ G4931 and confiscation thereof by the Authorized Officer of Forest Department. Respondent No. 1 Mohammed Arif Solanki is registered owner of the Matador bearing Registration No.MH 15/G4931. Respondent No.2 Shalikram Domaji Jiwatode was admittedly working as driver of the said motor vehicle. The said motor vehicle was allegedly involved in the forest crime and was seized by the Forest Department. It is the case of the petitioners that on 29th September, 2006 Range Forest Officer of Hiwari and his subordinate officers, while they were on patrolling duty, on the basis of certain information, reached Forest Check Post at Akola Bazar and started checking the vehicles passing through the said Check Post. It is around 1.30 a.m. that the above stated matador was intercepted at the Check Post. It was carrying six door shutters, eight window shutters and six door frames. All the articles were made of teak wood. It was also carrying one Diwan and one Sofa Set (3+2). The teak wood was suspected to be cut from Government Forest and therefore, the driver of the vehicle was subjected to inquiry. The Respondent No.2 could not give any satisfactory explanation with regard to possession of the shutters and door frames of teak wood. He had informed the Range Forest Officer and other officers accompanying him that the vehicle owner Mr. Mohammed Iqbal Solanki, resident of Hinganghat had directed him to go to Wai and contact Mohammed Rasool Hayat Sheikh. Accordingly respondent No.2 Jiwatode contacted said Mohammed Rasool. It was further stated by him that on the instructions of said Mohd. He had informed the Range Forest Officer and other officers accompanying him that the vehicle owner Mr. Mohammed Iqbal Solanki, resident of Hinganghat had directed him to go to Wai and contact Mohammed Rasool Hayat Sheikh. Accordingly respondent No.2 Jiwatode contacted said Mohammed Rasool. It was further stated by him that on the instructions of said Mohd. Rasool, above stated teak wood material was collected from one agricultural land. It was also stated by him that teak wood material was found concealed under some useless agricultural produce. The said material was to be transported to Hinganghat from the said agricultural land. Son of above said Mohammed Rasool accompanied the said matador. Further inquiry revealed that the said material was purchased by Mohammed Rasool from Gajanan Madhav Chutekar who was also known as Gajanan Kurpya. It was also revealed that said Ganajan Kurpya had cut the said teak wood from Beat No.256 of Shekalgaon Forest Division and had prepared the above stated teak material/ furniture. After the inquiry, the vehicle and door frames, window shutters and door shutters were seized by the Range Forest Officer and they were produced before the Authorized Officer i.e. Assistant Conservator of Forest, Yavatmal. It is the case of petitioners that a valid statutory show cause notice was issued to respondent No.1 on 15th January, 2007. The inquiry was held in presence of both the respondents and after recording statements of all the concerned persons, including respondents No. 1 and 2, the Authorized Officer came to the conclusion that the timber was forest produce and it was cut from Government Forest. He had also come to the conclusion that Matador MH15/ G4931 was involved in commission of forest offence. It was also concluded by him that respondent No. 1 had not taken reasonable and necessary precaution to see that matador was not used in any forest offence. It appears from his order that he was of the view that respondent No. 1 has not been able to discharge his burden and therefore, he was presumed him to be guilty of knowledge of commission of the said offence. In the result, the matador came to be confiscated under Section 61A(2). (3) Being aggrieved by the said order of the Authorized Officer, respondent No. 1 filed appeal under Section 61D of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, as amended by the State of Maharashtra. In the result, the matador came to be confiscated under Section 61A(2). (3) Being aggrieved by the said order of the Authorized Officer, respondent No. 1 filed appeal under Section 61D of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, as amended by the State of Maharashtra. As already stated, the appeal came to be decided in the year 2008. However, on filing of the writ petition by the petitioners the matter was remanded back to the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge for fresh hearing and deciding the matter in the light of the observations made by this Court. Fresh order passed by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge (hereinafter referred to as the learned Judge) on 06.04.2010 is impugned in this writ petition. The said order has been reproduced hereinabove. (4) Before we advert to the merits and demerits of the case of the parties, we find it necessary to say something regarding the nature of final order passed by the learned Judge. The final order passed by the learned Judge is in the nature of interim order, inasmuch as the vehicle is ordered to be returned on execution of the bond of Rs.five lacs. The learned Judge should have taken note of the fact that the Sessions Judge under Section 61D of the Indian Forest Act is empowered to confirm, modify or annul the order passed by the Authorized Officer. If at all bond was directed to be executed there should have been some conditions governing the custody of the vehicle by the respondent. Be that as it may, we now proceed to examine the order of the learned Judge to decide whether it could be sustained or otherwise. Following three issues were raised before the learned Judge by respondent No. 1. I) Show cause notice as provided in proviso to Section 61B was issued to respondent No.l. II) Forest offence, if any, was committed without knowledge of respondent No. 1 ; and III) the wooden frames and shutters seized by the Range Forest Officer and produced before the Authorized Officer did not fall under the definition of Timber. (5) As far as first issue is concerned, it is admitted position that respondent No.1 is the registered owner of vehicle in question and therefore, in view of the proviso to Section 61B of the Forest Act he was entitled to get show cause notice to explain his position. (5) As far as first issue is concerned, it is admitted position that respondent No.1 is the registered owner of vehicle in question and therefore, in view of the proviso to Section 61B of the Forest Act he was entitled to get show cause notice to explain his position. The provision of show cause notice is made only with a view to give opportunity to the registered owner of the vehicle to defend himself effectively in the proceedings before the authorized officer. The learned Judge in his impugned judgment though has not categorically stated that there was no service of notice but it appears from the order of the learned Judge that impliedly he was of the view that there was no proper service of the statutory notice. (6) We have gone through the record and proceedings of the Authorized Officer and we have also gone through the order passed by the Authorized Officer which was impugned before the learned Judge. The Authorized Officer in his order at paragraph C(e) has stated that respondents No. 1 and 2 in their statements before the Enquiry Officer/ Authorized Officer had stated that they had received all the papers pertaining to confiscation proceedings that they had also received show cause notices. It was stated by them before the Authorized Officer that they did not want to crossexamine any witness. It was further stated by them that the statements given by them on 21st January, 2007 should be treated as reply to the show cause notice. We have gone through the original statement of respondent No. 1 dated 24th January, 2007. Respondent No. 1 in his statement before the Authorized Officer had stated that he had received notice dated 15th January, 2007 and he had also received copies of the papers from page Nos. 1 to 61 and that he did not want to crossexamine anybody. He had admitted before the Authorized Officer that respondent No.2 had transported the forest produce without having any valid pass for the same. He had pleaded guilty for the mistake committed by him. Similar statement was given by respondent No.2 also. As such the finding given by the learned Judge with regard to the notice is not correct. Nobody prevented respondents No. 1 and 2 from filing their written reply before the authorized officer. He had pleaded guilty for the mistake committed by him. Similar statement was given by respondent No.2 also. As such the finding given by the learned Judge with regard to the notice is not correct. Nobody prevented respondents No. 1 and 2 from filing their written reply before the authorized officer. It appears that respondents No. 1 and 2 have purposefully avoided to make any commitment before the authorized officer as they wanted all the options to be kept open to be raised whenever needed. It need not be stated here that the nature of evidence in these type of departmental enquiries is not as strict as in the criminal prosecutions. Original records and proceedings of the Authorized Officer show that sufficient opportunity was given to both the respondents and particularly respondent No. 1 who was entitled for statutory notice under proviso to Section 6 IB of the Forest Act. We, therefore, do not agree with the finding given by the learned Judge that there was no service of notice on the respondent No. 1. (7) Second issue raised before the learned Judge was regarding knowledge of respondent No. 1. The learned Judge in his judgment has stated that respondent No.2 had contacted respondent No. 1 on telephone and had informed him that some domestic articles were to be transported from Wai to Hinganghat. It was submitted before the appellate Court that this was stated by respondent No.l in his statement before Forest Officer also. As such respondent No. 1 had no knowledge that the person who had hired the vehicle would be carrying forest produce in the said vehicle. It was, therefore, contended before the learned Judge that respondent No. 1 had discharged his burden to the satisfaction of the forest officer. The learned Judge had accepted the contention of respondent No. 1 and had given finding that respondent No.l had no knowledge of transportation of forest produce in the said vehicle. It appears that the learned Judge has not carefully examined record and proceedings of the authorized officer. It was noted by the Authorized Officer that respondent No. 1 had not only dishonestly played ignorance of the incident but had attempted to produce false documents which was found to be an afterthought by the authorized officer. It appears from the order of the Authorized Officer that Sk. Rasool Sk. It was noted by the Authorized Officer that respondent No. 1 had not only dishonestly played ignorance of the incident but had attempted to produce false documents which was found to be an afterthought by the authorized officer. It appears from the order of the Authorized Officer that Sk. Rasool Sk. Hayat, from whose premises articles were collected, had produced Bill No.317 dated 12th April, 2007 issued by S. Kumar Furnitures, Yavatmal with a view to establish that it was validly purchased timber. The said contention was turned down by the Authorized Officer on the ground that there was no valid pass for transportation of the said timber from the place of the said vendor to the place of Sk. Rasool. The Authorized Officer was of the view that it was an afterthought on the part of Sk. Rasool. It was obvious that Sk. Rasool wanted to rescue the respondent No. 1. It may be noted here that value of the seized articles was not of much importance. As such it is obvious that everybody was interested in the vehicle and not the timber. (8) Though the 1 earned Judge has taken note of the citations relied upon by respondent No. 1 and the appellant, but has failed to seriously consider the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Mahua Sarkar, reported at AIR 2008 SC 1591 . This case law was submitted before the learned Judge on behalf of the petitioners i.e. Forest Department. In the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court there was seizure of Maruti Van. The vehicle was confiscated by the Authorized Officer. In aa appeal before the Sessions Judge the order was confirmed. However, in the writ petition filed before the High Court, the High Court directed release of the vehicle. The matter was carried to the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the State of West Bengal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs No. 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the said judgment has observed as under: "7. However, in the writ petition filed before the High Court, the High Court directed release of the vehicle. The matter was carried to the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the State of West Bengal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs No. 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the said judgment has observed as under: "7. A bare reading of subsection (2) of Section 59B makes the position clear that no order confiscating any tool, rope chain, boat, vehicle or cattle shall be made under Section 59A if the owner thereof proves to the satisfaction of the authorized officer that such tool, rope, chain, boat, vehicle or cattle was used in carrying the timber or other forest produce without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself or his agent, if any, or the person in charge thereof and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. 8. The language used is very clear. It is the owner who has to prove that the vehicle was used in carrying timber or other forest produce without his knowledge or connivance or that of his agent. 9. The requirement is mandatory that the owner has to prove that he had no knowledge or had not connived. It is a matter which is within his knowledge. Mere assertion without anything else will not suffice. There is another requirement that either he or his agent, if any, or the person incharge thereof had taken all reasonable and necessary precaution against such use. This aspect has to be established by the concerned person by sufficient material. As noted above, mere assertion in that regard could not be sufficient. 10. The Forest Officer and the Appellate Authority clearly noted that the owner failed to establish his alleged lack of knowledge or connivance or taking necessary precaution. The High Court came to an abrupt conclusion and held that without knowledge of the owner of the vehicle driver was carrying forest produce illegally. 10. The Forest Officer and the Appellate Authority clearly noted that the owner failed to establish his alleged lack of knowledge or connivance or taking necessary precaution. The High Court came to an abrupt conclusion and held that without knowledge of the owner of the vehicle driver was carrying forest produce illegally. The High Court held that unless the driver of the vehicle acted as an agent of the owner of the said vehicle and indulged in carrying forest produce illegally and that too with the knowledge and connivance of the owner, neither the vehicle could be confiscated nor could the owner be prosecuted for such alleged offence." If one carefully goes through what is stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it will be clear that mere assertion without anything will not be sufficient for the registered owner to discharge his burden. The requirement is that either he or his agent, if any, or person in charge thereof had to take reasonable and necessary precaution to see that the vehicle is not used for committing forest offence. As such, the burden on respondent No. 1 was to show by positive evidence that he has taken necessary precaution that his vehicle was not used for committing forest offence. A bare statement that his driver informed him that, the vehicle was hired for transporting domestic articles, is not sufficient to discharge the burden. While determining the burden imposed on the owner of the vehicle it was necessary for the Authorized Officer and the appellate Court to bear in mind the purpose of introduction of the provision for confiscation of vehicles by the competent authorized officer irrespective of the result of the prosecution if any. The purpose, obviously, is to discourage the use of vehicles for committing forest offence and at the same time to cast strict liability on the owners of the vehicles to see that their vehicles are not used for such offences. The provision make it absolutely clear that by making a bare statement or keeping mum would not suffice. If the silence on the part of the owner or some lame excuse/ explanation is accepted then the provision of confiscation of vehicle can never be effectively implemented. The purpose of the legislation need to be achieved and not frustrated. The provision make it absolutely clear that by making a bare statement or keeping mum would not suffice. If the silence on the part of the owner or some lame excuse/ explanation is accepted then the provision of confiscation of vehicle can never be effectively implemented. The purpose of the legislation need to be achieved and not frustrated. The burden on the owner and his agent is cast only with a view to strict implementation of the provisions with regard to confiscation of the vehicles involved in forest offences. Tn the present case the circumstances strongly indicate that the respondent No.l knew the nature of the goods to be transported. It is because of this reason that the material facts were suppressed by respondent No.l during the course of enquiry. Tt is noted that respondent No. 1 is not a very big transporter or fleet owner. In normal course it was expected that he would have spoken to the person who had hired the matador for transportation of the so called household articles. He would have also fixed the amount of transportation charges. In our view, the conduct of respondent No.l during the period when his matador was stated to be hired and the offending goods were transported was highly suspicious. It was apparently a clandestine operation. Respondent No. 1 would not have been vicariously liable had it been the act of respondent No.2 independent of intervention of respondent No.l. Since respondent No.2 had acted after having consulted respondent No. 1 and after having taken orders from respondent No.l and since conduct of respondent No. 1 was found to be suspicious, it follows that respondent No. 1 had not been able to discharge the burden cast upon him under the Act. As already stated by us, silence on the part of respondent No. 1 or some lame excuse given by him before the Authorized Officer could not have saved him from the liability fastened upon the owner of the vehicle used for commission of forest offence. As such, we are of the view that the learned Judge has not applied the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court properly to the facts of the case before him. As such, we are of the view that the learned Judge has not applied the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court properly to the facts of the case before him. Considering the material before the Authorized Officer, which obviously was placed before the learned Judge, we are of the view that respondent No.l had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him. (9) Third issue raised before the learned Judge was regarding the nature of articles found in the vehicle. It was contended that wooden frames and wooden shutters did not fall in the category of timber. The learned Judge has referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Lohiya Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at (1996) 10 SCC 397 . Relevant portion of the judgment runs as under : "8. We may also state that according to us the view taken by the Gujrat High Court in Fatesang case is correct, because though bamboo as a whole is forestproduce, if a product, commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as totally different is brought into existence by human labour, such an article and product would cease to be a forestproduce. The definition of this expression leaves nothing to doubt that it would not take within its fold an article or thing which is totally different from forestproduce having a distinct character. May it be stated that where a word or an expression is defined by the legislature, courts have to look to that definition; the general understanding of it cannot be determinative. So, what has been stated in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary regarding a 'produce' cannot be decisive. Therefore, where a product from bamboo is commercially different from it and in common parlance taken as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed within the expression "forestproduce" as defined in Section 2(4) of the Act, despite it being inclusive in nature. That bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the commercial world, has not been disputed before us, and rightly." (10) The learned Judge failed to note that in the case before the Supreme Court issue was interpretation of the definition of "Tree" under the Forest Act and not the definition of "Timber". Articles found in the said case were made from Bamboo. Articles found in the said case were made from Bamboo. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court are in the context of Bamboo only. Secondly, it may be noted here that 'Tree' is covered by Section 2(4)(b)(i), whereas 'Timber' is covered by Section 2(4)(a). Basic difference between two categories is that Section 2(4)(a) covers both type of forest produce i.e. whether found in or brought from forest or otherwise and Section 2(4)(b)(i) covers forest produce found in or brought from the forest only. As such, the timber whether it was found in or brought from forest or otherwise is 'forest produce'. The timber is defined under Section 2(6) of the Forest Act as under : "2(6) "timber" includes trees when they have fallen or have been felled, and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not;" It is very clear from the definition of timber that whether it was cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not, it will remain timber. As such, even though teak wood was converted into shutters and frames, it remained to be timber. Moreover, frames and shutters were not complete frames and shutters, they appear to be semi finished frames and shutters. Obviously, the purpose was to carry them under the pretext that it was not forest produce. However, it cannot be ignored that despite converting the teak wood into frames and shutters it was being transported clandestinely at dead hours of night and was removed from the agricultural field where they were concealed under the heap of hay and other useless agricultural material. Therefore, we do not subscribe the view expressed by the learned Judge that the articles seized were not forest produce. (11) Briefly stated, it is abundantly clear from the above discussion that proper show cause notice was given to respondent No.1 and sufficient opportunity was given to both the respondents of being heard. It is admitted position that respondent No.2 was driver of the vehicle owned by respondent No. 1 and therefore, respondent No.2 was working as agent of respondent No. 1 when he agreed to transport the goods from Wai to Hinganghat. Moreover, the circumstances in which and the time at which the goods were being transported was clearly indicative of the fact that it was clandestine operation. Respondent No.1cannot be allowed to play ignorance of it. Moreover, the circumstances in which and the time at which the goods were being transported was clearly indicative of the fact that it was clandestine operation. Respondent No.1cannot be allowed to play ignorance of it. It was not possible for respondent No. 2 to indulge in such offending operation without having permission from respondent No.1 Even otherwise, the respondent No. 1 was vicariously liable for the acts of respondent No.2. In the inquiries of this nature Doctrine of Vicarious Liability plays a vital role. As already indicated by us the nature of evidence in such a inquiry is not required to be as strong as is required in criminal prosecution. (12) In our considered opinion, the order of the Authorized Officer was based on the facts placed before him and did not suffer from any infirmity. The learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge had no scope to interfere with the order of the Authorized Officer. The appeal, should have been dismissed by the learned Judge. Hence, we are inclined to allow the writ petition and set aside the order of the learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed. Judgment and order dated 06.04.2010 passed by Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Yavatmal in Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 2007 is set aside. The order passed by the Petitioner No.1 (Authorized Officer), dated 29.01.2007 in P.C.R. No.60 of 2011, dated 28.09.2006 is restored. Writ Petition stands disposed of accordingly. The interim order stands vacated. Petition allowed.